Battle of the Bulge?

Question

I need a well written description of beginning, during and aftermath of the battle of the bulge.

Answer 1

The Ardennes Offensive (called Unternehmen: Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine) by the German military (Heeresgruppe B), officially named the Battle of the Ardennes by the U.S. Army (and known to the general public as the Battle of the Bulge), started on December 16, 1944.[1] Wacht am Rhein was supported by subordinate operations known as Bodenplatte, Greif, and Währung. The goal of these operations as planned by the Germans was to split the British and American Allied line in half, capturing Antwerp and then proceeding to encircle and destroy four Allied armies, forcing the Western Allies to negotiate a peace treaty in the Axis’s favor. The Ardennes attack was planned in total secrecy in almost total radio silence. Even Ultra (the Allies’ reading of secret German radio messages) revealed nothing about the upcoming buildup and offensive. Moreover, the degree of surprise achieved was compounded by Allied overconfidence, preoccupation with their own offensive plans, poor aerial reconnaissance, and the relative lack of combat contact by the U.S. 1st Army. Allied intelligence failed completely to detect the upcoming offensive and almost complete surprise against a weak section of the Allies' line was achieved at a time of heavy overcast when the Allies' strong air forces would be grounded. The “bulge” refers to the salient the Germans initially put into the Allies' line of advance, as seen in maps presented in newspapers of the time.[2][3]

Most of the American casualties occurred within the first three days of battle, when two of the 106th Division’s three regiments were forced to surrender. In its entirety, the “Battle of the Bulge” was the most bloody of the comparatively few European battles American forces experienced in WWII, the 19,000 American dead unsurpassed by any other engagement. For the U.S. Army, the Battle of the Ardennes incorporated more American troops and engaged more enemy troops than any American conflict prior to WWII. Although the German objective was ultimately unrealized, the Allies’ own offensive timetable was set back by months. In the wake of the defeat, many experienced German units were left severely depleted of men and equipment, as German survivors retreated to the defenses of the Siegfried Line.The German assault began on December 16, 1944, at 0530 hrs with a massive artillery barrage on the Allied troops facing the 6.SS Panzer-Armee. By 0800 all three German armies attacked through the Ardennes. In the northern sector Dietrich’s 6.SS Panzer-Armee assaulted Losheim Gap and the Elsenborn Ridge in an effort to break through to Liège. In the centre von Manteuffel's 5.Panzer-Armee attacked towards Bastogne and St. Vith, both road junctions of great strategic importance. In the south, Brandenberger's 7.Armee pushed towards Luxembourg in their efforts to secure the flank from Allied attacks.

Attacks by the 6.SS Panzer-Armee infantry units in the north fared badly due to unexpectedly fierce resistance by the U.S. 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions, at the Elsenborn Ridge, stalling their advance; this forced Dietrich to unleash his panzer forces early. Starting on December 16, however, snowstorms engulfed parts of the Ardennes area. While having the desired effect of keeping the Allied aircraft grounded, the weather also proved troublesome for the Germans as poor road conditions hampered their advance. Poor traffic control led to massive traffic jams and fuel shortages in forward units.

The Germans fared better in the center (the 20 mile wide Schnee Eifel sector) as they attacked positions held by the U.S. 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions. The remarkable feature here was that the German attackers lacked any such overwhelming strength as had been deployed in the north; but it succeeded in surrounding two regiments (422nd and 423rd) of the 106th Division in a pincer movement and forced their surrender. That was a tribute to the way that Manteuffel’s new tactics had been applied. The official U.S. Army history states: “At least seven thousand [men] were lost here and the figure probably is closer to eight or nine thousand. The amount lost in arms and equipment, of course, was very substantial. The Schnee Eifel battle, therefore, represents the most serious reverse suffered by American arms during the operations of 1944-45 in the European theater.”

Further south on Manteuffel’s front the main thrust was delivered by all attacking divisions crossing the River Our, then increasing the pressure on the key road centers of St. Vith and Bastogne. Panzer columns took the outlying villages. The struggle for these villages, and transport confusion on the German side, slowed the attack to allow the 101st Airborne Division (reinforced by elements from the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions) to reach Bastogne by truck on the morning of 19 December 1944. The fierce defence of Bastogne, in which American engineers particularly distinguished themselves, made it impossible for the Germans to rush the town, and the panzer columns swung past on either side, thus Bastogne was cut off on 20 December.

In the extreme south, Brandenberger’s three infantry divisions were checked after an advance of four miles by divisions of the U.S. VIII Corps; that front was then firmly held. Only the German 5.Fallschirmjäger-Division of Brandenberger’s command was able to thrust forward 12 miles on the inner flank to partially fulfill its assigned role.

Eisenhower and his principal commanders realised by 17 December that the fighting in the Ardennes was a major offensive and not a local counter-attack, and ordered vast reinforcements to the area. Within a week 250,000 troops had been sent. In addition, the 82nd Airborne Division was also thrown into the battle north of the bulge, near Liège.


[edit] Operation Stösser
Originally planned for the early hours of 16 December, Operation Stösser was delayed for a day because of bad weather and fuel shortages. The new drop time was set for 0300 hrs on December 17; their drop zone was 11 km north of Malmedy and their target was the "Baraque Michel" crossroads. Von der Heydte and his men were to take it and hold it for approximately twenty-four hours until being relieved by the 12.SS Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend, thereby hampering the Allied flow of reinforcements and supplies into the area.

Just after midnight 16 December/17 December 112 Ju 52 transport planes with around 1,300 Fallschirmjäger (German paratroopers) on board took off amid a powerful snowstorm, with strong winds and extensive low cloud cover. As a result, many planes went off-course, and men were dropped as far as a dozen kilometres away from the intended drop zone, with only a fraction of the force landing near it. Strong winds also took off-target those paratroopers whose planes were relatively close to the intended drop zone and made their landings far rougher.

By noon a group of around 300 managed to assemble, but this force was too small and too weak to counter the Allies. Colonel von der Heydte abandoned plans to take the crossroads and instead ordered his men to harass the Allied troops in the vicinity with guerrilla-like actions. Because of the extensive dispersal of the jump, with Fallschirmjäger being reported all over the Ardennes, the Allies believed a major divisional-sized jump had taken place, resulting in much confusion and causing them to allocate men to secure their rear instead of sending them off to the front to face the main German thrust.


[edit] Operation Greif
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
The 1st SS Panzer Division's Dash Westward, and Operation Greif
Otto Skorzeny. After Operation Greif he was called “the most dangerous man in Europe”Main article: Operation Greif
Skorzeny successfully infiltrated a small part of his battalion of disguised, English-speaking Germans behind the Allied lines. Although they failed to take the vital bridges over the Meuse, the battalion’s presence produced confusion out of all proportion to their military activities, and rumors spread like wildfire. Even General Patton was alarmed and, on December 17, described the situation to General Eisenhower as “Krauts… speaking perfect English… raising hell, cutting wires, turning road signs around, spooking whole divisions, and shoving a bulge into our defenses.”

Checkpoints were soon set up all over the Allied rear, greatly slowing the movement of soldiers and equipment. Military policemen drilled servicemen on things which every American was expected to know, such as the identity of Mickey Mouse’s girlfriend, baseball scores, or the capital of Illinois. This latter question resulted in the brief detention of General Omar Bradley himself; although he gave the correct answer—Springfield—the GI who questioned him apparently believed that the capital was Chicago.

The tightened security nonetheless made things harder for the German infiltrators, and some of them were captured. Even during interrogation they continued their goal of spreading disinformation; when asked about their mission, some of them claimed they had been told to go to Paris to either kill or capture General Eisenhower. Security around the general was greatly increased, and he was confined to his headquarters. Because these prisoners had been captured in American uniform they were later executed by firing squad; this was the standard practice of every army at the time, although it was left ambiguous under the Geneva Convention, which merely stated that soldiers had to wear uniforms that distinguished them as combatants. In addition, Skorzeny was aware that under international law such an operation would be well within its boundaries as long as they were wearing their German uniforms when firing. Skorzeny and his men were fully aware of their likely fate, and most wore their German uniforms underneath their Allied ones in case of capture. Skorzeny himself avoided capture, survived the war and may have been involved with the Nazi ODESSA ratline escape network.


[edit] Malmedy massacre

The Malmedy massacreMain article: Malmedy massacre
In the north the main armoured spearhead of the 6.SS Panzer-Armee, Kampfgruppe Peiper, consisting of 4,800 men and 600 vehicles under the command of Waffen-SS Colonel Jochen Peiper, pushed west into Belgium. At 0700 hrs December 17 they seized a U.S. fuel depot at Büllingen, where they paused to refuel before continuing westward. At 12:30 hrs, near the hamlet of Baugnez, on the height halfway between the town of Malmedy and Ligneuville, they encountered elements of the American 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. After a brief battle the Americans surrendered. They were disarmed and, with some other Americans captured earlier (approximately 150 people), sent to stand in a field near the crossroads. Here they were all shot. It is not known what caused the shooting and there is no record of an SS officer giving an execution order; such shootings of prisoners of war (POWs), however, were more common by both sides on the Eastern Front. News of the killings raced through Allied lines. Afterwards, it became common for soldiers to take no SS or Fallschirmjäger soldiers prisoner. Captured SS soldiers who were part of Kampfgruppe Peiper were tried in the Malmedy massacre trial following the war.

The fighting went on and, by the evening, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division spearhead had pushed north to engage the U.S. 99th Infantry Division and Kampfgruppe Peiper arrived in front of Stavelot. He was already behind the timetable as it took 36 hours to advance from Eifel to Stavelot; it had taken just 9 hours in 1940. As the Americans fell back they blew up bridges and fuel dumps, denying the Germans critically needed fuel and further slowing their progress.


[edit] The Wereth 11
Main Article: Wereth 11
Another, much smaller, massacre was committed in Wereth, Belgium, approximately a thousand yards north-east of Saint-Vith, on 17 December 1944. Eleven African-Americans, after surrendering peacefully, were tortured and then shot by men of the 1.SS-Division, belonging to Kampfgruppe Hansen. The identity of the murderers remains unknown, and the perpetrators were never punished for this crime.


[edit] The assault of Kampfgruppe Peiper

SS Sturmbahnführer Joachim PeiperPeiper entered Stavelot on December 18 but encountered fierce resistance by the American defenders. Unable to defeat the American force in the area, he left a smaller support force in town and headed for the bridge at Trois-Ponts with the bulk of his forces, but by the time he reached it, the retreating U.S. engineers had already destroyed it. Peiper pulled off and headed for the village of La Gleize and from there on to Stoumont. There, as Peiper approached, the American engineers blew up the bridge and the American troops were entrenched and ready to fight a bitter battle.

His troops were cut off from the main German force and supplies when the Americans recaptured the poorly defended Stavelot on December 19. As their situation in Stoumont was becoming hopeless, Peiper decided to pull back to La Gleize where he set up his defences waiting for the German relief force. As no relief force was able to penetrate the Allied line, on December 23 Peiper decided to break through back to the German lines. The men of the Kampfgruppe were forced to abandon their vehicles and heavy equipment, although most of the unit was able to escape.


[edit] St. Vith
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St. Vith is lostIn the centre, the town of St. Vith, a vital road junction, presented the main challenge for both von Manteuffel’s and Dietrich’s forces. The defenders, led by the U.S. 7th Armored Division, and also including one regiment of the U.S. 106th Infantry Division, and additional elements of the U.S. 9th Armored Division and U.S. 28th Infantry Division, all under the command of General Bruce C. Clarke, successfully resisted the German attacks, thereby significantly slowing the German advance. Under orders, St. Vith was given up on December 21; U.S. troops fell back to entrenched positions in the area, presenting an imposing obstacle to a successful German advance. By December 23, as the Germans shattered their flanks, the defenders’ position became untenable and U.S. troops were ordered to retreat west of the Salm River. As the German plan called for the capture of St. Vith by 1800 hrs December 17, the prolonged action in and around it presented a major blow to their timetable.


[edit] Bastogne

Wacht am Rhein—the German offensive, 16–25 December 1944Main article: Battle of Bastogne
On December 19, the senior Allied commanders met in a bunker in Verdun. Eisenhower, realizing that the Allies could destroy German forces much more easily when they were out in the open and on the offensive than if they were on the defensive, told the generals, “The present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster. There will be only cheerful faces at this table.” Patton, realizing what Eisenhower implied, responded, “Hell, let’s have the guts to let the bastards go all the way to Paris. Then, we’ll really cut ’em off and chew ’em up.” Eisenhower asked Patton how long it would take to turn his 3rd Army (then located in south-central France) north to counterattack. He said he could do it in 48 hours, to the disbelief of the other generals present. Before he had gone to the meeting, in fact, Patton had ordered his staff to prepare to turn north; by the time Eisenhower asked him how long it would take the movement was already underway (Citizen Soldiers, p 208). On 20 December, Eisenhower removed the 1st and 9th American Armies from Bradley’s 12th Army Group and placed them under Montgomery’s 21st Army Group command.

By December 21 the German forces had surrounded Bastogne, which was defended by the 101st Airborne Division and Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division. Conditions inside the perimeter were tough—most of the medical supplies and medical personnel had been captured. Food was scarce, and ammunition was so low that artillery crews were forbidden to fire on advancing Germans unless there was a large, heavy concentration of them. Despite determined German attacks, however, the perimeter held. The German commander sent this request to the American commander in Bastogne.

To the USA Commander of the encircled town of Bastogne: The fortune of war is changing. This time strong German armored units have encircled the USA forces in and near Bastogne. . . . There is only one possibility to save the encircled USA troops from total annihilation; that is the honorable surrender of the encircled town. . . . If this proposal is rejected, one German Artillery Corps and six heavy AA Battalions are ready to annihilate USA troops … all the serious civilian losses caused by this artillery fire would not correspond with the well-known American humanity. . . . —The German Commander
When General Anthony McAuliffe was awakened by this German invitation to surrender, he gave a reply of annoyance that has been variously reported and was probably unprintable. There is no disagreement, however, as to what he wrote on the paper delivered to the Germans: “NUTS!” That reply had to be explained, both to the Germans and to non-American Allies.[6]

Rather than launching one simultaneous attack all around the perimeter, the German forces concentrated their assaults on several individual locations attacked in sequence. Although this compelled the defenders to constantly shift reinforcements in order to repel each attack, it tended to dissipate the Germans’ numerical advantage.


[edit] The Meuse
To protect the crossings on the Meuse at Givet, Dinant and Namur, on the 19 December Montgomery ordered those few units available to hold the bridges. This led to a hastily assembled force including rear echelon troops, military police and Army Air Force personnel. The British 29th Armoured Brigade, which had turned in its tanks for re-equipping, was told to take back their tanks and head to the area. XXX Corps in Holland began their move to the area.


[edit] Allied counter-offensive

The Germans fell far short of achieving their objectivesOn 23 December the weather conditions started improving, allowing the Allied air forces to attack. They launched devastating bombing raids on the German supply points in their rear, and P-47s started attacking the German troops on the roads. The Allied air forces also helped the defenders of Bastogne, dropping much-needed supplies—medicine, food, blankets and ammunition. A team of volunteer surgeons flew in by glider and began operating in a tool room.

By December 24 the German advance was effectively stalled short of the Meuse River. Units of the British XXX Corps were holding the bridges at Dinant, Givet, and Namur and U.S. units were about to take over. The Germans had outrun their supply lines and shortages of fuel and ammunition were becoming critical. Up to this point the German losses had been light, notably in armour, which was almost untouched with the exception of Peiper’s losses. On the evening of the 24th, General Hasso von Manteuffel recommended to Hitler’s Military Adjutant a halt to all offensive operations and a withdrawal back to the West Wall. Hitler rejected this.

Patton’s Third Army was now battling to relieve Bastogne. At 16:50 on December 26, the lead element of the 37th Tank Battalion of the 4th Armored Division reached Bastogne, ending the siege.

Charles Boggess drove the first vehicle from the 4th Armored into the lines of the 101st Airborne. He was followed by Capt. William Dwight. “How are you, General?” Dwight asked General McAuliffe, who had driven out to the perimeter to greet them. “Gee, I’m mighty glad to see you,” McAuliffe replied'. (Citizen Soldiers, p 248).

[edit] Germans strike back
On 1 January, in an attempt to keep the offensive going, the Germans launched two new operations. At 09:15, the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte, a major campaign against Allied airfields in the Low Countries. Hundreds of planes attacked Allied airfields, destroying or severely damaging some 465 aircraft. However, the Luftwaffe lost 277 planes, 62 to Allied fighters and 172 mostly because of an unexpectedly high number of Allied flak guns, set up to protect against German V-1 flying bomb attacks, but also due to friendly fire from the German flak guns that were uninformed of the pending large-scale German air operation. While the Allies recovered from their losses in just days, the operation left the Luftwaffe “weaker than ever and incapable of mounting any major attack again.” (A World At Arms, p 769, Gerhard Weinberg).

On the same day, German Army Group G launched a major offensive against the thinly stretched, 110 km line of the U.S. 7th Army. Operation Nordwind, the last major German offensive of the war on the Western Front, soon had the weakened U.S. 7th Army, which had, at Eisenhower’s orders, sent troops, equipment, and supplies north to reinforce the American armies in the Ardennes, in dire straits. By 15 January, the 7th Army’s VI Corps was fighting for its very life on three sides in Alsace. With casualties mounting, and running short on replacements, tanks, ammunition, and supplies, 7th Army was forced to withdraw to defensive positions on the south bank of the Moder River on 21 January. The German offensive finally drew to a close on 25 January. In the bitter, desperate fighting of Operation Nordwind, VI Corps, which had borne the brunt of the fighting suffered a total of 14,716 casualties. The total for the 7th Army is unclear, but the total casualties included at least 9,000 wounded and 17,000 sick and injured.(Smith and Clark, “Riviera To The Rhine,” p. 527.)


[edit] Allies prevail
While the German offensive had ground to a halt, they still controlled a dangerous salient in the Allied line. Patton’s Third Army in the south, centred around Bastogne, would attack north, Montgomery’s forces in the north would strike south, and the two forces planned to meet at Houffalize.

The temperature during January 1945 was unseasonably low. Trucks had to be run every half hour or the oil in them would freeze, and weapons would freeze. The offensive went forward regardless.


Erasing the Bulge—The Allied counter-attack, 26 December – 25 JanuaryEisenhower wanted Montgomery to go on the offensive on January 1, with the aim of meeting up with Patton's advancing Third Army and cutting off most of the attacking Germans, trapping them in a pocket. However, refusing to risk underprepared infantry in a snowstorm for a strategically unimportant area, Montgomery did not launch the attack until 3 January, by which time substantial numbers of German troops had already managed to successfully disengage, albeit with the loss of their heavy equipment.

At the start of the offensive, the two Armies were separated by about 40 km. American progress in the south was also restricted to about a kilometer a day. The majority of the German force executed a successful fighting withdrawal and escaped the battle area, although the fuel situation had become so dire that most of the German armour had to be abandoned. On 7 January 1945, Hitler agreed to withdraw forces from the Ardennes, including the SS Panzer Divisions, thus ending all offensive operations.


[edit] Controversy in the Allied high command
On the same day as Hitler’s withdrawal order, 7 January, Montgomery held a press conference at Zonhoven in which he gave credit for the victory to the “courage and good fighting quality” of the American troops, characterizing a typical American as a “very brave fighting man who has that tenacity in battle which makes a great soldier.” He went on to talk about the necessity of Allied teamwork, and praised Eisenhower, stating that “Teamwork wins battles and battle victories win wars. On our team, the captain is General Ike.”

The conference caused some controversy when his comments were interpreted as self-promoting, particularly his claiming that when the situation “began to deteriorate,” Eisenhower had placed him in command in the north. Patton and Eisenhower both felt this was a misrepresentation of the relative share of the fighting played by the British and Americans in the Ardennes. In the context of Patton and Montgomery’s well-known antipathy, Montgomery’s failure to mention the contribution of any American general beside Eisenhower was seen as insulting. Focusing exclusively on his own generalship, Montgomery continued to say that he thought the counter-offensive had gone very well but did not explain the reason for his delayed attack on January 3. He later attributed this to needing more time for preparation on the northern front. According to Churchill, the attack from the south under Patton was steady but slow and involved heavy losses, and Montgomery claimed to be trying to avoid this situation.

Montgomery subsequently recognized his error and later wrote: “I think now that I should never have held that press conference. So great were the feelings against me on the part of the American generals that whatever I said was bound to be wrong. I should therefore have said nothing.” Eisenhower commented in his own memoirs: “I doubt if Montgomery ever came to realize how resentful some American commanders were. They believed he had belittled them—and they were not slow to voice reciprocal scorn and contempt.”

Bradley and Patton both threatened to resign unless Montgomery’s command was changed. Subsequently Bradley started to court the press, and it was stated that he would rarely leave headquarters “without at least fifteen newspapermen”; it has been suggested that he and Patton began to leak information detrimental to Montgomery. Eisenhower, encouraged by his British deputy, Tedder, was minded to sack Montgomery. However, intervention by Montgomery’s and Eisenhower’s Chiefs of Staff, Major-General Freddie de Guingand, and Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith allowed Eisenhower to reconsider and Montgomery to apologize.


[edit] Strategic situation after the Bulge
Although the German advance was halted, the overall situation remained dangerous. On 6 January Winston Churchill once again asked Stalin for support. On 12 January, the Red Army launched the Vistula-Oder Offensive in Poland and East Prussia. Soviet sources claim this was done ahead of schedule, while most Western sources doubt it, and instead claim the Soviet offensive was delayed because of the situation in the West, with Stalin waiting until both sides had militarily exhausted themselves.

The Battle of the Bulge officially ended when the two American forces met up on 15 January 1945.


[edit] Aftermath

Battle of the Bulge memorial in BelgiumCasualty estimates from the battle vary widely. The official US account lists 80,987 American casualties, while other estimates range from 70,000 to 104,000. British losses totaled 1,400. The German High Command’s official figure for the campaign was 84,834 casualties, and other estimates range between 60,000 and 100,000.

The Allies pressed their advantage following the battle. By the beginning of February 1945, the lines were roughly where they had been in December 1944. In early February, the Allies launched an attack all along the Western front: in the north under Montgomery toward Aachen; in the center, under Courtney Hodges; and in the south, under Patton. Montgomery’s behavior during the months of December and January, including the press conference on January 7 where he downplayed the contribution of the American generals, further soured his relationship with his American counterparts through to the end of the war.

The German losses in the battle were critical in several respects: the last of the German reserves were now gone; the Luftwaffe had been broken; and the German Army in the West was being pushed back. Most importantly, the Eastern Front was now ripe for the taking. In the East, the German Army was unable to halt the Soviet juggernaut. German forces were sent reeling on two fronts and never recovered.

The Americans were short of available in-theater reinforcements. The American Military History says:

“Faced with a shortage of infantry replacements during the enemy’s counteroffensive General Eisenhower offered ***** soldiers in service units an opportunity to volunteer for duty with the infantry. More than 4,500 responded, many taking reductions in grade in order to meet specified requirements. The 6th Army Group formed these men into provisional companies, while the 12th Army Group employed them as an additional platoon in existing rifle companies. The excellent record established by these volunteers, particularly those serving as platoons, presaged major postwar changes in the traditional approach to employing ***** troops

Answer 2

For a bibliography try to look at http://www.ricerchemilitari.it selecting "Battles - Ardennes 1944" from the "Sector (research by list)" field.

Answer 3

If you have time to ask this question you have time to search the internet for your answer or read the chapter in your U.S. History book given to you by your teacher.

Answer 4

Oh, let me get right on that. Sounds like homework . . .

Answer 5

Good luck finding that.

Answer 6

Well, Google it and don't plagerize!

Answer 7

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_bulge

Contains everything you requested.