How did the Russians get to know that the Germans were preparing for Battle of Kursk?

Question

What were the key objectives of the Germans?

Answer 1

I f you look at a picture or map of the Russian Front line at the end of 1942,before the Battle of Kursk, you would see that it was a straight line from north to south. However there was a giant bulge in the line, protruding out about 200 hundred miles and encompassing Kursk. Just like the bulge in the American lines at the Battle of the Bulge but bigger.
The Russians knew that the Germans had to eliminate this bulge in their lines. It was obvious that this was where their spring 1943 offensive would be, the Russians just didn't know when exactly.
The Germans objective was to attack at the northern base and southern base of the bulge. The northern army would drive south and the southern army would drive north and they would meet near Kursk, thus eliminating the bulge in their line and the Russian armies in the bulge.
As you said the Russians expected this and built three in-depth defensive lines that the Germans couldn't break.
Hitlers generals wanted to attack in the spring but Hitler keep postponing the attack to wait for more Tiger and Ferdinand tanks to be built, to add to the attack, this was a mistake because it gave the Russians more time to complete strong defensive positions. The Germans might have succeeded if they had attacked in April or May.

P.S.
The night before the battle started a captured German sapper told the Russians the attack would come at 3:00 am that morning and German deserters informed the Russians that they were issued extra rations that night which, from experience, told the Russians an attack was coming and why the Russians decided to bomb and shell suspected German assembly areas early that morning.

Answer 2

The Russians found it out from a spy network located in Switzerland.They also managed to capture some German military personnel which had the knowledge of the upcoming attack.And the final reason is that they were decoding German radio signals.The main German objectives were to cut off the Russian salient west of Kursk by capturing Kursk and Livny.After that they would advance towards Moscow.The german 9th army was attacking to the north and the 14th panzer army to the south of the Kursk.Both armies faced success in the starting phases of the battle but got annihilated later,when they faced two thirds of the Red army (yes,two thirds of the Red army were defending Kursk).HTH:)

Answer 3

Two of the answers, above, correctly point out the superiority in numbers of the Red Army and Air Force, as well as excellent and thoughtful preparation. Another question is why the Reds were considered to have won, even though they lost more troops. While not a perfect answer, in general, the party left controlling the field of battle is the "winner."

Answer 4

General Erich Felgiebel-Chief of Communications for German Armed Forces
General Fritz Thiele-Chief of OKW communications
Major General Rudolph von Gersdoff-Chief of Intelligence for Army Group Centre
Rudolph Roessler was a German expatriate living in Switzerland and running a small publishing firm with the backing Brig. General Roger Masson who was Head of Swiss Military Intelligence. This was the so-called Lucy Ring. Thiele and Gersdoff supplied Roessler with an Enigma machine and a radio. So after Roessler obtained the information from OKW, he would pass it on to the GRU, the Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate. Brig. General Roger Masson would pass it on to British Intelligence who passed it on also to the Soviets. This was all part of the Lucy Ring.
This ended with the arrest of Erich Felgiebel and Fritz Thiele.

Answer 5

Stalin – and through him, Zhukov – knew almost the full details of Operation Citadel well in advance, giving them ample time to bait the trap for what would become the greatest land battle of WW2. Indeed, the Russians obtained virtually full information on Germany’s Citadel plans – including the German order of battle, and key technical data on the new Tiger and Panther tanks – almost as soon as those plans were finalized.

This intelligence coup did not come via Britain’s code breakers, although information from that source helped confirm what Moscow’s own spies had already reported. It came via the “Lucy” spy network from Switzerland. And, in particular, it came from Lucy’s key agent, someone within the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) itself: an agent identified by the code name “Werther”. OKW was the supreme command where Hitler, Keitel and Jodl planned out the war. It was to OKW that Manstein brought his proposals for Operation Citadel.

“Lucy” was Rudolf Rössler, a German journalist and publisher who had been domiciled in Lucerne, Switzerland, since 1933. Lucy had other sources besides Werther. There was "Teddy," a source in the army's High Command (the Oberkommando das Heeres, or OKH), where Generals Halder, von Brauchitsch, Thomas, and later others planned army actions. "Bill" was Lucy's source in the army weapons office, and "Olga" was the source in the replacement army. "Anna" provided information from the foreign office.
By Spring 1943, both Stalin and Hitler knew that – because of their preoccupation with the Mediterranean theatre – the Anglo-Americans would not be able to launch a cross-Channel invasion into France until 1944. This meant that the Wehrmacht’s strength could remain concentrated on the Eastern Front, and that the Germans could try to force a decisive battle there to break the stalemate that had ensued following Stalingrad.

Stalin was keen to launch the Red Army on a broad, massive offensive. Zhukov persuaded him to wait; to let the Germans make the first move; to lure them into a trap; and to use it to destroy the Wehrmacht’s armored strength before unleashing any Red Army offensive. Information from the Lucy network told Stalin and Zhukov exactly what the Germans were planning, so that Zhukov could prepare his defences.

The Germans knew that they had strength and time enough (before the Anglo-Americans could open the “Second Front”) for only one last major effort to knock Russia out of the war. Placing high hopes in the new Tigers and Panthers, Manstein proposed a short, sharp pincer attack from both North and South to envelop and destroy the Russian armies within the Kursk salient: a 120 mile wide, 60 mile deep, bulge into the German lines. With this accomplished, Manstein wanted to adopt a defensive posture, banking that Stalin would react with an overly-ambitious counter-offensive ... and that this would present an opportunity to destroy the Red Army as an effective opponent.

Manstein had “read” Stalin’s instincts correctly. But Manstein did not know that his plans had been betrayed to the Russians as soon as he had laid them before OKW. And Manstein therefore could not know that Citadel was doomed before it even got started.

Zhukov’s key information concerning Citadel (apart from the technical data on Germany’s new panzers) came from Lucy’s agent Werther, that mysterious spy within OKW.

Who was Werther? Lucy went to his grave without revealing that identity. But Louis Kilzer pieced together convincing evidence to show that it was Hitler’s closest associate, Martin Bormann.

You can read all about it in the book below. I include a link to a review (in which "Bormann" is consistently mispelled as "Boorman"!).

Answer 6

The Western Allies intercepted German radio signals about the battles preperations and passed the information to their Eastern Ally Russia.

Answer 7

Russian spies in the Werhmact and OKH (high command) and allied intelligence reports. The key objective was to eliminate the bulge in their front.