Why did the schlieffen plan not work?

Question

I heard they moved to far or something but had it have gone to plan would it have worked?

Also if britian had stayed out of it would it have worked or if Belgium let German troops pass through it?

Answer 1

It was too tightly planned in its timescale--it only took one incident, a French counterattack, to create a disruption sufficent to derail the entire operation. As to the British staying out: I think it unlikely. Too many folks in the UK viewed the German presence in Belgium as (in the words of one historian) a dagger pointed at the heart of London. A decade-plus of friction had preceeded the execution of Schlieffen's plan; it would have take a miracle to keep His Majesty's forces from becoming engaged on the continent.

Answer 2

When Helmuth von Moltke replaced Alfred von Schlieffen as German Army Chief

Of Staff in 1906, he modified the plan by proposing that Holland was not invaded.

Moltke argued that Belgium's small army would be unable to stop German forces

From quickly entering France. On 2nd August 1914, the Schlieffen Plan was put

Into operation when the German Army invaded Luxembourg and Belgium.

However, the Germans were held up by the Belgian Army and were shocked by

the Russian Army's advance into East Prussia. The Germans were also

Surprised by how quickly the British Expeditionary Force reached France and

Belgium.

Answer 3

Named after Alfred von Schlieffen the German Chief of Staff in the early 1900s. France, Britain and Russia had just signed the "Entente Cordiale" and Germany fearing an invasion, or an attack from three sides formulated a plan which would take out France. The theory being if France, Germany's nearest neighbour, was eliminated from a war then the other two nations would find it harder to mount an effective attack, more so as they were geographically separated. Schlieffen's plan involved using 90% of Germany's armed forces to attack France. Fearing the French forts on the border with Germany, Schlieffen suggested an attack through Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg into northern France. The rest of the German Army would be sent to defensive positions in the east to stop the expected Russian advance. Once France was forced to surrender the plan was to transfer the troops to the East and attack Russia. The assumption was that the Russian war machine would be slow to mobilise and that gave Germany time to defeat France before taking on Russia. When Helmuth von Moltke replaced Alfred von Schlieffen as German Army Chief of Staff in 1906, he modified the plan by proposing that Holland was not invaded. The main route would now be through the flat plains of Flanders in Belgium. Moltke argued that Belgium's small army would be unable to stop German forces from quickly entering France. Moltke suggested that 34 divisions should invade Belgium whereas 8 divisions would be enough to stop Russia advancing in the east. On 2nd August 1914, the Schlieffen Plan was put into operation when the German Army invaded Luxembourg and Belgium. However, the Germans were held up by the Belgian Army and were shocked by the Russian Army's mobilisation and rapid advance into East Prussia. The Germans were also surprised by how quickly the British Expeditionary Force reached France and Belgium.

Answer 4

The Schlieffen Plan was the German General Staff's overall strategic plan for victory both on the Western Front against France and against Russia in the east, taking advantage of expected differences in the three countries' speed in preparing for war. It was executed to near victory in the first month of World War I; however, a French counterattack on the outskirts of Paris, the Battle of the Marne (combined with surprisingly speedy Russian offensives), ended the German offensive and resulted in years of trench warfare. The plan has been the subject of debate among historians and military scholars ever since. The Schlieffen Plan was created by Alfred Graf von Schlieffen.
In essence, Schlieffen's audacious plan was never carried out. With the benefit of hindsight, there is evidence that it could have been successful.

A factor in evaluating the significance of the Schlieffen plan is the misinformation that was widely disseminated during and after the war. Records were lost and material made up to paint the events in a light more acceptable to those making the decisions at the time.

. The Schlieffen plan could have been simply a document that spurred operational thinking and planning, and became the working name for a strategy of bypassing the bulk of the French forces through a flanking maneuver. While the German army of 1914 was not sufficiently mobile for the plan to succeed, only 26 years later the same concept executed with more mobile forces was extremely successful.

Answer 5

The main idea of the plan was to feint an attack and then retreat on the fortifications of the magino line. This would encourage the French to use the fortifications troops to pursue the fleeing Germans. The terain was such that a sustained withdrawl was possible.

With the forts unmanned, the Germans could then attack around the flank, without fear of being countered themselves by the forts defenders, since they would be seriously out of position. This would then give the Germans a numerical superiority to engage Paris.

Germany however, did not follow its own plan. It attacked early, forcing the French back into their forts and also allowing losses on their own troops.

With the French back in thier fortifications, the German plan was scuppered.

Luck

Answer 6

The weakness of the Schlieffen Plan lay less in the rigidity of the timescale - for the German army very nearly succeeded in capturing Paris within the time allotted - but in its underestimation of the difficulties of supply and communication in forces so far advanced from command and supply lines.

Ultimately, it was these problems, particularly in communicating strategy from Berlin, that doomed the Schlieffen Plan. The Allied forces could rush troops to the front by use of the railway faster than the Germans could arrange fresh supplies of food and reserve troops.

Most critically, Moltke's isolation from the front line not far from Paris led to a series of poor decisions and a crucial weakening of his forces in the north. A promptly timed French counter-attack exploiting a gap in the German lines at the First Battle of the Marne set off the so-called 'race to the sea' and the onset of static trench warfare. The rapid war of movement was brought to an end.

Answer 7

There was a logistical flaw in the plan, as well. Moving the number of troops, and volume of supplies, required to execute the plan was beyond the capacities of the rail/road system. The plan was a counsel of perfection.

The most rightward units would have had to precede their attack in order to maintain a common front with units ranging to the left wing.The rightwing had further to travel than the rest of the front, the leftwing of which had to pivot in place awaiting the right's progress.

Hence the balance of forces had to shift centerwards, regardless, or else a large part of the German Army would have been ineffective until the final encirclement was accomplished

Answer 8

The Schlieffen Plan required weighting the German attack on the right wing, as you are no doubt aware.

The underlying reason for its failure was that by the time it was applied in 1914, many people had conspired to rob the right wing of its punch. In both successive pre-war reviews of the plan, and on the battlefield in August 1914, divisions were moved to the centre away from the right.

So as the battle of the Marne developed, Von Kluck on the right was more-or-less compelled to turn inward BEFORE he reached Paris. He thus exposed his flank to attack from Paris, instead of looping all the way around it. The lack of strength on the right meant that Von Kluck and his neighbouring armies were thinly spread, and they were thus ultimately penetrated by the BEF and by the French troops famously moved from Paris in taxis.

Troops were even pulled out of the right wing to transfer to the Eastern Front, even though Ludendorff (E Front chief of staff) said not to send them as they would arrive too late to affect the Battle of Tannenburg, then in full swing. Basically, the nuance and technique in Schlieffen's plan was subverted by a later generation of less gifted officers.

Perhaps a few 'what ifs' could have resulted in the Germans capturing Paris, but really they made enough mistakes on their own in the execution to take full responsibility for the failure.