On purely empirical data, it it possible to refute solipsism? Provide your proof.?

Question

Doctor, Doctor, how wrong you are on this one. A solipsist accepts the sense data that implies consciousness. Go look up solipsism and try again.

Scalia, Good example of reasoning. Would a consistent Solipsist inform others that they don't exist? If he keeps his mouth shut about his conviction, does he escape your refutation? The language argument has some cut to it also, but I talk to myself all the time. (I don't answer.) Wouldn't the solipsist insist that any dialogue was a necessary monologue?

SL, thank you for all the work you put in to your response. You anticipate possible objections and you articulate your argument well. I like your use of a priori as opposed to a posteriori concepts, and your pointing out that in an empirical proof a priori must be rooted out and destroyed. It is one of the reasons I find the question interesting. Can we avoid making a priori claims and still acknowledge the external world? This is an epistemic problem, but I don’t see how categorical mistakes enter into it. I’ve always wondered who keeps the updated list of proper categories anyway. I will have to ask about category errors in another question, because I don’t really understand it yet. I’ve read Ryle, but can’t be certain that I’m not making a category mistake when try to understand him. Thank you for raising the level of discussion. I believe it is time for us to stop catering to the mediocre just to get more answers.

I must say, this is the best answer I've ever received from a question in YA. I wish I could give you both 10 points. SL, if you're going to be humble, at least be believable. You may be many things, but you are not mediocre. If your intelligence were the national average, I would not be so worried for our future. Your awe of modernity is understandable though you come close to making it a virtue.
Scalia, your comment that we are traveling down well worn paths is rather comical given the topic, since it begs the question. Each of us is traveling the road for the first time and your particular slant on the question is unique, to me.
Most of us escape solipsism by what ever means, but the value of a philosophical point of view comes from following it to its logical conclusion. The gift of doing that for any given question is the gift of knowledge. If I know that empirical data alone cannot save me from solipsism, then I have gained knowledge

Lovethecuter, I didn't mean to leave you out. You are another example to this old dog that you youngsters think modernity is a virtue. The only comment I have for your thesis that we stand on the shoulders of midgets is that it is a formal logical fallisy. I know it is too much to ask philosophy students to end up actually doing some philosophy, but if every argument presented in the past is really just a straw man, then you are left standing in someone else's past. If meaning is confined to historical context then the station is, again, moving as well as the train. No progress is possible. Is that your position? Kant says we have a right to hope for progress, but there is no sign of it. I don't intend to be mean spirited. I just don't know how to understand something until I actually understand it. Maybe that is why I'm on YA asking about solipsism. By the way, what does empirical mean today?

Answer 1

Hi, I've enjoyed the discussion so far and like the question.

When you say "on empirical data" It's unclear to me whether you mean empirical data as a solipsis understands it (which is the way, I think, Lovethecuter interpreted it), or if you just mean having an empirical argument that refutes solipsism (which, I think, is how Scalia interpreted it). I think you probably mean the latter.

If it is the former interpretation, while I think Lovethecuter could have stated his argument more precisely and succinctly, I think that it is on the right track (given his interpretation of what you meant).

If it is the latter interpretation, than I think there are some problems with Scalia's arguments. The first argument has at least one salient suppressed premise; that is, an important premise implied but not stated, which is needed for the argument to succeed. Let's formulate it and consider the argument:

(1) If one is unable to perceive an independent universe, then one has no way to compare one’s own use of language with the usages of other men.

(2) The [solipsist] must employ language in order to communicate his argument.

(3) [suppressed premise] The employment of language in order to communicate one’s argument presupposes comparing one’s own use of language with the usages of other men.

(4) Therefore, [the solipsist] implicitly concedes the existence of an external world.”

Here is some of what I think. First, (4) does not follow. We need a premise that asserts that comparing one’s own use of language with the usages of others requires that there be an external world. But it is unclear how merely comparing language requires the existence of the external world, unless you presuppose that language comparison cannot occur without the existence of the external world. But that would beg the question. The mere assertion of an argument (by the solipsist), even if it involves comparison with the language of others, does not constitute an empirical refutation of solipsism. For one thing, this would assume an a priori principle regarding meaning and existence; but you asked for an empirical refutation, something a posteriori, not something that hinges on the a priori. Second, the solipsist can just claim that meaning refers to mental entities of which the language user (himself) has priviledged access. Third, the solipsist is not committed to having to inform others; nor is he committed to the negative thesis that others do not exist; he is committed to the positive thesis that only he [the solipsist himself] exists. Even if the positive thesis entails that others do not exist (say if solipsism were the doctrine that nothing exists outside one's own mind), it does not follow that the solipsist is informing anything that is independent of his own sensations. Insofar as he has sensations of others being informed, he still, nonetheless, claims to know only that he exists; perhaps the others are merely certain kinds of sensations.

One could claim that I'm conflating an ontological thesis of solipism with an epistemic thesis. If that were the case, then my counter argument would be unforceful (but then I'd really have to start thinking about all this).

Scalia’s second argument also does not constitute an empirical proof that refutes solipsism. Scalia has given a deductively valid argument, one which any scholastic would have smiled upon. But it does not follow from the fact that a solipsist is a contingent being, that he was caused to exist by another being. This would follow only if the following two principles were true: A cause necessarily is equal to or greater than its effect; and all contingent beings are caused. The solipsist is happy to concede he is a contingent being; but this concession hardly amounts to a proof to either of the above principles. On a charitable reading, these two principles may give reason to doubt the thesis of solipsism, but they still do not constitute an empirical proof that the thesis is false.

I don't think there is any empirical argument that refutes solipsism, but I'm not going to make an argument for that view. I do think the only form of solipism that is plausible is as an epistemic thesis. But then, as was hinted at by others, I might argue that knowledge is not normative; hence, the thesis of solipsism is a category mistake. But, again, this is not an empirical proof.

Thanks.

**EDIT**

To Sow....: thanks for the discussion. I really don’t have time to go deeper but let me try to say a couple things. I’m not claiming that an empirical proof cannot have a priori assumptions, most do. (For instance, In Hume for instance, a so-called paradigmatic empiricist, "Hume’s Fork"
and the "Copy Principle", I think, ultimately rest upon a priori assumptions, neither of which, by the way, does Hume argue for.) I am claiming, however, that merely speaking of contingency, and cause and effect as part of one’s premises is not sufficient for making the proof empirical. What are the conditions for an empirical proof? Well, you guys are reading BonJour, that should be enough to know that answering such a question is well beyond the scope of this format. Great philosophers ( which I am not) have thought we can make claims about the external world apart from a priori commitment, others have not. But the notion of a priori commitment has different senses, especially since the classical modern period. We would have to present a case for delimiting its sense. The sort of category mistake I’m talking about (and I see now I was vague in my initial statement ) is not the same sort as the famous Ryle example. I just mean that if solipsism were to pressupose that knowledge must be rationally justified, and knowledge was not normative, it is instead, say, descriptive, then the solipsist’s thesis is in the wrong epistemic category for coherence.

Lastly, I agree we ought not to cater to mediocrity; unfortunately, I rarely am capable of rising beyond it.

To Scalia: Thank you for the comments. We both think solipsism is incoherent, but not for the same reasons. You cite the traditional semantic argument. It is well trodden, and not effective in my opinion, against the solipsist or the Cartesian. But we’ll have to save that one for another discussion. The philosophy of language community is far from univocally endorsing this hackneyed Wittgenstienian stuff.

You ask: “How can an argument be deductively valid and yet it does not follow that a solipsist is a contingent being?”

Answer: First, I never claimed that the solipsist was not a contingent being; second, I did claim the solipsist can concede he is a contingent being. But it does not follow that all contingent beings are caused. You claim that something cannot come from nothing. (You must be a theist.) Even if that principle were true (I’m not sure that as it is stated, it is coherent), you want it too work for you that, I think, it beyond the scope of what it can do. You speak as if simply invoking these medieval a priori principles just is a proof. Well, if it were that simple, we’d all be a bunch of theists at the moment. But most, if not all, of what you take as proof, is highly controversial, philosophically speaking (and rejecting by most philosophers, save for those few hardcore Thomists). Even your concept of causality, and its relation to existence, is one straight out of the standard scholastic tomes. I simply don’t see anything but scholasticism in your claims. And while that’s all find and good (I happen to enjoy history of philosophy, particularly medieval), insofar as scholasticism is problematic, I find your invocation of it equally as problematic.

Maybe one of these days if I get the degree for it, I'll be a philosophy prof., and I'll see just how right you are. Until then, be patient with me, I'm still learning and appreciate the time you've taken to respond.

Answer 2

We act moment by moment accepting all the empirical information that comes to use as factual. It works sort of. How much more proof do you want?

Caveat: The term "empirical" needs to be defined if one sees a need to be technical. Empirical as is commonly thought to be does not exist. Empirical suggest indifferent particles of existence. No particle of existence is indifferent and for this reason what we see as empirical is not what it seems.

This leads one to ask just what is it you are trying to do by the questions you ask? You really should be doing some ground work within yourself. It is where real verifiable answers to relevant questions are found. The test for any "proof" is always the principle of non-contradiction which is never conclusive in one instance but only proven over time and constant analysis from the proper perspective.

This brings to light the problem of perspective. Wrong perspectives cannot reach agreement over what is empirical and thus factual data. And no, matter and its "empirical data" are not of the correct perspective. For that reason everything it assumes to be true including empiricism is dead in the water before we make the proposition.

IOW it works in a Euclidean world but we live in an Einstenian universe.

Answer 3

I believe that it can't be. All empirical data is suspect per solipsism - it is true and can be trusted that you are perceiving X, but that is no indication that X exists or exists as you are perceiving it, for all the standard reasons (could be dreaming or hallucinating, could be deceived by Descartes' evil demon pal, "The Matrix"-type brain-in-a-vat situations, etc). Thus, it seems that empirical data could never be grounds for rejecting solipsism.

It's somewhat similar to the problem of induction raised by Hume - our reasons for believing in induction involve induction, and thus cannot be trusted, for induction is the concept being questioned. (Or, more simply, why one can't use a word in its own definition, ie: "blue is the color that blue things are.") In the same way here, it is the veracity of empirical data which is questioned when we ponder solipsism, so we can accomplish nothing by giving an answer based upon empirical data.

Answer 4

Do you know what the most presumptive of ALL human endeavors is? It's a belief in a monotheism - the individual's presumption (based their parent's presumption) that supernatural magic channeled through a single, hidden and mysterious omnipotence is required to explain the workings of the universe. This argument that has worked well with the uneducated masses of humanity down, through the ages even though such beliefs are directly responsible for millions of human deaths, countless acts of inhumanity, and never-ending suffering. When will we ever learn?

Answer 5

No. Given that sense data imply only the conciousness of the one having those sense datum sensations, sense data are incapable of being used to infer the existence of anyone existing outside of my conciousness. Since sense datum only imply my existence (because, so the assumption goes, having a conciousness necessarily involves existence), and the only thing I'm warranted to infer from sense datum is that I exist, sense data never imply anything beyond my own subjective conciousness. For that reason, no empirical data could ever inform me of the existence of another conciousness, since all instances of empirical data just are subjective sensations of my own conciousness.

You cannot, therefore, refute solipsism based on a sense datum theory. But let's say we all do think the sense data idea is the way to go. The way to refute solipsim, then, is the old-fashioned Humean way: knowledge is not normative, and we can't but help, psychologically speaking, believing that others do indeed exist (that indeed an external world exists).

**EDIT** (just keeping with Scalia's convention)

Scalia's assertion of the definition of "empirical" is uncharitable (it is meant to be a slight to SL). It is unclear what is meant by "on empirical data" and here is why. Simply giving a definition as it is used today does not clear up any ambiguity. That’s just doing history of philosophy poorly. First, Solipsism is an historical thesis; specifically it is part of the history of 20th century analytic philosophy. Any inquiry into the history of philosophy requires an interpretive sensitivity to the projects at that time. You cannot just pluck some doctrine or thesis out of its historical context and anachronistically subject it too our current understanding of various important concepts. If that were a viable way to exegete, then we’d have no reason to ever study most great philosophers of history. Imagine asking the following:

On purely empirical data can you give a refutation of the doctrine of monads?

Well, it’s a joke to even consider that monads be taken seriously enough that someone today must provide a proof against their existence. However, it’s not a joke to consider, on purely empirical data, what Leibniz’s contemporaries and successors thought counted as refutations. Imagine the same question asked about the doctrine of hylomorphism. No one today would give a current definition of “empirical” and then proceed, in virtue of that definition, to refute hylomorphism. That’s not the way you do history of philosophy. Solipsism was born out of the problems with logical atomism and logical positivism. As such, solipsism was a serious issue for proponents of these views. At that time, the sense datum theory was predominant. When one spoke of “empirical” in this context, it had different connotations than it does today. An argument from empirical data, then, in terms of the project of solipsism and the logical atomists, is a bit different than what an argument from empirical data today would be. First, no one speaks of sense datum anymore—that theory is now, literally, history; likewise we don’t speak of giving the logical structure of facts as the basis for coherent talk of the empirical, as the logical atomists did. Moreover, it is well known that logical positivism and its pet theory of verificationism has been resigned to the philosophical trashcan. But those are the notions that frame empirical talk at that time. Today, no one speaks of proofs against solipsism, or hylomorphism or monads, for that matter. They are not viable issues for us because they are outside out current philosophical projects and discourse. You can take arguments and exegete them according to their historical relevance and try to generate refutations given the theories of that day; or you can just pluck something out of its historically relevant period and flex your current philosophical muscles when analyzing it, which is a bit unfair (though instructive). The latter is primarily what we do as undergrads and that’s why we are taught oh so many straw men. Descartes’ dream argument is probably the most commonly analyzed argument in school, and it is usually presented to the undergrad as if it were an ahistorical, stand-alone argument. The same holds for solipsism.

Answer 6

A solipsist rejects the existance of data. How could you possibly use it to prove anything to such a person?

EDIT:

Tsk. Before you have me look up 'solipsism', maybe you should look up 'emprical'. By definition it is information derived from the senses. Solipsists don't believe in sensory information. Therefore 'empirical' and 'solipsist' are contradictions in terms - the two cannot coexist.

No solipsist accepts data of the kind you describe. Indeed, they only datum (singular) I have seen them regularly accept is that they exist. Everything else is up in the air.

So I'll stand by my statement. Can you still stand by yours?

Answer 7

Yes, interesting question - I do not believe so.

I am curious to see what others say about this one.

Answer 8

We could each live in our own universes, deterministic except for some extremely small cross-talk.

Answer 9

Yes, a solipsist informs others they do not exist. Very odd at first blush, but it gets worse. Smith said it well:

"[Furthermore]… if one is trapped within one’s private world of consciousness, if one is unable to perceive an independent universe, then one has no way to compare one’s own use of language with the usages of other men. Therefore, since the [solipsist] must employ language in order to communicate his argument, he implicitly concedes the existence of an external world.”

Furthermore, if I exist, my existence is necessary, contingent or impossible (this is logically exhaustive). Since I exist, my existence is obviously not impossible. Consequently, I am here necessarily or contingently. Since I am not a Necessary Being (for a host of reasons not germane to your question), I must therefore be a contingent being. It follows that I am an effect caused to exist by another; but if there is "another," then I cannot be alone.

Best wishes,
Scalia

**EDIT**
Good points. A consistent solipsist's words would not backfire if no words were spoken; but he would still need to come to terms with his contingent existence. His actual existence, which he cannot rationally deny, is an effect. If the effect is real, so must be the cause. :-)

**EDIT**
I appreciate the vigorous discussion, yet the path is well trodden:

"With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed and solipsism is shown as foundationless, in theory and in fact. One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. Given this, it is scarcely surprising that those philosophers who accept the Cartesian premises that make solipsism apparently plausible, if not inescapable, have also invariably assumed that language-usage is itself essentially private. The cluster of arguments - generally referred to as 'the private language argument' - that we find in the Investigations against this assumption effectively administers the coup de grâce to both Cartesian dualism and solipsism. (I. § 202; 242-315). Language is an irreducibly public form of life that is encountered in specifically social contexts. Each natural language-system contains an indefinitely large number of 'language-games,' governed by rules that, though conventional, are not arbitrary personal fiats. The meaning of a word is its (publicly accessible) use in a language. To question, argue, or doubt is to utilize language in a particular way. It is to play a particular kind of public language-game. The proposition 'I am the only mind that exists' makes sense only to the extent that it is expressed in a public language, and the existence of such language itself implies the existence of a social context. Such a context exists for the hypothetical last survivor of a nuclear holocaust, but not for the solipsist. A non-linguistic solipsism is unthinkable and a thinkable solipsism is necessarily linguistic. Solipsism therefore presupposes the very thing that it seeks to deny. That solipsistic thoughts are thinkable in the first instance implies the existence of the public, shared, intersubjective world that they purport to call into question."

Please see the link below for elaboration.

A respondent said, "But it does not follow from the fact that a solipsist is a contingent being, that he was caused to exist by another being. This would follow only if the following two principles were true: A cause necessarily is equal to or greater than its effect; and all contingent beings are caused."

How can an argument be deductively valid and yet it does not follow that a solipsist is a contingent being? And if he is contingent, something cannot come from nothing. Quantum mechanics notwithstanding, there is NO empirical evidence that something can come from nothing. If he concedes contingency he *must* assume a cause (reality) other than his own.

A being's existence is self-caused, uncaused or caused by another. Self-causation is a contradiction and an uncaused being is not contingent. Hence, a contingent being is caused by another.

The respondent must have meant that it does not follow **IF** one is contingent, that the cause is equal or greater than its effect. It most certainly does if you believe the principle of causality, but that is *not* your question. It DOES follow that every effect has a cause because that is what the word "effect" means. Only being can cause being. Nothing does not exist, and only what exists can cause existence, since the concept of “Cause” implies an existing thing that has the power to effect another. From absolutely nothing comes absolutely nothing. Hence, either the cause is being or it is not. If it is not, then something can come from nothing; but this is absurd. Consequently, the cause is being.

What is "empirical"? Defined, it is "Relying on or derived from observation or experiment. Verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment. Guided by practical experience and not by theory, especially in medicine."

We observe the existence of other beings and this observation is validated by repeated experiment. Our "practical experience" refutes the solipsist's solitude. The pure empirical "proof" is easy. It is, however, the *argument* we're analyzing, and as a theory, it is incoherent.

The skeptical claims of solipsism are self-refuting and, as such, cannot be taken seriously. The solipsist knows enough about physical reality to know one cannot be certain (or know) anything about reality; but if he *knows* something about reality, then how can he claim nothing can be known about it? And if he knows nothing whatsoever about reality, then he has no basis for making any claim about it. He cannot run to *negative* knowledge -- that he knows what reality IS NOT -- for one cannot say *this* is not *that* without presupposing knowledge of both. I cannot say milk doesn't taste like Pepsi unless I know what both taste like; and if I have no knowledge whatsoever of what "Pepsi" is, then I cannot legitimately compare it with milk.

If the point is that all empirical arguments fail, then solipsism is tangential. Empiricism itself is then at issue.

**EDIT**
Hey, "Sow"! Although this is not directly relevant to your question, I am not an empiricist. I agree with Bonjour that a priori is unavoidable, but that discussion is for another time. See Bonjour's, In Defense of Pure Reason.

**EDIT**
This is probably my final installment, unless you want to extend the analysis of your question.

If the solipsist's language is truly private, it is incomprehensible to the rest of us. Incoherence indeed.

To SL: I granted your wording about a solipsist's finitude was probably mistaken. I've reread your sentence about it and I take it back. A little too quick of a scan. :-)

Merely repeating that contingency does not require a cause surrenders the argument. Bald asserstions still lack rational heft.

Something cannot come from nothing is both an empirical observation and logically coherent. There is NO scientific evidence that something can come from nothing. Spontaneous generation went out of fashion some time ago and, please remember, we're analyzing an empirical refutation of solipsism.

You're not certain this is coherent? Show me the peer reviewed papers demonstrating something can come from nothing. Causation is the foundation of the scientific method.

I merely "invoke" medieval principles? These "principles" are logically exhaustive categories and your unsupported dismissal of such indicates it is more formidable than you're willing to acknowledge. However, you're woefully mistaken to allege these are merely "medieval" principles. We learn in elementary school that material effects without adequate causes do not exist. Also, causes never occur after the effect. In addition, the effect never is greater than the cause. That is why scientists say that every material effect must have an adequate cause. The river did not turn muddy because the frog jumped in; the book did not fall off the table because the fly landed on it. These are not adequate causes. For whatever effects we see, we try to identify adequate causes. That, SL, is not a medieval principle; it is basic science.

By way of review, scientists observe living and non-living beings. They formulate hypotheses to explain observed phenomena. In physics, the hypothesis often takes the form of a causal mechanism or a mathematical relation. They then apply the hypothesis and predict quantitatively the results of new observations. They then test for consistency.

Science does not accept that beings "pop" into existence from nothing. Since they do not arise from nothing, they are necessarily effects from adequate antecedent causes. It then follows that effects do not occur without existing causes; and since these effects are caused, they are contingent. No scientific data is available for something causing its own existence. In fact, that IS a contradiction.

You say that what I say is highly controversial -- and what you say isn't? Linguistic and physical science is where my answer is coming from. Yes, that is controversial, but not nearly to the degree you allege. No great philosopher has espoused solipsism. Intellectual decimation would follow, but that is not the point. Refutation by name stacking is not rational. Besides, controversy doesn't help your argument. Your position isn't enhanced because mine is controversial.

In sum, Sowcratees asks for an empirical proof to refute solipsism. The scientific method does just that.

Although it is true I am a theist, it is also true that the history of theism is rich with rational thinkers who have not divorced themselves from rational inquiry.

If the Inductive Scandal is fatal to empiricism itself (I believe it is), that is beyond the scope of this question. If we accept science, solipsism sinks.

**EDIT**
Lovethecuter does not like my answer. That is his privilege, but I do not believe I am authorized to change word definitions without guidance from the asker. Sowcratees asked the question and he alone has the right to instruct us what type of answer he is looking for.

A search of the Internet discloses many, MANY people asserting Solipsism is irrefutable. It is not; and Sowcratees asks for an empirical one. He, at any time, could have clarified his question in order to steer the replies in the direction you prefer. He did not and I'm not going to manipulate it to fit my fancy.

You will recall my initial answer was succinct and sufficient to knock this so-called theory out of the ballpark. SL admirably, albeit weakly, addressed my initial statements and I felt obliged to reply accordingly.

You claim I slighted SL. If you're going to lecture me about charity, try a little yourself. SL's initial post at least twice reminded me that what I offered was not an empirical refutation. This surprised me, especially with respect to my second paragraph, since the second paragraph corresponds to scientific investigation. If somebody is going to split hairs with me, he shouldn't be shocked if I split a few myself. If we're going to talk about "suppressed premises" and such, you can rest assured I'll do what I can to make myself clear. There was NO slight intended.