What is weak foundationalism?

Answer 1

The common thesis of all versions of empirical foundationalism is that some empirical beliefs have a degree of noninferential epistemic justification, justification that does not derive from other empirical beliefs in a way which would require those beliefs to be antecedently justified. One way of distinguishing specific versions of foundationalism, though not in the end the most revealing, is in terms of the precise degree of non‑inferential epistemic justification which these "basic beliefs" are held to possess. In this regard there are three main views. The most obvious interpretation of the foundationalist response to the regress problem yields a view which I will call moderate foundationalism. According to moderate foundationalism, the noninferential warrant possessed by basic beliefs is sufficient by itself to satisfy the adequate‑justification condition for knowledge. Thus on this view a basic belief, if true, is automatically an instance of knowledge (assuming that Gettier problems do not arise) and hence fully acceptable as a premise for the justification of further empirical beliefs. By virtue of their complete justificatory independence from other empirical beliefs, such basic beliefs are eminently suitable for a foundational role.

Weak foundationalism is a version of foundationalism because it holds that there are basic beliefs having some degree, though a relatively low one, of noninferential epistemic justification. But weak foundationalism differs substantially from historically more orthodox versions of foundationalism. In particular, the weak foundationalist response to the regress problem (which is usually not made particularly clear) must differ significantly from that of the moderate foundationalist. The weak foundationalist cannot say, as does the moderate foundationalist, that the regress of justifying arguments simply comes to an end when basic beliefs are reached. For the weak foundationalist's basic beliefs are not adequately justified on their own to serve as justifying premises for everything else. The weak foundationalist solution to this problem is to attempt to augment the justification of both basic and nonbasic beliefs by appealing to the concept of coherence. Very roughly, if a suitably large, suitably coherent system can be built, containing a reasonably high proportion of one's initially credible basic beliefs together with nonbasic beliefs, then it is claimed, the justification of all the beliefs in the system, basic and nonbasic, may be increased to the point of being adequate for knowledge, where achieving high enough degree of coherence may necessitate the rejection of some of one's basic beliefs.

Thus understood, weak foundationalism represents a kind of hybrid between moderate foundationalism and the coherence theories mentioned earlier and is often thought to embody the virtues of both and the vices of neither. The weak foundationalist does appear to have an adequate answer to the first of the standard objections to the coherence theory set forth earlier: the choice between equally coherent systems is made by determining which system contains a greater quantity (however exactly this is to be measured) of these basic beliefs. And while it is much less clear how the other two objections to coherence theories are to be answered, especially the second, the weak foundationalist seems at least to have a good deal more room for maneuver. Finally, it is usually thought that weak foundationalism, by virtue of making a weaker claim on behalf of the foundational beliefs, is more defensible than moderate foundationalism.

Answer 2

Weak foundationalism is a version of foundationalism because it holds that there are basic beliefs having some degree, though a relatively low one, of noninferential epistemic justification. But weak foundationalism differs substantially from historically more orthodox versions of foundationalism. In particular, the weak foundationalist response to the regress problem (which is usually not made particularly clear) must differ significantly from that of the moderate foundationalist. The weak foundationalist cannot say, as does the moderate foundationalist, that the regress of justifying arguments simply comes to an end when basic beliefs are reached. For the weak foundationalist's basic beliefs are not adequately justified on their own to serve as justifying premises for everything else. The weak foundationalist solution to this problem is to attempt to augment the justification of both basic and nonbasic beliefs by appealing to the concept of coherence. Very roughly, if a suitably large, suitably coherent system can be built, containing a reasonably high proportion of one's initially credible basic beliefs together with nonbasic beliefs, then it is claimed, the justification of all the beliefs in the system, basic and nonbasic, may be increased to the point of being adequate for knowledge, where achieving high enough degree of coherence may necessitate the rejection of some of one's basic beliefs

Answer 3

That's when water makes you house start to sink.