Yes, it's incomplete. Maybe a line or two were dropped out from the print... "IF" premises must end with a "THEN".
"...IF we crave for the goal that is worthy and fitting for man, namely, happiness, (missing text?: THEN it may be said that we have learned the value) of life."
But personally, I disagree that happiness, in and of itself, is a worthy goal. It's just an emotion. How can you make an emotion your goal? That it's a choice to be happy, I get that. But a goal "worthy and fitting for man"?!... But I digress.
2007-11-28 05:40:21
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answer #2
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answered by jotdown 2
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Those things, however, are immaterial, eternal, without end, and it is in their nature to persist ever the same and unchanging, abiding by their own essential being, and each one of them is called real in the proper sense. But what are involved in birth and destruction, growth and diminution, all kinds of change and participation, are seen to vary continually, and while they are called real things, by the same term as the former, so far as they partake of them, they are not actually real by their own nature; for they do not abide for even the shortest moment in the same condition, but are always passing over in all sorts of changes. To quote the word of Timaeus, in Plato, "What is that which always is, and has no birth, and what is that which is always becoming but never is? The one is apprehended by the mental processes, with reasoning, and is ever the same; the other can be guessed at by opinion in company with unreasoning sense, a thing which becomes and passes away, but never really is."
Therefore, if we crave for the goal that is worthy and fitting for man, namely, happiness of life — and this is accomplished by philosophy alone and by nothing else, and philosophy, as I said, means for us desire for wisdom, and wisdom the science of the truth in things, and of things some are properly so called, others merely share the name — it is reasonable and most necessary to distinguish and systematize the accidental qualities of things.
Things, then, both those properly so called and those that simply have the name, are some of them unified and continuous, for example, an animal, the universe, a tree, and the like, which are properly and peculiarly called 'magnitudes'; others are discontinuous, in a side-by-side arrangement, and, as it were, in heaps, which are called 'multitudes,' a flock, for instance, a people, a heap, a chorus, and the like. 2
Wisdom, then, must be considered to be the knowledge of these two forms. Since, however, all multitude and magnitude are by their own nature of necessity infinite — for multitude starts from a definite root and never ceases increasing; and magnitude, when division beginning with a limited whole is carried on, cannot bring the dividing process to an end, but proceeds therefore to infinity 3 — and since sciences are always sciences of limited things, and never of infinites, it is accordingly evident that a science dealing either with magnitude, per se, or with multitude, per se, could never be formulated, for each of them is limitless in itself, multitude in the direction of the more, and magnitude in the direction of the less. A science, however, would arise to deal with something separated from each of them, with quantity, set off from multitude, and size, set off from magnitude.
2007-11-28 05:14:22
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answer #3
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answered by Rohit 4
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