Lol, you just wanna keep drinking. =P
2007-04-02 15:07:52
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answer #1
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answered by Anonymous
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Nope. Not at all.
Pascal's wager states that if there is a hell, then the penalty for not believing is eternal damnation and torture. If there is no hell, then there is nothing lost in believing. Hence, the cost benefit ratio leans toward believing.
The problem with this wager lies in the value of integrity which is ignored in the wager. Also lost is the fact that intellectual assent is not the same thing as faith. To reduce faith to an economic equation belittles the whole concept of salvation in the first place.
So, from a Christian viewpoint, a simple wager does not lead to faith. Pretending one believes in order to avoid hell isn't faith.
From the point of view of an atheist, a profession of faith would be a lax of integrity, which itself is a sort of sin.
Pascal's wager is only useful in reinforcing belief in those who already have it. It gives them an argument to offer some who may be weak, or on the edge, but it is not effective in convincing any real thinking person.
2007-04-02 15:13:51
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answer #2
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answered by Deirdre H 7
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Ironically enough, I have to assert that it is not.
It is an argument for an utilitaristic approach of religion, which is fine.
But - basically - one would have to estimate the probability of a particular religion being "true", then multiply it with the negative utility of what they state is going to happen to those who don't believe in it.
Then believe in whatever has the most negative product (probability times negative utility).
Obviously, this is a little silly as I can always make up a fairly believable religion that promises eternal hell for everyone who doesn't believe in it.
I do - however - propose Pascals Wager 2.0 - is life meaningful or not. If it is not meaningful (approach given by natural science), nothing matters. It also doesn't matter to believe that it is - in fact meaningful. If one believes that it is meaningful and it is meaningful, one wins.
So Pascals Wager 2.0 is about meaning. Much more general. And very important.
2007-04-02 15:36:06
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answer #3
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answered by Ejsenstejn 2
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No. Pascal's Wager says that the benefit you get if you believe in god is infinite (heaven = good and lasts forever, hell = bad and lasts forever), so it's a better bet to believe in god than not to believe, as long as there is a finite chance of got existing.
But the problem with that is, the chance of the Christian god existing is -zero-. There are too many contradictions and logic-defying things in the bible, plus if you look at it from the outside in it's no more special than any other religion people have come up with. So if the Christian god doesn't exist, then believing in it is no different than making something up and believing in it. I could make up an infinite number of deities and/or religions, and the chance of one of them being right would be 1/ infinity, or zero. So there's no point in believing in god.
2007-04-02 15:12:26
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answer #4
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answered by Anonymous
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No it is not!
To suppose there is a God and that this is reason enough to believe is pure crap. What about the nature of this God. That needs to be factored into the equasion. You would need to be able to accept that this God is going to torture anyone that doesn't bow to his will.
How do you know that this God's will is going to stay the same forever? What if you end up on the torture block after a few billion years? If this God has a nature that we can not know until after we are dead then how can we make a choice reguarding this God until after we are dead?
Buying into an God sight unseen is a worse investment then buying a car sight unseen. At least with a car you have lemon laws. There are no lemon laws with God in the event this God turns out to be a lemon!
2007-04-02 15:24:38
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answer #5
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answered by Xaphan 1
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Why not just grab any of the other hundred resolved questions on Pascal's Wager instead of asking it yet again? I'm sure when you asked the question, it popped up at least that many results in a key word search.
2007-04-02 15:15:37
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answer #6
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answered by Anonymous
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There are sufficient motives to reject Pascal's wager that we don't prefer something like this. i do no longer think of it truly is particularly efficient, besides. i do no longer agree which contain your P1 and that i'm specific many might argue against P2 besides. i think the biggest element is, who're you to assert what's optimal for me? possibly i prefer regimented regulations? possibly i'm getting exhilaration of believing i'm doing the artwork of despite god i might have self belief in? additionally, there's a huge concern on your effects tables in that in case you have self belief in gods and you're marvelous, how is it a hazard you lived a miles less optimal existence while that guy or woman replaced into superb. (I mean, if the god of the Bible exists and the Bible is definitely the notice of that god, then for sure we've been meant to stick to all those regulations. So your man or woman valuation of a 'optimal existence' is made beside the point.) There are lots greater ideal arguments against Pascal's wager: a million. wager works the two properly on all depictions of gods making concept in each god ever conceived the logical end. 2. Assumes the fee of concept to be nil yet it truly is obviously no longer the case. 3. Assumes concept itself is sufficient to income the payoff of heaven. Works, that have their very own expenditures, are additionally required in maximum depictions of gods. 4 (from 2 and 3) the possibilities of any specific depiction of gods latest are no longer 50/50. Taking the possibilities into attention (which will desire to be astronomical given even all of the depictions that must be real particularly) besides by using fact the payoff at those odds and the fee of the movements/concept, the 'pot odds' are somewhat very adverse certainly and you're greater ideal off taking those expenditures and works and putting them in the direction of something with a greater ideal payoff. 5. Assumes disbelief is sufficient to disqualify somebody from getting the payoff of heaven. i need to be the kindest maximum honourable and honest guy or woman who provides to charity, etc, yet while i don't have self belief in gods i'm going to be sent to hell? If it truly is real, then that god isn't worth of worship and that i might go with no longer something to do with it in any respect. Sorry to assert, yet i do no longer see how your argument is including something new or smart to the table.
2016-11-25 22:02:42
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answer #7
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answered by Anonymous
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Auuuggghhhh! I finished my last bottle of wine 15 minutes ago. Now Paschal's wager comes up and here I am. Can I have a popsicle instead?
2007-04-02 15:21:29
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answer #8
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answered by in a handbasket 6
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It's a terrible argument. I mean, if Pascal's Wager is true, shouldn't we follow every faith that ever existed-just in case one of them turns out to be the right one? If you'll excuse me, I'm going out to sacrifice something to every god/goddess that ever existed.
2007-04-02 15:10:29
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answer #9
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answered by Julia Sugarbaker 7
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No. If we're working on the basis that god can be discussed intelligently, we're assuming that he wanted us to use the damn brain in our head. I can't imagine a reasonable, logical god faulting someone for looking at this world and doubting the existence of an intelligent creator.
2007-04-02 15:10:22
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answer #10
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answered by lcraesharbor 7
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I think the point of the wager is to get people to think about how certain they are that God absolutely does not exist. One can't truly believe simply because he is afraid to not believe because the kind of belief that saves is a living, active, on-going belief that is reflected in a changed and changing life.
The wager is simply supposed to give one pause and cause one to reflect. It is valuable in this respect--God promises to reveal himself to anyone who truly seeks him. The wager could cause someone to seek, and therefore, find God.
2007-04-02 15:38:58
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answer #11
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answered by happygirl 6
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