It would have been better if this was two questions
What was the history
What was the holding
Here is a summary of the 68 page decision in 8 pages. The points of law here appear in the order they are given in the opinion:
Plaintiffs in Alabama legislative reapportionment case had no effective political remedy to obtain relief.
The Constitution of United States protects right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 14, 15, 17, 19, 23, 24.
The right to vote can neither be denied outright, nor can it be destroyed by alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot-box stuffing.
Qualified voters in a state have a right to cast their ballots and to have them counted.
The right to vote freely for candidate of one's choice is of the essence of democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at heart of representative government.
The right of suffrage can be denied by debasement or dilution of weight of citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.
The fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a state.
A predominant consideration in determining whether state's legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of rights asserted under Equal Protection Clause is that rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
In a state legislative apportionment case, the judicial focus must be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against certain of the state's citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
The right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society; since right to exercise franchise in free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights any alleged infringement of right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
State election systems should be designed to give approximately equal weight to each vote cast.
The constitution forbids sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Vote-diluting discrimination cannot be accomplished through device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
A voting regulation which discriminates against residents of populous counties in state in favor of rural sections lacks the equality to which the exercise of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Each citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in political processes of his state's legislative bodies; full and effective participation requires that each citizen has an equally effective voice in election of members of his state legislature.
Legislatures should be bodies which are collectively responsive to the popular will.
The concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
The achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is the basic aim of legislative apportionment.
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators; diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
A denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection.
When a state exercises power wholly within domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review; but such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.
The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate reason for over-weighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote.
State legislative malapportionment is constitutionally impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Population is the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies.
The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that seats in both houses of bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on population basis. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
An individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the state. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
The existing and two legislatively proposed plans for apportionment of seats in the two houses of the Alabama Legislature are invalid under Equal Protection Clause in that the apportionment is not on a population basis and is completely lacking in rationality. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const. Ala.1901, §§ 50, 197-200, 284; Code of Ala., Tit. 32, §§ 1, 2; Laws Ala.1962, Sp.Sess. p. 121.
Mathematical nicety is not a constitutional prerequisite to state legislative apportionment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
In Alabama legislative reapportionment cases, the district court properly considered two legislatively proposed apportionment plans, although neither was to become effective until 1966 election and proposed constitutional amendment was scheduled to be submitted to state's voters in November 1962; this consideration was necessary to determine whether Alabama Legislature had acted effectively to correct the already existing malapportionment and in ascertaining what sort of judicial relief, if any, should be afforded. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const.Ala.1901, §§ 50, 197-200, 284; Code of Ala., Tit. 32, §§ 1, 2; Laws Ala.1962. Sp.Sess. p. 121.
The so-called federal analogy of an upper house on a geographical basis and a lower house on a population basis is inapplicable to state legislative apportionment matters, notwithstanding that almost three-fourths of the present states were never in fact independently sovereign. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
When the system of representation in the Federal Congress was adopted, there was no intention of establishing a pattern or model for the apportionment of seats in state legislatures.
The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress was conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of the federal republic and was based on the consideration that in establishing federalism a group of formerly independent states bound themselves together under one national government.
Political subdivisions of states are not sovereign entities; they are subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by state to assist in carrying out state governmental functions.
Political subdivisions of states such as counties and cities, are created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them, and the number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon them and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state.
Legislatively proposed plan for apportionment of seats in Alabama Legislature cannot be sustained by recourse to the so-called federal analogy. Laws Ala.1962, Sp.Sess., p. 121; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
The concept of bicameralism is not rendered anachronistic and meaningless when predominant basis of representation in the two state legislative bodies is required to be population; a prime reason for bicameralism is to insure mature and deliberate consideration of, and to prevent precipitate action on, proposed legislative measures; simply because controlling criterion for apportioning representation is required to be the same in both houses does not mean that there will be no differences in the composition and complexion of the two bodies.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that a state make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable; however, it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters; mathematical exactness or precision is not a workable constitutional requirement. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
It is constitutionally valid to use political subdivision lines in establishing state legislative districts, so long as the resulting apportionment is based substantially on population and the equal-population principle is not diluted in any significant way. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
What is marginally permissible in one state in respect to legislative apportionment may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circumstances of the case.
Developing a body of doctrine on a case-by-case basis is the most satisfactory means of arriving at detailed constitutional requirements in the area of state legislative apportionment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
A state may legitimately desire to maintain integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing legislative apportionment scheme; valid considerations may underlie such aims.
Single-member districts may be the rule in one state, while another state might desire to achieve some flexibility by creating multimember or floterial districts; whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen.
So long as divergences from strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to effectuation of rational state policy, some deviations from equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to apportionment of seats in either or both of two houses of bicameral state legislature.
Neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation in both houses of state legislature.
Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from equal-population principle applicable in apportioning seats in both houses of state legislature.
Arguments for allowing deviations from population-based representation in both houses of state legislature in order to insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas and to prevent legislative districts from becoming so large that availability of access of citizens to their representatives is impaired are, for the most part, unconvincing.
A state can rationally consider according political subdivisions some independent representation in at least one body of the state legislature, so long as the basic standard of equality of population among districts is maintained; however, permitting deviations from population-based representation does not mean that each local governmental unit or political subdivision can be given separate representation, regardless of population.
A state may legitimately desire to construct legislative districts along political subdivision lines to deter the possibilities of gerrymandering.
If scheme of giving at least one seat in one house of state legislature to each political subdivision, such as a county, results in total subversion of equal-population principle in that legislative body, this result would be constitutionally impermissible. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Determining size of its legislative bodies is a matter within discretion of each individual state.
Careful judicial scrutiny must be given, in evaluating state legislative apportionment schemes, to character as well as degree of deviations from strict population basis.
If, even as a result of a clearly rational state policy of according some legislative representation to political subdivisions, population is submerged as controlling consideration in apportionment of seats in particular legislative body, then right of all of state's citizens to cast an effective and adequately weighted vote would be unconstitutionally impaired.
The admission of states into the Union with constitutions creating bicameral legislatures the membership in which is not apportioned on a population basis is not a justification for deviations from population in the apportionment of seats in the legislature. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Some questions raised under the Guaranty Clause of the Federal Constitution and nonjusticiable, where “political” in nature and where there is a clear absence of judicially manageable standards. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 4, § 4.
Despite congressional approval of state legislative apportionment plans at time of admission into Union, even though deviating from equal-population principle, the Equal Protection Clause requires more; an apportionment scheme in which both houses are based on population can hardly be considered as failing to satisfy the Guaranty Clause requirement. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 4, § 4; Amend. 14.
Congress presumably does not assume, in admitting states into the Union, to pass on all constitutional questions relating to character of state governmental organization.
Congressional approval of admission of state into Union does not validate an unconstitutional state legislative apportionment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
Congress lacks constitutional power to insulate states from attack with respect to alleged deprivations of individual constitutional rights.
That the Equal Protection Clause requires that both houses of state legislature be apportioned on population basis does not mean that states cannot adopt some reasonable plan for periodic revision of their apportionment schemes; decennial reapportionment is a rational approach to readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account population shifts and growth; the Equal Protection Clause does not require daily, monthly, annual or biennial reapportionment, so long as state has a reasonably conceived plan for periodic readjustment of legislative representation; the minimal requirement is decennial reapportionment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
With respect to operation of Equal Protection Clause, it makes no difference whether a state's legislative apportionment scheme is embodied in its constitution or in statutory provisions. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
State constitutional provisions should be deemed violative of Federal Constitution only when validly asserted constitutional rights could not otherwise be protected and effectuated.
Courts should attempt to accommodate the relief ordered in state legislative apportionment cases to the apportionment provisions of state constitutions insofar as it is possible.
A state legislative apportionment scheme is no less violative of Federal Constitution when it is based on state constitutional provisions which have been consistently complied with than when resulting from a noncompliance with state constitutional requirements. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
When there is an unavoidable conflict between the Federal and State Constitutions, the Supremacy Clause of Federal Constitution controls. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2.
Remedial techniques in state legislative apportionment cases will probably often differ with the circumstances of the challenged apportionment and a variety of local conditions.
Once a state's legislative apportionment scheme has been found to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan; however, under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and a state's election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding granting of immediately effective relief in legislative apportionment case.
In awarding or withholding immediate relief in state legislative apportionment case, court is entitled to and should consider proximity of forthcoming election and mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles.
With respect to timing of relief in state legislative apportionment case, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a state in adjusting to requirements of court's decree.
Any relief accorded in state legislative apportionment case can be fashioned in light of well-known principles of equity.
The district court wisely declined to stay impending primary election in Alabama, and properly refrained from acting further until Alabama Legislature had been given opportunity to remedy admitted discrepancies in state's legislative apportionment scheme, while initially stating some of its views to provide guidelines for legislative action.
The district court acted with proper judicial restraint, after Alabama Legislature had failed to act effectively in remedying the constitutional deficiencies in the state's legislative apportionment scheme, in ordering its own temporary reapportionment plan into effect, at a time sufficiently early to permit holding of elections pursuant to that plan without great difficulty, and in prescribing a plan admittedly provisional in purpose so as not to usurp the primary responsibilities for reapportionment which rests with the legislature. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
The action taken by district court in Alabama legislative apportionment case, in ordering into effect a reapportionment of both houses of Alabama Legislature for purposes of the 1962 primary and general elections, by using the best parts of the two proposed plans which it had found, as a whole, to be invalid, was an appropriate and well-considered exercise of judicial power, and the district court correctly indicated that the plan was invalid as a permanent apportionment; in retaining jurisdiction while deferring a hearing on issuance of final injunction in order to give the provisionally reapportioned legislature an opportunity to act effectively, the district court proceeded in a proper fashion.
Since the district court evinced its realization that its ordered reapportionment could not be sustained as basis for conducting 1966 election of Alabama legislators, and avowedly intends to take some further action should reapportioned Alabama Legislature fail to enact a constitutionally valid, permanent apportionment scheme in the interim, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and remanded the cases for further proceedings.
2007-11-08 11:34:48
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answer #1
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answered by Discipulo legis, quis cogitat? 6
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