China and Japan have had a long official and non-official relationship. China strongly influenced Japan, through its writing system, architecture, culture, philosophy, and religion. This influence, however, was not matched by political and economic interaction, until the Western industrial civilization came to the East towards the end of the nineteenth century.
European nations and the United States were looking to trade with East Asian countries. Japan was one of the more willing to accept this opportunity, while China was initially most resistant to foreign impact.
Friction between Japan and China arose from Japan's control over the Ryukyu Islands from 1870, annexation of Taiwan after the First Sino-Japanese war of 1894, and came to the declaration of war on China in 1937. Japan was soon able to gain control over all Chinese outlying territories. [1]
The relationship between Japan and China was further complicated by the commanding position of the United States within Japan. The security agreement between Japan and the United States signed in 1951 also heightened the discouragement of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Japan pushed dissension between the two countries even further by ending a peace treaty with China and establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese government.
Although all these things complicated the relationship between the two countries, the Chinese government orchestrated relations with Japanese non-governmental organizations through primarily the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). The CPIFA would receive Japanese politicians from all parties, but the Japanese left-wing parties were more interested in the Chinese initiatives. In 1952, the Chinese Commission for the Promotion of International Trade was able to get a trade agreement signed by the Japanese Diet members. Liao Chengzi, the deputy of directors of the State Council’s Office of Foreign Affairs, was able to arrange many other agreements “such as the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war with the Japanese Red Cross (1954), and the Fishery Agreement with the Japan-China Fishery Association (1955).” [1] Although during this time, the relationship between the two countries were primarily non-official, the agreements were essential in bringing together a more amalgamated environment.
The Soviet Union suddenly withdrew Soviet experts from China in the 1960’s, which resulted in a major economic crisis for China. China was left with few options one of which was to have a more official relationship with Japan. Tatsunosuke Takashi, member of the Liberal Democratic Party and of the Diet and Director of the Economic Planning Agency of the Japanese, went to China in order to sign a memorandum that would further the trade relations between the two countries. In 1964 Takashi and Chengzi established trade liaisons offices in Tokyo and Beijing.
The relationships between Japan and China ceased after Eisako Sato became Prime Minister of Japan. The Chinese press launched a campaign against the new leader of Japan, accusing him of working too closely with the United States, forming a ‘military bloc’ with South Korea and Taiwan and secret cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Chinese press began to become more militant against Japan going past attacks on the leaders to accusing the Japanese ruling elite of economic aggression and promoting the revival of Japanese militarism. The press was one of the main factors in the Chinese Diet's hesitation to form new relationships with the Sino-Japanese. The Chinese Communist Party and the Japanese Communist & Socialist Parties also withdrew from forming closer alliances. By the late 1960s, Sino-Japanese relations were at a complete standoff, trade relations included.
A turnaround began in the early 1970s, when the US officials shocked Japanese officials by developing a relationship with China. A new school of thought developed within Japan to consider having better relations with China. This strategy, which happened soon after the Cold War, “reflects the sense of uncertainty and anxiety among the Japanese about China’s future course, given the country’s sheer size and robust economic growth, as well as the fact that a considerable portion of the fruit of that growth is allocated for defense.” [2] The Japanese soon followed American’s lead, by also deciding to change its policies towards China. In December 1971, the Japanese and Chinese trade liaison offices began to discuss the possibility of restoring diplomatic trade relations. “The retirement of Premier Sato in July 1972 and the arrival of Kakuei Tanaka at the helm paved the way for a change.” [1]
“On that occasion the Chinese negotiators tabled three principles as the basis for normalizing relations between the two countries: (a) the government of the People’s Republic is the sole representative and legal government of China; (b) Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic; and (c) the treaty between Japan and Taiwan is illegal and invalid and should be abrogated.” [1] Japan, in answer to the Chinese negotiators, expressed their “full understanding” for the three principles addressed by China on July 18, 1972. Formal negotiations between the two governments began on September 25, 1972, in Beijing, each country represented by Tanaka and Zhou Enlai. Japan had little leverage in the negotiations, because of China’s relations with the UN and Nixon. But Japan’s most important issue was the continuation of its security arrangements with the United States, which China was implicit about condemning. The Chinese authorities surprised the Japanese by adopting a pacifying attitude on the issue of relations between Japan and the US. A compromise was attained on September 29, 1972, which gives the impression that the Japanese agreed to most of China’s demands, including the Taiwan issue. This caused interaction between the two countries, in terms of trade, grow rapidly, 28 Japanese and 30 Chinese economic and trade missions visited their partner country.
A Peace and Friendship Treaty was developed between Japan and China, most of the difficulty lying with the handling of “the anti-hegemony clause, which stated that neither party would oppose any such attempt by any other state.” [2] Japan was hesitant to sign such a treaty because anti-hegemony could easily be interpreted as anti-soviet. This would offend the relationship Japan had formed with the Soviet Union. The situation was pacified however by having a clause, which clarified that, the treaty did not affect the position of either country with respect to their relations with other countries.
Toward the end of the 1970s China began to receive loans from outside sources including Japan. This was a striking difference from their previous ideology of purity from foreigner interaction. This marked a feeling of goodwill that Japan had toward China.
During the 1980s, China seemed to be headed toward democratization. The Japanese supported Official Development Assistance (ODA) for China during this time. Yet, the Tianamen Square incident occurred, and many nations began to realize that this was far from China’s goal. Japan imposed sanctions upon China after this incident in following the solidarity of the other G-7 nations, but they were also the first to lift off the sanctions, and to help China out of their own self-imposed international isolation.
The 1990s led to an enormous growth in China’s economic welfare. Trade between Japan and China, was one of the many reasons China was able to grow in the double-digit amount during this time. Japan has been investing in China, during the early 1990s, and trade decreased during the late 1990s, but resurged at the millennium. The resurgence might have been because of the prospect of China becoming a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). “By 2001 China’s international trade was the sixth-largest in the world” [2] and over the next several years it will be just under Japan, at number 4.
In 1995, China received an official apology regarding World War II by Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, “During a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.”
Today, Japan is beginning to want to assist the Chinese people less; a growing movement to cease ODA support is beginning to flourish with the Japanese community. There are three essential reasons why Japan is considering ceasing ODA support toward China “First, giving China economic assistance is tantamount to subsidizing the massive buildup of its military sector, which increasingly is becoming a threat to Japan’s security. Second, China gives assistance to many other developing countries, and there is no need to assist any country that can afford to assist others. Third, China does not appreciate Japan’s assistance.” [2]
The counter argument for this attack on supporting China, is that by aiding China, they are more likely to play by the rules of the international system. As well as atonement for the damage Japan has done in the pre-war era.
The relationship between China and Japan can be perceived as nothing less but tumultuous. They have a very close bond, but both countries seemed to part ways, due to Western intrusion. The bond might be regarded as close but it also seems relatively fragile, as each country is suspicious of the other’s intention and role in the global economy. Although both countries have a very significant role in the global economy, they seem to be wary of forming close ties with any particular nation, although China seems more defensive in reacting with other nations, Japan seems to be on their guard as well. As they both grow in economic power it will be interesting to see how they will react to being dominant. For now they seem to be playing relatively low-key, and both seem rather careful so as to not intrude on any nations, Japan more so though. This low-key style might be the Sino-Asian way of doing things, rather than the more aggressive style that many Western nations usually adopt.
2006-07-11 02:26:27
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answer #7
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answered by optimistic_pessimist1985 4
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