How did Germany cause WW1?

Question

I am aware that there are other causes to WW1 such as Militarism and Imperialism but I am still unsure what role Germany played and this is to be a good part of our assessment. Could anyone offer any suggestions as to how Germany helped fuel the war?
Thanks.

Answer 1

The Causes of World War I were complex and included many factors, including the conflicts and antagonisms of the four decades leading up to the war. The immediate origins of the war lay in the decisions taken by statesmen and generals during the July crisis of 1914, the spark (or casus belli) for which was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian irredentist. The crisis did not however exist in a void; it came at the end of a long series of diplomatic clashes between the Great Powers in the decade prior to 1914 which had left tensions high almost to breaking point. In turn these diplomatic clashes can be traced to changes in the balance of power in Europe since 1870.

The arrest of a member of the 'Black Hand' group after the assassination of Franz FerdinandSee also: Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
In April 1914 the Serbian Civilian Government attempted to establish its authority over the Serbian Military. The Military resisted. After several moves and counter moves, the Military, in alliance with the King of Serbia and parliamentary opposition forced the Serbian Civilian Government's resignation at the beginning of June. The Military's victory was shortlived as Russian Ambassador Hartwig intervened, the King reversed himself, reinstalled the old government, called new elections, and, drawing the appropriate conclusion, retired in favor of his second son, Prince Aleksandar.It is in the midst of this political crisis that politically powerful members of the Serbian Military armed and trained three Bosnian students as assassins and sent them into Austria-Hungary. The assassins departed Belgrade on May 28.

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife, Sophie, duchess of Hohenburg, were assassinated in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, which Austria-Hungary had administered since 1878 and had annexed in 1908. They were shot by Gavrilo Princip, one of the three assassins sent from Belgrade. Princip was part of a group of six assassins (the three from Belgrade and three local recruits) under the coordination of Danilo Ilić. The assassins' goal was the violent separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and possibly other provinces from Austria-Hungary and attachment to Serbia to form a Greater Serbia or a Yugoslavia. The assassins' goals and methods are consistent with the movement that later became known as Young Bosnia.

Austria-Hungary immediately undertook a criminal investigation. Ilić and five of the assassins were promptly arrested and interviewed by an investigating judge. The three assassins who had come from Serbia told almost all they knew. Serbian Major Vojislav Tankosić had directly and indirectly given them six bombs (produced at the Serbian Arsenal), four pistols, training, money, suicide pills, a special map with the location of gendarmes marked, knowledge of an infiltration channel from Serbia to Sarajevo, and a card authorizing the use of that channel. In their training and on their way they were assisted by other members of the Serbian Military including three sergeants, two captains and a major who the assassins fingered in addition to Major Tankosić. The full extent of Serbia's role in the plot was obscured from the investigators by Ilić's silence regarding his contacts with the Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence and Montenegro and France suppressing the confession of the sixth assassin (who had escaped to Montenegro). While the investigators had not found the whole truth, what they had found warranted the interview of witnesses and the arrest of participants in Serbia.

Initially, Germany and Austria-Hungary treated the assassination as largely a police and diplomatic matter that could be settled peacefully. On June 30, German Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Zimmerman advised the Serbian Ambassador that Serbia should open a judicial inquiry into the complicity of individuals within Serbia’s borders. Zimmerman also spoke to the Russian Ambassador asking that Russia deliver the same message to Serbia. On that same day, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Serbia advised Serbian Foreign Minister Gruic that Serbia should open a judicial inquiry, to which Gruic falsely replied "Nothing had been done so far and the matter did not concern the Serbian Government." after which "high words" were spoken on both sides.[5] On July 6th Count Czernin, speaking for Austria-Hungary, brought the necessity of investigating the instigators of the assassination plot within the borders of Serbia to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov, but Sazonov cut him off.[6] It was Albertini’s conclusion that calls for a judicial investigation in Serbia were rebuffed despite the risk of a general European war because the investigation would have implicated many high ranking Serbs, and shown that the Prime Minister had monitored the progress of the plot.

Serbia’s refusal to agree to investigate, and Russia’s support for this refusal, made it easy for consensus in Germany and Austria to coalesce on coercive diplomacy to defeat Serbia diplomatically, or, failing that, militarily. Germany provided Austria-Hungary with its firm assurance that it would honor the terms of its alliance. This assurance became known as the "blank cheque".

Obtaining Hungarian support, collecting criminal evidence, and the drafting of demands to place on Serbia took two weeks to complete. This was poor timing as the bi-annual Franco-Russian summit was about to begin. The French President Raymond Poincaré and his Premier arrived in St. Petersburg on 20 July, conferred with the the Czar and his ministers, and left on 23 July 1914. The details of this summit have never been published. Austria-Hungary waited until the hour of the summit's conclusion and released its letter of demands on July 23 at 6PM Belgrade time. This letter of demands became known as the July Ultimatum.

The demands were tough. Austria-Hungary made Serbia's March 1909 declaration to the Great Powers in which Serbia promised to respect Austria-Hungary's territorial integrity and maintain good neighborly relations the basis of legitimacy of its ten enumerated demands and several demands in the letter's preamble. These demands focused on the investigation and arrest of the Serbian Military conspirators fingered by the assassins, destruction of the terrorist infrastructure and means of propaganda, rooting out terrorists from the Serbian Military, and putting Serbia back on track to be a good neighbor. Serbia was required to admit misbehavior by its officers and allow Austro-Hungarian authorities to participate in the investigation in Serbia. All demands had to be agreed to within 48 hours or Austria-Hungary would withdraw its ambassador.

The Serbian Government was unnerved. With the Russian abandonment of 1908-9 fresh in the minds of its ministers, Serbia began writing a response accepting the demands in total, while Serbia's diplomatic corps sought its allies' support. Having already discussed with France during the summit what action to take in response to such an Austro-Hungarian letter, Russia promptly sent a telegram offering full support and recommending against full acceptance of the demands and began taking steps preparatory to war.

With Russia's words of support and tangible action in hand, Serbia drafted a response, conciliatory in tone, accepting demands #8 and #10, and partially accepting, finessing, disingenuously answering or outright rejecting the remaining enumerated demands and the demands in the preamble.[8] Serbia mobilized for war and issued its response on July 25th, within the 48-hour time limit. (The Serbian response was a public relations triumph for a careless read of it made it appear that Serbia had accepted almost all of Austria-Hungary’s demands.) Austria-Hungary immediately followed through on its threat to break diplomatic relations. Serbia began evacuating its government and military from Belgrade.

On July 26th, Serbian reservist soldiers on tramp steamers apparently accidentally crossed onto the Austro-Hungarian half of the river near Temes-Kubin. Shots were fired into the air to warn them off. Kaiser Franz-Joseph was persuaded by exaggerated reports of the incident to declare war and mobilize against Serbia on July 28th. Belgrade was bombarded with artillery on July 29, on the same day Russian mobilization was ordered although Austria had not mobilized against Russia. (The Czar believed he had ordered mobilization against only Austria-Hungary, but in fact general mobilization was executed as Russia had no plans for partial mobilization). On July 31, Austria-Hungary ordered general mobilization of its army in response to the Russian mobilization.

Kaiser Wilhelm II was a close friend of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria-Este, and he was deeply shocked by his assassination. He had wanted to remain in Berlin until the crisis was resolved, but his courtiers had persuaded him instead to go on his annual cruise of the North Sea on 6 July 1914. This was consistent with Germany's policy of down playing the crisis, of localization of the dispute as one between Serbia and Austria-Hungary only, and with the Austro-German failed effort to conceal the July Ultimatum until its release.

The Kaiser made erratic attempts to stay on top of the crisis via telegram as he cruised with the German Fleet. When news reached the fleet that Serbia had mobilized, rejected Austria-Hungary's demands and was moving its government to Nish away from the Austro-Hungarian border in expectation of war, the Kaiser ordered the fleet to return to Cuxhaven (Kiel) departing on July 25th at 6PM over the objections of his chancellor.The next afternoon the order to disperse the British Fleet and dismiss British reservists was rescinded; it was a step prepratory to war. Wilhelm II reached Berlin on 28 July, read a copy of the Serbian reply, and wrote comments on it that represented a complete reversal from his "Ulimata are either accepted or they are not! There is no discussion!" comment of July 24th:

"A brilliant solution--and in barely 48 hours! This is more than could have been expected. A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every pretext for war falls to the ground, and [the Ambassador] Giesl had better have stayed quietly at Belgrade. On this document, I should never have given orders for mobilisation.

Unknown to the Kaiser, Austro-Hungarian ministers and generals had already convinced the 84-year-old Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria to sign a declaration of war against Serbia.

During this period, Britain promoted a conference to settle the matter; a conference where Austria-Hungary and Germany would be isolated. Austrian and German diplomatic efforts on the other hand were initially focused on localizing the conflict to one strictly between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. This of course would lead to complete Serbian defeat. When it became clear to Germany that Russia, France and probably Britain would back Serbia, Germany began advocating a “Stop in Belgrade” approach, meaning that Austria-Hungary would occupy Belgrade, which Serbia had already withdrawn from, and then a negotiating conference could be held regarding Austria-Hungary’s original demands. With Austria-Hungary, Serbia and Russia bent on war and inelastic mobilization schedules underway, this effort was ineffective and only given an audience because Russia needed more time for its mobilization and Austria-Hungary could not afford to snub its ally.

Having got wind of Russia's mobilization, Germany issued Russia an ultimatum on July 31, demanding a halt to mobilization within 12 hours. On the night of July 30-31, when handed a document stating that Russia would not cancel its mobilization, Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote a lengthy commentary containing the startling observations:

"For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves--knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria--to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us. ... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honorable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us."

On August 1, with the ultimatum expired, the German ambassador to Russia formally declared war. The terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance known as the Secret Treaty of 1892 required both Russia and France to mobilize and commence action if Austria-Hungary or Germany mobilized. Germany and France mobilized nearly simultaneously on August 1.

On August 2, Germany occupied Luxembourg as a preliminary step to the invasion of Belgium and implementation of the Schlieffen Plan (which was rapidly going awry because the Germans had not intended to be at war with a mobilized Russia so quickly).

Yet another ultimatum was delivered to Belgium on August 2, requesting free passage for the German army on the way to France. The Belgians refused. When it had become clear that the heretofore evasive British government would enter the war if Germany attacked France through Belgium, the panic-stricken Kaiser Wilhelm II attempted to redirect the main attack against Russia. When Helmuth von Moltke (the younger), the German Chief of General Staff, told him that this was impossible, William said: "Your uncle would have given me a different answer!!."Moltke refused on the grounds that it would be impossible to change the rail schedule—“once settled, it cannot be altered”.

On August 3, Germany declared war on France and invaded Belgium on August 4. This act violated Belgian neutrality, the status to which Germany, France, and Britain were all committed by treaty. It was inconceivable that Great Britain would remain neutral if Germany declared war on France; German violation of Belgian neutrality provided the casus belli that the British government sought. German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg told the Reichstag that the German invasions of Belgium and Luxembourg were in violation of international law, but he argued that Germany was "in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law." Later that same day, in a private, man-to-man conversation with the British Ambassador Sir Edward Goschen, Goschen claimed Bethmann Hollweg expressed astonishment that the British would go to war with Germany over the 1839 treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, referring to the treaty dismissively as a "scrap of paper," Goschen's version of this event outraged public opinion in Britain and the United States.Britain's guarantee to Belgium prompted Britain, which had been neutral, to declare war on Germany on August 4. The British government expected a limited war, in which it would primarily use its great naval strength.

Causes of the First World War, seen as logs, "encouraging" breath, an oily rag and various matches on a bonfire, about to be set alight by the spark (Sarajevo)Although World War I was triggered by this chain of events unleashed by the assassination, the war's origins go deeper, involving national politics, cultures, economics, and a complex web of alliances and counterbalances that developed between the various European powers over the course of the nineteenth century, following the final 1815 defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and the ensuing Congress of Vienna.

Fervent and uncompromising nationalism
Unresolved previous disputes
Intricate system of alliances
Convoluted and fragmented governance
Delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications
Arms races of the previous decades
Rigidity in military planning
Colonial rivalry (imperialism)
Economic rivalry

The various categories of explanation for World War I correspond to different historians' overall methodologies. Most historians and popular commentators include causes from more than one category of explanation to provide a rounded account of the causal circumstances behind the war. The deepest distinction among these accounts is that between stories which find it to have been the inevitable and predictable outcome of certain factors, and those which describe it as an arbitrary and unfortunate mistake.

In attributing causes for the war, historians and academics had to deal with an unprecedented flood of memoirs and official documents, released as each country involved tried to avoid blame for starting the war. Early releases of information by governments, particularly those released for use by the "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War" were shown to be incomplete and biased. In addition some documents, especially diplomatic cables between Russia and France, were found to have been doctored. Even in later decades however, when much more information had been released, historians from the same culture have been shown to come to differing conclusions on the causes of the war.

By the late 19th century, a new form of political and social thought emerged in the same context as nationalism, known as Social Darwinism. It emphasized the competition on a social scale between different national, ethnic, or racial groups. Inspired by what Charles Darwin considered a faulty understanding of his theory of evolution, with natural selection reduced and simplified to the expression 'survival of the fittest', this ideology was taken up by European political elites. The new ideology emphasized the violent struggle for existence between "races" or "nations" in which the weak would inevitably be destroyed by the strong. These ideas were profoundly influential. particularly in militaristic and nationalistic thinking. Much of the Russian leadership expected an inevitable battle between "Slavs" and "Germanic civilization." as exemplified by these statements reported by Kosutitch to Foreign Minister Isvolski and Czar Nicholas II: "Serbia will be condemned to a pitiful existence until the moment for the downfall of Austria arrives. The Annexation has brought this moment nearer, and when it comes, Russia will unroll and solve the Serbian question. Izvolski sees that the conflict with Germandom is inevitable, but Russia’s policy must be purely Slavophile." and "The Tsar said the Serbian sky is overcast with black clouds by this blow. The situation is frightful, because Russia is,unprepared for war, and a Russian defeat would be the ruin of Slavdom. The Tsar has the feeling that a conflict with Germandom is inevitable in the future, and that one must prepare for this.". Social Darwinism as a political ideology also influenced competition amongst nation states for colonies. Colonial expansion was rationalized by the elite as important for assuring a nation's economic and military strength in the face of rivals. The British policy of "strategic exclusion" of potential competitors was compatible with this adversarial perspective.

An aspect of late 19th century Social Darwinism was the sense of urgency it engendered. For a nation to be not growing compared to its neighbors and rivals was seen as very risky. The French looked in dismay at their birth rate, which was lower than Germany's.

Left wing parties, especially the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP) made large gains in the 1912 German election. German government at the time was still dominated by the Prussian Junkers who feared the rise of these left wing parties. Some authors feel that they deliberately sought an external war to distract the population and whip up patriotic support for the government. Other authors feel that German conservatives were ambivalent about a war, worrying that losing a war would have disastrous consequences, and even a successful war might alienate the population if it were lengthy or difficult. Many Germans, feeling that they were not given an adequate amount of respect from all surrounding European countries, desired this war in order to obtain the respect and appreciation that they felt they deserved.[citation needed] This feeling, as Henry Kissinger points out in his book Diplomacy, was greatly encouraged by Kaiser Wilhelm II. The New York Times, in the last days of July 1914, reported that crowds in German cities were jubilant about the idea that Austria-Hungary was going to war against Serbia, and that there were calls for war among the crowd. In early August, after France, Germany, Russia, Serbia, etc., had gone to war, an editorial ran in the same newspaper defending its reporting against accusations that it (and/or American media in general) had been unfair to Germany.

The situation was quite the opposite in France, but with the same results. More than a century after the French Revolution, there was still a fierce struggle between the left-wing French government and its right-wing opponents, including monarchists and "Bonapartists." A "good old war" was seen by both sides (with the exception of Jean Jaurès) as a way to solve this crisis thanks to a nationalistic reflex. For example, on July 29, after he had returned from the summit in St. Petersburg, President Poincare was asked if war could be avoided. He is reported to have replied: "It would be a great pity. We should never again find conditions better."

Everyone thought the war would be short and would lead to an easy victory. The left-wing government thought it would be an opportunity to implement social reforms (income tax was implemented in July 1914) and the right-wing politicians hoped that their connections with the army's leaders could give them the opportunity to regain power. Russian bribery under Poincaré's careful direction of the French press from July 1912 to 1914 played a role in creating the proper French political environment for the war. Prime Minister and then President Poincaré was a strong hawk. In 1913 Poincaré predicted war for 1914. In 1920 at the University of Paris, thinking back to his own student days, Poincaré remarked "I have not been able to see any reason for my generation living, except the hope of recovering our lost provinces (Alsace-Lorraine; Poincaré was born in Lorraine)."

In the years that followed the Congress of Vienna, conflicts began springing up all over Europe between those who cried out for change and those who resisted it. By the mid-19th century, nationalism had become an evident force. A wave of unrest was seen across the continent in the Revolution of 1848. The unification of Italy and the unification of Germany in the 1860s and early 1870s changed the political environment of Europe. The two nations were formed on the basis of nationalism. German unification was brought about by Prussia's "Iron Chancellor", Otto von Bismarck, through a series of wars from 1864–1871. Italy was finally unified in 1866 after a long struggle under leaders Cavour and Garibaldi. The addition of two great powers in Europe fundamentally altered the balance of power.

In 1867, the Austrian Empire fundamentally changed its governmental structure, becoming the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. For hundreds of years, the empire had been run in an essentially feudal manner with a German-speaking aristocracy at its head. However, with the threat represented by an emergence of nationalism within the empire's many component ethnicities, some elements, including Emperor Franz Joseph, decided that a compromise would have to be made in order to preserve the power of the German aristocracy. In 1867, the Ausgleich was agreed upon which made the Magyar elite in Hungary almost equal partners in the government of Austria-Hungary.

"Distribution of Races in Austria–Hungary" from the Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 1911This arrangement fostered a tremendous degree of dissatisfaction amongst many in the traditional German ruling classes. Some of them considered the Ausgleich to have been a calamity because it often frustrated their intentions in the governance of Austria-Hungary. For example, it was extremely difficult for Austria-Hungary to form a coherent foreign policy that suited the interests of both the German and Magyar elite.

Throughout the fifty years from 1867 to 1914, it proved difficult to reach adequate compromises in the governance of Austria-Hungary, leading many to search for non-diplomatic solutions. At the same time a form of social Darwinism became popular amongst many in the Austrian half of the government which emphasised the primacy of armed struggle between nations, and the need for nations to arm themselves for an ultimate struggle for survival.

As a result, at least two distinct strains of thought advocated war with Serbia, often unified in the same people.

In order to deal with political deadlock, some reasoned that more Slavs needed to be brought into Austria-Hungary in order to dilute the power of the Magyar elite. With more Slavs, the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary could force a new political compromise in which the Germans would be able to play the Magyars against the South Slavs. Other variations on this theme existed, but the essential idea was to cure internal stagnation through external conquest.
Another fear was that the South Slavs, primarily under the leadership of Serbia, were organizing for a war against Austria-Hungary, and even all of Germanic civilization. Some leaders, such as Conrad von Hötzendorf, argued that Serbia must be dealt with before it became too powerful to defeat militarily.

A powerful contingent within the Austro-Hungarian government was motivated by these thoughts and advocated war with Serbia long before the war began. Prominent members of this group included among them Leopold von Berchtold, Alexander Hoyos, and Janós Forgách Graf von Ghymes und Gács. Although many other members of the government, notably Franz Ferdinand, Franz Joseph, and many Hungarian politicians did not believe that a violent struggle with Serbia would necessarily solve any of Austria-Hungary's problems, the hawkish elements did exert a strong influence on government policy, holding key positions.

Historically, many of the economic causes of the war can be attributed to a growing material dependency of advancing European nations on imperialism. Nations such as Great Britain and France maintained thriving domestic economies in the late 19th century through their control of foreign resources, markets, territories, and people. As a late arrival on the world stage, Germany was locked out of the most valuable colonial regions in Africa and the Far East. In addition, the rapid exhaustion of natural resources in many European nations began to slowly upset the trade balance and make nations more eager to seek new territories rich in natural resources. Intense rivalries developed between the emerging economic powers and the incumbent great powers.

Map of the world with the participants in World War I.
The Allies are depicted in green, the Central Powers in orange and neutral countries in grey.Rivalry among the powers was exacerbated from the 1880s by the scramble for colonies which brought much of Africa and Asia under European rule in the following quarter-century. Otto von Bismarck resented an overseas empire but could not resist those forces, who succeeded the other way. This started Anglo-German tension since German acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific threatened to impinge upon British strategic and commercial interests. Bismarck knew that if the German state were to exist and thrive in spite of a clearly hostile France, it would be necessary to isolate France both diplomatically and militarily from the other European powers. Part of Bismarck's strategy was to allow France to pursue its own colonial interests without German fetters. It could even be argued that Bismarck supported French colonization in Africa because it diverted government attention away from continental Europe. In spite of all of Bismarck's deft diplomatic maneuvering, in 1890 he was forced to resign by the new Kaiser (Wilhelm II). His successor, Leo von Caprivi, was the last German Chancellor who tried successfully to calm down Anglo-German tensions. After his loss of office in 1894, it was not long till the new German colonial policy irritated the other European powers and Japan. Within a few short years, France gained diplomatic control in Europe, attaining alliances with both England and Russia.

Wilhelm's support for Moroccan independence from France—Britain's new strategic partner—provoked the Tangier Crisis of 1905 . During the Second Moroccan or Agadir Crisis (1911), a German naval presence in Morocco tested the Anglo-French coalition once again. These two crises led to negotiations which Germany arguably lost. Germany failed to achieve its aims during the conferences and failed to gain support from the other European powers (except Austria-Hungary). Wilhelm, like Bismarck, threatened the use of German military power in an attempt to "strong-arm" the other European Powers into compliance. The difference between the two statesmen was that Bismarck had his enemies isolated, and his allies were fully supportive. Wilhelm II, by contrast, had neither and therefore Germany was not viewed as a political/military superpower worthy of due consideration but rather as a militaristic belligerent nation.

A very tight web of alliances bound the European nations (many of them requiring participants to agree to collective defense if attacked): Treaty of London, 1839, about the neutrality of Belgium,
German-Austrian treaty (1879) or Dual Alliance,
Italy joining Germany and Austria in 1882,
Franco-Russian Alliance (1894),
"Entente" (less formal) between Britain and France (1904) and Britain and Russia (1907) forming the Triple Entente,
Russia proclaiming herself the "protector of the Southern Slavs" in the Balkans through several treaties. This complex set of treaties binding various players in Europe together prior to the war is sometimes thought to have been misunderstood by contemporary political leaders. Mobilization by a relatively minor player would have a cascading effect that could rapidly run out of control, involving every country. Yet leaders discussed the crisis between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as if it were a localized issue. This is how Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia resulted in Britain declaring war on Germany:

June 28, 1914: Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria is assassinated by Serbian irredentists.
July 23: Austro-Hungarian demarche made to Serbia.
July 25: Russia enters period preparatory to war, mobilization begins on all frontiers. Government decides on partial mobilization in principal to begin on July 29th.
July 25: Serbia mobilizes its army; responds to Austro-Hungarian demarche with less than full acceptance; Austria-Hungary breaks diplomatic relations with Serbia.
July 26: Serbia reservists accidentally violate Austro-Hungarian border at Temes-Kubin.
July 28: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia and mobilizes against Serbia only.
July 29: Russian general mobilization ordered, then changed to partial mobilization.
July 30: Russian general mobilization ordered at 5PM.
July 31: Austrian general mobilization is ordered.
July 31: Germany enters period preparatory to war.
July 31: Germany demands a halt to Russian military preparations within 12 hours.
August 1: French general mobilization is ordered.
August 1: German general mobilization is ordered.
August 1: Germany declares war against Russia.
August 2: Germany and The Ottoman Empire sign a secret treaty entrenching the Ottoman-German Alliance
August 3: Germany, after France declines (See Note) its demand to remain neutral, declares war on France.
August 4: Germany invades Belgium according to the modified Schlieffen Plan.
August 4: Britain declares war on Germany.
With Britain's entry, the remainder of the British Imperial colonies and dominions are drawn in offering financial and military assistance. These were Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.
August 23: Japan, honoring the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, declares war on Germany.
Note: French Prime Minister Rene Viviani merely replied to the German ultimatum that "France will act in accordance with her interests"

As David Stevenson has put it, "A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparedness ... was an essential element in the conjuncture that led to disaster ... The armaments race ... was a necessary precondition for the outbreak of hostilities." David Herrmann goes further, arguing that the fear that "windows of opportunity for victorious wars" were closing, "the arms race did precipitate the First World War." If Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been assassinated in 1904 or even in 1911, Herrmann speculates, there might have been no war; it was "the armaments race ... and the speculation about imminent or preventive wars" which made his death in 1914 the trigger for war. (Ferguson 1999 p 82)

The German naval buildup is seen by some historians as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations. The overwhelming British response, however, proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely to equal the Royal Navy. In 1900, the British had a 3.7:1 tonnage advantage over Germany; in 1910 the ratio was 2.3:1 and in 1914, 2.1:1. Ferguson (1999 p 83-85) argues that "so decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War." This ignores the self-evident fact Kaiserliche Marine had narrowed the gap by nearly half, and the Royal Navy had long felt (reasonably enough) a need to be stronger than any two potential opponents; the United States Navy was in a period of growth, making the German gains very ominous, indeed.

The belief that a war in Europe would be swift, decisive and "over by Christmas" is often considered a tragic underestimation; if it had been widely thought beforehand that the war would open such an abyss under European civilization, no one would have prosecuted it. This account is less plausible on a review of the available military theory at the time, especially the work of Ivan Bloch, an early candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Bloch's predictions of industrial warfare leading to bloody stalemate, attrition, and even revolution, were widely known in both military and pacifist circles. Some authors such as Niall Ferguson argue that the belief in a swift war has been greatly exaggerated since the war. He argues that the military planners, especially in Germany, were aware of the potential for a long war, as shown by the famous Willy-Nicky telegraphic correspondence between the emperors of Russia and Germany. He also argues that most informed people considered a swift war unlikely. Moreover, it was in the governments' interests to feature this message widely in their propaganda, since this encouraged men to join the offensive, made the war seem less serious and promoted general high spirits.

Primacy of the offensive and war by timetable
Main article: Cult of the offensive
Military theorists of the time generally held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory encouraged all belligerents to strike first in order to gain the advantage. The window for diplomacy was shortened by this attitude. Most planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive.

Some analysts have argued that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganization. Thus, diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored.

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Answer 2

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Answer 3

They put into play the Schlieffen plan on 14 March 1914. Basically the German states ( Germany was not a country as we know it today but a series of city states under one Kaiser) knew they had 12 weeks in which to invade and conquer Belgium and France and take Paris. The timing was critical. The reason for 12 weeks was that was how long they considered it would take the Russians to their east to mobilize an entire Army. By shutting down the west the Germans would then have the necessary resources to shut down the eastern front and so win the best part of Europe in a short period of time. The forts at Liege in Belgium hung the Germans up for over three weeks instead of three days ( the time accorded by the Schlieffen plan) and the window of opportunity was lost . The Germans advanced to Mons where a contingent of French and British soldiers held their advance and the Germans retreated to the Marne. Because the French and Germans did not pursue as rigorously as they could due to exhaustion and losses the Germans dug in and established what was essentially to be called the western front for the remainder of the war. meanwhile the Russians mobilized a lot more quickly that Germany had hoped but they were not as ready or as well trained as the Austrians troops who were sent to engage them and the Austrians won the initial confrontation with the Russians at tannenberg. This created what came to be called the eastern front. Unlike the western front the front moved fluidly and a lot more ground was won and lost in the east and was not such a stalemate as was the west. the Russian revolution of 1917 caused Russia to withdraw from the war and this allowed all the eastern front troops to be released to serve on the western front. But by this time the USA was starting to become involved . the gradual decimation of troops on all sides, the lack of supplies and resources coupled with the overthrow of the kaiser and the establishment of the Wiemar repiblic caused germany to seek an armistice which ended the war on 11 november 1918.

Answer 4

What is missing from that extremely long answer is that Germany had written a plan before war broke out. This plan was, in the event of war, to beat France first and then attack Russia - both of whom were their enermies. When they found themselves in the war due to the Austrians, they first attacked France by going through Belguim, which was an undefended route. Britain had vowed to protect Belguim since it's establishment, which is why we went into WW1 on the wrong side, defending Belguim and therefore becoming "allies" with the French and Russians, who were part of the original problem and also our old enermies. It's the Belguim connection that brought us into the war and is also why we Brits tend to blame the Germans, in what was actually a very complex situation.

Answer 5

With every day pass, our country is getting into more and more trouble. The inflation, unemployment and falling value of dollar are the main concern for our Government but authorities are just sleeping, they don’t want to face the fact. Media is also involve in it, they are force to stop showing the real economic situation to the people. I start getting more concern about my future as well as my family after watching the response of our Government for the people that affected by hurricane Katrina.

According to recent studies made by World Bank, the coming crisis will be far worse than initially predicted. So if you're already preparing for the crisis (or haven't started yet) make sure you watch this video at http://www.familysurvival.tv and discover the 4 BIG issues you'll have to deal with when the crisis hits, and how to solve them fast (before the disaster strikes your town!) without spending $1,000s on overrated items and useless survival books.

Answer 6

What needs to be looked at is not the immediate causes of the war (the assassination, the alliances, etc.) but what caused all of that in the first place. Europe had been called a powder keg in the early part of the 20th century, with only a spark needed to ignite a war that easily got out of hand. But why was that the case?

In looking at the history, it is hard not to find a lot of blame with the rise of Germany as a nation. The war of 1870 between France and (what was known at that time) Prussia was a precursor to this war. While most will point to the loss of Alsace Lorraine as a thorn in France's side (and it certainly was) that war solidified what had been an amalgamation of German states into one unified country.

While that country was a bona fide power (the Prussians were always known as great fighters) it also came with an inferiority complex. The conquered people in Alsace Lorraine never wanted to adapt into German culture, instead choosing to maintain much of their French heritage. This felt like an insult to German lifestyle. The country also did not possess the colonies that England and France did. With the second wave of imperialism taking place on the African continent, Germany was able to pick up some colonies. But it did not have the vast empire that Britian or even France had.

Germany always felt itself to be, in some ways, second class. It did not get the respect it felt it deserved after the decisive victory it had over France in 1870. Germany, though, went over the edge when France and Russia entered into an entente (understanding). Initially Germany had an alliance with Russia. For some reason, they let that alliance lapse, and France swooped in to form a pact with Russia. This put Germany on the edge. It now felt itself surrounded on both sides by enemies. Panic set in. Germany felt the need to build up its army. It needed to build up its navy (which drew the ire of Great Britian, who needed to have the world's greatest navy to protect its island country). Germany also needed alliances. While it may seem natural it went to Austria Hungary, an empire that shared a similar background to Germany in terms of language and culture, this ally was really not on equal footing with Germany. They were a weak empire, constantly bickering about the Balkans, with a coalition of nations that seemingly wanted to be independent. Yet despite these weaknesses, Germany felt like it needed an ally.

So Germany has an inferiority complex. It is manic in the sense that it feels it has enemies on either side of it. It builds up an army and its navy to account for this. It takes on allies that are weaker than it, that expose Germany to wars it does not need to fight. The rest of Europe simply reacts to this. England and France and Russia ally together. Each country builds up its military.

This is why Germany acted the way it did when the assassination took place. It felt that war was inevitable, and it felt the only way to win a war was to attack first (the Schiefflen Plan spoke about here called for the conquering of France before Russia mobilized, then pouring troops back east to hold off the Russia advance). The assassination should have been a local conflict (think of the current situation in Ukraine. A larger war is being prevented because the United States is not coming into the conflict and the Russians are allegedly not participating in the fighting - even if there are allegations they are supplying the separatists with guns and military equipment). But Germany felt that the time was right (even though its Navy had not caught up to the naval might of Britain).

Answer 7

The German war plan(The Schlieffen Plan) was actually written several years before the war began. Germany was already planning on a war and preparing. German was also the first to declare war and the first to mobilize its troops. Plus the Germans invaded Belgium(a neutral country) in order to get to France. This is what brought Britain into the war. Also, there was the Zimmerman Note. It was written by the Germans to the Mexico and intercepted by British agents. In this note Germany suggested an alliance with Mexico and promised that they would aid Mexico in a war against the U. S. to take back Texas, as well as, New Mexico, and Arizona. The Zimmerman Note is known as the overt act because it is what finally pushed the U. S. to join the war.

Answer 8

3

Answer 9

2

Answer 10

The only time a physical compliment is expected and truly appreciated by a woman (unless she’s naked) is when you first pick her up for a date. Learn here http://AttractAnyWoman.emuy.info/?1GAi
She has put forth a great deal of effort to look good for you and her efforts should be acknowledged. Tell her she looks pretty or beautiful; maybe give her a little spin while you appreciate her loveliness. Then stop. After that moment all compliments should be general, like “that’s fascinating”, “cool” and “awesome”. You will make a woman feel more attractive by letting her know that that she is interesting and special than you will by talking about her physical attributes.

Answer 11

supporting Austria, nationalism, treaties. Germany always gets blamed for WWI, but they were really no more responsible than anyone else.