Is there a study of the evidence for reductionism in science?

Question

Note that a sequence of links from a higher level theory to particle physics (e.g. evolution to biochemistry, etc) in itself is a weak evidence for a reduction because of the modeling and assumptions used. Some say that reductions are too complex to prove, these links are the best we can do, so the evidence is strong. It's a strange logic. These links are strong evidence for some relationship between the theory and a more elementary one, for some kind of reduction, but not necessarily for the (standard) reduction. So, we have evidence for the successful application of elementary particle physics in chemistry, etc, but unless one carefully consider the models and the assumptions used, we don't know if these links correspond to the standard reduction.

Do you know if someone made such a study? For example, someone might have attempted to find some recurring pattern in the assumptions and models used to see if there is an indication of a special kind of reduction.

Dr. R. I agree with your way to look at the question, but not with your implicit subjective evaluation of the evidence and facts.

You say that it happens all the times that elementary particle physics explain higher level phenomena. Yes, but what about the assumptions that are also used all the times. In this viewpoint, it's not really happening all the times.

You say the standard reduction has not been disproved. I agree, but your evaluation of this fact seems to be that we shouldn't expect a study of the evidence for it. I don't share this evaluation. The evidence for this meta-theory is not as strong as the evidence for the theories themselves. Given that we can legitimately debate the evidence, it makes sense to study them, see if they match other kind of reductions, etc.

So, my question remains. Did someone study the evidence for the standard reduction, especially to see if there are recurring patterns that could suggest another kind of reduction?

Re follow-up: Let me recall what we agree on. We have no evidence against the reductions in principle or against the comprehensiveness of the basic theory. However, the success of elementary particle physics in chemistry, etc. is usually the success of models with assumptions and thus is not strong evidence for a standard reduction. A non standard reduction or a more comprehensive basic theory could perhaps be easier to fit with the current models of chemistry, etc. So, it could be useful to step back and study what kind of evidence for a reduction we have. You accepted all that, I think.

However, you also say that this study is implicit in the current research. I am not sure about that. Sure, it could be
merged within the current research. However, until scientists explicitly consider the possibility of an alternative type of reduction, this study is not really occurring. We only accumulate data for it. That's why a blind belief in standard reductionism is not good.

I found this interesting: http://www.mth.uct.ac.za/~ellis/emerge.doc
It is an example of a non standard view on reductionism.. Needless to say, the author, Georges Ellis, is a well known and highly respected physicist.

Answer 1

At this point in time, I do not believe that there is any structured study of physical evidence for reductionism in science.

In addition, reductionism, at least type ontological reduction, breaks down below the atomic level. Currently there seems to be three realms: Sub-atomic (quantum), atomic and molecular matter (Newtonian) and astrophysical (relativistic) with some small overlap. There is no accepted unified field.

Philosophers might have a field day in the beliefs that human behavior can be reduced to chemistry. Such does not seem to be determined by objective evidence.

Much of the current reductionism work goes back no further than Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs and Willard Quine's verification theory from about five decades ago. There is no Journal of Scientific Reductionism. Papers in the field are widely scattered and often contested.

Physicists like George Ellis, often ignore quantum mechanics in their development of concepts like the Block Universe.

The concept of Matter/Energy in a Space/Time continuum as a Universal whole is beyond most human modeling systems. Subjective Reality is not logical and not subject to outside evidence.

Answer 2

You're basically talking about "emergent properties". These are ones for which a given level of description (physics, say) fails to adequately describe the phenomena. A reductionist would say that this is simply due to it reaching a critical level of complexity that defies present human abilities (even though it is so reducible *in principle*). In such cases, a higher-order phenomenological description must be developed (like biology). Such emergent properties are common in science, and result in the different branches of sciences, each with their own way to describe things. It's important to remember though, that sciences are human inventions which reflect human limits. It's presumed to all be reducible to physics in principle.

Reductionism, then, is actually a theory (or metatheory) which can be tested. It predicts that things that presently require a higher level phenomenological explanation will, as the lower level sciences and their tools of the trade advance (most notably computers), have a lower level description evolve to replace it, or at least provide more fundamental definitions of the previously phenomenological terms. This happens all the time (physics is slowly displacing chemistry, for example). To disprove the theory of reductionism, you need to do more than simply point out things that do not (yet) have a purely physical description; you need an example of a lower level physical description that has advanced to the point where it clearly *should* describe a complex system adequately, but fails to do so. This could then only be attributable to irreducible emergent properties. I don't think this has ever happened.

Re follow-up. I never said it shouldn't be studied. In fact it is impicitly studied all the time. The assumptions you speak of are indicitative of a higher level description (phenomenology entails assumptions). The main pursuit of science is to continuously lower the level of a phenomenological description to its most elementary form. To date, when this has not been successful, it is attributed to the lower level model not being sufficiently comprehensive. You want a description that all can agree is comprehensive, yet the phenomenology remains unexplained. I can see how you might have trouble convincing scientists heavily invested in reductionism to agree that the model is comprehensive, yet inadequate. It would be like having your mechanic say that all your car's parts are working fine and installed properly, but the car doesn't run. But that's exactly the kind of thing that should be *demonstrable* if reductionism is false.

Answer 3

Perhaps the recent work of a physicist might give an indication.

Wish I knew and look forward to answers of those cleverer than I.

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