What if a moral agent ought to "x" but can't?

Question

Given the statement:

If you ought to, you can
If you can't, you ought not

What if the agent is in a deadly situation, say they ought to swim so that the don't drown but they can't, then they still ought to right? So does the ought transfer to another moral agent, who should save them? Or is this a flawed principle to begin with?

Answer 1

I think my problem is with the statement that you assume as a given--"If you ought to, you can--If you can't, you ought not." I'm not sure why we should accept that as a principle. Of course, this will also depend on what moral theory we are going to apply.

For example, in utilitarianism the moral principle is to perform the action which will bring about the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people from among those actions which are available to me. Since utilitarian doctrine limits the decision to those actions which are possible, then it is implied that the person is capable of performing the right action.

But utilitarianism is not agreed upon as the best moral theory--most serious philosophers prefer a deontological approach. And your follow-up statement implies this, where you are considering a situation where morality dictates a certain type of action but the agent finds himself unable to comply. For whatever reason (you did not specify why the agent could not swim in this scenario), the agent is incapable of performing the moral action.

And this is a tragic reality. No one ever said that morality was easy. There is no guarantee that the morally correct action is an action that is possible to be accomplished. That's why morality is a lofty goal.

Now many of these theories will make concessions of sorts for this type of situation. Clearly the agent who is incapable of performing the right action will be--in some sense--justified in his immoral action. How seriously does this count against him? That will vary. Aristotle, for example, said that a person's morality is best measured over a lifetime, so a single instance in which the moral choice was impossible would not weigh heavily against the assessment of the individual.

So it seems that the principle with which you are beginning is questionable--it is not at all clear that "ought" implies "can." Indeed, it would seem to trivialize morality if it were so, because the assumption would be that every agent in every situation could easily do the right thing if he simply chose to do so. But we don't have a good reason to think that being moral should be easy.

Answer 2

It's a poorly applied principle in this example. The "ought to" can only refer to a course of action which, by implication, includes an element of moral choice. Swimming has nothing to do with moral choice.

Also, moral issues usually revolve around one's treatment of others, or about one's treatment of themselves as it effects others.

Neither apply in your example.

Answer 3

Your principle is silly, as I suspect you know. The correct principle is:

If we ought in principle and can in practice, then we ought in practice.

Or, as Immanuel Kant put it:

Ought implies can.

Answer 4

The question is, who has defined what they "ought" to do. The one who has the authority to make that definition is the one who holds the answer.

Answer 5

"ought" implies "can"