Actually, that's pretty much what happened, so nothing would have changed.
The German army was in no condition to attack Russia in 1940. Over the '40/'41 winter, the army almost tripled in size. France collapsed in June of 1940. The veterans of the French campaign would have had to have been redeployed eastward and reorganized and refitted. The earliest the attack could have taken place with a shoestring fighting force would have been early August. With half the campaign season over, that would have left a mere two months to cross nearly 1500 miles of enemy territory before the rasputitsa - the Russian mud -- would have brought things to a halt. The southern flank would have been left hanging, because the Rumanians and Hungarians had not yet joined the war. This would have prevented any action south of the Pripet marshes and required the Russians to defend the narrow Smolensk-Moscow highway gap. It's doubtful whether Germany could have mustered enough units in 1940 to even field a continuous front line once the Pripet marshes had been circumvented and the Ukraine opened up to the south.
In spring of 1940, the Italians got into trouble in Greece, which ended up with the Germans bailing them out during the Marita and Merkur operations. If the Germans had been occupied with the Russians, this would not have happened.
Tactically, the Germans were better equipped in 1941, with the new long-barreled panzer IV’s. In 1940, the best they had were the Panzer III’s, with the long 50mm high velocity gun. This was a terror in the western desert, but would have proved totally ineffective against the Soviet KVI’s and T-34’s.
Germany’s position was much better in 1941. The southern flank was opened for a two-prong attack into Russia, the army was much larger and better equipped. The Russians were not significantly stronger than they were in 1940. Had Germany not gotten involved in the Balkans and attacked on the original schedule in March, things could well have been different. If the German occupation policy had been more lenient in the Ukraine, the local population would have been supportive, and things may have been different. If Hitler had not changed the focus of the operation to the south and concentrated on Moscow in 1942, things could have been different. If you control Moscow and Kharkov, you control the entire transportation system throughout western Russia. By failing to capture Moscow, the Germans allowed the Soviets the ability to redeploy laterally along the front. If Hitler had allowed his generals to fight without insane orders to stand fast, they could have probably won. Von Mellenthin was of the opinion that Russia had run out of manpower by early 1945. Had Germany not squandered their manpower and stayed tactical and mobile they could have very well worn Russia to the breaking point.
2007-08-31 11:28:30
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answer #1
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answered by Anonymous
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BY that part of the war German submarines had ceased to be a threat because the allies had begun to use naval recon,blimps, sub-hunter ships and airplanes to hunt down the sub packs. By this part of the war hundreds of German subs were at the bottom of the Atlantic. They wouldn't have a chance in the channel because allied air power was always superior to the Germans. Like Napoleon attacking Russia was their big mistake.
2007-08-31 15:28:59
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answer #2
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answered by ericbryce2 7
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That's basically what he did, and you know how well that worked out.
Operations Sea Lion was delayed to fight the Battle of Britain. When it seemed like they couldn't quickly win that battle Germany turned her attention to the east. Probably the single biggest strategic error the Germans made was leaving England in the fight while they picked up new enemies.
2007-08-31 22:48:53
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answer #3
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answered by rohak1212 7
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If he'd gone after Russia instead of splitting his forces Germany might be A LOT bigger now. The plan you describe seems like it would have been pretty sound.
2007-08-31 15:24:28
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answer #4
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answered by Hendo 3
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