I agree. Each particular is unique, but everything can be said to belong to a universal class (of whatever kind), even if that universal does not yet have a name. We would not be able to understand the world around us at all if we did not distinguish all people, places, and things as particulars in a group of universals.
2007-05-16 01:22:29
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answer #1
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answered by Anonymous
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All of Creation is particular and without Universal Laws, Spirit and Love, there would not be a particular. It is Polarity, for without the Negative we would not have the Positive and vice versa. It is through Universal Law and Mind that all Creation is constantly being replenished, according to the thought, word and actions of each Particular here on Earth. All Creation is mathematics through the Golden Mean Equation as well as Pythagoras Theorem of Pi!
2007-05-16 06:41:22
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answer #2
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answered by Anonymous
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Any particular can be known to the exclusion of universals, but otherwise, no; particulars will always devolve back into their universality. In my humble opinion.
2007-05-16 08:18:05
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answer #3
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answered by Monita C 3
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Universals are the first perceived of reality for new consciousness.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slobject.htm#SL194n2
'(a) Mechanism
§ 195
The object (1) in its immediacy is the notion only potentially; the notion as subjective is primarily outside it; and all its specific character is imposed from without. As a unity of differents, therefore, it is a composite, an aggregate; and its capacity of acting on anything else continues to be an external relation. This is Formal Mechanism. Notwithstanding, and in this connection and non-independence, the objects remain independent and offer resistance, external to each other.'
The logic of the alpha-beta (A,B,C....) are universals in their concept or conceptual form in the mind and particulars in the word. Universality and particularity are conjoined in utility.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlobject.htm#HL3_711
Chapter 1 Mechanism
§ 1543
As objectivity is the totality of the Notion withdrawn into its unity, an immediate is thereby posited that is in and for itself this totality, and is also posited as such, although in it the negative unity of the Notion has not as yet detached itself from the immediacy of this totality; in other words, objectivity is not yet posited as judgment. In so far as it has the Notion immanent in it, it contains the difference of the Notion, but on account of the objective totality, the differentiated moments are complete and self-subsistent objects which consequently, even in their relation, stand to one another only as self-subsistent things and remain external to one another in every combination. This is what constitutes the character of mechanism, namely, that whatever relation obtains between the things combined, this relation is one extraneous to them that does not concern their nature at all, and even if it is accompanied by a semblance of unity it remains nothing more than composition, mixture, aggregation and the like. Spiritual mechanism also, like material, consists in this, that the things related in the spirit remain external to one another and to spirit itself. A mechanical style of thinking, a mechanical memory, habit, a mechanical way of acting, signify that the peculiar pervasion and presence of spirit is lacking in what spirit apprehends or does. Although its theoretical or practical mechanism cannot take place without its self-activity, without an impulse and consciousness, yet there is lacking in it the freedom of individuality, and because this freedom is not manifest in it such action appears as a merely external one.
A. The Mechanical Object
§ 1544
The object is, as we have seen, the syllogism, whose mediation has been sublated [ausgeglichen] and has therefore become an immediate identity. It is therefore in and for itself a universal — universality not in the sense of a community of properties, but a universality that pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality.
§ 1545
1. In the first place therefore the object does not differentiate itself into matter and form — a matter as the self-subsistent universal side of the object and a form as the particular and individual side; such an abstract difference of individuality and universality is excluded by the Notion of object; if it is regarded as matter it must be taken as in principle formed matter. Similarly, it may be defined as a thing with properties, as a whole consisting of parts, as a substance with accidents, or in terms of other relationships of reflection; but these relationships have been altogether superseded already in the Notion; the object therefore has neither properties nor accidents, for these are separable from the thing or the substance, whereas in the object the particularity is absolutely reflected into the totality. In the parts of a whole, there is indeed present that self-subsistence which belongs to the differences of the object, but these differences are themselves directly and essentially objects, totalities, that are not, like parts, determined as such in contrast to the whole.
2007-05-16 20:27:46
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answer #5
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answered by Psyengine 7
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