Is coreferential thought grounded in the need for warranted inference?

Answer 1

Talk about evidence and appropriate rules for consequence is meta-linguistic. There's no need that we have multiple systems of representation in any theory if we happen to constantly get it right. I mean, that there are multiple aspects or interpretations of an object seems to be a very contingent fact. But yeah, I agree that this kind of discursive dialogue, or competition among theories helps to generate our meta vocabulary for judging the best way to represent something.

Dretske is famous for making this really important to make a representation clear: we need a virtually open system that can describe phenomena from an infinity of perspectives to deliver our standards of right/wrong. Without that capacity, we have just disjunctions and no determination as to which POV is actually referring.

But all this transcends our practice as language users. How is Wittgenstein wrong here? We get the inference right if the fkn community is on board with whatever elimation rule we employ. There may be no unifying theory for everything, and coreference is just a very organic outcome of our need to use varying language games with untranslatable domains. But if you want a warranted inference, there's literally nothing 'out there' but our accepting it as a custom.

Answer 2

Not necessarily so. It is grounded in itself.

Answer 3

I don't know, but i do know that that the verbal diarroeah gang is in town.