whjy did lincoln issue the emancipatiion procalmation when he did?

Answer 1

I assume you are asking why he DELAYED it (why he did not issue it sooner). The answer depends partly on how far back you're looking.. Also, there was more than one factor for him to consider.

A) If you are asking about the FINAL delay -- from the time he showed the Proclamation to his cabinet (July 22) to the public proclamation (Sept 22), that is easily answered, and had been already. He was actually planning to announce it IMMEDIATELY in July, but agreed with the wisdom of Seward's suggestion that he wait for a Union victory, lest the move seem simply to be an act of desperation.

B) If you are asking why he didn't decide to make this move sometime earlier in the war, perhaps early in 1862, the answer is more complex (as one answer had it "it was a big deal!!"). Here are things that had to be considered:

1) Lincoln's view of its CONSTITUTIONALITY --
It is not clear that in 1861 or early 1862 Lincoln was yet CONVINCED that he had the Constitutional AUTHORITY to make the Proclamation. Note that the ONLY basis for his possibly making this move was the way he did it -- as "Commander-in-chief" acting out of "military necessity". He could NOT, under the Constitution, simply free slaves wherever and whenever he wished (contrary to what many seem to think who criticize him for not releasing slaves in states that had not seceded!)

The idea that he COULD do so in the exercise of his "war powers" was much debated. Though the idea had first been suggested by John Quincy Adams in the 1830s ( that such a thing MIGHT some day take place) that was just a theory, not something widely agreed on. At the start of the war Lincoln had not yet adopted this view.

2) Related to this "debatability" was the LEGAL risk --
Lincoln knew that this was just an untested "THEORY". He knew that many would disagree, and that someone (of the many who did NOT want this to become a war for emancipation) would challenge such an action in the courts. It might well end up decided by the Supreme Court, still presided over by Roger Taney (author of the Dred Scott Decision), who had already ruled against Lincoln's use of OTHER war powers (specifically, in the matter of suspension of habeas corpus). So the Proclamaiton was a LEGALLY risky move -- if he did not do it 'just right', the courts could annul it, and he would lose the power to act in this area.

3) Then there is the POLITICAL risk and importance of TIMING --
Lincoln knew that freeing the slaves would cause a backlash. The issue here was NOT the CONFEDERATE reaction (they would, of course, oppose it!) and whether they would 'fight more fiercely'. It was whether NORTHERN opponents of a "war of emancipation" (willing to fight for the Union, but not for the slaves), and ESPECIALLY in the border states.

Once he had decided to move in this direction, Lincoln had to consider when the time was politically ripe -- not when there would not be opposition, but when there would be ENOUGH support to make it all work. (He knew he would take a political hit, as he did, in the fall elections of 1862, in Congress and in state elections.)

The danger EARLIER in the war had been that the slave states that had NOT seceded would do so if Lincoln took such a step at that time. But the war was changing everything, turning society upside down, and many were coming to realize not only that slavery was the underlying issue (most knew that in 1860-1), but that it would not survive the war.... even that it HAD to be removed if the war were to succeed in permanently restoring the Union.

In this light, consider a letter Lincoln critics cite but fail to note the DATE of -- a public response to Horace Greeley in which Lincoln spoke of doing whatever it took to save the Union, including freeing ALL the slaves, NO slaves, or SOME slaves.

This letter was published on August 22, 1862 - midway between Lincoln's showing the Proclamation and announcing his intent to his Cabinet, and his public announcement. In other words, he wrote KNOWING he would soon take this step, thus clearly taking the opportunity to PREPARE the public for what he intended to do. This was a POLITICAL move... and a wise one!


4) Finally, there was the all-important PRAGMATIC question -- would it WORK?! And was it the BEST plan available?

Even if Lincoln believed that the move was Constitutional, that he could have it upheld in the courts, and could he overcome political hurdles, would it actually help him to WIN the war? It could be the morally "right thing" to do to free these slaves, but if he could not win the war and restore the Union he could not even enforce it! (In THAT case it would be nothing more than "symbolic", and cruelly so.)

Again, TIMING is an important consideration here. And even Frederick Douglass, who had been pushing Lincoln to act, later defended not only his action but his TIMING of it as effective... at the right time for it to succeed.

This included a lot of political considerations, as noted above -- the border states being prepared to accept the move was critical.

But there are several other pieces of this that are often forgotten. Such as the fact that Lincoln had been lobbying the loyal border states since late in 1861 to willingly emancipate their slaves, with some financial assistance from the federal government. (Unfortunately, they did not respond favorably to this until some time AFTER the Proclamation.) Lincoln pointed out to others that the expenses of such compensated emancipation would be MUCH less (in money and blood) than the war. Thus he apparently still HOPED that, once the LOYAL border states accepted this offer, OTHER border states like Virginia might do so..... In other words, he could 'peel off' these states (the last to secede, and not so willingly) from the Confederacy, and undermine the war.

Obviously, the Emancipation Proclamation would undercut the ability to pursue this more peaceful approach. So Lincoln had to be sure that his original program did NOT have a good chance of working (or at least of working in time to matter), before deciding to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, which depended on CONTINUING the war.

Many note that Lincoln also hoped the Proclamation would short-circuit continued Confederate efforts at gaining European recognition of their nationhood, and then of OPEN military support -- by cause internal political pressures (esp in Britain). This was a consideration, but not "THE reason" as some claim. If it HAD been, Lincoln would likely have acted much SOONER. As it was, the other practical and political factors AT HOME came first.

Finally, there had ALWAYS been the question of what would happen to slaves once they were emancipated. Lincoln himself had long supported the idea (once widespread) of colonization -- in his plan, voluntary, not forced -- to prevent societal upheavals, injustices to blacks (by a society full of prejudice against them)... all the dangers and difficulties of attempting to fully and quickly integrate such a large population into the full rights of society.

Very likely part of his hesitation over sudden complete emancipation as a PROGRAM were related to these REALISTIC concerns. (Southern history after the Civil War --from "black codes" to KKK to Jim Crow-- show how realistic such a concern was.)

Answer 2

He felt that if he announced it earlier it would be perceived as a desperate move, so he waited for some major victories for the Union. He wanted to:

-- create unrest among the slaves in the South;

-- Gain favor with the European countries, and help prevent them from recognizing the Confederacy as a legitimate government, which they almost did. By declaring the end of slavery (if not that moment, then certainly at war's end), he helped the US be the favored choice in Europe over the Confederacy.

Answer 3

The CSA was trying to get help from England in their war efforts. England would not sign a treaty or commit troops until the South freed their slaves. Lincoln knew this and that Jefferson Davis was preparing to sign an order doing just that. He signed the EP and put it into effect to beat Davis to the punch.

Answer 4

By freeing the slaves in the south, it caused confusion in the confederate force.

Answer 5

because he felt it was then known as a military measure and it was after a major union victory