General Custer at Little Big Horn River...?

Question

Is G.W.Custer can be considered as a Hero or a Roughless soldier to-day ?

Answer 1

Read this:- then you decide!! It don't sound good to me!!

Battle of the Little Bighorn
The Battle of the Little Bighorn, also called Custer's Last Stand, was an engagement between a Lakota-Northern Cheyenne combined force and the 7th Cavalry of the United States Army, June 25- June 26, 1876, near the Little Bighorn River in the eastern Montana Territory. The battle was the most famous incident in the Indian Wars and was a remarkable victory for the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. The U.S. cavalry detachment commanded by Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer was killed to the last man, but overall, the majority of U.S. soldiers survived the fight.
The U.S. forces were sent to attack the Indians based on Indian Inspector E.C. Watkins' report (issued on November 9, 1875) that stated that hundreds of Lakota and Northern Cheyenne associated with Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse were hostile to the United States. U.S. interest in Indian lands (including the gold-rich Black Hills) also played an important role.

As the larger wing of the troops under Gen. Alfred Terry, Custer's force arrived at an overlook 14 miles (23 km) east of the Little Bighorn River in what is now the state of Montana, on the night of June 24. The rest of the column was marching toward the mouth of the Little Bighorn, to provide a blocking action by the 26th.

The presence of what was judged a very large encampment of Indians was reported to Custer by his Crow Indian scouts. Despite this warning, on June 25, Custer divided his regiment into four commands and moved forward to attack the encamped Indians, who were expected to flee at the first sign of attack. The first battalion to attack was commanded by Major Marcus Reno and preceded by about a dozen Arikara and friendly Sioux scouts. His orders, given by Custer without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, were to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle." However, Custer did promise to "support...Reno with the whole outfit." Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today called Reno Creek, and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and ...not running away."

Sending a message to Custer, but hearing nothing in return, Reno launched its offensive northward. He stopped a few hundred yards short of the village, however, and dismounted, unwilling to attack the enormous village with his roughly 125 men. In about 20 minutes of long distance firing, he had taken only one casualty, but the odds against him had become more obvious, and Custer had not reinforced him. Reno ordered a retreat to nearby woods, and then made a disorderly withdrawal to the river and up to the top of the bluffs on the other side, suffering heavy casualties along the way. Reno was at the head of this movement and called it a charge; no bugle calls were heard, and a number of men were left in the woods. The river crossing was unguarded, and a number of men died there.


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At the top of the bluffs, Reno's force was met by a battalion commanded by Captain Frederick Benteen This force had been on a lateral scouting mission, and had been summoned by Custer to "Come on...big village, be quick...bring pacs..." Benteen's coincidental arrival on the bluffs was just in time to save Reno's men from annihilation. This combined force was then reinforced by a smaller command escorting the expedition's pack train. Benteen did not continue on towards Custer for at least an hour, in spite of the fact that heavy gunfire was heard from the north. Benteen's inactivity prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders to "march to the sound of the guns."

The gunfire heard on the bluffs (by everyone except Reno and Benteen) was from Custer's fight. His 210 men engaged the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne (or had been engaged by them) some 3.5 miles (6 km) to the north. Having driven Reno's force if not into oblivion, at least into chaos, the warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" has been a subject of debate. It does seem clear that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north, and climbed up the bluffs, reaching the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. From this point, he could see Reno, on the other side of the river, charging the village.

Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsucessfully to cross into the village. Other authorities believe that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. By the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered by the Indians who came from the Reno fight, according to this theory, it was too late to break through back to the south, where Reno and Benteen could have provided reinforcement.

Within about 2 hours, Custer's battalion was annihilated to the last man. Only two men from the U.S. side later claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians: a young Crow whose name translated as Curley, and a trooper named Peter Thompson, who had fallen behind Custer's column. Accounts of the last moments of Custer's forces vary, but all agree that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of Lakota who overwhelmed the cavalrymen. While exact numbers are difficult to determine, it is clear that the Northern Cheyenne and Lakota outnumbered the U.S. force by approximately 3:1, a ratio which was extended to 5:1 during the piecemeal parts of the battle. In addition, some of the Indians were armed with repeating Sharps and Winchester rifles, while the U.S. forces carried single-shot carbines, which had a slow rate of fire, tended to jam, and were difficult to operate from horseback.

After their fight with Custer was finished, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne came back to attack the remaining military forces under Benteen and Reno, who had finally ventured toward the audible firing of the Custer fight. For 24 hours, the outcome of this struggle was in doubt, but Benteen's leadership secured the U.S. lines. At this point, the U.S. forces under Terry approached from the north, and the Indians drew off to the south.

The Indian dead had mostly been removed from the field. The cavalry dead were given hasty burials, and the wounded were given what treatment was available at that time; six would later die of their wounds. Custer was found to have been shot in the temple and in the left chest; either wound would have been fatal. He may also have been shot in the arm. He was found near the top of the hill where the large obelisk now stands, inscribed with the names of the U.S. dead. Most of the dead had been stripped of their clothing, mutilated, and were in an advanced state of deterioration, such that identification of many of the bodies was impossible. From the evidence, it was impossible to determine what exactly had transpired, but there was not much evidence of prolonged organized resistance. Several days after the battle, the young Crow scout Curly gave an account of the battle which indicated that Custer had attacked the village after crossing the river at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee and had been driven back across the river, retreating up the slope to the hill where his body was later found. This scenario seemed compatible with Custer's aggressive style of warfare, and with some of the evidence found on the ground, and formed the basis for many of the popular accounts of the battle.

Of the U.S. forces killed at Little Bighorn, 210 died with Custer while another 52 died serving under Reno. Six men died later as a result of wounds. Among the casualties were several members of Custer's family, including his younger brothers Boston and Thomas Custer, nephew Autie Reed, and brother-in-law James Calhoun. Casualty figures on the Indian side included perhaps 40 killed. The battle was the subject of an army Court of Inquiry in 1879 in which Reno's conduct was scrutinized. Some testimony was presented suggesting that he was drunk and a coward, but since none of this came from army officers, Reno was not officially condemned. Other factors have been identified which may have contributed to the outcome of the fight: it is apparent that a number of the cavalry troopers were inexperienced and poorly trained. Benteen has been criticized for "dawdling" on the first day of the fight, and disobeying Custer's order. Both Reno and Benteen were heavy drinkers whose subsequent careers were truncated. Terry has been criticized for his tardy arrival on the scene.

Custer's contributions to the U.S. defeat were, at least, faulty intelligence and poor communication, which resulted in an uncoordinated attack against a larger force. For years a debate raged as to whether Custer himself had disobeyed Terry's order not to attack the village until reinforcements arrived. Finally, almost a hundred years after the fight, a document surfaced which indicated that Terry actually had given Custer considerable freedom to do as he saw fit. Custer's widow actively affected the historiography of the battle by suppressing criticism of her husband. A number of participants decided to wait for her death before disclosing what they knew... however, she outlived almost all of them. As a result, the event was recreated along tragic Victorian lines in numerous books, films and other media. The story of Custer's purported heroic attack across the river, however, was undermined by the account of participant Gall, who told Lieutenant Edward S. Godfrey that Custer never came near the river. Godfrey incorporated this into his important publication in 1892 in The Century Magazine. In spite of this, however, Custer's legend was embedded in the American imagination as a heroic American officer fighting valiantly against savage forces.

By the end of the 20th Century, the general recognition of the mistreatment of the various Native American nations in the conquest of the American west, and the perception of Custer's role in it, have changed the image of the battle and of Custer. The Little Bighorn is now popularly viewed as the confrontation between a reckless and ambitious agent of U.S. expansion against courageous warriors defending their land and way of life. It should be noted that most of the occupants of the large village attacked by Custer were non-combatants.

The memorials to U.S. troops have now been supplemented by markers celebrating the Indians who fought there. Many of the Native Americans in the fight, including Crazy Horse, played a leading role in this battle and the Battle of Rosebud one week before. On Memorial Day, 1999, the first of five red granite markers denoting where warriors fell during the battle were placed on the battlefield for Cheyenne warriors, Lame White Man and Noisy Walking The warrior markers dot the ravines and hillsides like the white marble markers representing where soldiers fell. Since then, markers have been added for the Sans Arc Lakota warrior Long Road and the Minniconjou Lakota Dog's Back Bone. On June 25, 2003, an unknown Lakota warrior marker was placed on Wooden Leg Hill, east of Last Stand Hill to honor a warrior who was killed during the battle as witnessed by the Northern Cheyenne warrior Wooden Leg. The first Indian Memorial was dedicated on June 25, 2003.

The bill that changed the name of the battlefield from Custer Battlefield National Monument to Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument also called for an Indian Memorial to be built near Last Stand Hill. President George H. W. Bush signed the bill into law on December 10, 1991. The Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument is located in southeastern Montana near Crow Agency, Montana and administered by the National Park Service.

Further reading

Ambrose, Stephen E., Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors, 1975. ISBN 0-385-47966-2

Gray, John S., Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed, Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1991. ISBN 0-803-27040-2

Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), Men with Custer: Biographies of the 7th Cavalry: June 25, 1876 , Hardin, MT: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 2000.

Scott, Douglas, Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2000, ISBN 0-806-13292-2.

Tillet, Leslie & Crowell, Thomas Y. (editors), Wind on the Buffalo Grass, The Indians' Own Account of the Battle at the Little Big Horn River, & the Death of their Life on the Plains, New York, 1976, ISBN 0-690-01155-5.

Utley, Robert, Custer: Cavalier in Buckskin, Univ. of Oklahoma Press; Revised edition (June 2001),ISBN 0-806-13347-3.

Answer 2

Custer being totally unaware of the size of the force he was attacking split his command into three columns, the 286 troops he took direct command of in the attack, a 2nd column under Reno and a 3rd column under Bentine. Colonel Custer assumed that he was attacking an inferior force consisting of mostly older men, young boys, women and children despite being warned by Indian Scouts that it was a very large emcampment at the Little Big Horn. Custer's concept of the battle was to attack head on and have Reno or Bentine block any escapes on the flanks. Some accounts indicate that there may have been as many of 5,000 Braves in the war party they encountered that day. Both Reno and Bentine saw the action unfolding from their blocking positions, however refrained from committing their columns to aid Custer. It is highly unlikely they could have done anything to effect the outcome of the battle. Despite it being July, 1876, the average Trooper in the U.S. 7th Calvary was equipped with a Sharp's 'drop block' lever action single shot carbine, caliber .45-70. A powerful short range weapon with a slow cyclic rate of fire. The standard issued pistol was still the model 1851 Colt in caliber .36, the same type pistol Custer had carried since the Civil War. It is possible one or two of the Troopers might have been armed with a newer, better weapon, however considering how poorly paid these troopers were it is very unlikely. Nobody is quite sure of how many of the 5,000 Braves used native weaponary such as bows and arrows, spears and tomahawks, but those who were armed with rifles we armed with leaver action repeating rifles such as the Henry model 1866 or the Winchester model 1873 which having been refused for federal service by the Army's Ordnance Corps were surplused, sold and in some cases given to the plains Indians so they could hunt. These rifles permitted the Indian to mass superior suppressive fire on the Calvarymen of the 7th, their superior numbers merely adding insult to injury as this clearly should not be considered a battle of any sorts.

Answer 3

Custer was no hero but an incompetent fool. He disobeyed orders and wanted the Glory if can call killing glory for himself.

He split his relative small command into three. First Mistake

He under-estimated the strength of the indian nations, Sioux, Cheyenne etc. Second Mistake.

He chose his ground badly Third mistake.

He lost his whole command Fourth and Final mistake.

Unfortunately The government and press of the day laid the blame for this defeat and made scapegoats of Major Reno and Captain Bentine.

Custer was an egotist of the highest degree

Answer 4

First of all the Rank at the time of Gressy Grass was Lt. Colonel, but due to his brevetted Rank in the Civil War was Major General. So if a person were to address him it would be General. It is the same as we refer to President Reagan after he left office, becaue he earned the title. The only way he would have lost the right to be called General is if he was demoted due to an infraction of military law. At the time he was posted here at Fort Lincoln Southwest of Bismarck, Dakota Territory was the need for generals was not as great.

During the Civil War he was considered the North premiere Calvary General were he perfected dividing his force and strategy that generations of historians would pan him for the last four decades.

First off, General Custer was arrogant, or maybe just overconfident. Although is it really arrogance when you can do what you think you can.
If he were as bad a character that the modern day historian claim he was.
(There is a theory that Reno and Benteen set him up to fail.)

His orders were vague, he and the seventh Calvary was supposed to meet up with General Terry sometime. He was offered gattlin guns. Some historians think that this might have saved him. There are three problems with this the terrain is incredibly hilly with a lot of coolies making it hard to get them set up. A gattlin gun weighed over a ton and would slow down a Calvary unit (the Calvary Unit of the 19th century were considered to be akin to our special forces today. The Calvary units were quick attack units. Third, black powder had a tendency to jam regularly. I wouldn't have wanted them.

I think that he found the village to soon. The rule of thumb if you could see an indian They KNEW you were there. I will grant you that he didn't listen to his scouts, but the number of warriors in the village I don't think anyone would have comprehended. There is a possibility that he was going to fight a holding action. Trying to hold out tell the three columns of Sheridan and the other Generals. Sheridan and the other two Generals were held up they weren't where they were late because they encountered other Nations on the way.

The morning of the battle Custer divided his command of about 100 troopers into three commands under Reno and Benteen. (Later in Reno's military career his was court martialed for assaulting his commanding officers daughter). This was so they could surround the village. The last order out from Custer was for Benteen to "bring packs big village." He didn't. Reno was surrounded for a time but when one of his sergeants brains were blown out Reno took off running.

Here is the victor's perspective. Months before the Battle Sitting Bull had a vision of soldiers falling into the village. The interesting part of the vision for me was the warning not to take anything from the soldiers or they would loose the war. His warning was headed. (Kinda harkens back to Joshua and the fall of Jericho when he warned them not to take anything, but Achan did and they lost the next battle Joshua 6-7 Makes me ponder what would have happened if the Nations would have heeded the warning).

Crazy Horse was a very formidable General. The terrain really lent a hand to the way the Lakota, Ogalla, and Cheyenne fought. It gave the warriors a lot of cover. The yellow boy Winchester 10 round magazine repeating rifle for close quarter fighting is very formidable against a single shot Spencer carbine. Not including recurve bows. The warriors were trained from an early age to fight one-on-one. The stiff formations of the Calvary didn't work well because the Warrior fought outside of the box.

The importance of this can still be seen today. 1893 the massacre at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge was perpertraited by the seventh Calvary. During the 1970's American Indian Movement (AIM) took over a government building at Pine Ridge. Leonard Peltier allegedly killed two FBI agents. The problem is the FBI story of what happened doesn't really have an aire of honesty to it. Leonard Peltier has spent more time in prison than most murders. To this day Pine Ridge is the poorest place in the country.

Our fore father set up the reservation system to fail. My family and I disagree on this, but we have treaties that we have to fulfill. Our forefather set a system where the Nations would be so dependent that the Feds shipped the kids off to distant government schools where they would beat the children if they spoke in their language. We destroyed their hope. That is the reason alcoholism and suicide is so prevalent on reservation.

Right now some of the Nations are trying to sue the government over past royalties that haven't been payed over the last century.

Was it General Custer's fault? I don't know. Glory hound yes, but he did his job. If his troops weren't all killed it wouldn't have given them the ralling point to actually finish the war. In a since, Custer has his immortality.
We only a hand full battles but the Nations actually somehow lost the war. Just something for you to think about.

Answer 5

Custer was an idiot who didn't listen to his advisers and scouts. He assumed that the Indians wouldn't be able to stand up to the firepower of the US Cavalry. He didn't remember the lessons that the British learned in the Revolutionary War. Guerrilla fighters have greater maneuverability. The don't just stand there and let you shoot them. While the Sioux weren't the greatest guerrilla fighters, they were, arguably, the best cavalry.

Answer 6

WHO ARE YOU ASKING ABOUT AND WHAT ARE YOU TRYING TO ASK? G.A. CUSTER. HE WAS A GLORY HOUND AND WAS NO HERO AT LBH. PRIOR TO LBH HIS BODY COUNT CONSISTED OF OLD WARRIORS,WOMEN AND CHILDREN. HE GOT WHAT HE DESERVED,TOO BAD HIS MEN LISTENED TO HIM. GIVEN THE TERRAIN AND ENEMY NUMBERS,GATLINGS WOULD HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE. THOSE INDIANS WERE PISSED OFF!!!!

Answer 7

The man was an absolute idiot,he was hell bent for personal glory and god help anyone who got in his way

Answer 8

He was a f#$*ing idiot. He refused to take 6 gatling guns on his last ride. That would have easily save all his men.

Answer 9

Who cares now anyway

Answer 10

it's G.A. gorge Armstrong not G.W., he did his job so yes a hero.

Answer 11

A hot headed moron.