I dunno that I can define it any better than great philosophers' (vague and qualified) attempts. I guess to me, the word sort of refers to the separation between self and world that must come before conscious experience ... consciousness is the world reflecting back on itself, giving an illusion of "aboutness"
Gah. Do I sound like a nutflake or what?
2007-06-07 19:53:04
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answer #2
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answered by zilmag 7
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The reality in our purpose for doing.
The Erikson life-stage virtues, in the order of the stages in which they may be acquired, are:
hope
will
purpose
competence
fidelity
love (in intimate relationships, work and family)
caring
wisdom
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http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ol/ol_phen.htm
THIRD PHASE.
Reason.
40. Reason is the highest union of consciousness and self-consciousness, or of the knowing of an object and of the knowing of itself. It is the certitude that its determinations are just as much objective, i.e. determinations of the essence of things, as they are subjective thoughts. It (Reason) is just as well the certitude of itself (subjectivity) as being (or objectivity), and this, too, in one and the same thinking activity.
41. Or what we see through the insight of Reason, is: (1) a content which subsists not in our mere subjective notions or thoughts which we make for ourselves, but which contains the in-and-for-itself-existing essence of objects and possesses objective reality; and (2) which is for the Ego no alien somewhat, no somewhat given from without, but throughout penetrated and assimilated by the Ego, and therefore to all intents produced by the Ego.
42. The knowing of Reason is therefore not the mere subjective certitude, but also TRUTH, because Truth consists in the harmony, or rather unity, of certitude and Being, or of certitude and objectivity.
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http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/osmorali.htm#OS504
(b) INTENTION & WELFARE
§ 505
As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. In point of form, the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature, embracing these individual points. This is the right of intention. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence, intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. (2)The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the action, in point of its matter, is not something external to him, but is a particularity of his own — that it contains his needs, interests, and aims. These aims, when similarly comprehended in a single aim, as in happiness (§ 479), constitute his well-being. This is the right to well-being. Happiness (good fortune) is distinguished from well- being only in this, that happiness implies no more than some sort of immediate existence, whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification.
§ 506.
But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular aspect in the empirically concrete action, thus making it essential to the intention or restricting the intention to it. In this way the supposed essentiality of the intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the greatest contradiction — e.g. a good intention in case of a crime. Similarly well-being is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this single agent, it is always something particular.
2007-06-07 15:36:55
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answer #3
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answered by Psyengine 7
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done with intention or on purpose; intended: an intentional insult.
2007-06-07 15:04:43
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answer #5
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answered by Anonymous
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