Is it true that Al Qaeda is training in Eleven(11*) other Nations? Your thoughts?

Question

What are we going to do attack those Eleven(11*) other Nations like we did Iraq? Your Thoughts?

Answer 1

Get our troop's home now, and guard our homelands.

Answer 2

I thought you said Al Qaeda training in Seven Eleven (7-11).

Answer 3

I wouldn't like to hazard a guess at how many nations have groups loosely affiliated to AQ.
It is highly unlikely the US has the ability to attack anyone else, with most of its resources tied up in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
You can see they are helping other nation to fight it themselves. Places like the Philippines and Pakistan come to mind probably some of the minor Gulf States

Answer 4

I'm sure that they are training in more than 11 other nations. I'm sure there is a lot about the terrorist that we are yet to find out about,
suro

Answer 5

In early 1995, at a remote camp in Afghanistan, a 21-year-old Tanzanian man prepared to begin a new life as a soldier of Islam.
The young man, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, had just completed training in weapons, explosives and religious studies. But rather than being sent off on a mission by the radical group that had prepared him, Al Qaeda, Mr. Mohamed was simply sent home
It was three more years before Mr. Mohamed got his call. Four months after that, he helped bomb the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania, one of two attacks in East Africa that day that killed 224 people and were attributed squarely to Al Qaeda and its founder, Osama bin Laden.
When Mr. Mohamed was captured in 1999, however, he told the F.B.I. that he was not really sure what Al Qaeda was, and that he had learned only through news reports who had sponsored his bombing. "KKM stated that he had never met Osama bin Laden, had not heard him speak, and that he did not know what Osama bin Laden looked like," the agents who debriefed him wrote.
As the United States prepares now to unleash war against Al Qaeda, its greatest challenge may be to find the front lines.
In little more than a decade, Mr. bin Laden has created a sprawling, global network of of men like Mr. Mohamed, terrorists-in-waiting whose skills and determination are often more finely honed than their loyalties to Al Qaeda or any of the groups to which it is allied.
The picture emerging from government documents, court transcripts and interviews is of an underground army so scattered and self- sustaining that even the elimination of Mr. bin Laden and his closest deputies might not eradicate the threat they have created.
"Bin Laden is the leader of a movement that doesn't necessarily need a leader to function and be effective," said Juliette N. Kayyem, a terrorism expert at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government and a former member of the National Commission on Terrorism. "This is such a diffuse structure that it can survive without him."
Like the suspected hijackers who attacked New York and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, the militants of Al Qaeda's infantry may remain invisible for months or even years. They may slip quietly back into their homelands to await orders, or infiltrate into European cities or American suburbs as "sleepers" before being mobilized to wage what they see as jihad, or holy war.
Even before the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. bin Laden's soldiers had sometimes confounded investigators' efforts to fit them into a coherent profile. They may be middle-aged veterans of the Afghan war or younger men outraged by the spread of Western culture. They may be well-educated or barely literate, from prosperous families or poor villages. Some may have sworn an oath directly to Mr. bin Laden; others, like Mr. Mohamed, may recognize only a loose allegiance to Al Qaeda, Arabic for "the Base."
The government's understanding of the decentralized nature of Al Qaeda dates at least to 1996, when Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a former aide to Mr. bin Laden, began secretly to cooperate with the United States. Mr. Fadl was among the first to join Mr. bin Laden in 1989, the year the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan after a devastating 10- year war.
"Be ready for another step, because in Afghanistan, everything is over," Mr. bin Laden exhorted his followers then, according to Mr. Fadl's testimony in the New York trial of the 1998 embassy bombers.
Over the succeeding years, Mr. bin Laden redrew the map of infidels to include Israel, the United States and its sometime Arab allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
According to Mr. Fadl's testimony, Al Qaeda sent trainers to Somalia and Chechnya, where Muslim forces confronted American and Russian troops respectively. It emerged after the 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi that Al Qaeda operatives had scouted out that target years earlier on orders from their leader.
By the time of Mr. Fadl's defection, the terrorist conspiracy had taken on something resembling a corporate structure. Beneath the "emir," as he says Mr. bin Laden was called, sat a council of about a dozen advisers called the shura. The council, based in Afghanistan, included such bin Laden confederates as Muhammad Atef, an Egyptian who served as military commander, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a surgeon who leads Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group held responsible for the 1981 assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt.
The council, in turn, oversees committees responsible for crucial areas: military operations, religious affairs, finances, and the production of false travel and identity documents.
In his testimony, Mr. Fadl suggested that Al Qaeda had taken great advantage of the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan to build up a steady supply of arms and camps to train recruits from around the world.
Just how many soldiers have graduated from Mr. bin Laden's camps is a matter of conjecture, with estimates in the thousands. But both American intelligence officials and Mr. bin Laden's own operatives have indicated that little more than a decade after its founding, Al Qaeda now can draw on a wide and diverse network of trained operatives.
Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, who was convicted this summer of helping plan the bombing of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, is a case in point.
Born in Saudi Arabia to Palestinian parents who now live in Jordan, Mr. Odeh went to study architecture and engineering in the Philippines in 1986, where he fell in with Islamic radicals who were proselytizing for the struggle of Afghan Muslims, the mujahedeen, against the occupying Soviet Army.
With $1,000 that his father had given him to complete his studies, Mr. Odeh flew instead to Afghanistan in 1990 to join the fight. Although the Soviets had just withdrawn, Mr. Odeh found that Al Qaeda was eagerly seeking recruits for a new jihad against the West.
"It did not matter what nationality you were," Mr. Odeh later told the F.B.I., according to a summary of his statement after his arrest in the embassy bombing case. The F.B.I. statement adds, "Odeh was not interested in joining any Palestinian groups, because its members took orders from a chain of command and would often do things that were not Islamically correct if ordered to do so."
After basic military training, Mr. Odeh went on to specialize in explosives. He worked as a military instructor and a medic before deciding to swear a formal oath, or "bayat," to Mr. bin Laden. But even then, he was left mostly to his own devices for the next five years, moving between Kenya and Somalia, training Muslim fighters and finally settling in a small village in Kenya, where he married and had a son. Eventually, Mr. Odeh joined the cell that was later activated for the embassy bombing in Nairobi.
Mr. Odeh's concern for religious purity was not necessarily the defining characteristic of Al Qaeda's recruits. Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian drifter, joined up after spending years as a common thief.
Mr. Ressam began cooperating with the United States government after he was convicted last April in a plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport during millennial celebrations. He had worked in Algeria in a coffee shop owned by his father. He sneaked into Corsica in 1992, and worked picking oranges and grapes. Then, with a phony French passport, he moved to Canada in 1994, he said, "to improve my life."
For the next four years, according to his testimony at the Manhattan trial of a co-defendant this year, Mr. Ressam supported himself on welfare checks and by stealing suitcases from tourists in Montreal hotels — selling the passports on the black market and helping himself to the traveler's checks and credit cards.
After hearing stories about Afghanistan from friends, Mr. Ressam decided in 1998 to go there himself. His goal, he said, was to join a "jihad in Algeria."
He spent nearly six months training in an Afghan camp with Muslims of every stripe — Jordanians, Yemenis, Saudis, Swedes, Germans, French, Turks and Chechens. He was then placed with five other Algerians in a cell led by a contact who kept in touch with Al Qaeda operatives in Europe.
"We were all to meet in Canada," Mr. Ressam testified, "and we were all to carry out operations of bank robberies and then get the money to carry out an operation in America." Mr. Ressam said he ultimately chose the Los Angeles airport because he had flown through it and knew his way around it a bit.
Long before American investigators began to link Al Qaeda to suspected Sept. 11 hijackers like Mohamed Atta, the son of a Cairo lawyer who was sent to study in Germany, the group had also drawn children of privilege. One such recruit was Mohamed Rashed Daoud al- 'Owhali, the son of a wealthy and prominent Saudi family, not unlike Mr. bin Laden.
Mr. 'Owhali was born in England while his father was studying there and began devouring stories about Islamic martyrs while still in his early teens, he told the F.B.I. After two years in a religious university in Riyadh, he, too, went to Afghanistan.
At the end of his initial training, he was granted an audience with Mr. bin Laden, who advised him to get more. He then attended a "jihad war camp," he said, where he learned about security, intelligence, kidnapping and the hijacking of buses and planes.
Again he met with Mr. bin Laden, and again he was told to wait his turn. "Take your time," he quoted Mr. bin Laden as saying. "Your mission will come in time." Finally, Mr. 'Owhali was assigned to help in the 1998 bombing of the embassy in Nairobi.
Mr. Odeh, the Jordanian who helped prepare that attack, distinguished for the F.B.I. between two types of Al Qaeda operatives. A more sophisticated group takes care of the planning — gathering intelligence, picking targets, doing surveillance and making bombs. Those who actually carry out the attack, he suggested, are more expendable.
"These people are good Muslims, but they are not experts in anything that would have a long-term benefit to the rest of the group," he said.
Khalfan Mohamed appeared to be one of the throwaways. After helping to bomb the American Embassy in his native Tanzania, he ended up in Cape Town, South Africa, working at a fast-food joint called Burger World.
Yet if Mr. Mohamed's development as an operative of Al Qaeda was limited, there was also a powerful simplicity to his ideas.
"KKM stated that his views about America began when he went to training in Afghanistan," the F.B.I. agent who debriefed him wrote. "KKM stated that America is a superpower with the ability to change the world. KKM stated that only bombings will make America listen to them."