2-firm case. Each firm produces C(q)=5q and mark dem is p=100-q. Find COURNOT NASH EQUILIBRIUM p,q and profit

Question

b) what if these 2 firms formed a cartel and maximized join profits? solve for the resulting quantities, prices and profits.
C)What if firm 2 cheats when firm 1 sets q1=q (j)? What are the resulting """"""""""""""""""""
d) What does this have to do with the prisoner dillema

2. BERTRAND: DERIVE THE bERTRAND nash equilibrium p,q and profit
3.Stackelberg: If firm 1 is the stackelberg leader, what are the resulting p q and proft

Answer 1

Wikipedia is your friend. Check out:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cournot_competition

It deals with all your questions except for the connection to prisoner's dilemma. For that the issue is what assumptions one can make.

The "paradox" of the prisoner's dilemma is that whatever the other person does, you are better off betraying. But if both parties follow this logic, both are worse off than if both had kept quiet.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner's_dilemma

The classic answer to the "paradox" is to explore the possibility of playing repeatedly. In this context, it can pay to cooperate.

Clearly, the issues of an ongoing game, assumptions about mutual understanding, ability to punish, etc. are what the distinctions between the various types of oligopolistic behaviors (Cournot vs. Bertrand, etc.) is all about.