essay on forgetting?

Question

i'm doing a research on forgetting and remembering for my psychology class. does anyone know some good cites that i can go to? pls response asap

Answer 1

The psychopathology of forgetting can be a very Freudian concept, here I have information from a site that will relate perfectly and will give you a good start. I have included a good part but there is more and it is referenced.

Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition.... The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Volume VI. Translated By James Strachey. London: The Hogarth Press, 1960.
vol. 6\1901 Psychopathology\slips\language\Condensation\Cathretic method\ displacement\distortion\dreams\forgetting\overdetermination\Repression\ Resistances\screen memories\Suggestion\symbols\

Editor's Introduction:
This is a text that Freud often updated with more examples and illustrations, while almost all of the theory was present in the original publication of the text. The editor, Strachey, notes that examples may detract the reader from the line of argumentation. Also there are a lot of plays on words in the original German which are untranslatable. In terms of dating this text, Strachey notes that Psychopathology was written after the completion of Traumdeutung and On Dreams. Thus the writing was completed by 1901 and in 1904 it was released as a separate volume. (X-XIII)

On page XII-XIII (footnote #1) of the "Editor's Introduction" we find Strachey commenting on Freud`s usage of the "parapraxis." According to Strachey, Freud special attention due to the fact that they, as with dreams, were what enabled him to extend to the norm of mental life the discoveries he had made first in connection to the neuroses. In fact, Strachey notes, Freud sometimes even preferred parapraxes over dreams. It was through this phenomena that Freud found it possible to demonstrate the existence of two distinct modes of mental functioning--i.e., the primary and the secondary processes. It was his belief in the universal application of determinism to people's mental lives that allowed this insight. This is characterized when Strachey writes: "it should be possible in theory to discover the psychical determinants of every smallest detail of the process of mind."
Chapter 1: The Forgetting of Proper Names
We are referred to "The Psychical Mechanism of Forgetfulness" (volume 3) as a starting point in the explication of Freud`s ideas on this subject.

Freud begins by pointing out the means by which proper names are either altered or forgotten. He notes that names may be 1] forgotten, 2] falsely remembered, and 3] substituted (by associations or displacement). (1) In forgetting, he writes, "a topic of interest that has been raised is disturbed by the preceding topic." (3) Or, alternately, one's memories are often diverted, especially if they are unpleasureable. (4)

Freud notes that the motive behind forgetting is similar to that of repression--it is the removal of objectionable material from consciousness. Thus it is often that case that an associated bit of information is also forgotten. Thus, Freud gives as an example the following statement: "I forgot the one thing against my will, while I wanted to forget the other thing intentionally." (4)

On page 6 Freud make the distinction that Paramnesia refers to false recollection. To Freud, paramnesia probably occurs when a suppressed element strives to assert itself in consciousness, but is only successful when suitable conditions meet it halfway. In other instances, the suppression succeeds with out any functional disturbance- -i.e., there is no sign of a symptom.

The conditions for paramnesia are as follows: 1] there must be a certain disposition to forget the name; 2] a process of suppression must be carried out shortly before the name is encountered; and 3] there must be the possibility for the establishment of an external association between the name in question and the element previously suppressed. Freud notes that the third condition is extremely difficult to fulfill. That is, when two elements are joined by an external association there must be some connection in the content of the two ideas which is demonstrable. (6)

Paramnesia is said to be always explicable as something motivated by repression. Thus Freud finds no theoretical justification to separate cases of the forgetting of names, accompanied by paramnesia, and the situations in which incorrect substitutes appear. He relies upon his belief that both show some relationship to the repressed element and to the forgotten or altered name.

Freud notes that there are two factors which help to being substitute names to consciousness. These are as follows: 1] an effort of attention and 2] an inner condition that attaches to the psychical material. In fact, Freud goes so far as to claim that all cases of name forgetting are to be classified in the same group and that "By the side of simple cases [as such] where proper names are forgotten there is a type of forgetting which is motivated by repression."

Chapter 2: The Forgetting of Foreign Words
Freud writes this chapter in a dialogical style. He begins by noting that it is easier to forget foreign vocabularies as there is a disposition to forget due to the amount of control we have over words according to the general conditions of health and the degree of tiredness. (8)

Using an example of a young man who could not remember "Aliqus" and several associations, Freud points out that the disturbances in the reproduction stems from the very nature of the topic. That is, the topic caused the upswelling of unconscious opposition to the wishful idea that it expressed or to which it was associated. In this case, Freud outlines the phenomenology of the act of forgetting: 1] an external association is arbitrarily constructed between one ideational content and a content of the repudiated wish; and, 2] a contradiction appears between the ideational contents which has its roots in repressed sources and functions to cause a diversion of attention away from the repressed material. Therefore, Freud claims that the second mechanism of forgetting is as follows: there is a disturbance of a thought which is the result of an internal contradiction which arises from repressed material. (13-14)

CHAPTER 3: THE FORGETTING OF NAMES AND SETS OF WORDS
Freud questions whether the same mechanisms are active in terms of memory loss in one's own language. He notes that faulty reproduction of this sort (names and sets of words) includes isolated portions of things that one has learned.

Freud outlines several examples in the next five pages, including ones submitted by Jung, Ferenczi and one from Goethe`s writings.

The common denominator in all of these examples is the fact that the forgotten or distorted matter is brought by some associative path into connections with an unconscious thought-content, which is the source of the effect manifested by forgetting. (20-21) In forgetting names there are two factors to consider: 1] the fact that the forgotten name may have touched on a `personal complex`; and, 2] the relationship between the forgotten name and oneself is usually an unexpected one which is usually arrived at via superficial associations--i.e., verbal similarity or similarity in sounds. A pair of examples serve to illustrate this point: 1] Freud forgot the name of a place which a sanitarium is found--Nervi--for the reason, he speculates, that the name has a similar sound to `nerves`; and, 2] Freud forgot the name of the third inn in a village that he knew well because, he says, its name is "Hochwarter" which is very similar to the name of a colleague in Vienna with whom Freud had some unpleasant dealings. (23)

Freud comments upon what he calls `personal references.` This is some sort of personal material, as opposed to instinctual material, which can betray itself when one forgets names. That is, one's personal complexes are put on alert and may result with the forgetting of someone's name. (24) Thus forgetting could be due to antipathy felt towards another person--e.g., a rival in life (25)--or forgetting a name may be the result of something more subtle. For instance, one may forget another's name as a result of a grudge one carries against the person whose name is forgotten. (26) Furthermore, forgetting a name may occur because the name may remind the subject of a concept that is uncomfortable to remember. (27)

Freud concludes that in a large number of cases a name is forgotten because, owing to a similarity in sound and assonance, it touches upon another name against which the motives of repression operate. In sum, then, the mechanisms of forgetting names are as follows: 1] forgetting consists in an interference with the intended reproduction of the name by an alien train of thought which is not conscious at the time of attempted recall. 2] Between the name inferred and the interfering complex either a connection exists from the onset or one is established via external associations. 3] In terms of interfering complexes those of the personal sphere prove to have the greatest effect. 4] In cases in which a name has more than one meaning and consequently belongs to more than one group of complexes is frequently interfered with in its connection with one train of thought owing to its participation in another, stronger, complex. 5] the motive for forgetting names is the attempt to avoid unpleasure caused by remembering something undesirable.

Freud points out two main types of forgetting names: 1] cases in which the touches something unpleasant; 2] where the name is brought into connection with another name that causes unpleasure. Freud says that the forgetting of names is supposed to be "highly contagious" in such cases, however, where forgetting is induced the forgotten name returns more readily. (40)

Chapter 4: CHILDHOOD MEMORIES AND SCREEN MEMORIES
The indifferent memories of childhood own their existence to the mechanism of displacement: that is, they operate as substitutes in mnemic reproductions of other, significant impressions. Such significant impressions can be brought out through analysis but a resistance prevents them from being directly reproduced in the everyday situation.

Types of displacement:

regressive displacement: in this case the content of a screen memory belongs to earliest childhood (which has been repressed since its origination) and the mental experiences it replaces usually occurred in the subject's later life;
opposite relation: this appears more frequently than regressive displacement. In this case an indifferent impression of recent occurrence establishes itself as a screen memory but owes its existence to associations from an earlier experience which is prevented from direct reproduction by one's resistances--i.e., they are said to be displaced forward;
CONTAGIOUS SCREEN MEMORIES: Such screen memories are connected with the impression that it screens off not only by its content but also by contiguity in time.
This chapter attempts to emphasize the similarities between the forgetting of proper names accompanied by paramnesia and the formation of screen memories. Hence the differences between forgetting names and screen memories are as follows: in proper names it is names that are forgotten, in screen memories it is whole concepts; in proper names there is a manifest failure of memory altogether, in screen memories strange memories replace the original content; in the case of proper names there is a momentary disturbance of memory, in screen memories there is a permanent or constant memory disturbance. Points of agreement in screen memories and the forgetting of proper names include: in both there are mistakes in remembering resulting sometime in the production of replacements; in the case of proper names we know that the substitute is false, in screen memories we are surprised that we possess them at all; in both cases substitute formations occur through displacement via superficial associations. (44-45)

Freud makes some general comments of memories. First of all he states that he does not trust infantile memories previous to the third year as such memories are generally visual in nature as is the dream process and include the self in the image of a child. But adult visual memories no longer include pictures of themselves. This, it is said, contradicts all suppositions that in a child's experiences his attention is directed to him or herself instead of being exclusively directed from the external world. Thus Freud leaps to the conclusion that early childhood memories are in fact revisions of such experiences. They are revisions which may have been subject to the various influences of one's psychical processes. Hence, infantile memories become, in general, to acquire the significance of screen memories. Still, Freud notes, it is vary difficult to analytically determine which memories are screens and which are not. (46-48)

Chapter 5: SLIPS OF THE TONGUE:
Freud begins this section by pointing to the work on slips done by Meringer and Mayer. In "Slips in Speaking and Reading" they attempt to put forth the conclusion that `a certain mental mechanism, in which the sounds of a word, or of a sentence and the words as well, are mutually linked and connected in a peculiar way.`(53) The authors then point out several classes of slips, which include the following:

Transpositions: e.g., `milo of Venus` as opposed to the `Venus of milo.`
Anticipations (Pre-sonances): making up words! (?)
Post-sonances or Perservations: the replacement of a correct phrase with another.
Contanimations: the combinations of two phrases.
Substitutions: the substitution of specific words with another. (54)
Freud argues against Meringer in that he feels that the initial sound of a word could be with the highest valency but it is not true than it is the initial sound that comes back to one's memory. For example, forgotten words or names often appear with the conviction that the first letter is such and such, but most often this is not the case. Freud thus suggests that we include the mechanisms of the forgetting of names to slips and we will thus develop a more deeply based judgment of slips. (55)

Hence Freud indicated that the disturbances in speaking which manifest in a slip of the tongue are caused by the following criterion:

as a result of the influence of another component in the same speech; or,
by an anticipatory sound (preservation); or
by another formulation of the ideas contained with in the sentence or context that it is one's intention to utter; or
by a process which could emanate from influences outside the word, context or sentence and could rise out of elements, which are not intended to be uttered and of whose excitations we learn precisely only through the actual disturbance.
(The first three criterion are from Meringer and the final one is Freud`s own. Freud notes that there are similarities between the first three and the fourth in that there is a simultaneity in the interfering stimulation. The differences appear in the position of the excitation--whether it is inside or outside of the sentence or context. Therefore it is only through the first three criterion that deductions of slips can be made, via a mechanism which links sounds and words to one another, so that they mutually influence their articulation.) (56)

In terms of substitutions, when another similar word lies a short way below consciousness, Freud says, substitutions may occur. That is, when an individual has two or more responses in mind and they come together and form a non-word we see the mechanism of condensation occurring. Condensation implies that two elements of unconscious material, which contain some similarity in ideational content or verbal presentation, are taken as an opportunity to create third word, which is composite or a compromise idea. (57-58) "The formation of substitutes and contaminations," Freud writes, "which occur in slips of the tongue is accordingly a beginning of the work of condensations which we find taking a most vigorous share in the construction of dreams."

Freud notes Meringer`s thoughts on contrary words replacing those that were meant to be uttered. Freud interprets this activity to be wishfulfillment. But, he notes, the opposites does not always appear-- that is, the intended word is often merely forgotten. (59)

Freud then points out that there are two mechanism to slips of the tongue which work in combination with one another. These are as follows: 1) there is an uninhibited stream of associations to the searched for term; and 2) there is a corresponding relaxation of inhibiting attention--i.e., with the relaxation of inhibitions the uninhibited stream of associations comes into play. [see: p. 80] Freud often finds that the following aspects must also be considered: 1) a disturbing influence which comes from something outside the intended utterance; and 2) the notion of anticipation is an utterance that anticipates the correct words full sound. (61)

Freud goes on to point out that slips of the tongue are to a high degree contagious. On pages 61ff Freud provides the reader with several examples, many of which take into consideration the sexual aspect of slips. Examples includes slips arising out of the following: condensation, substitutions, repressed memories, suppressed ideas, similarity of word sounds, and conflicting emotional impulses.

The import of slips of the tongue appear in Freud`s statement that slips are very useful in the analytic process in that it permits the analyst to get at repressed ideas and to get through resistances. In fact Freud claims to find both repressed ideas and resistances in both gross and subtle slips. From this he concludes that Meringer may have been barking up the wrong tree. He writes: "...it is not the influence of the contact effect of the sounds but the influences of thoughts that lie outside the intended speech which determines the occurrence of the slip and provides an adequate explanation of the mistake." (80) Hence we find that Freud thinks that the laws that govern the way which sounds modify one another are not enough alone to be sufficiently effective to disturb the correct process of speaking.

Thus Freud concludes that such laws are employed by a psychical motive which is more remote. "In a large number of substitutions resulting from slips of the tongue," he writes, "such phonetic laws are completely disregarded." Still, when one's speech is hurried and/or when attention is distracted Meringer and Mayer`s conditions may be sufficient explanation for slips. Again, other slips may be due to the sought for word's similarity to the sounds of obscene words and meanings. Freud has this to say of vulgarity: "Deliberate distortion and deformation of words and expressions, which are so dear to vulgar minds, has the sole purpose of exploiting innocent occasions of hinting at forbidden topics...." (81) This activity is so frequent, he points out, that nothing appears when it happens unconsciously. Reiterating his axiom, Freud states: "even simple slips of the tongue could be traced to interference by a half-suppressed idea that lies outside the intended context." Hence it could be the shame that one feels on the occasion of such a slip that invariably indicates that some motive has contributed to the occurrence of the interference. (83) In a sense, we may conclude, disturbances like stammering and stuttering caused by embarrassment. This, Freud concludes, is a result of an internal conflict displayed by the disturbance in speech--this appears in numerous literary instances as well. (101)

CHAPTER 6: MISREADING AND SLIPS OF THE PEN
Freud begins by noting that the general comments dealing with slips in speech apply to slips of the pen and misreadings as well. In other words, the roots of such parapraxes are repressed wishes. (106)

A) MISREADINGS: (Examples to 116)

B) SLIPS OF THE PEN & MISPRINTS: (Examples to 132)
125--slips of the pen often deal with impatience as well as more complex or serious desires.

CHAPTER 7: THE FORGETTING OF IMPRESSIONS AND INTENTIONS
Freud lists two general assumptions before preceding with this chapter. These assumptions are as follows:

Forgetting is a spontaneous process which may be regarded as requiring a certain length of time; and
A certain selection of impressions takes place. (134)
Freud then goes on to list some striking examples of forgetting that he has had himself. (136ff) He then distinguishes between forgetting of a) impressions and experiences [knowledge] from b) intentions. A statement characteristic of Freud`s thoughts about slips of any kind is as follows: "in every case the forgetting turned out to be based on a motive of unpleasure."

A) FORGETTING OF IMPRESSIONS AND KNOWLEDGE:
In such cases there is a disturbance of judgment subject to those nearest to oneself and a specific territory of memories is avoided. (137)

Thus Freud notes that the is a tendency to avoid what is disagreeable seems to be universal and he believes that the capacity to do so is undoubtedly developed with different degrees in different people.(144) In non-neurotics, for example, the recollection of distressing impressions and the occurrence of distressing thoughts is opposed by resistance "But the full significance of this fact can he estimated only when the psychology of neurotic people is investigated." To indicate what he means, Freud indicates that the mechanism of hysteria is the attempt to fend off unpleasureable memories or ideas. (146) Nonetheless, such it is not always possible to employ such defensive measures in every instance. In fact such defenses may come up against factors which aim at the opposite effect and bring it about in spite of the defensive trend. Thus, he concludes, it may be possible that defenses belong to the lower psychical agencies (to the unconscious) and are inhibited by the higher ones (conscious). (147)

Freud points out that such forms of forgetting may appear on a mass scale. This is an important point for any students interested in hermeneutics and the evolution of written texts. Freud writes, in terms of this notion, "where the origin of a people traditions and legendary history are concerned, a motive of this kind, whose aim is to wipe from memory whatever is distressing to natural feeling, must be taken into consideration." [my emphasis] Thus, as with the forgetting of names, the forgetting of impression may be due to faulty recollections as a result of paramnesia which is motivated by unconscious, repressed material. (148)

B) THE FORGETTING OF INTENTIONS:
Freud first comments that a lack of attention does not provide sufficient explanation. He then defines intention as an impulse to perform a certain action. It is an impulse that has already formed approval but whose expectation is postponed to a suitable occasion. Still it could be the case that motives change and that the intentions then are not carried out and is reexamined and canceled. (151) Humans, Freud rightly notes, are not in the habit of explaining the forgetting of intentions as we generally leave such things unexplained. To Freud, normal behaviour resulting after the formation of an intention coincides with the behaviour exhibited by those under hypnotic suggestion. To this end Freud writes: "The suggested intention slumbers on in the person concerned until the time for its execution approaches. Then it awakes and impels him to perform the action." (152)

Freud notes that there are two cases that argue for unconscious motives: 1) love relationships--e.g., when a lover forgets to come to a meeting; and 2) military discipline--the forgetting of a direct order suggests that a counter motive may have inhibited obedience. (153) On pages 154 following Freud provides examples based upon his own experience in an attempt to show that the forgetting of intentions can be traced to interference caused by unknown and unavowed motives-- something he calls a counter will. Such things usually happen when one is under obligations or services and they represent a demonstration to such obligations.

In terms of important intentions forgetfulness occurs because of some obscure motives rise up against them. In cases of less important intentions we may recognize a second mechanism--the counter will. In this case the counter will is transferred to the intention from some other topic, but this only occurs after an external association has been formed between the other topic and the content of the intention. (159) This notion of a counter will interfering with one's intents causes Freud to remind us of an old proverb: "`If one forgets to do a thing once, one will forget to do it many times over.`" (161)

CHAPTER 8: BUNGLED ACTIONS:
Since slips are motor actions, we can extend the mechanisms of slips, etc. to other types of actions. Such actions are called either symptomatic or chance actions in that the whole aim of such actions seems to be completely inappropriate. (162) On 163ff Freud provides several examples of his own. He concludes that parapraxes are a symbolic representation of a thought which was not really intended to be accepted seriously and consciously. (163) In other instances bungled actions are said to be symbolic of thought. (164) Another possibility is that a voice of self-criticism causes bungled actions. (165)

Later in the text Freud reiterates the notion that guilt is a originating cause of bungled actions. (171) Individual clumsy actions do not always have the same meaning but serve as a method of representing one purpose or another according to the circumstances. (173) Freud, in fact, points out that the double meaning of such terms as `falling,` stumbling,` and `slipping` demonstrate that they need not always be interpreted as accidental miscarriages of motor actions. (174) Rather, he suggests, there may be fantasies involved which can be represented by such losses of bodily equilibrium. Or, on the other hand, seemingly unintentional sexual activity and accidental actions may really be intentional--i.e., the clumsy actions may really be performed for sexual purposes. (175)

Many apparently accidental injuries that happen to people with severe psychoneuroses are in reality instances of self-injury. That is, an impulse to self punishment, which is constantly on the watch and usually finds expression through self-reproached or contributes to the formation of a symptom, takes advantage of an external situation or lends assistance to the situations until the desired injurious effect takes place. The impulse to self-punishment, furthermore, betrays its unconscious motivations by the striking composure the patients retain in what is supposed to be an accident. [See: "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" 1915 for a discussion of the death instinct] (179)

Thus Freud suggests, long before his postulate of the death instinct, that there are self-destructive elements in the unconscious which are skillfully disguised as mishaps. In fact Freud writes of the notion of unconscious intentions to self-punishment: "There is no need to think such self-destruction rare. For the trend to self-destruction is present to a certain degree in very many more human beings than those in whom it is carried out; self-injuries are as a rule a compromise between the instinct and the forces that are still working against it...." Thus, he concludes, even as an intention of suicide waits for its time, so does a unconscious intention wait for a originating occasion which can take over and liberate the intention from their suppressed state. (181)

To bring this chapter to a close, we may say that if a furious rage against oneself, one's life and integrity can be hidden behind apparently accidental clumsiness, so too, is it possible to transfer the same view to mistakes that seriously endanger the lives and health of others. (187)

CHAPTER 9: SYMPTOMATIC AND CHANCE ACTIONS:
The difference between bungled and chance actions is that the former "scorn the support of a conscious intention and are therefore not in need of a pretext." (191) They are said to appear on their own and are permitted to enter into consciousness because they are not suspected of having any aim or ambition. Thus they enter into motor activity by the virtue that the censor mechanism perceives nothing in them. They must be unobtrusive. Freud calls such actions symptomatic in that they give expression to something which the agent him or herself does not suspect in them and which he or she does not as a rule intend to impart to other actions. (191)

On page 192f Freud provides the reader with several examples from neurotic patients. He seems to suggests that symptomatic actions occur as symptoms in very obscure and round-about ways. (193) Freud goes on to list three groups of symptomatic actions, which are as follows:

habitual;
regularly occurring under certain circumstances; and
sporadically occurring.
Habitual occurrences are described as tics, et al, and should be dealt with as such. The regularly occurring symptomatic actions includes activities as doodling, jingling change in one's pocket, etc. Freud points out that during treatment idle play like this regularly conceals a sense of meaning which is denied any other form of expression and the person is usually completely unaware of these actions. (194)

On pages 195-210 Freud offers several examples of such behaviour. On page 202 Freud points out that in non-neurotics resistances may make up part of the disorder and this, Freud says, helps to make the symbolic meaning of the symptomatic act much clearer. That is, the disguised symbolic symptomatic action is hidden so as to afford relief from unconscious sources.

On 207 Freud takes up instances of misplacing or loosing objects. He claims that such instances of behaviour is due to the following:

a secrete intention of the loser;
a low estimation of the object's worth; and
a secrete antipathy felt towards the giver of the object is associated to the object itself.
To Freud the purposes of losing objects expresses a variety of impulses such as 1) the object is lost because it acts as a symbolic representation of a repressed thought; and, 2) more commonly, one loses the object as a kind of sacrificial `offering` to the obscure powers of destiny. (207)

On the next page Freud indicates that finding objects is also psychologically determined. For instance, in the case of finding money, Freud points out that it is often the case that several persons have passed by the money as it lie on the street until someone eventually picks it up. He speculates that this is so because the last person is unconscious, unlike all the others, had a predisposition towards finding the money. That is, the unconscious is in a state of "readiness to look for something." When this is the case it is more likely to lead to success than cases in which the individual has consciously directed his or her conscious intentions. (208-209) Indicating the import of such activities, Freud writes: "it is precisely such symptomatic acts that often offer the best approach to an understanding of people's intimate mental life." (210)

Sporadic actions: for instance two persons invite a third to breakfast, yet one of them places his or her coat over the remaining chairs thus giving a signal that they wish to be alone. (210) Freud believes that such sporadic actions result from a source of misunderstandings--misunderstandings in human relations. These are usually performed unconsciously by the first person and it may be considered to be tactless to point them out to the individual. (211) Freud indicates that this particular form of activity is often found in fictive writing. (212)

CHAPTER 10: ERRORS:
Errors in memory are distinguished from forgetting by paramnesia by the feature that in the former, the error (paramnesia) is not recognized as such but finds credence. In such cases `error` is used instead of `remembered wrongly.` This is so in cases where the emphasis is placed on a characteristic of objective reality in the psychical material we are trying to reproduce. That is, where what we are trying to remember is something different from a fact of our own psychical life. In this sense the antithesis to an error of memory is ignorance. Freud points out that he had provided several examples of such errors in The Interpretation of Dreams. At this point, Freud describes the mechanisms involved in errors. Keeping in line with drive theory, Freud notes that "Where an error makes its appearance a repression lies behind it--or more correctly, an insincerity, a distortion, which is ultimately rooted in repressed material." (217) Hence what one wants to suppress often succeeds against one's will in gaining access to what one wants to relate and appears in it in the form of an error which one fails to notice. (219) Hence we find "an unobserved error taking the place of an intentional concealment or repression." (220)

Freud points out that when one lies there is often the occurrence of parapraxis and this betrays the individual's lack of sincerity in such situations. Freud then indicates that of all parapraxes, errors seem to have the least rigid mechanism. That is, the occurrence of an error is a general indication that the mental activity in question has had to struggle with a disturbing influence but the particular form that the error takes is not determined by the quality of the concealed, disturbing idea. Thus slips are due to a disturbance caused by a mental process lying outside of our intention. From this perspective, Freud states that "all these forms of parapraxis are equivalent to one another." (E.g., slips, errors and bungled actions). (221-222)

CHAPTER 11: COMBINED PARAPRAXES: (230-239)
In this chapter Freud provides several examples of the combination of cases of forgetting and errors in remembering.

CHAPTER 12: DETERMINISM, BELIEF IN CHANGE AND SUPERSTITION--SOME POINTS OF VIEW:
What may possibly be the best way to characterize this chapter is found in the following: "certain shortcomings in our psychical functioning...and certain seemingly unintentional performances prove, if psycho-analytical methods of investigations are applied to them, to have valid motives and to be determined by motives unknown to consciousness." However, if such material is to be included in a class of phenomena explicable in this way, a psychical praxis must include the following:

not exceed certain dimensions fixed by our own judgment--that is, not exceed the limits of what is considered to be normal.
By nature it must be momentary and temporary--i.e., the same function must have been performed correctly previously or we must at all times believe ourselves capable of carrying out the activity. If corrected by others we must be capable of recognizing the rightness of the correction and the wrongness of the psychical process.
If we perceive a parapraxis at all, we must not be aware of any motives for it ourselves--rather we are tempted to explain it away as inattentiveness, etc. (239) Thus in this group of phenomena we find slips, forgetting, errors, misreadings, bungled actions and change actions. (240)

Answer 2

you ought to in no way ignore historic previous. after we start up ignoring/forgetting historic previous is even as the terrible issues repeat themselves. case in point, even as the U. S. went to invade Afghanistan, it forgot to ascertain historic previous, again contained in the 70's even as the U.S. (now Russia and previous Soviet Bloc international locations) tried it. They were there for 10 years, and it became a hellish 10 years. regardless of the truth that if something is terrible, horrendous, and abominable, we could continuously in no way ignore it, lest we repeat our mistakes.

Answer 3

New York city, Detroit, Los' Angelas, Miami

Answer 4

I know that getting a good bang on the head is sometimes good for forgetting. Coincidentally, that's exactly what you need right now.

Answer 5

My theme is forgetting. Let me start by saying... Damn... forgot what I was going to say!!

Answer 6

www.siue.edu/SPIN/forget.html

I hope this helps! Also, try www.webmd.com under symptoms

Answer 7

You know what....................I forgot about some websites. lol