The reasons for the Spartan fall from grace can be mostly traced to their failure to adapt the absurdly rigid Lycurgan system for a pan-Hellenic empire or for the influx of wealth that came with it. The councils, the ephors and the royal families of Sparta believed that the system given to them by Lycurgus did not need altering and they could cite the example of King Pausanias for the reasons why a Spartan should not have too much wealth or personal power. However, if they did realise that their system was too restrictive in an age of expansion, it was already too late. One of the major problems with the closed society, championed by Lycurgus and many other Spartans throughout the city’s history, was the lack of fresh blood being introduced into the Spartan race. They had been inter-breeding since the Dorian invasions and a closed society such as this would eventually decline, much like the Hapsburg royal families of medieval Europe. This is something that G.E.M. de Ste Croix picks up on and expands upon in Appendix 16 of his book, ‘The Origins of the Peloponnesian War’. He uses the same word as the great historian Aristotle uses in his work, ‘Politics’ (II.9). They both suggest that the Spartan hegemony ‘perished through ‘oliganthropia’’ – a lack of men. This is not because of a population decrease in Laconia but just a lack of men of the Spartan citizen class who could serve as hoplites, called ‘homoioi’ or ‘Spartiates’.
This decline can be shown with the differing numbers of troops that Sparta could call upon to send to battle during the 5th and early 4th centuries BC. The most famous 5th century battle, which included Spartans, took place in 480BC at Thermopylae against the Persians. This is the battle in which three hundred Spartans and 1,000 allies under the leadership of King Leonidas held off the massive invasion force of the Persian King, Xerxes, which perhaps numbered over 120,000 men. The romance of this event blurs the fact that this Spartan army was only a token force and, according to Herodotus, there were possibly 8,000 ‘Spartiates’ available for deployment. This figure would seem to be corroborated a year later in 479BC when the Spartans sent 5,000 hoplites to lead the Pan-Hellenic army at the battle of Plataea. Knowing the Spartan apprehension over leaving their territory unguarded. I do not think it is an exaggeration on Herodotus’ part that maybe as many as 2,700 ‘Spartiates’ were left in Laconia. Comparing these numbers with those that are reported for the 4th century BC, we see a large drop. G.E.M. de Ste Croix suggests that after the Peloponnesian War in 404BC the number of available hoplites may have fallen to between 3,000 and 4,000. And, according to A.J. Toynbee in his book ‘Some Problems in Greek History’ p401-2’, after the Battle of Leuctra in 371BC there may have as few as 1,200 ‘Spartiates’ and by around 340BC, Aristotle claims that ‘there were not even 1,000 ‘Spartiates’’. If these numbers were correct it would help explain the complete military collapse of Sparta after the destruction of four hundred hoplites at Leuctra.
Another long-term cause for the defeats suffered by Sparta in the 370’s BC which was contributed to by the rigidity of the Lycurgan system, was the failure of Spartan generals and kings to adapt and change the tactics used by the Spartan armies. Even before the battles of Tegyra and Leuctra, there had been several instances that showed the Spartans to be tactically naïve. The outmanoeuvring of Spartan armies by the Athenians at Olpae in 426BC and even more spectacularly at on the promontory of Sphacteria off the coast of Pylos a year later showed that the Lacedaemonians could be outwitted on the field of battle; and at the Battle of Haliartos in 395BC when the Spartans tried to implement a complicated pincer movement to trap the Thebans they ended up failing miserably and losing one of their only major tactician, Lysander. All of this illustrates that if the Spartans could not out-muscle or depend on their reputation to scare off their opponents, they were in trouble especially if the enemy had a competent leader. This is what happened at Leuctra in 371BC when a Spartan army met an undermanned Theban force. The Thebans were brimming with confidence after their victory at Tegyra four years earlier and were led by the seasoned campaigners Pelopidas and Epaminondas, while the Spartans were under the command of the young and inexperienced King Cleombrotos. It is debateable whether or not even the wily veteran Agesilaus would have been able to counter the deep ranks tactic of the Thebans especially when the ‘Sacred Band’ was a match for the Spartan hoplites.
So much for the long-term causes; what were the short-term causes of the Spartan failure to hold on to her leading position in Greece? Before the 4th century BC only the Spartans could boast a standing, professional army but in the years following the Peloponnesian War there was a dramatic increase in the demand for mercenaries, especially Greek hoplites and peltasts. Many Greek citizens no longer wanted to fight for their land if it was going to be destroyed while they were away. The governments themselves had also realised that the citizen militias they called upon to fight for them were not as capable as professionals. Thebes was the first major power to follow Sparta’s example and form a military unit of three hundred highly-trained full-time soldiers in 378BC called the ‘Sacred Band’, which was led first by its founder Gorgidas and later by the great Theban general, Pelopidas.
Other Greek cities, instead of training their own unit, would hire mercenaries, which by the 4th century came with their own equipment and sometimes a capable leader. There had been mercenary armies for centuries, shown with the inscription of the names of Greek mercenaries, who had been hired by the Egyptian King Psammetichus II between the years 594BC and 589BC, on the statues of a temple in the city of Abu Simbel in Upper Egypt, but only now in the 4th century BC did they become increasingly important. So important that we even see men like Cyrus, the son of the Persian King Darius II, hiring 13,000 Greeks, later led by the historian Xenophon, to fight for him in his failed attempt to replace his brother, Artaxerxes, at the Battle of Cunaxa in 401BC. Many other famous Greeks found employment as mercenary leaders in the 4th century BC either through want or necessity. Athenians like Conon, his son Timotheus and Iphicrates are known to have sold their services to the Persians but most famously in the last years of his career, while still King of Sparta, the nonagenarian Agesilaus led two mercenary armies in Egypt in an attempt to gain much needed funds for the Spartan treasury right up until his death in at the Harbour of Menelaus in the winter of 361-0BC. The growing usage of mercenary and professional armies in Greece took away the main advantage that Sparta had held over her ‘subordinates’ for nearly three centuries and once this happened, as was to be expected, the Spartans were unable to cope with this reversal in fortunes.
There is another reason that several ancient sources give for the sudden downfall of the Spartan hegemony and that is religion. The pro-Spartan historian Xenophon says in ‘Book V.4’ of his ‘Hellenica’ that Sparta incurred the wrath of the gods by going against their sworn oath ‘to leave the cities independent’ by seizing the Theban Acropolis, the Cadmea, in 382BC. Of course being biased towards the Lacedaemonians Xenophon uses this as the only reason for the Spartan fall, neglecting to mention that the Thebans out-think and out-muscle the Spartan hoplites at Leuctra and that once the myth of invincibility was gone the Spartan system could not cope and imploded. The retrospective Greek historian Plutarch expresses the same view on the religious failure of Sparta (‘Life of Agesilaus’ Ch.30), but he takes it one step further and blames Xenophon’s hero Agesilaus for offending the gods. Plutarch believed that it was Agesilaus’ hatred for Thebes that pushed him to take the opportunity to capture the city when it presented itself even when there was an oath to the contrary. As well as this specific occasion there is another more general religious reason for the downfall of Sparta. It was widely believed in Greece that the gods, being spiteful deities, brought down the great powers before they got too great with a proverbial ‘Hand of God’, a notion expressed by Jason, the despot of Pherae.
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The Downfall of Sparta
After Athens surrendered after the Peloponnesian War, Sparta becamethe major power in Greece. The Spartans didn't rule the other city-states like an empire, but did exercise major influence over their governments, instilling puppet governments loyal to the Spartan regime.(3)
Sparta would later embark on a period of attempted expansion, in an attempt to build and consolidate a true empire. an attempted invasion of Persia accomplished nothing positive for the Spartans, but it did distract them from their domestic affairs long enough to allow the Athenians to rebuild their city walls and navy.
In its zeal to solidify a true empire, Sparta eventually overstepped its bounds when it captured the city of Thebes, a former ally against the Persians, without provocation. Athens, with it's rebuilt military, allied itself with Thebes, and together, they defeated the Spartans in 371 BC.(2)
This ended pretty much forever the Spartan control of Greece. Eventually, Sparta and the rest of the Greek city-states would be conquered and ruled by Philip of Macedon, and later, his son Alexander the Great.(1)
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Hypothesis: Sparta collapsed because they did not allow the helots to fight in battle
The Beginning of Sparta In about 100 BCE, the Dorians invaded Greece from the North. During the Dark Ages, the Dorians made their way south, capturing the inhabitants of the lands they passed through as helots. At the beginning of the Dark Ages, it is thought that there were many Dorian settlements in Laconia, each with their own helot population. At some time during the Dark Ages, Sparta overtook these fellow Dorian settlements and their helot populations, as well as control of the whole of Laconia. The Spartans kept the helots as a huge, strong slave race and, although they did not enslave their fellow Dorians, the other Dorians were made perioci, meaning "those who live round about". The perioci were needed to be the craftsmen, tradesmen and manufacturers for the Spartans, who were trained as full time soldiers.
At the end of the Dark Ages, there was nothing exceptional about Sparta (except her control of the helot population) but from about the middle of the 6th Century BCE, Sparta gradually turned away from the rest of Greece. They no longer welcomed visitors, cut their trade ties, stopped building ships and when the rest of Greece began using coins instead of iron spits, Sparta continued to use the spits. Sparta still had poetry and music, but instead of listening to new poems and songs, they learned only the compositions of the past, and new poets and musicians were not welcomed. Sparta still produced pottery and metal work for every-day use, but it was of poorer quality than the work of other cities. Spartans no longer participated in athletic festivals in other parts of Greece and the whole city became secretive and withdrawn, refusing to communicate with the rest of Greece.
Education The Spartans were raised and educated to be perfectly obedient and obey the state without question. Spartan education had no interest with literature, intellectual or academic activities and did Spartans were not taught subjects like mathematics, science or geography. Even as babies, Spartiates were treated harshly - they were made to eat whatever food they were given, left alone, left alone in the dark, and it is probable that no attention was paid to babies when they cried.
A Spartan Boy's education as a soldier began when the boy was about 7 or 8 years old. At this time, the boys were removed from their home and taken to live at the barracks like soldiers, having companies and platoons for each barrack. The boys were 'looked after' by the Paidonomos, who had complete rule over the boys and could punish for misbehaviour. The Paidonomos were helped by the Eirens - boys over 18 who had the right to give orders and punish the boys. It is believed that the Eirens were very cruel, as they carried whips to punish the boys. This first stage of education was designed to make the boys physically strong through athletics, physical training and wrestling, as well as to teach obedience and communal living. They boys learned how to look after themselves, get on together, take orders and share responsibilities.
When the boys turned 12, they began their advanced training. This was similar to the first stage, but even harsher - the boys were only allowed to wear a single garment all year round and were forced to sleep on beds made from reeds, which they had to cut from the banks of the river. During this stage, the boys were fed so little that they had to resort to stealing food from nearby estates just to get by. If the boys were caught stealing, however, they would be publicly whipped and given even less food. This was meant to teach the boys how to live off the land.
The most important part of the education in Sparta was the part of obedience. Everyone was taught to be completely obedient to the state, and taught that the individual was the least important. During their education, boys would only play team sports, and compete in music and poetry competitions only in groups. It was very important to the Spartans that no one questioned the thoughts, ideas or laws of Sparta and that everyone was completely obedient. However, once this rigid obedience was broken, it would have been hard to continue 'the Spartan way of life'.
The Helots The Helots were a very resentful slave population. They were constantly threatening to rebel, but never did, probably due to the fact that the Spartans kept them under such close watch. Just to show their supremacy, each year, the Spartans would declare war on the helots, allowing any Spartan to kill any helots. As well as declaring war on the helots, the Spartans would select some helots to be beaten publicly, and it is said that any helot who seemed particularly strong was killed, just to ensure that he did not lead a rebellion.
The helots were farmers and not soldiers and would not have stood up well in battle. If they had been allowed to fight alongside the Spartans, they would have been more burden than help.
The Downfall of Sparta The end of Sparta began when Sparta overran Athens, destroying the city walls and leaving the city with only 10 ships. But Sparta only just survived the war. The numbers of full Spartiates were very low, and no thought was put into increasing the Spartiate population. This is probably due to them basking in their newfound wealth in other states their army had overrun.
The Spartan empire began to grow, and the Spartans were forced with a completely new way of life - completely different to the simple life they were used to living. They had been brought up knowing only one way of life and had been taught vigorously not to challenge the ideas of the state, but now the state was changing. Sparta sent out commanders to conquered states, and, outside of Sparta, these commanders were surrounded with wealth and luxuries, the likes of which they had never known in Sparta. The temptation was too much for these commanders like Lysander, and began to dress in fine clothes, dine on expensive food and wear delicate and expensive jewelry. Away from the protection of Sparta, power went to some of these commanders' heads. For example, Lysander became rich and arrogant, so much so that people refused to serve under him. Although Lysander was recalled to Sparta, it was found that he had been smuggling riches into the city of Sparta itself, and it is thought that this happened in many other cases. With this corruption to the Spartan way of life going on all around, Sparta was on the way to its end.
The final blow for Sparta came with the battle of Leuctra in 371 BCE, when the Theban army, lead by Epaminondas, marched into the city of Sparta itself. During this war, The number of Spartiates was drastically reduced, probably to less then 1000 full citizens, and now the discipline that Sparta was famous for was no longer due to the corruption, it was almost impossible to raise another professional soldier race.
With the Theban army facing them across the Eurotas, the Spartans armed 6,000 Helots and promised them their freedom if they fought well1. The Spartans allowing the helots to fight in the Battle of Leuctra was a desperate measure that had never been tried before, because Sparta had never been so desperate. However, the helots were a strong force, as it is said by Xenaphon "they feared the number of the helots when they saw them ranged alongside them and thought that they were too many".
Conclusion I think that the helots did nothing for the Spartans while in battle, as proved during the Battle of Leuctra in 371BCE. The only way Sparta could have benefited from the inclusion of helots in their forces would have been if the helots were trained as soldiers like the Spartans, but this would have meant that there was no-one to farm for the soldiers.
Even if the helots were able to win the Battle of Leuctra for the Spartans, there was still much corruption in Sparta, which had ruined the simple Spartan way of life. This was also a major part of the downfall of Sparta, not just the fact that they were beaten at war.
Analysis Deciding on a hypothesis and question was quite difficult, though after reading general books on Sparta, I became interested in the downfall of Sparta and why it happened. Sparta was a strong city, with a huge slave population, and a population of fill-time, professional soldiers. How could other Greeks whose armies consisted of normal people with only limited military training beat them? At this time, I did not know about the use of the helots in the Battle of Leuctra. It turned out that helots had in fact been used in The Battle of Leuctra, a battle which the Spartans lost.
I eventually came to my final question: What caused the downfall of Sparta? and my hypothesis: Sparta collapsed because they did not allow the helots to fight in battle.
I found that my hypothesis was incorrect, because in 371BCE, at the time of the fateful Battle of Leuctra, the 'Spartan way of life' had been totally ruined and corrupted by wealth brought into Sparta from all over Greece by people like Lysander. Even if the Battle of Leuctra had been lost, but the 'Spartan way of life' was still intact and the Spartiates were still obedient to the state and all its laws, I think that Sparta would have picked itself up again and continued as it had done. But with all the corruption, Sparta could no longer survive.
Finding information on Sparta was relatively easy, but many of these general books on Sparta did not cover the downfall of Sparta, and the Battle of Leuctra is not even mentioned in many, so finding books relevant to my specific topic was more difficult than I thought it would be.
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Sparta´s ultimate downfall can be seen to be a result of its implementation of the founding laws which made it so successful in Laconia but, could not be adapted for change. Ultimately, Sparta was a society designed for stability, an enemy of change?
This section will look into the causes and effects of the Spartan system. The laws, religion, warfare, women in Sparta and the Agoge.
2007-03-17 05:52:52
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answer #8
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answered by Dandirom 2
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