How did the USSR become involved in the Korean War?

Answer 1

Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan any aggression against South Korea. Instead he was worried about an attack from the South, and he did everything to avoid provoking Washington and Seoul. In 1947-1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the possibility of a unification of Korea, and refused to sign a separate friendship and cooperation treaty with North Korean leader Kim II Sung. (1)

In the beginning of 1949 the Soviet embassy began to alert the Kremlin to the growing number of violations of the 38th parallel by South Korean police and armed force. On 3 February 1949 Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Shtykov bitterly complained that the North Koreans did not have enough trained personnel, adequate weapons and sufficient number of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions from the South. Receiving Kim II Sung in the Kremlin on 5 March 194, Stalin showed an open concern about growing pressure from the opponent in the vicinity of the 38th parallel and emphatically told Kim "The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important." (2)

After Kim's return to North Korea, the situation did not improve. On 17 April 1949, Stalin informed his ambassador of an imminent attack from the South. The Soviet ambassador confirmed that a large-scale war was being prepared by Seoul with the help of Americans and raised alarm about the inability of North Korean troops to withstand the aggression. (3) In May-August 1949 the Kremlin and Pyongyang continued to exchange data about a possible attack from the South. The USSR was clearly afraid of such an attack, and was nervous not knowing pondered how to prevent the war. Stalin repeatedly castigated Ambassador Shtykov for failing to do everything in his power to maintain peace on the 38th parallel. (4)

2. Kim insists on war. Stalin disagrees.

While Stalin tried to prevent a war in Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, demanding permission to liberate the South. On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in Moscow, Kim II Sung said: "We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means." The Soviet leader disagreed, citing the military weakness of the North, the USSR-USA agreement on the 38th parallel and the possibility of American intervention.

Stalin added that only if the adversary attacked Pyongyang, North Korea could they try military unification by launching a counter attack. "Then," the Kremlin chief explained, "your move will be understood and supported by everyone." (5)

In August and again in September 1949, North Korean leaders resumed pressure on Moscow. hoping to convince it that: a) peaceful reunification was totally impossible; b) the Korean people wanted liberation and would not understand if the chance for reunification was missed; c) Northern armed forces were superior to the Southern army; d) after the withdrawl of American troops from Korea, the 38th parallel lost its meaning; e) Seoul had postponed its plans for an overall offensive against the North and use of a counterattack for re-unification was no longer possible. (6)

Finally Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending, on 11 September 1949, instructions to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, political and international aspects of a possible attack on the South. The embassy gave a negative view on the matter (14 September 1949) and on 24 September 1949, the CPSU CC Politburo rejected the appeal of the North Koreans to start the war, concludING that the North Korean army was not prepared for such an attack militarily, that "little has been done to raise the South Korean masses to an active struggle," and that an unprovoked attack by the North "would give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interfererence into Korean affairs." (7)

As can be seen from this Politburo document, Moscow no longer flatly rejected the idea of military reunification of Korea. Instead it called upon Pyongyang to become better better prepared for the operation. Evidently couraged by this shift in the Kremlin's mood, the North Korean leadership increased pressure to win Soviet support for the war. On 17 January 1950, Kim II Sung complained to Soviet ambassador Shtykov: "I can't sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the cause...is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people." Kim II Sung requested permission to make a new visit to the USSR to receive "orders and permission" from Stalin for the offensive. (8)

3. Stalin blesses the invasion

After ambasador Shtykov informed Moscow of this wave of demands by Pyongyang, Stalin (on 30 January 1950) replied (through diplomatic channels): "I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim II Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea... requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him...I am prepared to help him in this matter." (9)

So, Stalin finally took the decision to initiate preparations for the war. At exactly the same time that the above mentioned exchange of cables between Moscow and Pyongyang took place, Mao Zedong was present in the Soviet capital. Stalin discussed with Mao the Korean situation, but according to all available data the Soviet dictator never mentioned to the Chinese guest his decison to launch an attack on the South as well as his invitation to Kim II Sung to come to Moscow.

Kim II Sung and his delegation spent almost all of April 1950 in the Soviet Union. The first issue on the agenda was: ways and methods of unification of Korea through military means. (10) Stalin gave his approval to an invasion of the South and outlined his view on how the war had to be prepared. Unfortunately, memorandums of conversations between Stalin and Kim in April 1950 have not been found as yet in the Russian archives. However, from some secondary sources (testimonies of people involved in the negotiations, reports of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR), and from earlier and later statements and positions of Moscow and Pyongyang, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Stalin changed his mind on the Korean war because of: a) the victory of the communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb (first tested by Moscow in August 1949); c) the establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West; and d) a perceived weakening of Washington's position and of its will to become militarily involved in Asia.

Stalin was now more confident of the communist bloc's strength, less respectful of American capabilities, and less interested in the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves.

2. Stalin did not consult Mao in advance because he wanted to work out the plans for the Korean war himself without Chinese interference and objections and then present Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it. While in Moscow Mao insisted on the liberation of Taiwan. Stalin was negative to the idea. It would be hard for Stalin to convince Mao in Moscow to help the Koreans before the Chinese had completed the reunification of their own country."

and this is what the USSR did:

"That the Soviets trained and equipped Kim Il Sung’s Korean People’s Army (KPA, the North Korean Army) and supplied weapons to Mao Zedong’s Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) has never been in doubt. However, the wartime activities of Soviet MiG-15 fighter pilots, radar operators, and anti-aircraft gunners were, until recently, kept secret. U.S. Air Force pilots often reported hearing Russian spoken over the radio and sighting distinctly non-Chinese pilots while fighting in the northwest corner of Korea known as “MiG Alley,” but the extent of this involvement was unknown. Recent research in the Soviet-era archives in Russia not only verifies the direct involvement of Soviet units, but also provides an inside view of Stalin’s high-level diplomacy and the military deployments that implemented these policies. This evidence indicates that the Soviet dictator pursued a policy designed to ensure Chinese troops would shoulder most of the burden of defending East Asia (2).
Russian and Chinese sources still disagree on what exactly Stalin promised Mao in order to secure Chinese intervention. The documents thus far available from the Russian archives indicate that Stalin never planned to use his MiG-15s and anti-aircraft forces for anything other than defending Chinese industry and supply lines. However, the Chinese claim that Stalin promised complete air support for their ground forces.

In any event, the Chinese army went into combat against U.S. and South Korean troops in late October 1950 without air cover or bomber support. This alleged betrayal by Stalin was a critical point in the eventual breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations. While it is certainly possible that Stalin made promises to the Chinese in Moscow that he later reneged on, there is currently no evidence to suggest that he took any steps to change the military deployments already underway in northeast China (11).

Most Soviet air divisions deployed to China were sent to defend Chinese industrial cities along the eastern coast, the Beijing area, and Manchurian cities. Only two Soviet air divisions were deployed at any one time to defend the airspace over “MiG Alley.” The first Soviet units deployed to the Andong airbase continued to train Chinese pilots while carrying out their defensive mission along the Yalu River.

The Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) in North Korea began initial actions against U.N. forces in late October but did not launch its general offensive until the end of November. Soviet pilots began flying missions against the U.N. air forces on the afternoon of 1 November 1950. Apparently, this was in reaction to a reported U.S. air raid on North Korean planes on an airfield in Manchuria (12).

For more, please see link 2

Answer 2

Long roots to that answer. Russia wanted part of Korea since the late 1800's. Japan had already start to colonize the Korea peninsula and Japan and Russia fought a war in 1903 to try and stop each others expansion in the Far East. Russia lost the war and Teddy Roosevelt brokered the peace agreement, he became the first American President to win a Nobel Peace Prize because of that.

During WW 2 the USSR did not declare war on Japan until the summer of 1945. In the last couple of months of the war the USSR try to rush in and try to capitalize on the power vacuum left by a defeated Japan. Soviet forces came down from Siberia and occupied Korea down to the 38th parallel. They then set up a Communist government which five years later invaded the South in an attempt to reunite the country.

Stalin used the North Koreans to fight a war that kept the USA off balanced and unable to politically force the USSR out of the Warsaw block of Eastern European nations.

This is a very rough general outline but this should give you an idea of where to do your research.

Answer 3

By proxy, not directly. The USSR sold MIG fighter planes and other arms to the North. The Soviet envoy to the U.N., Andrei Gromyko, was boycotting a security council meeting for some reason, and they passed a resolution to send U.N. troops to help the South without his veto. China got directly involved when the U.S. pushed right up to the Yalu River border with China.

Answer 4

Seoul is definitely South Korea's greatest town and one of East Asia's financial and social epicentres, you can discover more with hotelbye . Seoul is a exciting blend of old traditions and cutting-edge electronic technology, home to countless road food sellers and huge nightlife districts, an very high-pressure instructional system and serene Buddhist temples, a trend-setting childhood tradition and often crushing conformism, extraordinary architecture and countless monotonous lines of grey residence structures, Seoul is just a town filled up with stark contrasts. Seoul is a significant section of Korea's social heritage.

Answer 5

Interesting records from Stalin's viewpoint by Johnslat (thumbs up). I add that both Rusia and China had a land border with N Korea in 1950, and were competing for influence over that region. Later, Mao and Stalin ended their 'friendship'.

Answer 6

i could defiantely do yuor own analyze in this. That pronounced you may desire to defiantely keep in mind the actuality that the UN grew to become into in that's infancy, having been shaped purely some years earlier. It grew to become into the successor of the League of international locations whose failure to offer up or interfere in Nazi Germany's occupation by making use of invasion of the two Austria and Czechoslovakia led to that's crumple and arguably to the 2nd international conflict. This grew to become into the UN's first attempt of character. whilst N Korea invaded the South it did so with the permission of that's sponsors, the U.S. and Communist China. Neither social gathering on their area believed that the UN (i.e. the Western participants) could face as much as the invasion. in the tip, the UN resolved to no longer blik first and their gamble failed.

Answer 7

The story is that they wanted to try their MiG jets out on their cold war opponents USA , the US Sabre jets and the Migs were based on the German WW11 jet Me 262, the ironic fact is that the MiG was powered by Rolls Royce engines gifted to them by the UK a few years earlier.

Answer 8

I believe the Soviet Union backed the Communist North Korea.

Answer 9

both north and south Korea were backed by warring countries countries in their war. the south is backed by the imperialist us and the north is backed by socialist Russia.