Is the proposition "Nothing is red and green all over" true or false?
2006-09-08
01:59:20
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4 answers
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asked by
sokrates
4
in
Arts & Humanities
➔ Philosophy
Remember that I am concerned with metaphysical possibility, not with our possible perception of colors.
2006-09-08
02:15:13 ·
update #1
To be specific, my questions pertains to metaphysical possibility. Therefore, it does not matter whether red or green exist outside of my perception of things. I am well acquainted with metaphysical history in general. I know about the Kantian critique of metaphysics and his Copernican revolution. But the point does not seem particularly germane to my question. Whether red and green are phenomena or noumena is not all that relevant. I am talking about whether it is metaphysically possible for a given entity to be red and green all over. It doesn't matter whether the entity is a possible apple, car or house. The point is whether this entity is a metaphysical possibility.
2006-09-08
07:17:36 ·
update #2
Metaphysics is the theory of ultimate reality or the science of being qua being. It deals with what is behind the appearances or what might really exist.
2006-09-08
07:38:59 ·
update #3
'Although the term terms "ontology" and "metaphysics" are far from being univocal and determinate in philosophical jargon, an important distinction seems often enough to be marked by them. What we may call ontology is the attempt to say what entities exist. Metaphysics, by contrast, is the attempt to say, of those entities, what they are. In effect, one’s ontology is one’s list of entities, while one’s metaphysics is an explanatory theory about the nature of those entities.'
Quoted from: http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/ontology.html
2006-09-08
07:43:17 ·
update #4
Metaphysics (among other things) deals with what is beyond phenomenal appearances. It concerns itself with ultimate reality. It is very difficult for me to believe that a contradictory state of affairs can obtain in any metaphysical entity. If something is red/green all over, then we have a contradictory state of affairs. It is not even necessary to qualify this state of affairs by saying that nothing may be A and not A in the same time and the same respect. One can simply state that nothing is red and green all over, without any type of qualification. The very phenomenon of color prevents such a contradictory state of affairs from ever obtaining. Aristotle's law of noncontradiction thus applies de re and de dicto.
2006-09-11
02:39:30 ·
update #5