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How effective was this tactic?

2007-09-16 20:44:41 · 7 answers · asked by Anonymous in Arts & Humanities History

7 answers

Jason, you know very well that the Germans used “blitzkrieg” operational and tactical methods on the Eastern Front. They used these methods in Barbarossa, Typhoon, Blau and Citadel (plus in other smaller scale offensive operations). And you know all of that very well yourself.

So, I have to believe that the REAL point of your question is to obtain opinions on your part two ... “How effective was this tactic?”

My answer to that “effectiveness” question is: -

[1] In a short-term sense, “blitzkrieg” tactics remained very effective for the Germans during their main offensives of 1941 and 1942.

By “short-term sense”, I’m really referring to an inevitable ingredient of the blitzkrieg formula. It is, by its very nature, an extremely violent combined arms attack, designed to break through the enemy’s defensive crust. Then to drive deep behind enemy lines, destroying HQ’s and rear area support formations, and throwing the enemy into administrative and morale chaos. To encircle and force the surrender of major enemy combat formations.

BUT blitzkrieg demands careful planning and preparation, and is inevitably of short duration, because supplies and (in the case of the Wehrmacht) slow-moving foot soldiers cannot keep pace with the armored spearheads. So it grinds to a halt within a week or two at most.

[2] The Wehrmacht was at its peak of strength and efficiency for Barbarossa in mid-1941; and still significantly superior to the Red Army for Blau in 1942. Conversely, the Red Army was in terrible disarray when Barbarossa was launched; and not in much better shape throughout most of 1942. These comparative conditions gave blitzkrieg every chance of success for the first 18 months of the Russian campaign ... and that is what happened.

[3] But blitzkrieg was designed to work in short, sharp campaigns against opponents with limited resources and with limited space in which to operate. Those conditions did not apply in Russia. The Soviets’ manpower resources were indeed huge. And the Soviets could trade space to win time.

[3.a] On June 22nd 1941, the Red Army numbered approx 5.5 million men, of whom about 2.7 million were stationed in the Western military districts targeted by Barbarossa. But, in addition, the Soviet mobilization pool contained a further 12 million men, many being trained reservists.

[3.b] Consequently, although the Red Army lost (killed, captured, or incapacitated by wounds) almost 3,150,000 men in 1941; and lost a further 3,260,000 men in 1942; the Red Army’s field strength had actually increased by February 1943 to 6,100,000. And there were still more reserves in training.

[3.c] Meanwhile, Wehrmacht strength was being whittled away, especially in quality.
• For Barbarossa, the Germans fielded 3,100,000 of their own men, plus 650,000 Finns and Rumanians.
• By the time of Operation Blau, the Germans were able to field 2,700,000 of their own men, plus approx 1 million Finns, Rumanians, Hungarians and Italians.
• By the time of Operation Citadel, the Germans had scraped up 3,100,000 of their own men, plus 650,000 allies. But Red Army field strength stood at 6,900,000 ... plus 3,600,000 in reserve.

[3.c] Space mattered enormously. Transposed onto a map of the United States, the Soviet territory conquered by the Germans at their peak advance (late 1942) was equivalent to everything from the Eastern Seaboard to the Mississippi River. But there was still a lot more of Russia beyond that.

[4] Climate and terrain mattered too. The Wehrmacht was designed to excel in Western European conditions. Its equipment and, especially, its logistics proved hopelessly inadequate for Russian conditions.

[5] By 1943, several other factors began to further blunt the effectiveness of German blitzkrieg-style attacks on the Russian Front: -

• Russian re-organization and re-equipment. By 1943, the Red Army was totally familiar with German blitzkrieg tactics and had worked out highly effective countermeasures. Russian equipment, especially armor and anti-tank weaponry, was also now well able to cope with most Panzer attacks.

• Lend-lease. By 1943, the flow of American and British supplies to Russia, especially trucks, had begun to hugely increase the mobility of the Red Army.

• Luftwaffe distraction. By 1943, Germany had lost control of the air over the key battlefields of the Eastern Front. Largely, this was as a result of Anglo-American strategic bombing of Germany: Goering pulled most of the Luftwaffe back to defend Germany against these raids. Without command of the air, blitzkrieg style warfare could not win.

CONCLUSION

The entire scope of the Russian campaign was beyond German capability from the start ... unless the Soviet government collapsed, which did not happen. Red Army resistance and resilience mattered; so did space, terrain and climate; but lack of supplies for a long war was probably the most important factor of all. Under those conditions, localized blitzkrieg victories looked spectacular; but they were never going to win the war for Germany.

2007-09-17 03:22:05 · answer #1 · answered by Gromm's Ghost 6 · 0 0

Of course they did.They prepared almost 3 million men and 2500 tanks for that gigantic blitzkrieg but it failed due to extremely large territory they had to conquer,poor road conditions and when winter came they were totally halted because men and equipment started to freeze at minus 30 C.Their tanks froze and fuel inside vehicles too.After the spring of 1942. they restarted the blitzkrieg but it was much less effective and already at Sevastopol battle it was clear that Germans can't keep up anymore.What didn't happen at Sevastopol,happened at Stalingrad and after the winter of 1942/43. they were in full retreat.In the summer of 1943. they tried to restart the blitzkrieg again by operation Citadel but as we all know it was just another failure.After the battle of Kursk,Germans were never again capable of renewing the large offensive on the east.However,every little German counterattack that occurred on the east was a small size blitzkrieg,so asking if they have tried is hilarious because that was the only type of attack they were doing.Hope this helps :)

2007-09-16 22:25:09 · answer #2 · answered by Opera Phantom 5 · 0 0

Surprise. German air superiority. German units were far more mobile. German infiltration tactics (the blitzkrieg) German's had an experienced professional officer corps and NCOs, the Russian command structure was far more politicized because of the purges. The biggest reason is that the Soviets had the bulk of their troops very close to the border, deployed in what appear to be preparations for an offencive, they had made few if any defencive preparations. This is still one of history's big mysteries, was Stalin planning on attacking Hitler and Hitler beat him to the punch? The answer died with Stalin.

2016-05-21 08:21:30 · answer #3 · answered by ? 3 · 0 0

Blitzkrieg was a term used after the event to describe the 1940 campaign in France.
Hitler claimed he had originated it and tried to apply it in Russia.

2007-09-17 00:15:23 · answer #4 · answered by Anonymous · 0 0

No try about it. Germany used the blitzkrieg ("lightning war") extensively on the Russian front. They would not have made the gains they did otherwise.

2007-09-16 21:30:02 · answer #5 · answered by Anonymous · 1 0

They did, but due to the expanse of Russian territory and the oncoming winter weather, they had to change tactics.

2007-09-16 20:49:44 · answer #6 · answered by Gary Jackson 1 · 0 0

Yes they used it in Poland and the Soviet Union.
Attack with tanks and motorised infantry supported by dive bombers.
A new kind of war and very effective.

2007-09-17 05:24:25 · answer #7 · answered by brainstorm 7 · 1 0

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