Did the Japanese ever consider going North (ie Russia) instead of heading South during WW2?

Question

I mean large scale campaigns in Russia and forgoing China and south east asia.

Answer 1

The Japanese actually did intend to go North against Russia in WW2, instead of South against America and the British and Dutch empires. The decision to go South instead of North was based mainly on Russian strength and Western weakness.

From the time of Japan’s successful war against Imperial Russia in 1905, all the way through to mid-1941, the Japanese army was preoccupied with devising a continental strategy against Russia; and spent no time at all in considering a war against the Western Powers.

Before I go into details, I should remind you that the army (the “IJArmy”) in 1930’s / 1940’s Japan was not just the military servant of a Japanese civilian government. To an extraordinary degree, the IJArmy WAS the de facto government (or at least the power behind the throne) in Japan. The IJArmy did not have everything entirely their own way in running Japan; civilian politicians and the navy (the “IJNavy”) both tried to resist IJArmy domination. But for most of the crucial 1930’s / early 1940’s the IJArmy was in control of Japan’s affairs.

Nowadays, we are usually told that economic desperation drove Japan’s decision to attack South against the Western Powers in 1941. Japan’s plight (thanks to the US strategic embargo) was indeed real, with its supplies of most key materials to keep fighting its war in China in jeopardy. The Japanese really did need oil from Indonesia and Burma; rubber from Malaya; etc. Nobody (including the Russians) knew in 1941 that Siberia was as enormously mineral-rich as it actually is. An “attack North” strategy into Mongolia and Siberia seemed to offer little quick economic plunder for Japan.

But the IJArmy view of Russia as “the enemy to be beaten” was deeply ingrained, no matter what the economists said. The real reason why Japan switched from its focus on attacking Russia, and instead attacked the Western Powers in SE Asia and the Pacific was much less complicated. Japan thought it would lose against Russia. By contrast, Japan thought that it could quickly gobble up the resource-rich but feebly defended colonies of the Dutch and the British ... and then negotiate a favorable peace with a USA emasculated by the crippling of its Pacific Fleet.

Why would Japan think that it would lose against Russia --- especially with Hitler seemingly unstoppable in Barbarossa? Three reasons: -

[1] Khalkin-Gol, the undeclared border war between Japan and Russia in 1939. The IJArmy had concentrated for 20 years on developing methods and weapons to defeat the Red Army. At Khalkin-Gol, the IJArmy learned that they needed to start over from scratch. Nothing worked for them. Japanese artillery and armor was at least a technical generation out-of-date; their pitiful handful of 37mm anti-tank guns couldn’t stop most Russian tanks; their field artillery was overrun by Russian armor, because it had no AT ammunition; their mobility was far inferior; and their logistics were hopeless. The only worthwhile implement that they had was their fanatical infantry, who were – as a result of their fanaticism – promptly slaughtered. As a result of Khalkin-Gol, the Japanese knew that they were not going to beat the Red Army in Mongolia / Siberia as long as it remained there in some serious strength.

[2] To beat the Russians, Japan needed the Red Army to be so distracted by Hitler’s onslaught that its forces in Mongolia / Siberia would be rushed to the far side of Russia. That did not happen, even in Russia’s darkest hours. When oda315 says that the Russians transferred their Mongolian divisions west to defend Moscow, etc. he quotes a conventional but misleading Western-history-book commonplace. In 1939, the Red Army had 30 full divisions on the Japanese border. We now know, from Russian archives, that only 10 of those divisions were sent west to fight Hitler. From then on, the Russians maintained never less than 20 divisions to guard against Japanese attack.

[3] That was not a sufficient reduction in the Russian defense to allow any real hope of success for a Japanese attack on Russia. The IJArmy was so heavily embroiled in its war in China (it had 23 divisions fighting there in 1938, versus only 9 divisions elsewhere throughout the Japanese empire) that it could not marshal sufficient strength in Manchuria to launch a serious attack against Russia. Ultimately nearly 700,000 Japanese troops in sixteen divisions and 600 aircraft assembled in Manchuria under the guise of the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver. That still left them outnumbered (and even more badly outgunned) by the Russian 20-division defense.

Until Japan realized that Hitler was NOT destroying Russia’s ability to defend itself, the IJArmy planned to attack the USSR on 29th August 1941; and then to halt in mid-October before the onset of the brutal Siberian winter.

But, long before Hitler understood it, the IJArmy realized that Hitler was NOT destroying Russia’s ability to defend itself.

On 5th August 1941, the IJArmy abandoned its plans for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Nine days later, on 14th August 1941, the IJNavy – now back in Imperial favor – surprised the IJArmy by announcing that the new priority was to prepare for war against Britain and America ... and to have the army's plans for that war ready by 15th October.

So the IJNavy (not necessarily including Yamamoto himself) got the war that IT wanted – to secure oil supplies above all else. And the IJArmy found that, to its astonishment, it was being called upon to play second fiddle to the navy in a war of the navy’s choosing.

And the almost-deliberate failure of the Japanese army to be of much help to its hated rival, the Japanese navy, in the Pacific War is just another of the reasons why Japan lost.

Answer 2

In 1939, at the Battle of Kalkhan Gol in Mongolia, Georgie Zhukov handed a decisive defeat to the Japanese in a large manuever battle. As a result of this battle, the Japanese decided they would not go further beyond this northern point.

Later, in late 1941, Richard Sorge, basically, a spy in Japan friendly with influential Nazis in Japan, provided intelligence that Japan would not attack Russian forces in the Far East. That enabled the Russians to transfer their Mongolian divisions West in time to defend Moscow and later, to counter attack at Stalingrad.
Regards

Answer 3

Because Japan and Russia have a non-aggresion treaty, and the Japanese need the resource of SE Asia paricularly Iron.

Answer 4

Thyey had already beaten Russia in 1905 and probably did not consider them much of a threat.