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I have a list but im not sure who are the most important (well except for Meade and Lee) also please state why they are significant (both confederate and union)

2007-11-16 11:30:37 · 7 answers · asked by tennisgrl9294 3 in Arts & Humanities History

7 answers

Confederacy had General Robert E Lee vs USA General Grant!

Under them they had some very well known commanders with them. For example Grant had Custer. Lee's best was General Stonewall Jackson whom unfortunately was already dead by the time this battle took place.

So there are three for you. I am sure others know more than just those three names! I am even sure that Wild Bill Hick cock was riding for the USA doing behind the lines work I have read a few times.

2007-11-16 11:56:36 · answer #1 · answered by Legend Gates Shotokan Karate 7 · 7 5

General Robert E. Lee and General George meade

2015-03-23 11:23:04 · answer #2 · answered by ? 1 · 1 0

Gen Bufords decision to stay overnight and wait for the Confederates is what set the stage for the battle, Gen's Lee and Meade however were the major decision makers once it started.

2007-11-16 11:38:23 · answer #3 · answered by deejayspop 6 · 4 4

President Lincoln vs President Jefferson those were the LEADERS!!

Everyone else were either Generals, Colonels, soldiers or citizens of one side or the other. Those were the only TWO main leaders. all others were under the presidents command as were Grant and Lee both under their presidents leash so to speak!

2007-11-17 19:14:08 · answer #4 · answered by Anonymous · 2 3

Confederate Gen JEB Stuart---He was off around Harrisburg causing trouble, his delay in giving information like the size and position of the Union army to General Lee, helped in the defeat at Gettysburg.

Confederate Gen James Longstreet---He opposed fighting at Gettysburg. He wanted to find a better spot slightly to the south where the Union army would have to attack them. His delay on the second day ALSO helped in the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg.

Confederate Gen George Pickett---HIs division was utterly destroyed by what's known as Pickett's Charge. To his dying day he never forgave Lee for ordering that charge!!!

Union Gen Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain--- His 20th Maine Regiment was out of ammunition and was in danger of losing their position on Little Round Top---the EXTREME left of the Union army. He ordered an unlikely text-book maneuver. He had them fix bayonets and charge after the 15th Alabama.

Union Gen John Buford---He held off the Rebel army on the first day until reinforcementys could arrive.

Union Gen John Reynolds---He died on the first day of battle. But here's where the significance is: Lincoln offered Reynold's command of the Union Army a week before. Had he accepted and had been killed, there would have been chaos.

Edited: I didn't include Meade and Lee because you already had them. And the guy below me is completely wrong. Grant wasn't even at Gettysburg, because he was in Vicksburg Mississippi at the time.

2007-11-16 11:44:04 · answer #5 · answered by Sic Semper Tyrannis 5 · 4 7

Longstreet, Meade, Custer, Lee and more. See list below.

2007-11-16 11:43:44 · answer #6 · answered by staisil 7 · 4 4

~Union Commander in Chief: Abraham Lincoln
Union General-in-Chief: Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck

On site: Union (Army of the Potomac) General Staff and
Headquarters

MG George G. Meade, Commanding

[Meade replaced MG Joseph Hooker on June 28
MG John F. Reynolds was in charge until he was killed
at McPherson Ridge, then Maj. Gen. Winfield S.
Hancock took command until Meade arrived]

General Staff and Headquarters

Chief of Staff: MG Daniel Butterfield
Chief of Artillery: BG Henry J. Hunt
Assistant Adjutant General: BG Seth Williams
Chief Quartermaster: BG Rufus Ingalls
Medical Director: Dr Jonathan Letterman
Chief Signal Officer: Capt Lemuel B. Norton
Chief Ordnance Officer: Lt John R. Edie (acting)
Bureau of Military Information: Col George H. Sharpe
Provost Marshal General: BG Marsena R. Patrick
93rd New York: Col John S. Crocker
8th U.S. (8 companies): Capt Edwin W. H. Read
2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry: Col R. Butler Price
6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Companies E and I: Capt
James Starr
Regular cavalry (detachments from 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th
Regiments) (15)
Chief of Engineers: BG Gouverneur K. Warren
Engineer Brigade: BG Henry W. Benham
5th New York (3 companies): Maj Walter L. Cassin
50th New York: Col William H. Pettes
U.S. Battalion: Capt George H. Mendell

The Corps Commanders were:

I Corps
MG John F. Reynolds
MG Abner Doubleday
MG John Newton

II Corps

MG Winfield S. Hancock
BG John Gibbon
BG John C. Caldwell
BG William Hays

III Corps

MG Daniel E. Sickles
MG David B. Birney

V Corps

MG George Sykes

VI Corps

MG John Sedgwick

XI Corps

MG Oliver O. Howard
MG Carl Schurz

XII Corps

MG Henry W. Slocum
BG Alpheus S. Williams


Confederate Commander-in-Chief: Jefferson Davis
Confederate General-in-Chief: None (Davis assumed the
role and (poorly) directed the Southern strategy until late
in the war)

On site: Confederate (Army of North Virgina) General Staff and Headquarters:

Gen Robert E. Lee, Commanding

General Staff

Chief of Staff and Inspector General, Col Robert H. Chilton
Chief of Artillery, BG William N. Pendleton
Medical Director, Dr. Lafayette Guild
Chief of Ordnance, Ltc Briscoe G. Baldwin
Chief of Commissary, Ltc Robert G. Cole
Chief Quartermaster, Ltc James L. Corley
Judge Advocate General, Maj Henry E. Young
Military Secretary and Acting Asst. Chief of Artillery, Col Armistead L. Long
Aide de Camp and Asst. Adjutant General, Maj Walter H. Taylor
Aide de Camp and Asst. Military Secretary, Maj Charles Marshall
Aide de Camp and Asst. Inspector General, Maj Charles S. Venable
Engineer, Capt Samuel R. Johnson

The three Corps Commanders were:

First Army Corps: LTG James Longstreet

Second Army Corps: LTG Richard S. Ewell
Third Army Corps: LTG Ambrose Powell Hill,

Then there were the Division, Brigade, Regimental, Cavalry and Artillery commanders for each army as well as unattached units of sharpshooters (the Civil War equivalent of today's Special Forces). It would be easier if you would just search "Gettysburg Order of Battle"

This was a battle that should never have happened. Lee had ordered that none of his units engage until his entire force was consolidated and assembled. AP Hill disobeyed that order on July 1 and sent two Brigades of Heth's division (Archer and Davis) to Gettysburg to confront Union forces that had been reported in the vicinity (Buford and Gamble's cavalry). The level and frequency of insubordination and direct disobedience of orders on both sides at this battle boggles the mind.

There is simply too much information to give you here and you can get it all with a couple keystrokes. Do it yourself and at least you'll have some idea as to the validity of the information.

You'd get better information that way, too. For instance, Joshua Chamberlain was a colonel, not a general, and was in charge of a single regiment, the 20th Maine. Gen. Warren probably saved the battle for the Federals when he discovered Little Round Top to be undefended and ordered the 140th New York, some artillery units and Col Strong Vincent's 3rd Brigade, which included Chamberlain's regiment, there. Vincent arrived just ahead of Brig. Gen. Evander Law's Brigade, who had been ordered to take the high ground by Gen. Hood.

Gen. Ewell probably lost the battle for the Confederates when he decided not to advance on Cemetery Ridge, thus allowing Meade to establish his defensive lines which would prove so costly to Picket, Pettigrew and Trimble two days later. On the first day, even though the battle had been wrongfully initiated by Hill and Lee's main body was still miles away, the Confederates overran Union positions where ever they engaged and had Ewell continued his advance and occupied Cemetery Ridge, it is doubtful that Hancock would have elected fight the battle at Gettysburg at all. [The decision to make a stand at Gettysburg was made by Hancock after consulting with Howard. Meade was still on the way and he had delegated they authority to Hancock. Although they were pretty much being routed, the Union troops responded and morale soared when word got out the Hancock had told Howard that a defensive position on Cemetery Ridge was about the best place to have a battle that he'd ever seen. And Ewell gave the Federals that position in gift wrap and ribbons.] After Early routed Barlow at Blocher's Knoll, Maj Gen Isaac R. Trimble pleaded with Ewell to put a brigade on Cemetery Ridge before the Federals did. As Trimble reports it, Ewell made an "impatient reply". As witnesses to the conversation report it, the 'impatient reply' was , "When I need advice from a junior officer I generally ask for it." Fortunately for the Union, Trimble had no troops then under his direct command so he could not disobey orders and/or take it upon himself to occupy THE preeminent defensive position on the entire battlefield.

Gen Sickles all but gave the battle back the next day when he disobeyed his orders and advanced a half mile beyond his assigned position. The salient this created in Union lines led to the slaughter at the Peach Orchard and the Wheat Field and to the destruction of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell's division and Sickles' III Corps. Hancock saved the day by ordering a near-suicidal attack by Col William Covill's 1st Minnesota Regiment. Covill was killed and the Regiment suffered casualties of 82%, which still stands as the greatest loss by any American combat unit in a single battle.

There was a Grant at Gettysburg, but it was Col Lewis A. Grant, who commanded 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, VI Corps (the famed "Vermont Brigade") This Grant would later rise to the rank of Major General and win the Medal of Honor. US Grant, however, was busy taking Vicksburg at the same time Gettysburg was being contested.

JEB Stuart was acting under Lee's express orders when he took his three best Brigades around the Federal east flank. By June 29, Lee's army was stretched over an arc that ran from Chambersburg to Carlisle and almost into Harrisburg and Wrightsville. The Army of the Potomac was approaching from the south. It made great military sense for Stuart to flank them on the east, but Stuart was out of communication and unaware the battle had been joined on July 1. Had he continued east and south, he could have cut off Union reinforcements and completed the encirclement of Meade's Army. He was at Gettysburg by noon on the second day, long before the major fighting started that day, but Lee didn't send him out until his troops and horses were rested. Stuart's absence did limit reconnaissance by the South, but Lee had more cavalry at his disposal than Stuart's. Stuart's cavalry would have made a difference on July 1 and may have kept the Federals off of cemetery ridge. He, unlike Ewell, would have seen and understood the significance of the position and would never have let it fall into enemy hands. But had Hill followed his orders, the battle would not have been joined on July 1. That was why Lee felt he could safely send Stuart and some, but not all, of his cavalry around the Union east flank. Stuart had 7 brigades. He only took 3 with him. Imboden's cavalry, not part of Stuart's division, was available (and used) as well.

Lee agreed with Longstreet that Longstreet should delay his offensive on July 2 until all of his troops arrived. Lee, after all, was the one who ordered that no engagements be made until the entire army was consolidated and prepared. Then, when Longstreet had 2/3's of his Corps together, he had to alter his route of advance and his battle plan because of the location of various Federal units in his planned path and the presence of signal units which had been discovered on Little Round Top. The attack was supposed to as much of a surprise as possible and he couldn't very well parade his troops past Union units on his way to the fight. Before he started to move into position, Sickles, in defiance of his orders, had inadvertently parked III Corps right in the center of Longstreet's intended route. Hood's division attacked at 4:00 and McLaw's at 5:00. Picket's division was still on its way from Chambersburg and not available. Since Sickles had moved his Corps forward, the battle occurred in the Peach Orchard and Wheat Field instead of at Cemetery Ridge as planned.

Meanwhile, Ewell's Corps was to simultaneously harass the enemy on the right flank and 'pursue if the advantage presented itself'. Ewell didn't move until around 7:00. Johnson's division started late and the Federals under Slocum and Greene had had time to construct stone walls and defensive works. Johnson did overrun some Union positions, but he had started too late and was given no support. Jubal Early's division moved as night fell and made some headway then essentially broke off when Early chose not to support the brigades which were engaged. Meanwhile, Ewell pretty much kept Rodes' division out of the fight and in reserve. Had Ewell followed up as ordered, it is highly likely the Union left would have collapsed. Two days in a row Ewell broke off when he had fresh troops in reserve and a clear advantage. Had Ewell attacked on schedule, the Union reserves sent to bail out the troops Sickles had left hanging (and Sickles himself) would not have been available for Hancock's use.

Having failed on the right and on the left, Lee went after the Union center on day 3. The plan was to attack the left flank and center, but a Union counterattack at Culp's Hill forced Lee to change tactics. Ewell was ordered to hold until Longstreet's assault began. This day, probably because he had he been severely chastised by Lee and his fellow officers for his actions on the 1st and 2nd, Ewell took it upon himself to engage - hours ahead of schedule. When Lee ordered him to break off, Ewell messaged back that it was too late, his men could not be recalled. The diversion Ewell's attack on the right was to have provided so as to draw troops and fire from the main assault was over with before Longstreet's men left the woods.

The new plan called for Longstreet to send Picket's Division and six brigades from Hill's Corps against the enemy center. One would think after Fredericksburg that Civil War commanders would have learned that using 18th century tactics against 19th century artillery and rifles was not a good idea. A lot of good men died on both sides before that lesson was learned. Longstreet advised against the charge and predicted failure but was overruled by Lee. Picket, Pettigrew and Trimble (who had been given command of Dorsey Pender's Division after Pender was mortally wounded) led the attack. Pickett's troops were fresh, having arrived too late on the second day to engage. Hill was sick and didn't get to select units from his corps which would be used. Instead of using fresh troops from III Corps, exhausted troops which had seen action on the 1st and 2nd were selected.

The assault should not be called Picket's charge. Picket led only about 1/3 of the force and he was under the direct command of Longstreet. The more accurate name favored by at least some contemporary historians is the "Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Assault."

Pickett's division suffered fewer casualties than did Pettigrew's during the assault, and Pettigrew's Division saw action on all three days of the battle, suffering substantial losses each day. Pickett's Virginians, especially Brockenbrough's Brigade (one of the units from Hill's Corps), were outfought by Pettigrew's Carolinians during the assault and were blamed by many southerners for the failure of the attack. Pickett was a prima donna, a whiner and not much of a leader. His division suffered no worse casualties than most and a lot fewer than many on both sides. [The casualty rate for the Army of North Virginia over the three days was about 1/3.] During the assault, Trimble lost his leg and Pettigrew was wounded. All three of Pickett's brigade commanders, and 13 of his regimental officers were killed, wounded or captured. Pickett chose to lead from the rear and didn't get a scratch.

The legend about Pickett harboring any animosity towards Lee over the assault is pure myth and supported by no fact or evidence. It is likely that Pickett was never real pleased with the attack or the outcome, but the statement attributed to him "That man destroyed my division." has largely been debunked by legitimate historians for generations as never having been made. When asked later why the assault failed, Pickett said "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." After the assault, he still had plenty of men in his division, but he was a little short of officers. Pickett's next battlefield command of import was in April,1865 at Five Forks. When Pickett's position fell Lee's line collapsed and Richmond was abandoned. Lee surrendered at Appomattox a few days later. During the Battle of Five Forks, Pickett was 2 miles away at a party.

On July 4, the battle was over at Gettysburg and only minor skirmishes sporadically broke out. Out west, Vicksburg fell. It was a banner day all the way around for the Confederacy. Lee retreated from Gettysburg on the 5th and headed back to Virginia. Lincoln and Halleck ordered Meade, then pleaded with him, to pursue. Meade dragged his heels and didn't engage. The Potomac was flooding. Lee couldn't cross. Meade could have trapped a depleted, defeated and beleaguered army on the muddy banks of the river with no escape route and ended the war, but Meade blew it by not following up on the victory at Gettysburg.

There's a lot more. It was a major event. It, together with Vicksburg, determined the outcome of the war and defined the course of American history, and, collaterally, of world history. You really should read and learn about it.

2007-11-16 13:25:23 · answer #7 · answered by Oscar Himpflewitz 7 · 5 6

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