~Of course it was.
Japan was defeated. The Japanese Navy no longer existed. Their Air Force was reduced to poorly trained single flight Kamikaze pilots. Ground forces were depleted and replacements untrained. The supply of available troops was severely reduced. The General Staff was considering a coup, one group leaning to surrender and another (which had far less support and influence), towards a suicidal fight to the last man and total annihilation of Japan if necessary. The populace, with the war on its front lawns, was not as rabidly suicidal as portrayed and was amenable to surrender.
Invasion of the home islands could have been deferred indefinitely while Japan was embargoed. The industrial capacity to produce weapons was substantially diminished and could have been destroyed by carrier based planes and bombers launched from Okinawa, as the raids on Tokyo prove (not to mention the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki themselves). Without imports, Japan could not feed itself, let alone maintain an army and she lacked the steel to build weapons or fuel to power them. The fire bombing of Tokyo was more destructive than either of the nuclear strikes in any event and there was no target out of reach of allied (conventional) bombs. Yes, the A-bombs probably did speed the surrender, but Japanese surrender was inevitable.
Stalin had defeated Hitler in Europe. After Stalingrad, total victory there by the allies was a foregone conclusion. Normandy opened a second front (in Europe - the war had been a two front war all along, given Africa, Sicily and Italy) but that second front did not change the outcome. It simply prevented Stalin from claiming full, complete and total victory against the Nazis.
Stalin complied with his treaty obligations and entered the war against Japan after Berlin fell. The US and Britain could not afford finishing second to the Soviets in the Pacific too. The war had to be ended and ended quickly, by means that would convince Stalin and Mao that they were not going to run roughshod over the democracies during the peace talks and, more importantly, the post-war rebuilding of the world. Hiroshima and Nagasaki filled this bill quite nicely.
It was obvious that the next major conflict would be between the US and either China or the USSR (or both). Stalin and Mao had to be held in check, or so thought Washington. What better way to do that than drop Little Boy. That having been accomplished, what was the need of using Fat Man at Nagasaki, other than to let the world (and more to the point, Stalin and Mao) know we had more than one bomb, and were capable of producing more and willing to (and savage enough to) use them? The US still claims the
distinction of being the only nation to have used atomic weapons. Such a distinction to claim - and Barry Goldwater wanted to do an encore in Vietnam!
Little Boy, the Hiroshima bomb, was an enriched U-235 weapon. Fat Man, the Nagasaki weapon, was plutonium. The powers that were also wanted a live-fire comparison of the effect of the different types of weapons. And of course the Manhattan Project had to be justified as to its cost and expense. What better way than to cause a few generations worth of birth defects in Japanese civilians. Other than for political and laboratory purposes, there was no need to use either weapon and certainly no strategic military reason to use both.
As to the loss of life in the war, the Soviets suffered 10 million troop (male and female) and 15 million civilian dead in the war as opposed to less than 350 thousand US military casualties. (That's 64% of the total allied troop KIA's for the Soviets against 2% for the US.) At Pearl on December 7, only 68 civilians were killed. Most of the 110,000 Japanese killed instantly at Nagasaki and Hiroshima were civilians, as were the 230,000 who died of the effects over the next several years. Clearly, the countless children born with birth defects over the next few generations had no part in the war.
Although Japan had never in its history been successfully invaded by a conquering army, WWII was an unprecedented conflict and Japan had never been reduced to the ashes it was prior to August 6, 1945. The pummeling would have continued with impunity by conventional weapons launched from afar but for the urgency to get the job done and the demand for unconditional surrender. With Soviet troops now in the field, that urgency was increased, not abated: else the USSR would have had a far greater role in the reconstruction of Japan. The US wanted Japan in its fold at war's end, the better with which to have bases near both the USSR and China should they want to get uppity.
Draw your own conclusions as to the justification for using the bombs, but do it based on the facts, not on the propaganda.
In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity,
no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish,
the physicists have known sin;
J. Robert Oppenheimer
Edit to JackP: The stats on civilian deaths were addressed to the military import of the drops. Yeah, you are right. I never heard of either the legitimate Japanese attacks on military targets, such as the Indianapolis or the atrocities, including the several you spared us the lecture on. Thanks for the update. Are you suggesting that killing a quarter million civilians is justified because of those atrocities? Gee, that means the US is open to any nuclear, bio or chemical attack from any source because of US treatment of American Indians and/or slaves? Or because of the current illegal occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan in which we are engaged? Or that it would have been ok to fire-bomb Dresden because of the Camps (Oh, never mind - we did that one.) I did not mention that about 2000 of those killed at Hiroshima were Japanese-Americans, students, mostly, who had been stranded in Japan in December '41 and an unknown number of American POW's. How does that compare to the number who died for want of supplies and medicine on the Bataan March?
The point is, killing civilians is never considered an appropriate goal in war by civilized nations. That one side may do it does not justify like response by the other. Joke that it was, the My Lai verdict should have established that principal once and for all, Gitmo notwithstanding. There was something written up in Geneva and signed by the US to that effect.
Yes, much of my answer is supposition. That supposition is supported by the facts and based on logical interpretation of them. Such is the nature of history (and education). Did you expect that Harry Truman would leave a memo laying around that said he approved the bombs as a political ploy? Or that MacArthur would encourage it out of revenge rather than as a war time necessity? (Actually, MacArthur argued against the bombs, claiming surrender was imminent and they were unnecessary.) Get real. As to the ability to conduct the air war and an embargo from bases on Iwo and Okinawa, how many successful airraids were flown in July alone without losses to enemy fire? By August of '45 at least 5 dozen Japanese cities had been destroyed by conventional weapons and fire bombs. (Curtis LeMay himself acknowledged he would have been tried for war crimes for the firebombing, especially of Tokyo, had the US lost the war.) Yes, Japan could have been starved and beaten into submission without a single marine hitting the beaches. Martial law was imposed in Japan to protect against a citizen's revolt in demand for peace. Surrender was coming.
The question did not address what the Japanese did or might have done had the roles been reversed. What does that have to do with the US decision to drop the bombs or the military necessity for doing so. If you are suggesting that there was a revenge motive in dropping the bombs, I won't argue with you. But revenge is hardly justification or military necessity. Just ask the Sioux and Cheyenne what they think about that one (and Wounded Knee).
Your cut and paste of Bataan was a poor choice of material. Given the conditions of the prisoners at the time of the surrender, their sheer numbers (vs the numbers the Japanese had expected) and the dearth of supplies, food and medicine available to the captors, it is nothing short of miraculous that so many prisoners survived. What, a couplethousand sick and half-dead US prisoners or so died out of 75,000? The real number will never be known. Better material would be the trial transcripts (of both Japanese and US testimony - which I have read). What no one ever mentions is that the captors suffered exactly the same conditions as did the captives - the Japanese troops were simply more fit and more able to withstand the privations. They had not been held under sieze prior to the surrender (THAT embargo did work) and had had access to their subsistence rations. The US troops were already sick and dying when they surrendered. Sorry John Wayne, but that is the simple truth. Actually, it is rather surprising that the prisoners were not just lined up and shot, but I guess the sub-human Japanese war mongers were somewhat more humane than were their German counterparts. The Russian, Pole and Slav POWs didn't fare so well.
I responded to the question, and I refuse to be swayed by the self-justifying propoganda pumped out of the Pentagon when the facts are so clear. Maybe that's why I was in the 2% minority who realized the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were immoral, illegal and unjustified, not to mention that they were doomed to the failure they have met, way back when Georgie the Younger started to rattle his sabre. Too bad we don't have thinking representatives in congress who can learn from history. Where is Wayne Morse when we need him?
But thanks for the comments. The dialogue is refreshing.
Edit to MyNameAShand:
First, the Soviets did not enter the war against Japan until after the fall of Berlin because that was the agreement made at Teheran in November '43. Given that the Soviets were so committed in Europe, and neither Great Britain nor the US could match the number of troops (or the quality or quantity of tanks and artillery pieces) that the Soviets had in the field, it was agreed that the USSR would continue to shoulder the bulk of the load against the Nazis. The numbers and results in Europe speak for themselves. Never ever underestimate what Stalin's forces did to the Wehrmacht. Had Patton tried to take on that meat grinder, he'd have lasted a month or two if he was lucky. What did the Soviet's do in the few days they spent in Manchuria in August 45?
You are right that Hiroshima was a virgin target. It was deliberately left alone because the brass wanted to fully assess the extent of the damage that could be caused by Little Boy on its own. This speaks to curiosity of the power of the weapon, not necessity.
Nagasaki had been hit by US conventional weapons on August 1. Nagasaki was not the primary target, but overcast skies over Kokura redirected Bockscar and Fat Man. The first bomb was dropped on August 6. The Japanese had already floated peace feelers in July, requesting only 4 not unreasonable conditions. Why negotiate if you've got nukes?
The second bomb fell on August 9, not because of recalcitrance on the part of the Japanese but because bad weather was forecast for the 10th to the 15th. The drop was initially scheduled for the 11th. Rather than to give Hirohito and his government time to assess the damage, the power of the Hiroshima bomb and Japan's options, the second bombing was moved up to make sure it could be tested on a live taget in real-world conditions. This is not military necessity to save the lives of ground troops.
Oppenheimer's request that the bombs be dropped on a strictly military target or, better still, on uninhabitted ground, was rejected out of hand. That is vengence and intimidation (of the Soviets and Chinese) at work. The next 6 bombs scheduled for production (to be deployed with in 2 to 4 weeks) were not intended to be dropped on troop concetrations to clear the anticipated path of Operation Downfall (the invasion of Japan) but on cities and civilian targets. One would think that if one wanted to save one's own troops, one would use one's primary weapon on opposing forces, not civilians. The surrender came on August 15 officially but the decision was made on August 12 as the Soviets began their march through Manchuria. With a much more formidible foe knocking at the back door and a more merciful conqueror at the front, the Japanese accepted the inevitable. The bombs played little, if any, role.
The facts and circumstances are self-evident, and, through them, the motive should be clear.
But don't take my word for it:
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan." Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
"The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.
"In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives." Dwight D. Eisenhower.
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
However, the way the Russians were eating up and spitting out the Japanese forces in Manchuria just a few days after entering the war played more than a major part in the ultimate decision to surrender unconditionally, much more than either bomb, according to no less than Hirohito and Tojo themselves.
2007-07-05 10:36:28
·
answer #1
·
answered by Oscar Himpflewitz 7
·
3⤊
2⤋
Im answering your question and clearifying a misconception that a previous answerer said concerning hirosima.
It was a military manuever, inorder to save American lives. As we saw the loss of life during Normandy, we expected even greater loss if we invaded Japan, which is a series of islands. We saw the how much sacrifice went into capturing Iwo Jima and Okinawa and we believed the loss would be even greater if we invaded Japan itself. That is the military reason why we did it.
The political reason, is that the Soviet Union only declared was on Japan after the war in Europe was finished. The US could not allow Japan to fall into Soviet hands so we needed to win the war in the Pacific quickly to prevent the spread of Communism.
Now Hiroshima and nagasaki were chosen because the were "virgin" targets meaning the US had not bombed them before and they would therefore allow US to gather information concerning the strenth of our new weapon. In no way were those two cities fire bombed. Tokyo on the other hand was Fire Bombed.
2007-07-05 12:23:21
·
answer #2
·
answered by MyNameAShadi 5
·
5⤊
0⤋
The Soviets were war weary, and they had no interest in helping the USA in the final conquest of Japan. They did indicate a keen interest in gaining some of the spoils of Japanese defeat, especially in terms of territory.
The full blown acknowledgment of Soviet danger was not present in 1945. Those in the circle of power could see obvious signs, but many thought their actions in East Europe we as much about anger and retribution towards the Nazis as a communist power grab.
While I don't think the 'bomb drop' presidential decision matrix listed slowing of Soviet expansion in the top 5 of reasons to drop the bomb, I do think the consideration was on the list.
One cannot deny that we exploited the two detonations post-facto, both diplomatically and militarily.
2007-07-05 12:24:31
·
answer #3
·
answered by Izdiwaj 2
·
0⤊
0⤋
Yes two major reasons were to bring an end to the war and to intimidate the soviets. But also a part of the decision process was that the government had spent billions of dollars on the development of the bomb (a large amount of money by 1945 standards) and if they had not have used the bomb it would have been a waste of money. Also it was an experiment, to see how effective the bomb would be, that is the reason Hiroshima and Nagasaki had never been bombed before, they were clean targets.
2007-07-05 10:35:36
·
answer #4
·
answered by dpgoronzy500 2
·
0⤊
2⤋
No, it was intended to bring a swift conclusion to WWII. Without the a-bomb, 1 million US troops would have been needed to conduct a land invasion of Japan. The losses would have been a disaster for America.
It did intimidate the Soviet Union for a few years following WWII but they had the bomb within 2 years after the Japanese surrendered on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Harbor. So it wasn't an effective intimidation to say the least.
2007-07-05 09:06:48
·
answer #5
·
answered by maddog 5
·
9⤊
1⤋
Yeah, ol Uncle Joe (as Stalin was called while he was on our side during the war) was told about the Bomb before we ever dropped it, so it is unlikely to have been meant to intimidate him.
The bomb was a bit of a last ditch effort to prevent a land invassion. We had already bombed many of the key cities into effective rubble. It was more of a tool used by the Japanese factions desirous of peace to force a surrender (by showing how little it would cost America to level the island, no mind it was a bit of a bluff).
2007-07-05 10:00:04
·
answer #6
·
answered by Thought 6
·
1⤊
1⤋
Because the Japanese EMPIRE started that war with America. And near the end of the war when they knew they were going to lose, they still fought tooth and nail for every square inch. And, the Jap empire was starting to arm women and children to fight to the death for the empire. Had America invaded Japan, millions of lives on both sides would have been lost. And then Russia who was starting to turn on America would have posed a serious threat. America had to end the war as fast as possible and create a show of power so Russia wouldnt completely turn on us. So, dropping 2 nukes on japanese cities and killing a couple hundred thousand people, outweighted millions dying on the invasion, and then a prolonged war with Russia. The odds justified the means. And dont think Japan was innocent. They committed countless atrocities in China and killed 100x more civilians than America ever did.
2016-05-19 00:33:53
·
answer #7
·
answered by Anonymous
·
0⤊
0⤋
Indirectly, yes. Truman was led to believe that an invasion of Japan would cost 1000's of American lives. (This info was probably, in hindsight, erroneous.) The bomb's power was, as an afterthought, probably a show of force to the Soviets, but we probably did not realize how insidious they were at the time.
2007-07-05 09:43:40
·
answer #8
·
answered by Al S 1
·
1⤊
2⤋
I doubt it, but it likely played a strong role in keeping the Soviets out of Japan and the Kurils in the immediate post-war period.
2007-07-05 09:21:38
·
answer #9
·
answered by Anonymous
·
3⤊
1⤋
the reason for dropping the bomb was simply cold hearted, evil and unnecessary. many Americans do not know that Hiroshima was already destroyed. the city was made mostly out of wood so it was fire bombed. most of the city was destroyed and it citizens dead before the bomb was dropped. thier surrender was offered before the a-bomb had dropped.
2007-07-05 10:17:00
·
answer #10
·
answered by "GoSANE" 6
·
0⤊
5⤋
Probably a better solution than the atomic bomb would have been to arm, equip, and transport every male Korean, Chinese, Filipino, Indo-Chinese, Malayan who wished to participate to perform the invasion of Japan, while the US fleet sailed home. The resulting blood bath, rape of every Japanese female and castration or killing of every Japanese male would have certainly changed things over the next few decades.
That would have taken care of all the problems resulting from the post-war Japanese economic gargantuan, as well as side-stepping the attempts to second-guess Truman's reasons for dropping the bomb.
Whatever alternatives Harry Truman had, he exercised the one he thought most suited the interests of his country. More US lives saved, fewer lost.
That might be considered a political decision.
//////////////////////////////...
Oscar Himpflewitz: Some of what you say is certainly fact. Much is supposition.
For instance, you suggest Japan was 'ready' to surrender. Ten days before the Hiroshima burst:
The Sinking of USS Indianapolis
The USS Indianapolis (CA-35) was commissioned at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 15 November 1932. The ship served with honor from Pearl Harbor through the last campaign of World War II, sinking in action two weeks before the end of the war. On 30 July 1945, while sailing from Guam to Leyte, Indianapolis was torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-58. The ship capsized and sank in twelve minutes. Survivors were spotted by a patrol aircraft on 2 August. All air and surface units capable of rescue operations were dispatched to the scene at once, and the surrounding waters were thoroughly searched for survivors. Upon completion of the day and night search on 8 August, 316 men were rescued out of the crew of 1,199.
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq30-1...
Embargo as an alternative? How many ships and seamen would have died in that embargo?
You also mention how many civilians were killed at Pearl Harbor.
Probably you never heard of this:
The Nanking Massacre, commonly known as "The Rape of Nanking," was an infamous war crime committed by the Japanese military in and around the then capital of China, Nanjing, after it fell to the Imperial Japanese Army on December 13, 1937. (At the time, Nanjing was known in English as Nanking). The duration of the massacre is not clearly defined, although the violence lasted well into the next six weeks, until early February 1938.
During the occupation of Nanjing, the Japanese army committed numerous atrocities, such as rape, looting, arson and the execution of prisoners of war and civilians. Although the executions began under the pretext of eliminating Chinese soldiers disguised as civilians, a large number of innocent men were intentionally identified as enemy combatants and executed—or simply killed outright—as the massacre gathered momentum. A large number of women and children were also killed, as rape and murder became more widespread.
The extent of the atrocities is debated between China and Japan, with numbers[1] ranging from some Japanese claims of several hundred,[2] to the Chinese claim of a non-combatant death toll of 300,000[3]. A number of Japanese researchers consider 100,000 – 200,000 to be an approximate value.[4] Other nations usually believe the death toll to be between 150,000 – 300,000.[5] This number was first promulgated in January of 1938 by Harold Timperly, a journalist in China during the Japanese invasion, based on reports from contemporary eyewitnesses. Other sources, including Iris Chang's commercially-successful The Rape of Nanking, also promote 300,000 as the death toll.
Or this:
Unit 731
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Body disposal at Unit 731Unit 731 was a covert biological warfare research and development unit of the Imperial Japanese Army that undertook lethal human experimentation during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II. It was responsible for some of the most notorious war crimes carried out by Japanese personnel. Officially known by the Imperial Japanese Army as the Kempeitai Political Department and Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory, it was initially set up as a political and ideological section of the Kempeitai military police of pre-Pacific War Japan. It was meant to counter the ideological or political influence of enemies, and to reinforce the ideology of military units.
Or this:
Comfort women (Japanese: ???, ianfu?) or military comfort women (Japanese: ?????, jugun-ianfu?) is a euphemism for the up to 200,000 women who served in the Japanese army's brothels during World War II. Historians and researchers into the subject have stated that the majority were from Korea, China and other occupied territories and were recruited by force or deception to serve as "sex slaves."[1][2][3]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/comfort_wom...
The Sook Ching massacre (?????) was a systematic extermination of perceived hostile elements among the Chinese in Singapore by the Japanese military during the Japanese Occupation of Singapore, after the British colony surrendered in the Battle of Singapore on 15 February 1942 during World War II. Sook Ching was later extended to include Chinese Malayans. The massacre took place from February 18 to March 4 1942 at various places.
The term Sook Ching (??) is a Chinese word meaning "a purge through cleansing". At the time, the Japanese also described the incident as such (it was referred to as the ????/Kakyoshukusei, or "purging of Chinese"). The Japanese also referred to it as the Shingaporu Daikensho (?????????), lit. "great inspection of Singapore".
Although the term "Sook Ching" appeared as early as 1946, it was not commonly used in the Chinese press or other publications until the 1980s. It is not clear whether it was the Japanese or Chinese who first used Sook Ching/shukusei, which is ?? in both languages.
The current Japanese term for the massacre is Shingaporu Kakyosgyakusatsujiken (????????????), lit. "(the) Singapore Chinese massacre".
Or this:
The Death March
Prisoners on the march from Bataan to the prison camp, May 1942. (National Archives)Although General Homma and Kawane had expected 25,000 prisoners of war, the Allied garrison at Bataan consisted of more than 75,000 (66,000 Filipinos and 11,796 Americans) starving and malaria-stricken men. During the battle, only 27,000 of these men were listed as "combat effective". Even then, three fourths of this number were still affected by malaria. As a result, the Japanese army met great difficulties in transporting these prisoners from the beginning. Distributing food was also almost impossible as many were fed nothing. 4,000 sick or wounded captives had to stay behind to be treated by the Japanese at Bataan. A shortage of manpower and supplies on the part of the Japanese, who were now laying siege to Corregidor, raised confusion and irritation amongst the guards as many prisoners escaped. At most, only 4 Japanese soldiers could accompany each group of 300 prisoners. The march to Balanga, which was to take only one day, lasted three days for some soldiers.
After reaching Balanga, it became obvious to General Kawane that his trucks could not carry more than half of the prisoners to the rail center at San Fernando. Since most of the other vehicles the Japanese had brought to the Philippines were either in repair or being used for the Battle of Corregidor, those who could not get a ride were forced to continue marching for more than 30 miles on completely unshaded roads that were sometimes made of asphalt. The thick dust swirling in the air would make it difficult for the prisoners to see and breathe while those who were walking barefoot had their feet burned on the molten asphalt. Men who refused to abandon their belongings were the first to fall. The last nine miles of the march from the town of Lubao to San Fernando were among the hardest the men would ever walk.
Those who were able to reach San Fernando alive were then locked into makeshift prisons where they were finally able to receive some level of proper and adequate medical care, food, and rest. Soon after this, however, the prisoners were jammed into freight trains that took them to Capas. Vomiting was frequent during the ride as some were even crammed or suffocated to death. After the three hour trip, which included few stops for rest, the prisoners then marched the 8 mile road to Camp O'Donnell.
Through the duration of nine days, a majority of the disease and grief-stricken Filipino and American prisoners were forced to march as much as two-thirds of the 90 miles that separated Bataan from Camp O'Donnell. Those few who were lucky enough to travel to San Fernando on trucks still had to endure more than 25 miles of marching. Prisoners were beaten randomly, and were often denied the food and water they were promised. Those who fell behind were usually executed or left to die; the sides of the roads became littered with dead bodies and those begging for help. A number of prisoners were further diminished by malaria, heat, dehydration, and dysentery. It should be noted, however, that many of the soldiers who accompanied the prisoners of war were not only Japanese, but Korean. Since they were not trusted by the Japanese to fight on the battlefield, most Koreans in the Japanese army were forbidden to participate in combat roles and delegated to such service duties as guarding prisoners. As one prisoner recalled, "The Korean guards were the most abusive... the Koreans were anxious to get blood on their bayonets; and then they thought they were veterans." [1]
On the Bataan Death March, approximately 54,000 of the 72,000 prisoners reached their destination. The death toll of the march is difficult to assess as thousands of captives were able to escape from their guards. In some instances, prisoners were even released by their Japanese counterparts. Out of fear that the prisoners would be mistreated, Colonel Takeo Imai made the humanitarian decision of releasing more than 1,000 of his prisoners into the jungle. These acts of kindness, however, were especially rare. All told, approximately 5,000-10,000 Filipino and 600-650 American prisoners of war died before they could reach Camp O'Donnell. [2] Many prisoners died of dysentery and other infectious diseases, in part because they couldn't understand, or ignored, their captors' orders regarding sanitation. Even with perfect compliance, sanitation would have been a challenge; without it, it became nearly impossible.[citation needed]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bataan_deat...
//////////////////////////////...
Now that you have heard of them, exactly how much restraint do you suppose the Japanese military, had the situation been reversed, would have exercised?
2007-07-05 09:28:35
·
answer #11
·
answered by Jack P 7
·
2⤊
3⤋