battle of gettysburg?

Question

please help me i need to answer these questions can u give me the answer?

1)Who Won?
2)Who Were The Commanders?
3)What Were the numbers of Union And Confederate Deaths?
4)What prompted Lincoln to make the speech there?
5)Why did Lincoln Order the dead be buried together?
6)How long did it take to bury the dead?
7)what would you see today if you visited gettysburg?

Answer 1

1) Union Victory (North)
2) Lee (South) and Meade (North)
3) Union - 23,055 (3,155 killed, 14,531 wounded, 5,369 captured/missing)
Conferacy - 23,231 (4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded, 5,830 captured/missing)
4) It was the bloodiest battle of the war and Lincoln wanted to redefine the purpose of the war.
5) To remind everyone that despite the war, we were still one nation.
6) It took a long time to bury the dead - many were buried quickly, horse carcasses were burned. The cemetery was not dedicated until 4 months later.
7) The battlefield is much as it was back then, but now covered with more growth (trees) and monuments to regiments and individuals where they fell.

Answer 2

While many mistakes were made at Gettysburg, the one looked at as most detrimental to the confederate cause was the failure of Richard Ewell to take the high ground on the first day. Specifically Clups Hill And Cemetery Ridge. After routing the Union forces on the 1st day and driving them back through Gettysburg proper, Ewell was ordered to pursue the Union forces up the high ground ( Clups Hill) "if possible" by R.E Lee. Ewell decided that it was not possible and did not attack. Ewell was only in command of this division because of the death of Thomas Jackson at Chancellorsville some months before. If the confederates would have taken the high ground it would have been the Union that would be forced to attack them up hill through terrible terrain for the next two bloody days instead of the other way around. There would have been no need for Pickett s disastrous charge on the 3rd day if the high ground was taken on the 1st.

Answer 3

1. The Union won.
2. Lee was the commanding general for the Confederates.
Meade ( I think) was the commanding general for the
Union.
Others present for the South: Longstreet, Armistad and
Pickett.
Others present for the North: Reynolds, Beauford, and a
Maj. Chamberlain (from the 20th Maine).
3. Easily over 50,000 in the course of the three days of the
battle.
4. the sheer enormity of what had happened
5. they were all brothers
6. I can't imagine. I don't know either.
7. a monument, some rocks, the Seminary buildings,
a national cemetery

Answer 4

1. The Union won

2. Robert E. Lee(Confederate) George Gordon Meade(Union)

3. 23,055 (3,155 killed, 14,531 wounded, 5,369 captured/missing(Union)
23,231 (4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded, 5,830 captured/missing)(Confederate)

4. Lincoln made the speech to re-dedicate the US to the war effort and to honor the dead.

5. I did not know Lincoln ordered this but the people who buried them buried them together to speed up the process.

6. Some 3000 of the dead were burned within days, the rest were buried soon after because dead bodies decay and carry disease.

7.If you visited Gettysburg today it is 2 landmarks, the Gettysburg National Cemetary and the Gettysburg National Park, both are maintained by the National Park Service

Answer 5

1

Answer 6

The other answers covered things pretty well, but I'll expand on 4, 5, and 7.

Lincoln was invited to speak at the opening of the cemetery, I believe by the governor of Pennsylvania and the local Gettysburg lawyer who oversaw construction. He was one of two speakers at the opening, and was generally considered (before the speech) to be the less interesting of the two. The other speaker was a famous speech-maker who took two hours to address the crowd, compared to Lincoln's two minutes.

Lincoln, so far as I know, had little or nothing to do with the layout and location of the cemetery - it was all handled by State government officials, primarily from Pennsylvania. The Confederate dead were *not* interred in the cemetery as it was originally laid out, and did not get re interred there until years later.

As for what you would see at Gettysburg today, it is one of my favorite National Parks (though I haven't gotten over there in a couple of years). They work hard to try to keep it looking as much like it did during the battle as they can by cutting back trees and other growth and planting the fields in appropriate crops. However, there's always encroachment from business interests nearby, with signs and gaudy displays, and the various statuary, monuments and historical markers can be a little distracting. Currently, a new visitor center is under construction.

Answer 7

I was wondering the same question myself today

Answer 8

ate July 1 – July 3, 1863
Location Adams County, Pennsylvania
Result Union victory

Combatants
United States of America (Union) Confederate States of America
Commanders
George Gordon Meade Robert Edward Lee
Strength
93,921 71,699
Casualties
23,055 (3,155 killed, 14,531 wounded, 5,369 captured/missing) 23,231 (4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded, 5,830 captured/missing)
Gettysburg Campaign
Brandy Station – 2nd Winchester – Aldie – Middleburg – Upperville – Sporting Hill – Hanover – Gettysburg – Carlisle – Hunterstown – Fairfield – Williamsport – Boonsboro – Manassas Gap

General Staff and Headquarters
MG* George G. Meade, Commanding

General Staff and Headquarters

Chief of Staff: MG Daniel Butterfield
Chief of Artillery: BG Henry J. Hunt
Assistant Adjutant General: BG Seth Williams
Chief Quartermaster: BG Rufus Ingalls
Medical Director: Dr Jonathan Letterman
Chief Signal Officer: Capt Lemuel B. Norton
Chief Ordnance Officer: Lt John R. Edie (acting)
Bureau of Military Information: Col George H. Sharpe
Provost Marshal General: BG Marsena R. Patrick (1,528)
93rd New York: Col John S. Crocker (148)
8th U.S. (8 companies): Capt Edwin W. H. Read (401)
2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry: Col R. Butler Price (489)
6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Companies E and I: Capt James Starr (81)
Regular cavalry (detachments from 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Regiments) (15)
Chief of Engineers: BG Gouverneur K. Warren
Engineer Brigade: BG Henry W. Benham
15th New York (3 companies): Maj Walter L. Cassin
50th New York: Col William H. Pettes
U.S. Battalion: Capt George H. Mendell
Guards and Orderlies
Oneida (New York) Cavalry: Capt Daniel P. Mann (42)

[edit] I Corps
Total: 12,596 men
I Corps Commanders:
MG John F. Reynolds
MG Abner Doubleday
MG John Newton
General HQ: 1st Maine Cavalry, Company L: Capt Constantine Taylor (57)
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
BG James S. Wadsworth (3,860)
1st Brigade ("Iron Brigade"):

BG Solomon Meredith
Col William Robinson
(1,829 engaged)
2nd Wisconsin: Col Lucius Fairchild, Maj John Mansfield, Capt George H. Otis (302)
6th Wisconsin: Ltc Rufus R. Dawes (344)
7th Wisconsin: Col William W. Robinson, Maj Mark Finnicum (364)
19th Indiana: Col Samuel J. Williams (308)
24th Michigan: Col Henry A. Morrow, Capt Albert M. Edwards (496)

2nd Brigade:

BG Lysander Cutler
(2,020)
7th Indiana: Col Ira G. Grover (437)
76th New York: Maj Andrew J. Grover, Capt John E. Cook (375)
84th New York ("14th Brooklyn Militia"): Col Edward B. Fowler (318)
95th New York: Col George H. Biddle, Maj Edward Pye (241)
147th New York: Ltc Francis C. Miller, Maj George Harney (380)
56th Pennsylvania (9 companies): Col J. William Hofmann (252)

Second Division:
BG John C. Robinson (3,027)
1st Brigade:

BG Gabriel R. Paul
Col Samuel H. Leonard
Col Adrian R. Root
Col Richard Coulter
Col Peter Lyle
Col Richard Coulter (1,829)
16th Maine: Col Charles W. Tilden, Maj Archibald D. Leavitt (298)
13th Massachusetts: Col Samuel H. Leonard, Ltc N. Walter Batchelder (284)
94th New York: Col Adrian R. Root, Maj Samuel A. Moffett (411)
104th New York: Col Gilbert G. Prey (309)
11th Pennsylvania: Col Richard Coulter, Capt Benjamin F. Haines, Capt John B. Overmyer (292)
107th Pennsylvania: Ltc James MacThomson, Capt Emanuel D. Roath (255)

2nd Brigade:

BG Henry Baxter (1,198)
12th Massachusetts: Col James L. Bates, Ltc David Allen, Jr (261)
83rd New York (9th Militia): Ltc Joseph A. Moesch (215)
97th New York: Col Charles Wheelock, Maj Charles Northrup (236)
88th Pennsylvania: Maj Benezet F. Foust, Capt Henry Whiteside (274)
90th Pennsylvania: Col Peter Lyle, Maj Alfred J. Sellers, Col Peter Lyle (208)

Third Division:
MG Abner Doubleday
BG Thomas A. Rowley
MG Abner Doubleday (4,711)
1st Brigade:

Col Chapman Biddle
BG Thomas A. Rowley
Col Chapman Biddle (1,387)
80th New York (20th Militia): Col Theodore B. Gates (287)
121st Pennsylvania: Maj Alexander Biddle, Col Chapman Biddle, Maj Alexander Biddle (263)
142nd Pennsylvania: Col Robert P. Cummins, Ltc A. B. McCalmont (362)
151st Pennsylvania: Lt Col George F. McFarland, Capt Walter L. Owens, Col Harrison Allen (467)


2nd Brigade:

Col Roy Stone
Col Langhorne Wister
Col Edmund L. Dana (1,314)
143rd Pennsylvania: Col Edmund L. Dana, Ltc John D. Musser (465)
149th Pennsylvania: Ltc Walton Dwight, Capt James Glenn (450)
150th Pennsylvania: Col Langhorne Wister, Ltc H. S. Huidekoper, Capt Cornelius C. Widdis (397)

3rd Brigade
2nd Vermont Brigade:

BG George J. Stannard
Col Francis V. Randall (1,950)
12th Vermont: Col Asa P. Blunt (guarding baggage) (641)
13th Vermont: Col Francis V. Randall, Maj Joseph J. Boynton, Ltc William D. Munson (636)
14th Vermont: Col William T. Nichols (647)
15th Vermont: Col Redfield Proctor (guarding baggage) (637)
16th Vermont: Col Wheelock G. Veazey (661)

Artillery Brigade:

Col Charles S. Wainright (621)
2nd Maine Light, Battery B: Capt James A. Hall (117, 6 x 3" rifle)
5th Maine Light, Battery E: Capt Greenleaf T. Stevens, Lt Edward N. Whittier (119, 6 x Napoleon)
1st New York Light, Batteries E & L: Capt Gilbert H. Reynolds, Lt George Breck (141, 6 x 3" rifle)
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B: Capt James H. Cooper (114, 4 x 3" rifle)
4th US, Battery B: Lt James Stewart (123, 6 x Napoleon)



[edit] II Corps
Total: 11,509 men
II Corps Commanders:
MG Winfield S. Hancock
BG John Gibbon
MG Winfield S. Hancock
BG John C. Caldwell
BG William Hays
General HQ: 6th New York Cavalry, Companies D and K: Capt Riley Johnson (64)
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
BG John C. Caldwell (3,400)
1st Brigade:

BG Edward E. Cross
Col H. Boyd McKeen (932)
5th New Hampshire: Ltc Charles E. Hapgood (182)
61st New York: Ltc K. Oscar Broady (104)
81st Pennsylvania: Col H. Boyd McKeen (McKean?), Ltc Amos Stroh (175)
148th Pennsylvania: Ltc Robert McFarlane (468)

2nd Brigade ("Irish Brigade"):

Col Patrick Kelly (532)
28th Massachusetts: Col Richard Byrnes (224)
63rd New York (2 companies): Ltc Richard C. Bentley, Capt Thomas Touhy (75)
69th New York (2 companies): Capt Richard Moroney, Lt James J. Smith (75)
88th New York (2 companies): Capt Denis F. Burke (90)
116th Pennsylvania (4 companies): Maj St. Clair A. Mulholland (66)

3rd Brigade:

BG Samuel K. Zook
Ltc John Fraser (975)
52nd New York: Ltc C. G. Freudenberg, Capt William Scherrer (134)
57th New York: Ltc Alford B. Chapman (175)
66th New York: Col Orlando H. Morris, Ltc John S. Hammell, Maj Peter Nelson (147)
140th Pennsylvania: Col Richard P. Roberts, Ltc John Fraser (515)

4th Brigade:

Col John R. Brooke (852)
27th Connecticut (2 companies): Ltc Henry C. Merwin, Maj James H. Coburn (75)
2nd Delaware: Col William P. Baily, Capt Charles H. Christman (234)
64th New York: Col Daniel G. Bingham, Maj Leman W. Bradley (204)
53rd Pennsylvania: Ltc Richards McMichael (136)
145th Pennsylvania (7 companies): Col Hiram L. Brown, Capt John W. Reynolds, Capt Moses W. Oliver (202)

Second Division:
BG John Gibbon
BG William Harrow
BG John Gibbon (3,606)
1st Brigade:

BG William Harrow
Col Francis E. Heath (1,378)
19th Maine: Col Francis E. Heath, Ltc Henry W. Cunningham (439)
15th Massachusetts: Col George H. Ward, Ltc George C. Joslin (239)
1st Minnesota & 2nd Company, Minnesota Sharpshooters: Col William Colvill, Jr., Capt Nathan S. Messick, Capt Henry C. Coates (330 + 32)
82nd New York (2nd NY Militia): Ltc James Huston, Capt John Darrow (335)

2nd Brigade "Philadelphia Brigade":

BG Alexander S. Webb (1,208)
69th Pennsylvania: Col Dennis O'Kane, Capt William Davis (284)
71st Pennsylvania: Col Richard Penn-Smith (261)
72nd Pennsylvania: Col De Witt C. Baxter, Ltc Theodore Hesser (380)
106th Pennsylvania: Ltc William L. Curry (280)

3rd Brigade:

Col Norman J. Hall (922)
19th Massachusetts: Col Arthur F. Devereux (163)
20th Massachusetts: Col Paul J. Revere, Ltc George N. Macy, Capt Henry L. Abbott (243)
7th Michigan: Ltc Amos E. Steele, Jr, Maj Sylvanus W. Curtis (165)
42nd New York: Col James E. Mallon (197)
59th New York (4 companies): Ltc Max A. Thoman, Capt William McFadden (152)

unattached Massachusetts Sharpshooters, 1st Company: Capt William Plumer, Lt Emerson L. Bicknell (42)

Third Division:
BG Alexander Hays (3,760)
1st Brigade ("Gibraltar Brigade"):

Col Samuel S. Carroll (1,036)
14th Indiana: Col John Coons (236)
4th Ohio: Ltc Leonard W. Carpenter (229)
8th Ohio: Ltc Franklin Sawyer (209)
7th West Virginia: Ltc Jonathan H. Lockwood (319)


2nd Brigade:

Col Thomas A. Smyth
Ltc Francis E. Pierce (1,134)
14th Connecticut: Maj Theodore G. Ellis (200)
1st Delaware: Ltc Edward P. Harris, Capt Thomas B. Hizar, Lt William Smith, Lt John T. Dent (228)
12th New Jersey: Maj John T. Hill (444)
10th New York Battalion: Maj George F. Hopper (provost guard) (82)
108th New York: Ltc Francis E. Pierce (200)

3rd Brigade:

Col George L. Willard
Col Eliakim Sherrill
Ltc James M. Bull (1,508)
39th New York (4 companies): Maj Hugo Hildebrandt (269)
111th New York: Col Clinton D. MacDougall, Ltc Isaac M. Lusk, Capt Aaron P. Seeley (390)
125th New York: Ltc Levin Crandell (392)
126th New York: Col Eliakim Sherrill, Ltc James M. Bull (455)

Artillery Brigade:

Cpt John G. Hazard (603)
1st New York Light, Battery B: Lt Albert S. Sheldon, Capt James McKay Rorty, Lt Robert E. Rogers (114, 6 x 3" rifle)
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A: Capt William A. Arnold (117, 6 x 3" rifle)
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B: Lt T. Fred. Brown, Lt Walter S. Perrin (129, 6 x Napoleon)
1st US Light, Battery I: Lt George A. Woodruff, Lt Tully McCrea (113, 6 x Napoleon)
4th US Light, Battery A: Lt Alonzo H. Cushing, Sgt Frederick Fuger (126, 6 x Three Inch Ordinance Rifles)



[edit] III Corps
Total: 10,726
III Corps Commanders:
MG Daniel E. Sickles
MG David B. Birney
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
MG David B. Birney
BG J. H. Hobart Ward (5,090)
1st Brigade:

BG Charles K. Graham
Col Andrew H. Tippin (1,516)
57th Pennsylvania (8 companies): Col Peter Sides, Capt Alanson H. Nelson (207)
63rd Pennsylvania: Maj John A. Danks, (246)
68th Pennsylvania: Col Andrew H. Tippin, Capt Milton S. Davis (320)
105th Pennsylvania: Col Calvin A. Craig (274)
114th Pennsylvania ("Collis' Zouaves"): Ltc Frederick F. Cavada, Capt Edward R. Bowen (259)
141st Pennsylvania: Col Henry J. Madill (209)

2nd Brigade:

BG J. H. Hobart Ward
Col Hiram Berdan (2,187)
20th Indiana: Col John Wheeler, Ltc William C. L. Taylor (401)
3rd Maine: Col Moses B. Lakeman (210)
4th Maine: Col Elijah Walker, Capt Edwin Libby (287)
86th New York: Ltc Benjamin L. Higgins (286)
124th New York: Col A. Van Horne Ellis, Ltc Francis M. Cummins (238)
99th Pennsylvania: Maj John W. Moore (277)
1st US Sharpshooters: Col Hiram Berdan, Ltc Casper Trepp (313)
2nd US Sharpshooters (8 companies): Maj Homer R. Stoughton (169)

3rd Brigade:

Col P. Régis de Trobriand (1,387)
17th Maine: Ltc Charles B. Merrill (350)
3rd Michigan: Col Byron R. Pierce, Ltc Edwin S. Pierce (237)
5th Michigan: Ltc John Pulford (216)
40th New York: Col Thomas W. Egan (431)
110th Pennsylvania (6 companies): Ltc David M. Jones, Maj Isaac Rogers (152)

Second Division:
BG Andrew A. Humphreys (4,960)
1st Brigade:

BG Joseph B. Carr (1,718)
1st Massachusetts: Ltc Clark B. Baldwin (321)
11th Massachusetts: Ltc Porter D. Tripp (286)
16th Massachusetts: Ltc Waldo Merriam, Capt Matthew Donovan (245)
12th New Hampshire: Capt John F. Langley (224)
11th New Jersey: Col Robert McAllister, Capt Luther Martin, Lt John Schoonover, Capt William H. Lloyd, Capt Samuel T. Sleeper, Lt John Schoonover (275)
26th Pennsylvania: Maj Robert L. Bodine (365)

2nd Brigade:

Col William R. Brewster (1,842)
70th New York: Col J. Egbert Farnum (288)
71st New York: Col Henry L. Potter (248)
72nd New York: Col John S. Austin, Ltc John Leonard (305)
73rd New York: Maj Michael W. Burns (349)
74th New York: Ltc Thomas Holt (266)
120th New York: Ltc Cornelius D. Westbrook, Maj John R. Tappen (383)

3rd Brigade:

Col George C. Burling (1,396)
2nd New Hampshire: Col Edward L. Bailey (354)
5th New Jersey: Col William J. Sewell, Capt Thomas C. Godfrey, Capt Henry H. Woolsey (206)
6th New Jersey: Ltc Stephen R. Gilkyson (207)
7th New Jersey: Col Louis R. Francine, Maj Frederick Cooper (275)
8th New Jersey: Col John Ramsey, Capt John G. Langston (170)
115th Pennsylvania: Maj John P. Dunne (182)

Third Division:

BG Washington Lafayette Elliott
(Not at Gettysburg; division detached to Maryland Heights)

Artillery Brigade:

Cpt George E. Randolph
Cpt A. Judson Clark (616)
1st New Jersey Light, Battery B: Capt A. Judson Clark, Lt Robert Sims (143, 6 x 10pdr Parrot)
1st New York Light, Battery D: Capt George B. Winslow (116, 6 x Napoleon)
4th New York Light Battery: Capt James E. Smith (126, 6 x 10pdr Parrot)
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E: Lt John K. Bucklyn, Lt Benjamin Freeborn (108, 6 x Napoleon)
4th US, Battery K: Lt Francis W. Seeley, Lt Robert James (121, 6 x Napoleon)



[edit] V Corps
Total: 10,997
V Corps Commander:
MG George Sykes
General HQ:
12th New York Infantry, Companies D and E: Capt Henry W. Rider (109)
7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Companies D and H: Capt William Thompson (78)
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
BG James Barnes (3,420)
1st Brigade:

Col William S. Tilton (655)
18th Massachusetts: Col Joseph Hayes (139)
22nd Massachusetts: Ltc Thomas Sherwin, Jr (137)
1st Michigan: Col Ira C. Abbott, Ltc William A. Throop (145)
118th Pennsylvania: Ltc James Gwyn (233)

2nd Brigade:

Col Jacob B. Sweitzer (1,423)
9th Massachusetts: Col Patrick R. Guiney (412)
32nd Massachusetts: Col George L. Prescott (242)
4th Michigan: Col Harrison H. Jeffords, Ltc George W. Lumbard (342)
62nd Pennsylvania: Ltc James C. Hull (426)

3rd Brigade:

Col Strong Vincent
Col James C. Rice (1,336)
20th Maine: Col Joshua L. Chamberlain (386)
16th Michigan: Ltc Norval E. Welch (263)
44th New York: Col James C. Rice, Ltc Freeman Conner (391)
83rd Pennsylvania: Capt Orpheus S. Woodward (295)

Second Division:
BG Romeyn B. Ayres (4,002)
1st Brigade:

Col Hannibal Day (1,553)
|3rd US (6 companies): Capt Henry W. Freedley, Capt Richard G. Lay (300)
4th US (4 companies): Capt Julius W. Adams, Jr (173)
6th US (5 companies): Capt Levi C. Bootes (150)
12th US (8 companies): Capt Thomas S. Dunn (415)
14th US (8 companies): Maj Grotius R. Giddings (513)

2nd Brigade:

Col Sidney Burbank (953)
2nd US (6 companies): Maj Arthur T. Lee, Capt Samuel A. McKee (197)
7th US (4 companies): Capt David P. Hancock (116)
10th US (3 companies): Capt William Clinton (93)
11th US (6 companies): Maj DeLancey Floyd-Jones (286)
17th US (7 companies): Ltc J. Durell Greene (260)

3rd Brigade:

BG Stephen H. Weed
Col Kenner Garrard (1,491)
140th New York: Col Patrick "Paddy" O'Rorke, Ltc Louis Ernst (449)
146th New York (Zouaves): Col Kenner Garrard, Ltc David T. Jenkins (456)
91st Pennsylvania: Ltc Joseph H. Sinex (220)
155th Pennsylvania: Ltc John H. Cain (362)

Third Division:
BG Samuel W. Crawford (2,949)
1st Brigade:

Col William McCandless (1,235)
1st Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies): Col William C. Talley (379)
2nd Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc George A. Woodward (233)
6th Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc Wellington H. Ent (324)
13th Pennsylvania Reserves: Col Charles F. Taylor, Maj William R. Hartshorne (298)

3rd Brigade:

Col Joseph W. Fisher (1,709)
5th Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc George Dare (285)
9th Pennsylvania Reserves: Ltc James McK. Snodgrass (322)
10th Pennsylvania Reserves: Col Adoniram J. Warner (401)
11th Pennsylvania Reserves: Col Samuel M. Jackson (327)
12th Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies): Col Martin D. Hardin (373)

Artillery Brigade:

Cpt Augustus P. Martin (432)
3rd Massachusetts, Battery C: Lt Aaron F. Walcott (115, 6 x Napoleon)
1st New York, Battery C: Capt Almont Barnes (62, 4 x 3" rifle)
1st Ohio Light, Battery L: Capt Frank C. Gibbs (113, 6 x Napoleon)
5th US, Battery D: Lt Charles E. Hazlett, Lt Benjamin F. Rittenhouse (68, 6 x 10pdr Parrot)
5th US, Battery I: Lt Malbone F. Watson, Lt Charles C. MacConnell (71, 4 x 3" rifle)



[edit] VI Corps
VI Corps Commander:
MG John Sedgwick
General HQ:
1st New Jersey Cavalry, Company L: Capt William S. Craft
1st Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company H
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
BG Horatio G. Wright
1st Brigade
(First New Jersey Brigade):

BG Alfred T. A. Torbert
1st New Jersey: Ltc William Henry, Jr.
2nd New Jersey: Ltc Charles Wiebecke
3rd New Jersey: Ltc Edward L. Campbell
15th New Jersey: Col William H. Penrose

2nd Brigade:

BG Joseph J. Bartlett
5th Maine: Col Clark S. Edwards
121st New York: Col Emory Upton
95th Pennsylvania: Ltc Edward Carroll
96th Pennsylvania: Maj William H. Lessig

3rd Brigade:

BG David Allen Russell
6th Maine: Col Hiram Burnham
49th Pennsylvania (4 companies): Ltc Thomas M. Hulings
119th Pennsylvania: Col Peter C. Ellmaker
5th Wisconsin: Col Thomas S. Allen

Provost Guard 4th New Jersey (3 companies): Capt William R. Maxwell

Second Division:
BG Albion P. Howe
2nd Brigade ("Vermont Brigade"):

Col Lewis A. Grant
2nd Vermont: Col James H. Walbridge
3rd Vermont: Col Thomas O. Seaver
4th Vermont: Col Charles B. Stoughton
5th Vermont: Ltc John R. Lewis
6th Vermont: Col Elisha L. Barney

3rd Brigade:

BG Thomas H. Neill
7th Maine (6 companies): Ltc Selden Connor
33rd New York (detachment): Capt Henry J. Gifford
43rd New York: Ltc John Wilson
49th New York: Col Daniel D. Bidwell
77th New York: Ltc Winsor B. French
61st Pennsylvania: Ltc George F. Smith

Third Division:
MG John Newton
BG Frank Wheaton
1st Brigade:

BG Alexander Shaler
65th New York: Col Joseph E. Hamblin
67th New York: Col Nelson Cross
122nd New York: Col Silas Titus
23rd Pennsylvania: Ltc John F. Glenn
82nd Pennsylvania: Col Isaac C. Bassett

2nd Brigade:

Col Henry L. Eustis
7th Massachusetts: Ltc Franklin P. Harlow
10th Massachusetts: Ltc Joseph B. Parsons
37th Massachusetts: Col Oliver Edwards
2nd Rhode Island: Col Horatio Rogers, Jr

3rd Brigade:

BG Frank Wheaton
Col David J. Nevin
62nd New York: Col David J. Nevin, Ltc Theodore B. Hamilton
93rd Pennsylvania: Maj John I. Nevin
98th Pennsylvania: Maj John B. Kohler
102nd Pennsylvania: Col John W. Patterson
139th Pennsylvania: Col Frederick H. Collier, Ltc William H. Moody

Artillery Brigade:

Col Charles H. Tompkins
1st Massachusetts Light, Battery A: Capt William H. McCartney
1st New York, Independent Battery: Capt Andrew Cowan
3rd New York, Independent Battery: Capt William A. Harn
1st Rhode Island, Battery C: Capt Richard Waterman
1st Rhode Island, Battery G: Capt George W. Adams
2nd US, Battery D: Lt Edward B. Williston
2nd US, Battery G: Lt John H. Butler
5th US, Battery F: Lt Leonard Martin



[edit] XI Corps
XI Corps Commanders:
MG Oliver O. Howard
MG Carl Schurz
MG Oliver O. Howard
General HQ:
1st Indiana Cavalry, Companies I and K: Capt Abram Sharra
8th New York Infantry (1 company): Lt Hermann Foerster
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
BG Francis C. Barlow
BG Adelbert Ames
1st Brigade:

Col Leopold von Gilsa
41st New York (9 companies): Ltc Detleo von Einsiedel
54th New York: Maj Stephen Kovacs, Lt Ernst Both
68th New York: Col Gotthilf Bourry
153rd Pennsylvania: Maj John F. Frueauff

2nd Brigade:

BG Adelbert Ames
Col Andrew L. Harris
17th Connecticut: Ltc Douglas Fowler, Maj Allen G. Brady
25th Ohio: Ltc Jeremiah Williams, Capt Nathaniel J. Manning, Lt William Maloney, Lt Israel White
75th Ohio: Col Andrew L. Harris, Capt George B. Fox
107th Ohio: Col Seraphim Meyer, Capt John M. Lutz

Second Division:
BG Adolph von Steinwehr
1st Brigade:

Col Charles R. Coster
134th New York: Ltc Allan H. Jackson
154th New York: Ltc Daniel B. Allen
27th Pennsylvania: Ltc Lorenz Cantador
73rd Pennsylvania: Capt Daniel F. Kelley

2nd Brigade:

Col Orland Smith
33rd Massachusetts: Col Adin B. Underwood
136th New York: Col James Wood, Jr
55th Ohio: Col Charles B. Gambee
73rd Ohio: Ltc Richard Long

Third Division:
MG Carl Schurz
BG Alexander Schimmelfennig
MG Carl Schurz
1st Brigade:

BG Alexander Schimmelfennig
Col George von Amsberg
82nd Illinois: Ltc Edward S. Salomon
45th New York: Col George von Amsberg, Ltc Adolphus Dobke
157th New York: Col Philip P. Brown, Jr
61st Ohio: Col Stephen J. McGroarty
74th Pennsylvania: Col Adolph von Hartung, Ltc Alexander von Mitzel, Capt Gustav Schleiter, Capt Henry Krauseneck

2nd Brigade:

Col Wladimir Krzyzanowski
58th New York: Ltc August Otto, Capt Emil Koenig
119th New York: Col John T. Lockman, Ltc Edward F. Lloyd
82nd Ohio: Col James S. Robinson, Ltc David Thomson
75th Pennsylvania: Col Francis Mahler, Maj August Ledig
26th Wisconsin: Ltc Hans Boebel, Capt John W. Fuchs

Artillery Brigade:

Maj Thomas W. Osborn
1st New York Light, Battery I: Capt Michael Wiedrich
13th New York Independent Battery: Lt William Wheeler
1st Ohio Light, Battery I: Capt Hubert Dilger
1st Ohio Light, Battery K: Capt Lewis Heckman
4th US, Battery G: Lt Bayard Wilkeson, Lt Eugene A. Bancroft



[edit] XII Corps
XII Corps Commanders:
MG Henry W. Slocum
BG Alpheus S. Williams
Provost Guard: 10th Maine (4 companies): Capt John D. Beardsley
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
BG Alpheus S. Williams
BG Thomas H. Ruger
1st Brigade:

Col Archibald L. McDougall
5th Connecticut: Col Warren W. Packer
20th Connecticut: Ltc William B. Wooster
3rd Maryland: Col Joseph M. Sudsburg
123rd New York: Ltc James C. Rogers, Capt Adolphus H. Tanner
145th New York: Col Edward L. Price
46th Pennsylvania: Col James L. Selfridge

2nd Brigade:

BG Henry H. Lockwood
1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade: Col William P. Maulsby
1st Maryland, Eastern Shore: Col James Wallace
150th New York: Col John H. Ketcham

3rd Brigade:

BG Thomas H. Ruger
Col Silas Colgrove
27th Indiana: Col Silas Colgrove, Ltc John R. Fesler
2nd Massachusetts: Ltc Charles R. Mudge, Maj Charles F. Morse
13th New Jersey: Col Ezra A. Carman
107th New York: Col Nirom M. Crane
3rd Wisconsin: Col William Hawley

Second Division:
BG John W. Geary
1st Brigade:

Col Charles Candy
5th Ohio: Col John H. Patrick
7th Ohio: Col William R. Creighton
29th Ohio: Capt Wilbur F. Stevens, Capt Edward Hayes
66th Ohio: Ltc Eugene Powell
28th Pennsylvania: Capt John Flynn
147th Pennsylvania (8 companies): Ltc Ario Pardee, Jr

2nd Brigade:

Col George A. Cobham, Jr
BG Thomas L. Kane
Col George A. Cobham, Jr
29th Pennsylvania: Col William Rickards, Jr
109th Pennsylvania: Capt Frederick L. Gimber
111th Pennsylvania: Ltc Thomas M. Walker, Col George A. Cobham, Jr, Ltc Thomas M. Walker

3rd Brigade:

BG George S. Greene
60th New York: Col Abel Godard
78th New York: Ltc Herbert von Hammerstein
102nd New York: Col James C. Lane, Capt Lewis R. Stegman
137th New York: Col David Ireland
149th New York: Col Henry A. Barnum, Ltc Charles B. Randall

Artillery Brigade:

Lt Edward D. Muhlenberg
1st New York Light, Battery M: Lt Charles E. Winegar
Pennsylvania Independent Light, Battery E: Lt Charles A. Atwell
4th US, Battery F: Lt Sylvanus T. Rugg
5th US, Battery K: Lt David H. Kinzie



[edit] Cavalry Corps
Cavalry Corps Commanders:
MG Alfred Pleasonton
Division Brigade Regiments and Others
First Division:
BG John Buford
1st Brigade:

Col William Gamble
8th Illinois: Maj John L. Beveridge
12th Illinois (4 companies); 3rd Indiana (6 companies): Col George H. Chapman
8th New York: Ltc William L. Markell

2nd Brigade:

Col Thomas Devin
6th New York: Maj William E. Beardsley
9th New York: Col William Sackett
17th Pennsylvania: Col Josiah H. Kellogg
3rd West Virginia (2 companies): Capt Seymour B. Conger

Reserve Brigade:

BG Wesley Merritt
6th Pennsylvania: Maj James H. Haseltine
1st US: Capt Richard S. C. Lord
2nd US: Capt Theophilus F. Rodenbough
5th US: Capt Julius W. Mason
6th US: Maj Samuel H. Starr, Lt Louis H. Carpenter, Lt Nicholas Nolan, Capt Ira W. Claflin

Second Division:
BG David McM. Gregg
1st Brigade:

Col John B. McIntosh
1st Maryland (11 companies): Ltc James M. Deems
Purnell (Maryland) Legion, Company A: Capt Robert E. Duvall
1st Massachusetts: Ltc Greely S. Curtis
1st New Jersey: Maj Myron H. Beaumont
1st Pennsylvania: Col John P. Taylor
3rd Pennsylvania: Ltc Edward S. Jones
3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Battery H: Capt William D. Rank

2nd Brigade:

Col Pennock Huey
(Not at Gettysburg)

3rd Brigade:

Col J. Irvin Gregg
1st Maine (10 companies): Ltc Charles H. Smith
10th New York: Maj M. Henry Avery
4th Pennsylvania: Ltc William E. Doster
16th Pennsylvania, Lieut: Col John K. Robison

HQ Guard
1st Ohio, Company A: Capt Noah Jones

Third Division:
BG Judson Kilpatrick
1st Brigade:

BG Elon J. Farnsworth
Col Nathaniel P. Richmond
5th New York: Maj John Hammond
18th Pennsylvania, Lieut: Col William P. Brinton
1st Vermont, Lieut: Col Addison W. Preston
1st West Virginia (10 companies): Col Nathaniel P. Richmond, Maj Charles E. Capehart

2nd Brigade ("Michigan Brigade"):

BG George A. Custer
1st Michigan: Col Charles H. Town
5th Michigan: Col Russell A. Alger
6th Michigan: Col George Gray
7th Michigan (10 companies): Col William D. Mann

HQ Guard
1st Ohio, Company C: Capt Samuel N. Stanford

Horse Artillery
1st Brigade:

Capt James M. Robertson
9th Michigan Battery: Capt Jabez J. Daniels
6th New York Battery: Capt Joseph W. Martin
2nd US, Batteries B and L: Lt Edward Heaton
2nd US, Battery M: Lt Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr
4th US, Battery E: Lt Samuel S. Elder

2nd Brigade:

Capt John C. Tidball
1st US, Batteries E and G: Capt Alanson M. Randol
1st US, Battery K: Capt William M. Graham
2nd US, Battery A: Lt John H. Calef
3rd US, Battery C: Lt William D. Fuller



[edit] Artillery Reserve
Commanders:
BG Robert O. Tyler
Capt James M. Robertson
HQ Guard: 32nd Massachusetts Infantry, Company C: Capt Josiah C. Fuller
Brigade Batteries
1st Regular Brigade:

Capt Dunbar R. Ransom
1st US, Battery H: Lt Chandler P. Eakin, Lt Philip D. Mason
3rd US, Batteries F and K: Lt John G. Turnbull
4th US, Battery C: Lt Evan Thomas
5th US, Battery C: Lt Gulian V. Weir

1st Volunteer Brigade:

Ltc Freeman McGilvery
5th Massachusetts Light Battery E: Capt Charles A. Phillips
9th Massachusetts Light Battery: Capt John Bigelow, Lt Richard S. Milton
15th New York Independent Battery: Capt Patrick Hart
Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and F: Capt James Thompson

2nd Volunteer Brigade:

Capt Elijah D. Taft
1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B: Capt Albert F. Brooker
1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery M: Capt Franklin A. Pratt
2nd Connecticut Light Battery: Capt John W. Sterling
5th New York Independent Battery: Capt Elijah D. Taft

3rd Volunteer Brigade:

Capt James F. Huntington
1st New Hampshire Independent: Capt Frederick M. Edgell
1st Ohio Light, Battery H: Lt George W. Norton
1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries F and G: Capt R. Bruce Ricketts
1st West Virginia Light, Battery C: Capt Wallace Hill

4th Volunteer Brigade:

Capt Robert H. Fitzhugh
6th Maine Light, Battery F: Lt Edwin B. Dow
1st Maryland Light, Battery A: Capt James H. Rigby
1st New Jersey Light, Battery A: Lt Augustin N. Parsons
1st New York Light, Battery G: Capt Nelson Ames
1st New York Light, Battery K: Capt Robert H. Fitzhugh

Train Guard
4th New Jersey Infantry (7 companies): Maj Charles Ewing
12th New Jersey Infantry (3 companies): Maj Forest Juziuk









The Battle of Gettysburg (July 1 – July 3, 1863), fought in and around the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, as part of the Gettysburg Campaign, was the bloodiest[1] battle of the American Civil War and is frequently cited as the war's turning point.[2] Union Major General George Gordon Meade's Army of the Potomac defeated attacks by Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, ending Lee's invasion of the North.

Following his brilliant success at Chancellorsville in May 1863, Lee led his army through the Shenandoah Valley for his second invasion of the North, hoping to reach as far as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or even Philadelphia, and to influence Northern politicians to give up their prosecution of the war. Prodded by President Abraham Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker moved his army in pursuit but was relieved almost on the eve of battle and replaced by Meade.

The two armies began to collide at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, as Lee urgently concentrated his forces there. Low ridges to the northwest of town were defended initially by a Union cavalry division, which was soon reinforced with two corps of Union infantry. However, two large Confederate corps assaulted them from the northwest and north, collapsing the hastily developed Union lines, sending the defenders retreating through the streets of town to the hills just to the south.

On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled. The Union line was laid out resembling a fishhook. Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. On the Union right, demonstrations escalated into full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Across the battlefield, despite significant losses, the Union defenders held their lines.

On the third day of battle, July 3, fighting resumed on Culp's Hill, and cavalry battles raged to the east and south, but the main event was a dramatic infantry assault by 12,500 Confederates against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Pickett's Charge was repulsed by Union rifle and artillery fire at great losses to the Confederate army. Lee led his army on a torturous retreat back to Virginia. Between 46,000 and 51,000 Americans were casualties in the three-day battle. That November, President Lincoln used the dedication ceremony for the Gettysburg National Cemetery to honor the Union dead and redefine the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address.
Shortly after Lee's army won a decisive victory over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville (April 30 – May 6, 1863), Robert E. Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North (the first was the unsuccessful Maryland Campaign of September 1862). Such a move would upset Federal plans for the summer campaigning season and possibly relieve the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg, and it would allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much needed rest. In addition, Lee's 72,000-man army[3] could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and strengthen the growing peace movement in the North.[4]

Thus, on June 3, Lee's army began to shift northward from Fredericksburg, Virginia. In order to attain more efficiency in his commands, Lee had reorganized his two large corps into three new corps. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet retained command of his First Corps. The old corps of deceased Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was divided into two, with the Second Corps going to Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and the new Third Corps to Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill. The Cavalry Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart.[5]

The Union Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of seven infantry corps, a cavalry corps, and an Artillery Reserve, for a combined strength of about 94,000 men.[6] However, President Lincoln replaced Hooker with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, a Pennsylvanian, because of Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville and his timid response to Lee's second invasion north of the Potomac River.

The first major action of the campaign took place on June 9 between the opposing cavalry forces at Brandy Station, near Culpeper, Virginia. The Confederate cavalry under Stuart was surprised and nearly routed by the Federal troopers, but Stuart eventually prevailed. The battle, the largest cavalry engagement of the war, proved that for the first time, the Union horse soldier was equal to his Southern counterpart.[7]

By mid-June, the Army of Northern Virginia was poised to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. After defeating the Federal garrisons at Winchester and Martinsburg, Ewell's Second Corps began crossing the river on June 15. Hill's and Longstreet's corps followed on June 24 and June 25. Hooker's army pursued, keeping between the U.S. capital and Lee's army. The Federals crossed the Potomac from June 25 to June 27.[8]

Lee gave strict orders to his army to minimize any negative impacts on the civilian population. Food, horses, and other supplies were generally not seized outright, although quartermasters reimbursing northern farmers and merchants using Confederate money were not well received. Various towns, most notably York, Pennsylvania, were required to pay indemnities in lieu of supplies, under threat of destruction. The most controversial of the Confederate actions during the invasion was the seizure of some forty northern African Americans, a few of whom were escaped slaves but most freemen. They were sent south into slavery under guard.[9]

On June 26, elements of Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's division of Ewell's Corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes. Early laid the borough under tribute but did not collect any significant supplies. Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge, and they destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines. The following morning, Early departed for adjacent York County.[10]

Meanwhile, in a controversial move, Lee allowed J.E.B. Stuart to take a portion of the army's cavalry and ride around the east flank of the Union army. Lee's orders gave Stuart much latitude, and both generals share the blame for the long absence of Stuart's cavalry, as well as for the failure to assign a more active role to the cavalry left with the army. Stuart and his three best brigades were absent from the army during the crucial phase of the approach to Gettysburg and the first two days of battle. By June 29, Lee's army was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg (28 miles (45 km) northwest of Gettysburg) to Carlisle (30 miles (48 km) north of Gettysburg) to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River.[11]

In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison, Hooker offered his resignation, and Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who were looking for an excuse to get rid of him, immediately accepted. They replaced him early on the morning of June 28 with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, commander of the V Corps.[12]

On June 29, when Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed its namesake river, he ordered a concentration of his forces around Cashtown, located at the eastern base of South Mountain and eight miles (13 km) west of Gettysburg.[13] On June 30, while part of Hill's Corps was in Cashtown, one of Hill's brigades, North Carolinians under Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured toward Gettysburg. The memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, claimed that Pettigrew was in search of a large supply of shoes in town, but this explanation may have been devised in retrospect to justify an overly heavy reconnaissance force.[14]

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they noticed Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. John Buford arriving south of town, and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, two brigades of Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.[15]
The First Day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863, began as an American Civil War meeting engagement between isolated units of the Army of Northern Virginia (under Confederate General Robert E. Lee) and the Army of the Potomac (Union Maj. Gen. George G. Meade), but it soon escalated into a major battle which culminated in the outnumbered and defeated Union forces retreating to the high ground south of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

The first-day battle proceeded in three phases as combatants continued to arrive at the battlefield. In the morning, two brigades of Confederate Maj. Gen. Henry Heth division (of Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill's Third Corps) were delayed by dismounted Union cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. John Buford. As infantry reinforcements arrived under Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds of the Union I Corps, the Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed, although Gen. Reynolds was killed. By early afternoon, the Union XI Corps had arrived, and the Union position was in a semicircle from west to north of the town. The Confederate Second Corps under Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell began a massive assault from the north, with Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes's division attacking from Oak Hill and Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's division attacking across the open fields north of town. The Union lines generally held under extremely heavy pressure, although the salient at Barlow's Knoll was overrun.

The third phase of the battle came as Rodes renewed his assault from the north and Heth returned with his entire division from the west, accompanied by the division of Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender. Heavy fighting in Herbst's Woods (near the Lutheran Theological Seminary) and on Oak Ridge finally caused the Union line to collapse. Some of the Federals conducted a fighting withdrawal through the town, suffering heavy casualties and losing many prisoners; others simply retreated. They took up good defensive positions on Cemetery Hill and waited for additional attacks. Despite discretionary orders from Robert E. Lee to take the heights "if practicable," Richard Ewell chose not to attack. Historians have debated ever since how the battle might have ended differently if he had found it practicable to do so.Defense by Buford's cavalry

Cavalry delaying action, 7:00–10:00 a.m.On the morning of July 1, Union cavalry in the division of Brigadier General John Buford were awaiting the approach of Confederate infantry forces from the direction of Cashtown, to the northwest. Confederate forces from the brigade of Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew had briefly clashed with Union forces the day before but believed they were Pennsylvania militia of little consequence, not the Regular Army cavalry that was screening the approach of the Army of the Potomac.[1]

General Buford realized the importance of the high ground directly to the south of Gettysburg. He knew that if the Confederates could gain control of the heights, Meade's army would have a hard time dislodging them.[2] He decided to utilize three ridges west of Gettysburg: Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge, and Seminary Ridge (proceeding west to east toward the town). These were appropriate terrain for a delaying action by his small division against superior Confederate infantry forces, meant to buy time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could occupy the strong defensive positions south of town, Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge, and Culp's Hill.[3] Early that morning, Reynolds, who was commanding the Left Wing of the Army of the Potomac, ordered his corps to march to Buford's location, with the XI Corps (Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard) to follow closely behind.[4]

Confederate Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division, from Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill's Third Corps, advanced towards Gettysburg. Heth deployed no cavalry and led, unconventionally, with the artillery battalion of Major William J. Pegram.[5] Two infantry brigades followed, commanded by Brig. Gens. James J. Archer and Joseph R. Davis, proceeding easterly in columns along the Chambersburg Pike. Three miles (5 km) west of town, about 7:30 a.m., Heth's two brigades met light resistance from cavalry vedettes and deployed into line. Eventually, they reached dismounted troopers from Col. William Gamble's cavalry brigade. The first shot of the battle was claimed to be fired by Lieutenant Marcellus E. Jones of the 8th Illinois Cavalry; fired at an unidentified man on a gray horse over a half-mile away, the act was merely symbolic.[6] Buford's 2,748 troopers would soon be faced with 7,600 Confederate infantrymen, deploying from columns into line of battle.[7]

Gamble's men mounted determined resistance and delaying tactics from behind fence posts with rapid fire from their breech-loading carbines.[8] It is a modern myth that they were armed with multi-shot repeating carbines. Nevertheless, they were able to fire two or three times faster than a muzzle-loaded carbine or rifle. Also, the breech-loading design meant that Union troops did not have to stand to reload and could do so safely behind cover. This was a great advantage over the Confederates, who still had to stand to reload, thus providing an easier target. But this was so far a relatively bloodless affair. By 10:20 a.m., the Confederates had reached Herr Ridge and had pushed the Federal cavalrymen east to McPherson Ridge, when the vanguard of the I Corps finally arrived, the division of Maj. Gen. James S. Wadsworth. The troops were led personally by Gen. Reynolds, who conferred briefly with Buford and hurried back to bring more men forward.[9]


[edit] Davis versus Cutler

Davis vs. Cutler, 10:00–10:45 a.m.The morning infantry fighting occurred on either side of the Chambersburg Pike, mostly on McPherson Ridge. To the north, an unfinished railroad bed opened three shallow cuts in the ridges. To the south, the dominant features were Willoughby Run and Herbst Woods (sometimes called McPherson Woods, but they were the property of John Herbst). Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's Union brigade opposed Davis's brigade; two of Cutler's regiments were north of the Pike, two to the south. To the left of Cutler, Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith's Iron Brigade opposed Archer.[10]

General Reynolds directed both brigades into position and placed guns from the Maine battery of Captain James A. Hall where Calef's had stood earlier.[11] While the general rode his horse along the east end of Herbst Woods, shouting "Forward men! Forward for God's sake, and drive those fellows out of the woods," he fell from his horse, killed instantly by a bullet striking him behind the ear. (Some historians believe Reynolds was felled by a sharpshooter, but it is more likely that he was killed by random shot in a volley of rifle fire directed at the 2nd Wisconsin.) Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday assumed command of the I Corps.[12]

On the right of the Union line, three regiments of Cutler's brigade were fired on by Davis's brigade before they could get into position on the ridge. Davis's line overlapped the right of Cutler's, making the Union position untenable, and Wadsworth ordered Cutler's regiments back to Seminary Ridge. The commander of the 147th New York, Lieutenant Colonel Francis C. Miller, was shot before he could inform his troops of the withdrawal, and they remained to fight under heavy pressure until a second order came. In under 30 minutes, 45% of Gen. Cutler's 1,007 men became casualties, with the 147th losing 207 of its 380 officers and men.[13] Some of Davis's victorious men turned toward the Union positions south of the railroad bed while others drove east toward Seminary Ridge. This defocused the Confederate effort north of the pike.[14]


[edit] Archer versus Meredith

Archer vs. Meredith, 10:45 a.m.South of the pike, Archer's men were expecting an easy fight against dismounted cavalrymen and were astonished to recognize the black Hardee hats worn by the men facing them through the woods: the famous Iron Brigade, formed from regiments in the iron-producing Western states, had a reputation as fierce, tenacious fighters. As the Confederates crossed Willoughby run and climbed the slope into Herbst Woods, they were enveloped on their right by the longer Union line, the reverse of the situation north of the pike.[15]

Gen. Archer was captured in the fighting, the first general officer in Robert E. Lee's army to suffer that fate. Archer was most likely positioned around the 14th Tennessee when he was captured by Private Patrick Moloney of Company G., 2nd Wisconsin, "a brave patriotic and fervent young Irishman." Archer resisted capture, but Moloney overpowered him. Moloney was killed later that day, but he received the Medal of Honor for his exploit. When Archer was taken to the rear, he encountered his former Army colleague Gen. Doubleday, who greeted him good-naturedly, "Good morning, Archer! How are you? I am glad to see you!" Archer replied, "Well, I am not glad to see you by a damn sight!"[16]


[edit] Railroad cut

Fighting at the railroad cut, 11:00 a.m.At around 11 a.m., Doubleday sent his reserve regiment, the 6th Wisconsin, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rufus R. Dawes, north in the direction of Davis's disorganized brigade. The Wisconsin men paused at the fence along the pike and fired, which halted Davis's attack on Cutler's men and caused many of them to seek cover in the railroad cut. The 6th was joined by the 95th New York and the 84th New York (also known as the 14th Brooklyn) along the pike.[13] The three regiments charged to the railroad cut, where Davis's men were seeking cover. The majority of the 600-foot (180 m) cut (shown on the map as the center cut of three) was too deep to be an effective firing position—as deep as 15 feet (4.5 m).[17] Making the situation more difficult was the absence of their overall commander, General Davis, whose location was unknown.[18]

Dawes's men nevertheless faced daunting fire as they charged toward the cut. The regiment's American flag went down at least three times during the charge. At one point Dawes took up the fallen flag before it was seized from him by a corporal of the color guard. As the Union line neared the Confederates, its flanks became folded back and it took on the appearance of an inverted V. When the Union man reached the railroad cut, vicious hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting broke out. They were able to pour enfilading fire from both ends of the cut, and many Confederates considered surrender. Colonel Dawes took the initiative by shouting "Where is the colonel of this regiment?" Major John Blair of the 2nd Mississippi stood up and responded, "Who are you?" Dawes replied, "I command this regiment. Surrender or I will fire."[19] Dawes later described what happened next:[20]

The officer replied not a word, but promptly handed me his sword, and his men, who still held them, threw down their muskets. The coolness, self possession, and discipline which held back our men from pouring a general volley saved a hundred lives of the enemy, and as my mind goes back to the fearful excitement of the moment, I marvel at it.

– Col. Rufus R. Dawes, Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers (1890, p. 169)

Despite this surrender, leaving Dawes standing awkwardly holding seven swords, the fighting continued for minutes more and numerous Confederates were able to escape back to Herr Ridge. The three Union regiments lost 390-440 of 1,184 engaged, but they had blunted Davis's attack, prevented them from striking the rear of the iron brigade, and so overwhelmed the Confederate brigade that it was unable to participate significantly in combat for the rest of the day. The Confederate losses were about 500 killed and wounded and over 200 prisoners out of 1,707 engaged.[21]


[edit] Mid-day lull

Disposition of forces, 12:30 p.m.By 11:30 a.m., the battlefield was temporarily quiet. On the Confederate side, Henry Heth faced an embarrassing situation. He had been under orders from General Lee to avoid a general engagement until the full Army of Northern Virginia had concentrated in the area. But his excursion to Gettysburg, ostensibly to find shoes, essentially a reconnaissance in force conducted by a full infantry division, had indeed started a general engagement and he was on the losing side of it so far. By 12:30 p.m., his remaining two brigades, under Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew and Col. John M. Brockenbrough, had arrived on the scene, as had the division (four brigades) of Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender, also from Hill's Corps. Hill's remaining division (Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson) did not arrive until late in the day.[22]

Considerably more Confederate forces were on the way, however. Two divisions of the Second Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, were approaching Gettysburg from the north, from the towns of Carlisle and York. The five brigades of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes marched down the Carlisle Road but left it before reaching town to advance down the wooded crest of Oak Ridge, where they could link up with the left flank of Hill's Corps. The four brigades under Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early approached on the Harrisburg Road. Union cavalry outposts north of the town detected both movements. Ewell's remaining division (Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson) did not arrive until late in the day.[23]

On the Union side, Doubleday reorganized his lines as more units of the I Corps arrived. First on hand was the Corps Artillery under Col. Charles S. Wainwright, followed by two brigades from Doubleday's division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, which Doubleday placed on either end of his line. The XI Corps arrived from the south before noon, moving up the Taneytown and Emmitsburg Roads. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard was surveying the area from the roof of the Fahnestock Brothers' dry-goods store downtown at about 11:30[24] when he heard that Reynolds had been killed and that he was now in command of all Union forces on the field. He recalled: "My heart was heavy and the situation was grave indeed, but surely I did not hesitate a moment. God helping us, we will stay here till the Army comes. I assumed the command of the field."[25]

Howard immediately sent messengers to summon reinforcements from the III Corps (Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles) and the XII Corps (Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum). Howard's first XI Corps division to arrive, under Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz, was sent north to take a position on Oak Ridge and link up with the right of the I Corps. (The division was commanded temporarily by Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig while Schurz filled in for Howard as XI Corps commander.) The division of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow was placed on Schurz's right to support him. The third division to arrive, under Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr, was placed on Cemetery Hill along with two batteries of artillery to hold the hill as a rallying point if the Union troops could not hold their positions; this placement on the hill corresponded with orders sent earlier in the day to Howard by Reynolds just before he was killed.[26]

However, Rodes beat Schurz to Oak Hill, so the XI Corps division was forced to take up positions in the broad plain north of the town, below and to the east of Oak Hill.[27] They linked up with the I Corps reserve division of Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson, whose two brigades had been sent forward by Doubleday when he heard about Ewell's arrival.[28] Howard's defensive line was not a particularly strong one in the north.[29] He was soon outnumbered (his XI Corps, still suffering the effects of their defeat at the Battle of Chancellorsville, had only 8,700 effectives), and the terrain his men occupied in the north was poorly selected for defense. He held out some hope that reinforcements from Slocum's XII Corps would arrive up the Baltimore Pike in time to make a difference.[30]


[edit] Afternoon

Rodes, Heth, and Early attack, 2:00 – 4:00 p.m.In the afternoon, there was fighting both west (Hill's Corps renewing their attacks on the I Corps) and north (Ewell's Corps attacking the I and XI Corps) of Gettysburg. Ewell, on Oak Hill with Rodes, saw Howard's troops deploying before him, and he interpreted this as the start of an attack and implicit permission to set aside Gen. Lee's order not to bring about a general engagement.[31]


[edit] Rodes attacks from Oak Hill
Rodes initially sent three brigades south against Union troops that represented the right flank of the I Corps and the left flank of the XI Corps: from east to west, Brig. Gen. George P. Doles, Col. Edward A. O'Neal, and Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson. Doles's Georgia brigade stood guarding the flank, awaiting the arrival of Early's division. Both O'Neal's and Iverson's attacks fared poorly against the six veteran regiments in the brigade of Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter, manning a line in a shallow inverted V, facing north on the ridge behind the Mummasburg Road. O'Neal's men were sent forward without coordinating with Iverson on their flank and fell back under heavy fire from the I Corps troops.[32]

Iverson failed to perform even a rudimentary reconnaissance and sent his men forward blindly while he stayed in the rear (as had O'Neal, minutes earlier). More of Baxter's men were concealed in woods behind a stone wall and rose to fire withering volleys from less than 100 yards away, creating over 800 casualties among the 1,350 North Carolinians. Stories are told about groups of dead bodies lying in almost parade-ground formations, heels of their boots perfectly aligned. (The bodies were later buried on the scene, and this area is today known as "Iverson's Pits", source of many local tales of supernatural phenomena.)[33]

Baxter's brigade was worn down and out of ammunition. At 3:00 p.m. he withdrew his brigade, and Gen. Robinson replaced it with the brigade of Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul. Rodes then committed his two reserve brigades: Brig. Gens. Junius Daniel and Dodson Ramseur. Ramseur attacked first, but Paul's brigade held its crucial position. Paul had a bullet go in one temple and out the other, blinding him permanently (he survived the wound and lived 20 more years after the battle). Before the end of the day, three other commanders of that brigade were wounded.[34]

Daniel's North Carolina brigade then attempted to break the I Corps line to the southwest along the Chambersburg Pike. They ran into stiff resistance from Col. Roy Stone's Pennsylvania "Bucktail Brigade" in the same area around the railroad cut as the morning's battle. Fierce fighting eventually ground to a standstill.[35]


[edit] Heth renews his attack
Gen. Lee arrived on the battlefield at about 2:30 p.m., as Rodes's men were in mid-attack. Seeing that a major assault was underway, he lifted his restriction on a general engagement and gave permission to Hill to resume his attacks from the morning. First in line was Heth's division again, with two fresh brigades: Pettigrew's North Carolinians and Col. John M. Brockenbrough's Virginians.[36]

Pettigrew's Brigade was deployed in a line that extended south beyond the ground defended by the Iron Brigade. Enveloping the left flank of the 19th Indiana, Pettigrew's North Carolinians, the largest brigade in the army, drove back the Iron Brigade in some of the fiercest fighting of the war. The Iron Brigade was pushed out of the woods, made three temporary stands in the open ground to the east, but then had to fall back toward the Lutheran Theological Seminary. Gen. Meredith was downed with a head wound, made all the worse when his horse fell on him. To the left of the Iron Brigade was the brigade of Col. Chapman Biddle, defending open ground on McPherson Ridge, but they were outflanked and decimated. To the right, Stone's Bucktails, facing both west and north along the Chambersburg Pike, were attacked by both Brockenbrough and Daniel.[37]

Casualties were severe that afternoon. The 26th North Carolina (the largest regiment of the army with 839 men) lost heavily, leaving the first day's fight with around 212 men. Their commander, Colonel Henry K. Burgwyn, was fatally wounded by a bullet through his chest. By the end of the three-day battle, they had about 152 men standing, the highest casualty percentage for one battle of any other regiment, North or South.[38] One of the Union regiments, the 24th Michigan, lost 363 of 496.[39] It had nine color bearers shot down, and its commander, Col. Henry A. Morrow, was wounded in the head and captured. The 151st Pennsylvania of Biddle's brigade lost 337 of 467.[40]

The highest ranking casualty of this engagement was Gen. Heth, who was struck by a bullet in the head. He was apparently saved because he had stuffed wads of paper into a new hat, which was otherwise too large for his head.[41] But there were two consequences to this glancing blow. Heth was unconscious for over 24 hours and had no further command involvement in the three-day battle. He was also unable to urge Pender's division to move forward and supplement his struggling assault. Pender was oddly passive during this phase of the battle; the typically more aggressive tendencies of a young general in Lee's army would have seen him move forward on his own accord. Hill shared the blame for failing to order him forward as well, but he claimed illness. History cannot know Pender's motivations; he was mortally wounded the next day and left no report.[42]


[edit] Early attacks XI Corps
Carl Schurz of the XI Corps had a difficult defensive problem. He had only four brigades to cover the wide expanse of featureless farmland north of town. He deployed the division of Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig on the left and Francis C. Barlow on the right. From the left, the brigades were Schimmelfennig's (under Col. George von Amsberg), Col. Wlodzimierz Krzyzanowski, Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames, and Col. Leopold von Gilsa.[43]

Making things more difficult, Barlow advanced much farther north than Schimmelfennig's division, occupying a 50-foot (15 m) elevation above Rock Creek named Blocher's Knoll (ever since the battle known as Barlow's Knoll).[44] This turned out to be a serious misjudgment because it created a salient in the line that could be assaulted from multiple sides. Barlow's justification was that he wanted to prevent Doles's Brigade, of Rodes's division, from occupying it and using it as an artillery platform against him.[45]

Richard Ewell's second division, under Jubal Early, swept down the Harrisburg Road, deployed in a battle line three brigades wide, almost a mile across (1,600 m) and almost half a mile (800 m) wider than the Union defensive line. Early started with a large-scale artillery bombardment. The Georgia brigade of Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon was then directed for a frontal attack against Barlow's Knoll, pinning down the defenders, while the brigades of Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays and Col. Isaac E. Avery swung around their exposed flank. At the same time the Georgians under Doles launched a synchronized assault with Gordon. The defenders of Barlow's Knoll targeted by Gordon were 900 men of von Gilsa's brigade; in May, two of his regiments had been the initial target of Stonewall Jackson's flanking attack at Chancellorsville. The men of the 54th and 68th New York held out as long as they could, but they were overwhelmed. Then the 153rd Pennsylvania succumbed. Barlow, attempting to rally his troops, was shot in the side and captured. Barlow's second brigade, under Ames, came under attack by Doles and Gordon. Both Union brigades conducted a disorderly retreat to the south.[46]

On the left flank of the XI Corps, the attack focused on Gen. Schimmelfennig's division. They were subjected to a deadly artillery crossfire from Rodes's and Early's batteries, and as they deployed they were attacked by Doles's infantry. Early's troops were able to employ a flanking attack and roll up the division from the right, and they fell back in confusion toward the town. A desperate counterattack by the 157th New York from von Amberg's brigade was surrounded on three sides, causing it to suffer 307 casualties (75%).[47]

Gen. Howard, witnessing the disaster, sent forward an artillery battery and an infantry brigade from von Steinwehr's reserve force, under Col. Charles Coster. Coster's battle line just north of the town in a brickyard was overwhelmed by Hays and Avery. He did provide some valuable cover for the retreating soldiers, but at a high price: of Coster's 800 men, 313 were captured, as were two of the four guns from the battery.[48]

The collapse of the XI Corps was completed by 4:00 p.m., after a fight of less than an hour. They suffered 3,200 casualties (1,400 of them prisoners), about half the number sent forward from Cemetery Hill. The losses in Gordon's and Doles's brigades were under 750.[49]


[edit] Rodes and Pender break through

Rodes and Pender break through, 4:00 p.m.Rodes's original faulty attack at 2:00 had stalled, but he launched his reserve brigade, under Ramseur, against Paul's Brigade in the salient on the Mummasburg Road, with Doles's Brigade against the left flank of the XI Corps. Daniel's Brigade resumed its attack, now to the east against Baxter on Oak Ridge. This time Rodes was more successful, mostly because Early coordinated an attack on his flank.[50]

In the west, the Union troops had fallen back to the Seminary and built hasty breastworks running 600 yards north-south before the western face of Schmucker Hall, bolstered by 20 guns of Wainwright's battalion. Dorsey Pender's division of Hill's Corps stepped through the exhausted lines of Heth's men at about 4:00 p.m. to finish off the I Corps survivors. The brigade of Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales attacked first, on the northern flank. His five regiments of 1,400 North Carolinians were virtually annihilated in one of the fiercest artillery barrages of the war, rivaling Pickett's Charge to come, but on a more concentrated scale. Twenty guns spaced only 5 yards apart fired spherical case, explosive shells, canister, and double canister rounds into the approaching brigade, which emerged from the fight with only 500 men standing and a single lieutenant in command. Scales wrote afterwards that he found "only a squad here and there marked the place where regiments had rested."[51]

The attack continued in the southern-central area, where Col. Abner M. Perrin ordered his Alabama brigade (four regiments of 1,500 men) to advance rapidly without pausing to fire. Perrin was prominently on horseback leading his men but miraculously was untouched. He directed his men to a weak point in the breastworks on the Union left, a 50-yard gap between Biddle's left-hand regiment, the 121st Pennsylvania, and Gamble's cavalrymen, attempting to guard the flank. They broke through, enveloping the Union line and rolling it up to the north as Scales's men continued to pin down the right flank. By 4:30 p.m., the Union position was untenable, and the men could see the XI Corps retreating from the northern battle, pursued by masses of Confederates. Doubleday ordered a withdrawal east to Cemetery Hill.[52]

On the southern flank, the North Carolina brigade of Brig. Gen. James H. Lane contributed little to the assault; he was kept busy by a clash with Union cavalry on the Hagerstown Road. Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas's Georgia Brigade was in reserve well to the rear, not summoned by Pender or Hill to assist or exploit the breakthrough.[53]


[edit] Union retreat

Gettysburg in 1863, north of town, viewed from the area of the Luthern Theological SeminaryThe sequence of retreating units remains unclear. Each of the two corps cast blame on the other. There are three main versions of events extant. The first, most prevalent, version is that the fiasco on Barlow's Knoll triggered a collapse that ran counterclockwise around the line. The second is that both Barlow's line and the Seminary defense collapsed at about the same time. The third is that Robinson's division in the center gave way and that spread both left and right. Gen. Howard told Gen. Meade that his corps was forced to retreat only because the I Corps collapsed first on his flank, which may have reduced his embarrassment but was unappreciated by Doubleday and his men. (Doubleday's career was effectively ruined by Howard's story.)[54]

Union troops retreated in different states of order. The brigades on Seminary Ridge were said to move deliberately and slowly, keeping in control, although Col. Wainwright's artillery was not informed of the order to retreat and found themselves alone. When Wainwright realized his situation, he ordered his gun crews to withdraw at a walk, not wishing to panic the infantry and start a rout. As pressure eventually increased, Wainwright ordered his 17 remaining guns to gallop down Chambersburg Street, three abreast.[55] A.P. Hill failed to commit any of his reserves to the pursuit of the Seminary defenders, a great missed opportunity.[56]

Near the railroad cut, Daniel's Brigade renewed their assault, and almost 500 Union prisoners surrendered. Paul's Brigade, under attack by Ramseur, became seriously isolated and Gen. Robinson ordered it to withdraw. He ordered the 16th Maine to hold its position "at any cost" as a rear guard against the enemy pursuit. The regiment, commanded by Col. Charles Tilden, returned to the stone wall on the Mummasburg Road, and their fierce fire gave sufficient time for the rest of the brigade to escape, which they did, in considerably more disarray than those from the Seminary. The 16th Maine started the day with 298 men, but at the end of this holding action there were only 35 survivors.[57]

For the XI Corps, it was a sad reminder of their retreat at Chancellorsville in May. Under heavy pursuit by Hays and Avery, they clogged the streets of the town; no one in the corps had planned routes for this contingency. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out in various places. Parts of the corps conducted an organized fighting retreat, such as Coster's stand in the brickyard. The private citizens of Gettysburg panicked amidst the turmoil, and artillery shells bursting overhead and fleeing refugees added to the congestion. Some soldiers sought to avoid capture by hiding in basements and in fenced backyards. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig was one such person who climbed a fence and hid behind a woodpile in the kitchen garden of the Garlach family for the rest of the three-day battle.[58] The only advantage that the XI Corps soldiers had was that they were familiar with the route to Cemetery Hill, having passed through that way in the morning; many in the I Corps, including senior officers, did not know where the cemetery was.[59]

As the Union troops climbed Cemetery Hill, they encountered the determined Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock. At midday, Gen. Meade was nine miles (14 km) south of Gettysburg in Taneytown, Maryland when he heard that Reynolds had been killed. He immediately dispatched Hancock, commander of the II Corps and his most trusted subordinate, to the scene with orders to take command of the field and to determine whether Gettysburg was an appropriate place for a major battle. (Meade's original plan had been to man a defensive line on Pipe Creek, a few miles south in Maryland. But the serious battle underway was making that a difficult option.)[60]

When Hancock arrived on Cemetery Hill, he met with Howard and they had a brief disagreement about Meade's command order. As the senior officer, Howard yielded only grudgingly to Hancock's direction. Although Hancock arrived after 4:00 p.m. and had almost no effect on the conduct of the battle that day, he provided inspiration to the Union troops arriving on the hill and directed them to defensive positions with his "imperious and defiant" (and profane) persona. As to the choice of Gettysburg as the battlefield, Hancock told Howard "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." When Howard agreed, Hancock concluded the discussion: "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, inspected the ground and concurred with Hancock.[61]


[edit] Evening
Gen. Lee also understood the defensive potential to the Union army if they held the high ground of Cemetery Hill. He sent orders to Ewell to "carried the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army." In the face of this discretionary, and possibly contradictory, order, Ewell chose not to attempt the assault.[62] One reason posited was the battle fatigue of his men in the late afternoon, although "Allegheny" Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps was just arriving on the battlefield. Another was the difficulty of assaulting the hill through the narrow corridors afforded by the streets of Gettysburg, immediately to the north. Ewell did consider taking Culp's Hill, which would have made the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable, but he abandoned the idea when it was reported that Union troops (probably Slocum's XII Corps) were approaching on the York Pike and a small group of them were found to be present on the hill.[63]

Lee's order has been criticized because it left too much discretion to Ewell. Numerous historians and proponents of the Lost Cause movement (most prominently Jubal Early) have speculated how the more aggressive Stonewall Jackson would have acted on this order if he had lived to command this wing of Lee's army, and how differently the second day of battle would have proceeded with Confederate artillery on Cemetery Hill, commanding the length of Cemetery Ridge and the Federal lines of communications on the Baltimore Pike.[64] Historian Stephen Sears has suggested that Gen. Meade would have invoked his original plan for a defensive line on Pipe Creek and withdrawn the Army of the Potomac, although that movement would have been a dangerous operation under pressure from Lee.[65]

Most of the rest of both armies arrived that evening or early the next morning. Johnson's division joined Ewell and Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's joined Hill. Two of the three divisions of the First Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, arrived in the morning. Three cavalry brigades under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart were still out of the area, on a wide-ranging raid to the northeast. Gen. Lee sorely felt the loss of the "eyes and ears of the Army"; Stuart's absence had contributed to the accidental start of the battle that morning and left Lee unsure about enemy dispositions through most of July 2. On the Union side, Meade arrived after midnight. The II Corps and III Corps took up positions on Cemetery Ridge, and the XII Corps and the V Corps were nearby to the east. Only the VI Corps was a significant distance from the battlefield, marching rapidly to join the Army of the Potomac.[66]

The first day at Gettysburg—more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days—ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by number of troops engaged. About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged.[67] Union casualties were almost 9,000, Confederate slightly more than 6,000.[68]
In the Second Day of the Battle of Gettysburg (July 2, 1863), Confederate General Robert E. Lee attempted to capitalize on his first day's victory. He launched his Army of Northern Virginia in multiple attacks against the flanks of the Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General George G. Meade.After a lengthy delay to assemble his forces and avoid detection in his approach march, Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet attacked with his First Corps against the Union left flank. His division under Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood attacked Little Round Top and Devil's Den. To Hood's left, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws attacked the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard. Although neither prevailed, the Union III Corps was effectively destroyed as a combat organization as it attempted to defend a salient over too wide a front. Gen. Meade rushed as many as 20,000 reinforcements from elsewhere in his line to resist these fierce assaults. The attacks in this sector concluded with an unsuccessful assault by the Third Corps division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson against the Union center on Cemetery Ridge.

That evening, Confederate Second Corps commander Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell turned demonstrations against the Union right flank into full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and East Cemetery Hill, but both were repulsed.

The Union army had occupied strong defensive positions, and Meade handled his forces well, resulting in heavy losses for both sides but leaving the disposition of forces on both sides essentially unchanged. Lee's hope of crushing the Army of the Potomac on Northern territory was dashed, but undaunted, he began to plan for the third day of fighting.

This article includes details of many attacks on the Union left flank (Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, and the Peach Orchard) and center (Cemetery Ridge), but separate articles describe other major engagements in this massive battle of the second day:

Little Round Top
Culp's Hill
Cemetery Hill

[edit] Lee's plan and movement to battle
By the morning of July 2, six of the seven corps of the Army of the Potomac had arrived on the battlefield. The I Corps (Maj. Gen. John Newton, replacing Abner Doubleday) and the XI Corps (Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard) had fought hard on the first day, and they were joined that evening by the XII Corps (Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum), III Corps (Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles), and II Corps (Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock), and on the morning of July 2 by the V Corps (Maj. Gen. George Sykes). The VI Corps (Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick) was still 30 miles (50 km) away in Manchester, Maryland, on that morning. They assumed positions in a fish hook shape about three miles (5 km ) long, from Culp's Hill, around to Cemetery Hill, and down the spine of Cemetery Ridge. The Army of Northern Virginia line was roughly parallel to the Union's, on Seminary Ridge and on an arc northwest, north, and northeast of the town of Gettysburg. All of the Second Corps (Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell) and Third Corps (Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill) were present, and the First Corps (Lt. Gen. James Longstreet) was arriving from Cashtown; only Longstreet's division under George E. Pickett did not participate in the battle on July 2.[1]

Robert E. Lee had several choices to consider for his next move. His order of the previous evening that Ewell occupy Culp's Hill or Cemetery Hill "if practicable" was not realized, and the Union army was now in strong defensive positions with compact interior lines. His senior subordinate, Longstreet, counseled a strategic move—the Army should leave its current position, swing around the Union left flank, and interpose itself on Meade's lines of communication, inviting an attack by Meade that could be received on advantageous ground. Longstreet argued that this was the entire point of the Gettysburg campaign, to move strategically into enemy territory but fight only defensive battles there. Lee rejected this argument because he was concerned about the morale of his soldiers having to give up the ground for which they fought so hard the day before. He wanted to retain the initiative and had a high degree of confidence in the ability of his army to succeed in any endeavor, an opinion bolstered by their spectacular victories the previous day and at Chancellorsville. He was therefore determined to attack on July 2.[2]


Lee's Plan for July 2.Lee wanted to seize the high ground south of Gettysburg, primarily Cemetery Hill, which dominated the town, the Union supply lines, and the road to Washington, D.C., and he believed an attack up the Emmitsburg Road would be the best approach. He desired an early-morning assault by Longstreet's Corps, reinforced by Ewell, who would move his Corps from its current location north of town to join Longstreet. Ewell protested this arrangement, claiming his men would be demoralized if forced to move from the ground they had captured.[3] And Longstreet protested that his division commanded by John Bell Hood had not arrived completely (and that Pickett's division had not arrived at all).[4] Lee compromised with his subordinates. Ewell would remain in place and conduct a demonstration (a minor diversionary attack) against Culp's Hill, pinning down the right flank of the Union defenders so that they could not reinforce their left, where Longstreet would launch the primary attack as soon as he was ready. Ewell's demonstration would be turned into a full-scale assault if the opportunity presented itself.[5]

Lee ordered Longstreet to launch a surprise attack with two divisions straddling, and guiding on, the Emmitsburg Road.[6] Hood's division would move up the eastern side of the road, Lafayette McLaws's the western side, each perpendicular to it. The objective was to strike the Union Army in an oblique attack, rolling up their left flank, collapsing the line of Union corps onto each other, and seizing Cemetery Hill.[7] The Third Corps division of Richard H. Anderson would join the attack against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge at the appropriate time. This plan was based on faulty intelligence because of the absence of J.E.B. Stuart and his cavalry, leaving Lee had an incomplete understanding of the position of his enemy. He believed that the left flank of the Union army was on Cemetery Ridge, and an early-morning scouting expedition seemed to confirm that.[8] However, he did not account for the initiative of Union Gen. Sickles.


[edit] Sickles repositions
When Sickles arrived with his III Corps, General Meade instructed him to take up a position on Cemetery Ridge that linked up with the II Corps on his right and anchored his left on Little Round Top. Sickles originally did so, but after noon he became concerned about a slightly higher piece of ground 0.7 miles (1,100 m) to his front, a peach orchard owned by the Sherfy family. He undoubtedly recalled the debacle at Chancellorsville, where the high ground ("Hazel Grove") he was forced to give up was used against him as a deadly Confederate artillery platform. Acting without authorization from Meade, Sickles marched his corps to occupy the Peach Orchard. This had two significant negative consequences: his position now took the form of a salient, which could be attacked from multiple sides; and he was forced to occupy lines that were much longer than his two-division corps could defend. Meade was furious about this insubordination, but it was too late to do anything about it—the Confederate attack was imminent.[9]


[edit] Longstreet delayed
Longstreet's attack was delayed, however, because he first had to wait for his final brigade (Evander M. Law's, Hood's division) to arrive, and then he was forced to march on a long, circuitous route that could not be seen by Union Army Signal Corps observers on Little Round Top. It was 4 p.m. by the time his two divisions reached their jumping off points, and then he and his generals were astonished to find the III Corps planted directly in front of them on the Emmitsburg Road. Hood argued with Longstreet that this new situation demanded a change in tactics; he wanted to swing around, below and behind, Round Top and hit the Union Army in the rear. Longstreet, however, refused to consider any modifications to Lee's order.[10]

Partly because of Sickles's unexpected location, Longstreet's assault did not proceed according to Lee's plan. Instead of wheeling left to join a simultaneous two-division push on either side of the Emmitsburg Road, Hood's division attacked in a more easterly direction than intended, and McLaws's and Anderson's divisions deployed brigade by brigade, in an en echelon style of attack, also heading more to the east than the intended northeast.[11]


[edit] Hood's assault
Longstreet's attack commenced with a 30-minute artillery barrage by 36 guns that was particularly punishing to the Union infantry in the Peach Orchard and the troops and batteries on Houck's Ridge. Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood's division deployed in Biesecker's Woods on Warfield Ridge (the southern extension of Seminary Ridge) in two lines of two brigades each: at the left front, Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson's Texas Brigade (Hood's old unit); right front, Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law; left rear, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson; right rear, Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning.[12]

At 4:30 p.m., Hood stood in his stirrups at the front of the Texas Brigade and shouted, "Fix bayonets, my brave Texans! Forward and take those heights!" It is unclear to which heights he was referring. His orders were to cross the Emmitsburg Road and wheel left, moving north with his left flank guiding on the road. This discrepancy became a serious problem when, minutes later on Slyder's Lane, Hood was felled by an artillery shell bursting overhead, severely wounding his left arm and putting him out of action. His division moved ahead to the east, no longer under central control.[13]

There were four probable reasons for the deviation in the division's direction: first, regiments from the III Corps were unexpectedly in the Devil's Den area and they would threaten Hood's right flank if they were not dealt with; second, fire from the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters at Slyder's farm drew the attention of lead elements of Law's Brigade, moving in pursuit and drawing his brigade to the right; third, the terrain was rough and units naturally lost their parade-ground alignments; finally, Hood's senior subordinate, Gen. Law, was unaware that he was now in command of the division, so he could not exercise control.[14]

The two lead brigades split their advances into two directions, although not on brigade boundaries. The 1st Texas and 3rd Arkansas of Robertson's brigade and the 44th and 48th Alabama of Law's brigade headed in the direction of Devil's Den, while Law directed the remaining five regiments toward the Round Tops.[15]


[edit] Devil's Den
Devil's Den was the extreme left of the III Corps line, manned by the large brigade (six regiments and two companies of sharpshooters, 2,200 men in all) of Brigadier General J. H. Hobart Ward, in Maj. Gen. David B. Birney's division. It was the southern end of Houck's Ridge, a modest elevation on the northwest side of Plum Run Valley, made distinctive by piles of huge boulders. These boulders were not the direct avenue of approach used by the Confederates. The 3rd Arkansas and the 1st Texas drove through Rose Woods and hit Ward's line head-on. His troops had lacked the time or inclination to erect breastworks, and for over an hour both sides participated in a standup fight of unusual ferocity. In the first 30 minutes, the 20th Indiana lost more than half of its men. Its colonel was killed and its lieutenant colonel wounded. The 86th New York also lost its commander. The commander of the 3rd Arkansas fell wounded, one of 182 casualties in his regiment.[16]

Meanwhile, the two regiments from Law's brigade that had split from the column advancing to the Round Tops pushed up Plum Run Valley and threatened to turn Ward's flank. Their target was the 4th Maine and the 124th New York, defending the 4th New York Independent artillery battery commanded by Captain James Smith, whose fire was causing considerable disruption in Law's brigade's advance. The pressure grew great enough that Ward needed to call the 99th Pennsylvania from his far right to reinforce his left. The commander of the 124th New York, Colonel Augustus Van Horne Ellis, and his major, James Cromwell, decided to counterattack. They mounted their horses despite the protests of soldiers who urged them to lead more safely on foot. Maj. Cromwell said, "The men must see us today." They led the charge of their "Orange Blossoms" regiment to the west, down the slope of Houck's Ridge through a triangular field surrounded by a low stone fence, sending the 1st Texas reeling back 200 yards. But both Colonel Ellis and Major Cromwell were shot dead as the Texans rallied with a massed volley; and the New Yorkers retreated to their starting point, with only 100 survivors from the 283 they started with. As reinforcements from the 99th Pennsylvania arrived, Ward's brigade retook the crest.[17]

The second wave of Hood's assault was the brigades of Henry Benning and George "Tige" Anderson. They detected a gap in Birney's division line: to Ward's right, there was a considerable gap before the brigade of Régis de Trobriand began. Anderson's line smashed into Trobriand and the gap at the southern edge of the Wheatfield. Trobriand wrote that the Confederates "converged on me like an avalanche, but we piled all the dead and wounded men in our front." The Union defense was fierce, and Anderson's brigade pulled back; its commander was wounded in the leg and was carried from the battle.[18]

Two of Benning's Confederate regiments, the 2nd and 17th Georgia, moved down Plum Run Valley around Ward's flank. They received murderous fire from the 99th Pennsylvania and Hazlett's battery on Little Round Top, but they kept pushing forward. Capt. Smith's New York battery was under severe pressure from three sides, but its supporting infantry regiments were suffering severe casualties and could not protect it. Three 10-pound Parrott rifles were lost to the 1st Texas, and they were used against Union troops the next day.[19]

Birney scrambled to find reinforcements. He sent the 40th New York and 6th New Jersey from the Wheatfield into Plum Run Valley to block the approach into Ward's flank. They collided with Benning's and Law's men in rocky, broken ground that the survivors would remember as the "Slaughter Pen". (Plum Run itself was known as "Bloody Run"; Plum Run Valley as the "Valley of Death".) As the men of the 40th fell back under relentless pressure, the 6th New Jersey covered their withdrawal and lost a third of its men in the process.[19]

The pressure on Ward's brigade was eventually too great, and he was forced to call for a retreat. Hood's division secured Devil's Den and the southern part of Houck's Ridge. The center of the fighting shifted to the northwest, to Rose Woods and the Wheatfield, while five regiments under Evander Law assaulted Little Round Top to the east. Benning's men spent the next 22 hours on Devil's Den, firing across the Valley of Death on Union troops massed on Little Round Top.[20]

The assaults by Hood's brigades were classic, tough infantry fights. Of 2,423 Union troops engaged, there were 821 casualties (138 killed, 548 wounded, 135 missing); the 5,525 Confederates lost 1,814 (329, 1,107, 378).[21]


[edit] Little Round Top
The Confederate assaults on Little Round Top were some of the most famous of the three-day battle and the Civil War. Arriving just as the Confederates approached, Col. Strong Vincent's brigade of the V Corps mounted a spirited defense of this position, the extreme left of the Union line, against furious assaults up the rocky slope. The stand of the 20th Maine under Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain against the 15th Alabama (Col. William C. Oates) is particularly storied, but heroes such as Strong Vincent, Patrick "Paddy" O'Rorke, and Charles E. Hazlett also made names for themselves.

Further information: Little Round Top

[edit] McLaws's assault
Lafayette McLaws arranged his division on Warfield Ridge similar to Hood's on his right—two lines of two brigades each: left front, facing the Peach Orchard, the brigade of Brig. Gen. William Barksdale; right front, Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw; left rear, Brig. Gen. William T. Wofford; right rear, Brig. Gen. Paul Jones Semmes.[22]

Lee's original plan called for Hood and McLaws to attack in concert, but Longstreet held back McLaws while Hood's attack progressed. Around 5 p.m., Longstreet saw that Hood's division was reaching its limits and that the enemy to its front was fully engaged. He ordered McLaws to send in Kershaw's brigade, with Barksdale's to follow on the left, beginning the en echelon attack—one brigade after another in sequence—that would be used for the rest of the afternoon's attack. McLaws resented Longstreet's hands-on management of his brigades. Those brigades engaged in some of the bloodiest fighting of the battle: the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard.[23]


[edit] Wheatfield

Initial assault on the Wheatfield.The area known as the Wheatfield had three geographic features, all owned by the John Rose family: the 20-acre (8 ha) field itself, Rose Woods bordering it on the west, and a modest elevation known as Stony Hill, also to the west. Immediately to the east was Houck's Ridge and Devil's Den. The fighting here, consisting of numerous confusing attacks and counterattacks over two hours by eleven brigades, earned the field the nickname "Bloody Wheatfield."[24]

The first engagement in the Wheatfield was actually that of Anderson's brigade (Hood's division) attacking the 17th Maine of Trobriand's brigade, a spillover from Hood's attack on Houck's Ridge. Although under pressure and with its neighboring regiments on Stony Hill withdrawing, the 17th Maine held its position behind a low stone wall with the assistance of Winslow's battery, and Anderson fell back. Trobriand wrote, "I had never seen any men fight with equal obstinacy."[25]

By 5:30 p.m., when the first of Kershaw's regiments neared the Rose farmhouse, Stony Hill had been reinforced by two brigades of the 1st Division, V Corps, under Brig. Gen. James Barnes, those of Cols. William S. Tilton and Jacob B. Sweitzer. Kershaw's men placed great pressure on the 17th Maine, but it continued to hold. For some reason, however, Barnes withdrew his understrength division about 300 yards to the north—without consultation with Birney's men—to a new position near the Wheatfield Road. Trobriand and the 17th Maine had to follow suit, and the Confederates seized Stony Hill and streamed into the Wheatfield. (Barnes's controversial decision was widely criticized after the battle, and it effectively ended his military career.)[26]


Union soldier killed by artillery fire in the Wheatfield.Earlier that afternoon, as Meade realized the folly of Sickles's movement, he ordered Hancock to send a division from the II Corps to reinforce the III Corps. Hancock sent the 1st Division under Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell from its reserve position behind Cemetery Ridge. It arrived at about 6 p.m. and three brigades, under Cols. Samuel K. Zook, Patrick Kelly (the Irish Brigade), and Edward E. Cross moved forward; the fourth brigade, under Col. John R. Brooke, was in reserve. Zook and Kelly drove the Confederates from Stony Hill, and Cross cleared the Wheatfield, pushing Kershaw's men back to the edge of Rose Woods. Both Zook and Cross were mortally wounded in leading their brigades through these assaults, as was Confederate Semmes. When Cross's men had exhausted their ammunition, Caldwell ordered Brooke to relieve them. By this time, however, the Union position in the Peach Orchard had collapsed (see next section), and Wofford's assault continued down the Wheatfield Road, taking Stony Hill and flanking the Union forces in the Wheatfield. Brooke's brigade in Rose Woods had to retreat in some disorder. Sweitzer's brigade was sent in to delay the Confederate assault, and they did this effectively in vicious hand-to-hand combat. The Wheatfield changed hands once again.[27]


Confederates seize the Wheatfield.Additional Union troops had arrived by this time. The 2nd Division of the V corps, under Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres, was known as the Regular Division because two of its three brigades were composed of U.S. Army troops, not state volunteers. (The brigade of volunteers, under Brig. Gen. Stephen H. Weed, was already engaged on Little Round Top, so only the Regular Army brigades arrived at the Wheatfield.) In their advance across the Valley of Death they had come under heavy fire from Confederate sharpshooters in Devil's Den. As the regulars advanced, the Confederates swarmed over Stony Hill and through Rose Woods, flanking the newly arrived brigades. They retreated back to the relative safety of Little Round Top in good order, despite heavy casualties and pursuing Confederates. The two regular brigades suffered 829 casualties out of 2,613 engaged.[28]

This final Confederate assault through the Wheatfield continued past Houck's Ridge into the Valley of Death at about 7:30 p.m. The brigades of Anderson, Semmes, and Kershaw were exhausted from hours of combat in the summer heat and advanced east with units jumbled up together. Wofford's brigade followed to the left along the Wheatfield Road. As they reach the northern shoulder of Little Round Top, they were met with a counterattack from the 3rd Division (the Pennsylvania Reserves) of the V Corps, under Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. The brigade of Col. William McCandless, including a company from the Gettysburg area, spearheaded the attack and drove the exhausted Confederates back beyond the Wheatfield to Stony Hill. Realizing that his troops were too far advanced and exposed, Crawford pulled the brigade back to the east edge of the Wheatfield.[29]

The bloody Wheatfield remained quiet for the rest of the battle. But it took a heavy toll on the men who traded possession back-and-forth. The Confederates suffered casualties of 1,394 and the Union 3,215 (not a typical ratio of attackers to defenders). Some of the wounded managed to crawl to Plum Run but could not cross it. The river ran red with their blood. As with the Cornfield at Antietam, this small expanse of agricultural ground would be remembered by veterans as a name of unique significance in the history of warfare.[30]


[edit] Peach Orchard

McLaws attacks the Peach Orchard, Caldwell counterattacks in the Wheatfield.While the right wing of Kershaw's brigade attacked into the Wheatfield, its left wing wheeled left to attack the Pennsylvania troops in the brigade of Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham, the right flank of Birney's line, where 30 guns from the III Corps and the Artillery Reserve attempted to hold the sector. The South Carolinians were subjected to infantry volleys from the Peach Orchard and canister from all along the line. Suddenly someone unknown shouted a false command, and the attacking regiments turned to their right, toward the Wheatfield, which presented their left flank to the batteries. Kershaw later wrote, "Hundreds of the bravest and best men of Carolina fell, victims of this fatal blunder."[31]

Meanwhile, the two brigades on McLaws's left—Barksdale's in front and Wofford's behind—charged directly into the Peach Orchard, the point of the salient in Sickles's line. Gen. Barksdale led the charge on horseback, long hair flowing in the wind, sword waving in the air. Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys's division had only about 1,000 men to cover the 500 yards from the Peach Orchard northward along the Emmitsburg Road to the lane leading to the Abraham Trostle farm. Some were still facing south, from where they had been firing on Kershaw's brigade, so they were hit in their vulnerable flank. Barksdale's 1,600 Mississippians wheeled left against the flank of Humphreys's division, collapsing their line, regiment by regiment. Graham's brigade retreated back toward Cemetery Ridge; Graham had two horses shot under them, was hit by a shell fragment, and a bullet in his upper body. He was eventually captured by the 21st Mississippi. Wofford's men dealt with the defenders of the orchard.[32]

As Barksdale's men pushed toward Sickles's headquarters near the Trostle barn, the general and his staff began to move to the rear, when a cannonball caught Sickles in the right leg. He was carried off in a stretcher, sitting up and puffing on his cigar, attempting to encourage his men. That evening his leg was amputated, and he returned to Washington, D.C. Gen. Birney assumed command of the III Corps, which was soon rendered ineffective as a fighting force.[33]

The relentless infantry charges posed extreme danger to the Union artillery batteries in the orchard and on the Wheatfield Road, and they were forced to withdraw under pressure. The six Napoleons of Capt. John Bigelow's 9th Massachusetts battery, on the left of the line, "retired by prolonge": a technique rarely used in which the cannon was dragged backwards as it fired rapidly, the movement aided by the gun's recoil. By the time they reach the Trostle house, they were told to hold the position to cover the infantry retreat, but they were eventually overrun by troops of the 21st Mississippi, who captured three of their guns.[34]

Humphreys's fate was sealed when the Confederate en echelon attack continued and his front and right flank began to be assaulted by the Third Corps division of Richard H. Anderson on Cemetery Ridge.


[edit] Anderson's assault

Anderson's assault on Cemetery Ridge.The remaining portion of the en echelon attack was the responsibility of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division of A.P. Hill's Third Corps, and he attacked starting at about 6 p.m. with five brigades in line, commencing on the right with Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, followed by Perry's Brigade (commanded by Col. David Lang), Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright, Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey, and Brig. Gen. William Mahone.[35]

The brigades of Wilcox and Lang hit the front and right flank of Humphreys's line, dooming any chance for his division to maintain its position on the Emmitsburg Road and completing the collapse of the III Corps. Humphrey displayed considerable bravery during the attack, leading his men from horseback and forcing them to maintain good order during their withdrawal. He wrote to his wife, "Twenty times did I [bring] my men to a halt and face about ... forcing the men to it."[36]

On Cemetery Ridge, Generals Meade and Hancock were scrambling to find reinforcements. Meade had sent virtually all of his available troops (including most of the XII Corps, who would be needed momentarily on Culp's Hill) to his left flank to counter Longstreet's assault, leaving the center of his line relatively weak. There was insufficient infantry on Cemetery Ridge and only a few artillery pieces, rallied from the debacle of the Peach Orchard by Lt. Col. Freeman McGilvery.[37]

The long march from Cemetery Ridge had left some of the Southern units disorganized, and their commanders paused momentarily at Plum Run to reorganize. Hancock led the II Corps brigade of Col. George L. Willard to meet Barksdale's brigade as it moved toward the ridge. Willard's New Yorkers drove the Mississippians back to Emmitsburg Road. Barksdale was wounded in his left knee, followed by a cannonball to his left foot, and finally was hit by another bullet to his chest, knocking him off his horse. His troops were forced to leave him for dead on the field, and he died the next morning in a Union field hospital. Willard was also killed, and Confederate guns drove back Willard's man in turn.[38]

As Hancock rode north to find additional reinforcements, he saw Wilcox's brigade nearing the base of the ridge, aiming at a gap in the Union line. The timing was critical, and Hancock chose the only troops at hand, the men of the 1st Minnesota, Harrow's Brigade, of the 2nd Division of the II Corps. They were originally placed there to guard Thomas's U.S. Battery. He pointed to a Confederate flag over the advancing line and shouted to Col. William Colvill, "Advance, Colonel, and take those colors!" The 330 Minnesotans charged the Alabama brigade with bayonets fixed, and they blunted their advance at Plum Run but at horrible cost; including their defense against Pickett's Charge the following day, they suffered 67.9% casualties (Based on new research[39] it has been determined that the numbers, though not as high as the frequently reported "262 effectives charged in, suffering 82% casualties", were still horrendous by any standards.) The men of the 1st Minnesota are remembered as martyrs for suffering one of the largest regimental single action losses throughout the war. Surprisingly, despite overwhelming Confederate numbers, the small 1st Minnesota checked Wilcox's advance, and with the support of Willard's brigade on their left, the Alabamians were forced to withdraw.[40]

The third Confederate brigade in line, under Ambrose Wright, crushed two regiments posted on the Emmitsburg Road north of the Codori farm, captured the guns of two batteries, and advanced toward a gap in the Union line just south of the Copse of Trees. (For a time, the only Union soldiers in this part of the line were Gen. Meade and some of his staff officers.) Wright's Georgia brigade may have reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge and beyond. Many historians have been skeptical of Wright's claims in his after-action report, which, if correct, would mean he passed the crest of the ridge and got as far as the Widow Leister's house before being struck in the flank and repulsed by Union reinforcements (Brig. Gen. George J. Stannard's Vermont brigade). Others believe his account was plausible because he accurately described the masses of Union troops on the Baltimore Pike that would have been invisible to him if he had been stopped earlier. Furthermore, his conversations with General Lee that evening lend support to his claim. It is possible that Lee derived some false confidence from Wright about the ability of his men to reach Cemetery Ridge the following day in Pickett's Charge.[41]

Wright told Lee that it was relatively easy to get to the crest, but it was difficult to stay there.[42] A significant reason Wright could not stay was his lack of support. Two brigades were on Wright's left and could have reinforced his success. Carnot Posey's brigade made slow progress and never crossed the Emmitsburg Road, despite protestations from Wright. William Mahone's brigade inexplicably never moved at all. Gen. Anderson sent a messenger with orders to Mahone to advance, but Mahone refused. Part of the blame for the failure of Wright's assault must lie with Anderson, who took little active part in directing his division in battle.[43]


[edit] Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill
Richard Ewell's orders from Lee had been to launch a demonstration, or minor diversionary attack, on the Union right flank. He started the attack at 4 p.m. with an artillery bombardment from Benner's Hill, which caused little damage to the Union lines, but the counterbattery fire returned upon the lower hill was murderous. Ewell's best artillerist, 19-year-old Joseph W. Latimer, the "Boy Major", was killed. Ewell did not launch a conventional infantry attack until after 7 p.m., after Anderson's assault on Cemetery Ridge had crested.[44]

The division of Edward "Allegheny" Johnson assaulted the lone XII Corps brigade of Brig. Gen. George S. Greene behind strong breastworks on Culp's Hill and suffered severe casualties. They were able to occupy only the portions of the Union line that had been vacated under orders that afternoon by Gen. Meade to reinforce the left flank of his line against Longstreet.[45]

Further information: Culp's Hill
At around 8 p.m., two brigades of Jubal Early's division assaulted East Cemetery Hill, reaching the crest and the numerous Union artillery batteries placed there, but Union reinforcements arrived and drove them from the hill.[46]

Further information: Cemetery Hill

[edit] Council of war
The battlefield fell silent around 10:30 p.m., except for the cries of the wounded and dying. Gen. Meade telegraphed to Washington:[47]

The enemy attacked me about 4 p.m. this day and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. ... I shall remain in my present position to-morrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defense of character.

– George G. Meade, Telegraph to Halleck, July 2, 1863


Meade and his generals in the council of war, engraving by James E. Kelly.Meade made his decision late that night in a council of war that included his senior staff officers and corps commanders. The assembled officers agreed that, despite the beating the army took, it was advisable for the army to remain in its present position and to await attack by the enemy, although there was some disagreement about how long to wait if Lee chose not to attack. There is some evidence that Meade had already decided this issue and was using the meeting not as a formal council of war, but as a way to achieve consensus among officers he had commanded for less than a week. As the meeting broke up, Meade took aside Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, in command of the II Corps, and predicted, "If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be in your front. ... he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed and if he concludes to try it again, it will be on our centre."[48]

There was considerably less confidence in Confederate headquarters that night. The army had suffered a significant defeat by not dislodging their enemy. A staff officer remarked that Lee was "not in good humor over the miscarriage of his plans and his orders." But in Lee's report, he showed more optimism:[49]

The result of this day's operations induce the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. ... The general plan was unchanged.

– Robert E. Lee, Official Report on battle, January 1864.

Longstreet wrote, years after the battle, that on July 2 the men of his corps had done the "best three hours' fighting done by any troops on any battle-field."[50] That night he continued to argue for his recommendation of a strategic movement around the Union left flank, but Lee would hear none of it. He sent orders to Richard Ewell to "assail the enemy's right" at daylight, and he ordered Jeb Stuart (who had finally arrived at Lee's headquarters early that afternoon) to operate on Ewell's left and rear.

On the night of July 2, all of the remaining elements of both armies had arrived: Stuart's cavalry, George Pickett's division, and John Sedgwick's VI Corps. The stage was set for the bloody climax of the three-day battle.[51]

Lee's actual plan for July 3 is disputed by historians.[52] What history does record is that Meade's prediction was correct; Lee struck near the Union center on Cemetery Ridge in a disastrous attack, Pickett's Charge.

Casualty figures for the second day of Gettysburg are difficult to assess because both armies reported by unit after the full battle, not by day. One estimate is that the Confederates lost approximately 6,000 killed, missing, or wounded, which for Hood's, McLaws's, and Anderson's divisions were 30–40% casualties. Union casualties probably exceeded 9,000.[53]
At about 11 a.m. On July 3, Stuart reached Cress Ridge, just north of what is now called East Cavalry Field, and signaled Lee that he was in position by ordering the firing of four guns, one in each direction of the compass. This was a foolish error because he also alerted Gregg to his presence. The brigades of McIntosh and Custer were positioned to block Stuart. As the Confederates approached, Gregg engaged them with an artillery duel, and the superior skills of the Union horse artillerymen got the better of Stuart's guns.[7]

Stuart's plan had been to pin down McIntosh's and Custer's skirmishers around the Rummel farm and swing over Cress Ridge, around the left flank of the defenders, but the Federal skirmish line pushed back tenaciously; the troopers from the 5th Michigan Cavalry were armed with Spencer repeating rifles, multiplying their firepower. Stuart decided on a direct cavalry charge to break their resistance. He ordered an assault by the 1st Virginia Cavalry, his own old regiment, now in Fitz Lee's brigade. The battle started in earnest at approximately 1 p.m., at the same time that Col. Edward Porter Alexander's Confederate artillery barrage opened up on Cemetery Ridge. Fitz Lee's troopers came pouring through the farm of John Rummel, scattering the Union skirmish line.[8]

Gregg ordered Custer to counterattack with the 7th Michigan. Custer personally led the regiment, shouting "Come on, you Wolverines!" Waves of horsemen collided in furious fighting along the fence line on Rummel's farm. Seven hundred men fought at point-blank range across the fence with carbines, pistols, and sabers. Custer's horse was shot out from under him, and he commandeered a bugler's horse. Eventually enough of Custer's men were amassed to break down the fence, and they caused the Virginians to retreat. Stuart sent in reinforcements from all three of his brigades: the 9th and 13th Virginia (Chambliss's Brigade), the 1st North Carolina and Jeff Davis Legion (Hampton's), and squadrons from the 2nd Virginia (Lee's). Custer's pursuit was broken, and the 7th Michigan fell back in a disorderly retreat.[9]

Stuart tried again for a breakthrough by sending in the bulk of Wade Hampton's brigade, accelerating in formation from a walk to a gallop, sabers flashing, calling forth "murmurs of admiration" from their Union targets. Union horse artillery batteries attempted to block the advance with shell and canister, but the Confederates moved too quickly and were able to fill in for lost men, maintaining their momentum. Once again the cry "Come on, you Wolverines!" was heard as Custer and Col. Charles H. Town led the 1st Michigan Cavalry into the fray, also at a gallop.[10] A trooper from one of Gregg's Pennsylvania regiments observed,

As the two columns approached each other the pace of each increased, when suddenly a crash, like the falling of timber, betokened the crisis. So sudden and violent was the collision that many of the horses were turned end over end and crushed their riders beneath them.[11]

As the horsemen fought desperately in the center, McIntosh personally led his brigade against Hampton's right flank and the 3rd Pennsylvania and 1st New Jersey hit Hampton's left from north of the Lott house. Hampton received a serious saber wound to the head; Custer lost his second horse of the day. Assaulted from three sides, the Confederates withdrew. The Union troopers were in no condition to pursue beyond the Rummel farmhouse.[12]

The losses from 40 intense minutes of fighting on East Cavalry Field were relatively minor: 254 Union casualties, 219 of them from Custer's brigade; 181 Confederate. Although tactically inconclusive, the battle was a strategic loss for Stuart and Robert E. Lee, whose plans to drive into the Union rear were foiled. George Armstrong Custer must be considered an unsung hero of the Battle of Gettysburg, marking the high point of his Army career.[13]


[edit] South Cavalry Field

Gettysburg South Cavalry FieldOn the morning of July 3, Union Cavalry Corps commander Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton ordered two of his brigades to the left flank of the Union army. He ordered Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's Reserve Brigade of Buford's division to move north from Emmitsburg to join Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's division, moving from Two Taverns on the Baltimore Pike to the area southwest of Round Top. By this time, the only brigade in Kilpatrick's division was that of Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth, George Custer's brigade having been detached for service with David Gregg at East Cavalry Field. It is unclear what Pleasonton hoped to accomplish. There is no record that he performed any reconnaissance in this area. It has been speculated that Army of the Potomac commander George G. Meade was preparing for a possible counterattack to follow the repulse of Pickett's Charge, which he had anticipated since the night before.[14]

Farnsworth reached the area at approximately 1 p.m., about the time the massive Confederate artillery barrage started in preparation for Pickett's Charge, and his 1,925 troops took up a position in a line south of the George Bushman farm. From left to right, the regiments were the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry, the 1st West Virginia, and 1st Vermont. Battery E., 4th U.S. Artillery, occupied a small, rocky knoll in the rear and the 5th New York cavalry was placed in a nearby ravine to guard the artillery. Joined by Kilpatrick, they awaited Merritt's brigade, which arrived at about 3 p.m. and took up a position straddling the Emmitsburg Road, to Farnsworth's left. By this time the infantry portion of Pickett's Charge had begun, and Kilpatrick was eager to get his men into the fight.[15]

On the Confederate line to the east of the Emmitsburg Road, only infantry troops were involved. The four brigades of Hood's division, under the command of Evander M. Law, had occupied the area from Round Top, through Devil's Den, and back to the road since the battle on July 2. Initially, Law had just the 1st Texas Infantry (from Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson's Texas Brigade) facing Farnsworth to the south, but he soon reinforced them with 47th Alabama Infantry, the 1st South Carolina, and artillery. To the west of the road, facing Merritt, was the Georgia brigade of Brig. Gen. George "Tige" Anderson.[16]

Young Kilpatrick had little experience in commanding cavalry, and he demonstrated that by attacking fortified infantry positions in a piecemeal fashion. West of the road, Merritt went in first, with his 6th Pennsylvania cavalrymen fighting dismounted. Anderson's Georgians repulsed their attack easily. Farnsworth was to follow, but he was astonished to hear Kilpatrick's order for a mounted cavalry charge. The Confederate defenders were positioned behind a stone fence with wooden fence rails piled high above it, too high for horses to jump, which would require the attackers to dismount under fire and dismantle the fence. The terrain leading to it was broken, undulating ground, with large boulders, fences, and woodlots, making it unsuitable for a cavalry charge. Accounts differ as to the details of the argument between Farnsworth and Kilpatrick, but it is generally believed that Kilpatrick dared or shamed Farnsworth into making the charge the latter knew would be suicidal. Farnsworth allegedly said "General, if you order the charge I will lead it, but you must take the awful responsibility."[17]

First in the assault was the 1st West Virginia Cavalry, led by Colonel Nathaniel P. Richmond. They rode in great confusion after coming under heavy fire from the 1st Texas, but they were able to breach the wall. Hand-to-hand fighting with sabers, rifles, and even rocks ensued, but the attack was forced back. Of the 400 Federal cavalrymen in the attack, there were 98 casualties. The second wave came from the 18th Pennsylvania, supported by companies of the 5th New York, but they were also turned back under heavy rifle fire, with 20 casualties.[18]

It was finally the turn of the 1st Vermont Cavalry, about 400 officers and men, which Farnsworth divided into three battalions of four companies each under Lieutenant Colonel Addison W. Preston, Major William Wells, and Captain Henry C. Parsons. Parsons's battalion led the charge, passing the Texans and riding north into the blinding sun toward the John Slyder farm. Evander Law sent three Georgia regiments (the 9th, 11th, and 59th) to move to the support of the Texans and the artillery batteries. A staff officer carrying the order encountered the 4th Alabama, who also joined in support. An Alabama lieutenant yelled "Cavalry, boys, cavalry! This is no fight, only a frolic, give it to them!" And the infantrymen found many easy targets.[19]

All three battalion advances were turned back with great losses. The final group, led by Wells and by Farnsworth, circled back toward Big Round Top, where they met a line of the 15th Alabama across their front. Farnsworth's party had dwindled to only 10 troopers as they weaved back and forth, trying to avoid the murderous fire. Farnsworth fell from his horse, struck in the chest, abdomen, and leg by five bullets. Postwar accounts by a Confederate soldier that claimed Farnsworth committed suicide with his pistol to avoid capture have been discounted. Major Wells received the Medal of Honor for his heroism in leading the rest of his men back to safety. The Vermont regiment suffered 65 casualties during the futile assault.[20]

Kilpatrick's ill-considered and poorly executed cavalry charges are remembered as a low point in the history of the U.S. Cavalry and marked the final significant hostilities at the Battle of Gettysburg. Six miles (10 km) west of Gettysburg, one of Merritt's regiments, the 6th U.S. Cavalry, was defeated that afternoon at Fairfield by Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones's "Laurel Brigade," an action not considered to be a formal part of the Battle of Gettysburg.[21]

All of Pleasonton's cavalry brigades were exercised for the remainder of the Gettysburg Campaign in the lackluster pursuit of Lee's army back across the Potomac River.[22]Gettysburg National Cemetery is located on Cemetery Hill in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Shortly after the Battle of Gettysburg, with the support of Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin, the site was purchased and Union dead were moved from shallow and inadequate burial sites on the battlefield to the cemetery. Local attorney David Wills was the man primarily responsible for acquiring the land, overseeing the construction of the cemetery, and planning its dedication ceremony, although the initial concept and early organizational efforts were led by rival lawyer David McConaughy. The landscape architect William Saunders, founder of the National Grange, designed the cemetery. It was originally called Soldiers' National Cemetery at Gettysburg.

The removal of Confederate dead from the field burial plots was not undertaken until seven years after the battle. From 1870 to 1873, upon the initiative of the Ladies Memorial Associations of Richmond, Raleigh, Savannah, and Charleston, 3,320 bodies were disinterred and sent to cemeteries in those cities for reburial, 2,935 being interred in Hollywood Cemetery, Richmond. Seventy-three bodies were reburied in home cemeteries.


Labor, from Soldiers National MonumentSaunders's design had two facets: first, the Soldiers National Monument was placed at the center, promoting the Union victory and the valor of the fallen soldiers; second, the graves were arranged in a series of semi-circles around the monument, emphasizing the fundamental egalitarian nature of U.S. society, with all the graves considered equal. The original plan was to arrange the plots in essentially random order, but resistance from the states caused this to be modified and the graves are grouped by state, with one section for unknowns. (In later years, additional graves were added outside the original section for the dead of the Spanish-American War and World War I.) There are numerous other monuments in the cemetery, including the New York Monument, the first statue to Major General John F. Reynolds, the "Friend to Friend Memorial" in the National Cemetery Annex, and the monument to Lincoln's address.


New York Monument in Gettysburg National Cemetery, Caspar Buberl, sculptorThe cemetery was dedicated on November 19, 1863. The main speaker at the ceremony was Edward Everett, but it was here that Abraham Lincoln delivered his most famous speech, the Gettysburg Address. The night before, Lincoln slept in Wills's house on the main square in Gettysburg, which is now a landmark administered by the National Park Service. The cemetery was completed in March of 1864 with the last of 3,512 Union dead were reburied. It became a National Cemetery on May 1, 1872, when control was transferred to the War Department. It is currently administered by the National Park Service as part of Gettysburg National Military Park and contains the remains of over 6,000 individuals whom served in a number of American wars, from the Mexican-American War to the present day.

The Gettysburg Address is the most famous speech of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln and one of the most quoted speeches in United States history. Historian James McPherson has called it "the world’s foremost statement of freedom and democracy and the sacrifices required to achieve and defend them." It was delivered at the dedication of the Soldiers' National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on November 19, 1863, during the American Civil War, four and a half months after the Union armies defeated the Confederates at the decisive Battle of Gettysburg.

Lincoln's carefully crafted address, secondary to other presentations that day, came to be regarded as one of the greatest speeches in American history. In fewer than 300 words delivered in just over two minutes, Lincoln invoked the principles of human equality espoused by the Declaration of Independence and redefined the Civil War as a struggle not merely for the Union, but as "a new birth of freedom" that would bring true equality to all of its citizens, create a unified nation in which states rights were no longer dominant, defined democracy in terms of government of the people, by the people, for the people, and defined republicanism in terms of freedom, equality and democracy.

Beginning with the now-iconic phrase "Four score and seven years ago," Lincoln referred to the events of the American Revolution and described the ceremony at Gettysburg as an opportunity not only to dedicate the grounds of a cemetery, but also to consecrate the living in the struggle to ensure that "government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."


The only known photo of Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg (seated, center), taken about noon, just after Lincoln arrived and some three hours before he spoke. To Lincoln's right is his bodyguard, Ward Hill Lamon.Despite the speech's prominent place in the history and popular culture of the United States, the exact wording of the speech is disputed. The five known manuscripts of the Gettysburg Address differ in a number of details and also differ from contemporary newspaper reprints of the speech.The Battle of Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) forever changed the little Pennsylvania town – and, for that matter, the history of the United States. The battlefield contained the bodies of more than 7,500 dead soldiers and several thousand horses of the Union's Army of the Potomac and the Confederacy's Army of Northern Virginia. The stench of rotting bodies made many townspeople violently ill in the weeks following the battle[citation needed], and the burial of the dead in a dignified and orderly manner became a high priority for the few thousand residents of Gettysburg. Under the direction of David Wills, a wealthy 32-year-old attorney, Pennsylvania purchased 17 acres (69,000 m²) for a cemetery to honor those lost in the summer's battle.

Wills originally planned to dedicate this new cemetery on Wednesday, September 23, and invited Edward Everett, who had served as Secretary of State, U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative, Governor of Massachusetts, and president of Harvard University, to be the main speaker. At that time, Everett was widely considered to be the nation's greatest orator.[1] In reply, Everett told Wills and his organizing committee that he would be unable to prepare an appropriate speech in such a short period of time, and requested that the date be postponed. The committee agreed, and the dedication was postponed until Thursday, November 19.

Almost as an afterthought, Wills and the event committee invited Lincoln to participate in the ceremony. Wills' letter stated, "It is the desire that, after the Oration, you, as Chief Executive of the nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks."[2] Lincoln's role in the event was secondary, akin to the modern tradition of inviting a noted public figure to do a ribbon-cutting at a grand opening.

Lincoln arrived by train in Gettysburg on November 18, and spent the night as a guest in Wills' house on the Gettysburg town square, where he put the finishing touches on the speech he had written in Washington.[3] Contrary to popular belief, Lincoln neither completed his address while on the train nor wrote it on the back of an envelope.[4] On the morning of November 19 at 9:30 A.M., Lincoln, astride a chestnut bay horse, joined in a procession with the assembled dignitaries, townspeople, and widows marching out to the grounds to be dedicated between Secretary of State William H. Seward and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase.[5][6]

Approximately 15,000 people are estimated to have attended the ceremony, including the sitting governors of six of the 24 Union states: Andrew Gregg Curtin of Pennsylvania, Augustus Bradford of Maryland, Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, Horatio Seymour of New York, Joel Parker of New Jersey, and David Tod of Ohio.[7] The precise location of the program within the grounds of the cemetery is disputed.[8] Reinterment of the bodies buried from field graves into the cemetery, which had begun within months of the battle, was less than half complete on the day of the ceremony.[9]


Program and Everett's "Gettysburg Oration"

Edward Everett delivered a two-hour Oration before Lincoln's few minutes of Dedicatory Remarks.The program organized for that day by Wills and his committee included:

Music, by Birgfield's Band
Prayer, by Reverend T.H. Stockton, D.D.
Music, by the Marine Band
Oration, by Hon. Edward Everett
Music, Hymn composed by B.B. French, Esq.
Dedicatory Remarks, by the President of the United States
Dirge, sung by Choir selected for the occasion
Benediction, by Reverend H.L. Baugher, D.D.[10]
While it is Lincoln's short speech that has gone down in history as one of the finest examples of English public oratory, it was Everett's two-hour oration that was slated to be the Gettysburg address that day. His now seldom-read 13,607-word oration began:

Standing beneath this serene sky, overlooking these broad fields now reposing from the labors of the waning year, the mighty Alleghenies dimly towering before us, the graves of our brethren beneath our feet, it is with hesitation that I raise my poor voice to break the eloquent silence of God and Nature. But the duty to which you have called me must be performed; — grant me, I pray you, your indulgence and your sympathy.[11]
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Gettysburg OrationAnd ended two hours later with:

But they, I am sure, will join us in saying, as we bid farewell to the dust of these martyr-heroes, that wheresoever throughout the civilized world the accounts of this great warfare are read, and down to the latest period of recorded time, in the glorious annals of our common country, there will be no brighter page than that which relates the Battles of Gettysburg.[11]

Lincoln's Gettysburg Address

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A modern recording of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.
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Not long after those well-received remarks, Lincoln spoke in his high-pitched Kentucky accent for two or three minutes. Lincoln's "few appropriate remarks" summarized the war in ten sentences and 272 words, rededicating the nation to the war effort and to the ideal that no soldier at Gettysburg had died in vain.

Despite the historical significance of Lincoln's speech, modern scholars disagree as to its exact wording, and contemporary transcriptions published in newspaper accounts of the event and even handwritten copies by Lincoln himself differ in their wording, punctuation, and structure. Of these versions, the Bliss version, written well after the speech as a favor for a friend, is viewed by many as the standard text. Its text differs, however, from the written versions prepared by Lincoln before and after his speech. It is the only version to which Lincoln affixed his signature, and the last he is known to have written.

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.
The words "under God" do not appear in the Nicolay and Hay drafts (see below), but were added later (possibly extemporaneously at the address's delivery [4]) and are included in the three later copies (Everett, Bancroft, and Bliss).


Content and themes
Lincoln used the word "nation" five times (four times when he referred to the American nation, and one time when he referred to "any nation so conceived and so dedicated"), but never the word "union," which might refer only to the North — furthermore, restoring the nation, not a union of sovereign states, was paramount. Lincoln's text referred to the year 1776 and the American Revolutionary War, and included the famous words of the Declaration of Independence, that "all men are created equal".

Lincoln did not allude to the 1787 Constitution, which implicitly recognized slavery in the "three-fifths compromise," and he avoided using the word "slavery". He also made no mention of the contentious antebellum political issues of nullification or states' rights.

In Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America, Garry Wills suggests the Address was influenced by the American Greek Revival and the classical funereal oratory of Athens, as well as the Transcendentalism of Unitarian minister and abolitionist Theodore Parker (the source of the phrase "of all the people, by all the people, for all the people") and the constitutional arguments of Daniel Webster.[12]

Civil War scholar James McPherson's review of Wills' book addresses the parallels to Pericles' Funeral Oration during the Peloponnesian War as described by Thucydides, and enumerates several striking comparisons with Lincoln's speech.[13] Pericles' speech, like Lincoln's, begins with an acknowledgment of revered predecessors: "I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the present"; then praises the uniqueness of the State's commitment to democracy: "If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences"; honors the sacrifice of the slain, "Thus choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour, but met danger face to face"; and exhorts the living to continue the struggle: "You, their survivors, must determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it may have a happier issue."[14][15]

Craig R. Smith, in "Criticism of Political Rhetoric and Disciplinary Integrity", also suggested the influence of Webster's famous speeches on the view of government expressed by Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address, specifically, Webster's "Second Reply to Hayne", in which he states, "This government, Sir, is the independent offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of State legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on State sovereignties."[16][17]

Some have noted Lincoln's usage of the imagery of birth, life, and death in reference to a nation "brought forth," "conceived," and that shall not "perish." Others, including Allen C. Guelzo, the director of Civil War Era studies at Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania,[18] suggested that Lincoln's formulation "four score and seven" was an allusion to the King James Version of the Bible's Psalms 90:10, in which man's lifespan is given as "threescore years and ten".[19][20]

Writer H. L. Mencken criticized what he believed to be Lincoln's central argument, that Union soldiers at Gettysburg "sacrificed their lives to the cause of self-determination." Mencken contended, "It is difficult to imagine anything more untrue. The Union soldiers in the battle actually fought against self-determination; it was the Confederates who fought for the right of their people to govern themselves."[21] Most historians note that the Confederates were fighting for the right to govern their slaves.


The five manuscripts
The five known manuscript copies of the Gettysburg Address are each named for the associated person who received it from Lincoln. Lincoln gave a copy to each of his private secretaries, John Nicolay and John Hay. Both of these drafts were written around the time of his November 19 address, while the other three copies of the address, the Everett, Bancroft, and Bliss copies, were written by Lincoln for charitable purposes well after November 19. In part because Lincoln provided a title and signed and dated the Bliss Copy, it has been used as the source for most facsimile reproductions of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.

The two earliest drafts of the Address are associated with some confusion and controversy regarding their existence and provenance. Nicolay and Hay were appointed custodians of Lincoln's papers by Lincoln's son Robert Todd Lincoln in 1874.[4] After appearing in facsimile in an article written by John Nicolay in 1894, the Nicolay copy was presumably among the papers passed to Hay by Nicolay's daughter Helen upon Nicolay's death in 1901. Robert Lincoln began a search for the original copy in 1908, which resulted in the discovery of a handwritten copy of the Gettysburg Address among the bound papers of John Hay—a copy now known as the "Hay Draft."

The Hay Draft differed from the version of the Gettysburg Address published by John Nicolay in 1894 in a number of significant ways: it was written on a different type of paper, had a different number of words per line and number of lines, and contained editorial revisions in Lincoln's hand.[4]


Nicolay Copy
The Nicolay Copy[22] is often called the "first draft" because it is believed to be the earliest copy that exists. Scholars disagree over whether the Nicolay copy was actually the reading copy Lincoln held at Gettysburg on November 19. In an 1894 article that included a facsimile of this copy, Nicolay, who had become the custodian of Lincoln's papers, wrote that Lincoln had brought to Gettysburg the first part of the speech written in ink on Executive Mansion stationery, and that he had written the second page in pencil on lined paper before the dedication on November 19.[23] Matching folds are still evident on the two pages, suggesting it could be the copy that eyewitnesses say Lincoln took from his coat pocket and read at the ceremony. Others believe that the delivery text has been lost, because some of the words and phrases of the Nicolay copy do not match contemporary transcriptions of Lincoln's original speech. The words "under God", for example, are missing in this copy from the phrase "that this nation (under God) shall have a new birth of freedom…" In order for the Nicolay draft to have been the reading copy, either the contemporary transcriptions were inaccurate, or Lincoln uncharacteristically would have had to depart from his written text in several instances. This copy of the Gettysburg Address apparently remained in John Nicolay's possession until his death in 1901, when it passed to his friend and colleague John Hay. It is on permanent display as part of the American Treasures exhibition of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.[24]


Hay Copy

The Hay Copy, with Lincoln's handwritten corrections.With its existence first announced to the public in 1906, the Hay Copy[25] was described by historian Garry Wills as "the most inexplicable of the five copies Lincoln made." With numerous omissions and inserts, this copy strongly suggests a text that was copied hastily, especially when one examines the fact that many of these omissions were critical to the basic meaning of the sentence, not simply words that would be added by Lincoln to strengthen or clarify their meaning. This copy, which is sometimes referred to as the "second draft," was made either on the morning of its delivery, or shortly after Lincoln's return to Washington. Those that believe that it was completed on the morning of his address point to the fact that it contains certain phrases that are not in the first draft but are in the reports of the address as delivered and in subsequent copies made by Lincoln. It is probable, they conclude, that as stated in the explanatory note accompanying the original copies of the first and second drafts in the Library of Congress, that it was this second draft which Lincoln held in his hand when he delivered the address.[26] Lincoln eventually gave this copy to his other personal secretary, John Hay, whose descendants donated both it and the Nicolay copy to the Library of Congress in 1916.


Everett Copy
The Everett Copy,[27] also known as the "Everett-Keyes" copy, was sent by President Lincoln to Edward Everett in early 1864, at Everett's request. Everett was collecting the speeches given at the Gettysburg dedication into one bound volume to sell for the benefit of stricken soldiers at New York's Sanitary Commission Fair. The draft Lincoln sent became the third autograph copy, and is now in the possession of the Illinois State Historical Library in Springfield, Illinois, where it is currently on display in the Treasures Gallery of the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum.


Bancroft Copy
The Bancroft Copy of the Gettysburg Address was written out by President Lincoln in April 1864 at the request of George Bancroft, the most famous historian of his day.[28] Bancroft planned to include this copy in Autograph Leaves of Our Country's Authors, which he planned to sell at a Soldiers' and Sailors' Sanitary Fair in Baltimore. As this fourth copy was written on both sides of the paper, it proved unusable for this purpose, and Bancroft was allowed to keep it. This manuscript is the only one accompanied both by a letter from Lincoln transmitting the manuscript and by the original envelope addressed and franked by Lincoln. This copy remained in the Bancroft family for many years, was sold to various dealers and purchased by Nicholas and Marguerite Lilly Noyes, who donated the manuscript to Cornell in 1949. It is now held by the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections in the Carl A. Kroch Library at Cornell University.[26] It is the only one of the five copies to be privately owned.[29]


Bliss Copy
Discovering that his fourth written copy (which was intended for George Bancroft's "Autograph Leaves") could not be used, Lincoln wrote a fifth draft, which was accepted for the purpose requested. The Bliss Copy,[30] once owned by the family of Colonel Alexander Bliss, Bancroft's stepson and publisher of "Autograph Leaves", is the only draft to which Lincoln affixed his signature. It is likely this was the last copy written by Lincoln, and because of the apparent care in its preparation, and in part because Lincoln provided a title and signed and dated this copy, it has become the standard version of the address. The Bliss Copy has been the source for most facsimile reproductions of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. This draft now hangs in the Lincoln Room of the White House, a gift of Oscar B. Cintas, former Cuban Ambassador to the United States.[26] Cintas, a wealthy collector of art and manuscripts, purchased the Bliss copy at a public auction in 1949 for $54,000, at that time the highest price ever paid for a document at public auction.[31] Cintas' properties were claimed by the Castro government after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, but Cintas, who died in 1957, willed the Gettysburg Address to the American people, provided it would be kept at the White House, where it was transferred in 1959.[32]

Garry Wills concluded the Bliss Copy "is stylistically preferable to others in one significant way: Lincoln removed 'here' from 'that cause for which they (here) gave…' The seventh 'here' is in all other versions of the speech." Wills noted the fact that Lincoln "was still making such improvements," suggesting Lincoln was more concerned with a perfected text than with an 'original' one.

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Gettysburg Address
Contemporary sources and reaction

The New York Times article from November 20, 1863, indicates Lincoln's speech was interrupted five times by applause and was followed by "long continued applause."[33]Another contemporary source of the text is the Associated Press dispatch, transcribed from the shorthand notes taken by reporter Joseph L. Gilbert. It also differs from the drafted text in a number of minor ways.[34][35]

Eyewitness reports vary as to their view of Lincoln's performance. In 1931, the printed recollections of 87-year-old Mrs. Sarah A. Cooke Myers, who at the age of 19 was present, suggest a dignified silence followed Lincoln's speech: "I was close to the President and heard all of the Address, but it seemed short. Then there was an impressive silence like our Menallen Friends Meeting. There was no applause when he stopped speaking.";[36]

According to historian Shelby Foote, after Lincoln's presentation, the applause was delayed, scattered, and "barely polite."[37] In contrast, Pennsylvania Governor Curtin maintained, "He pronounced that speech in a voice that all the multitude heard. The crowd was hushed into silence because the President stood before them...It was so Impressive! It was the common remark of everybody. Such a speech, as they said it was!"[38]

In a letter to Lincoln written the following day, Everett praised the President for his eloquent and concise speech, saying, "I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes." Lincoln was glad to know the speech was not a "total failure."

Other public reaction to the speech was divided along partisan lines. The next day the Chicago Times observed, "The cheek of every American must tingle with shame as he reads the silly, flat and dishwatery utterances of the man who has to be pointed out to intelligent foreigners as the President of the United States." In contrast, the New York Times was complimentary. A Massachusetts paper printed the entire speech, commenting that it was "deep in feeling, compact in thought and expression, and tasteful and elegant in every word and comma."


Audio recollections of an eyewitness
William R. Rathvon is the only known eyewitness of both Lincoln's arrival at Gettysburg and the address itself to have left an audio recording of his recollections. [39] One year before his death in 1939, Rathvon's reminiscences were recorded on February 12, 1938 at the Boston studios of radio station WRUL, including his reading the address, itself, and a 78 rpm record was pressed. The title of the 78 record was "I Heard Lincoln That Day - William R. Rathvon, TR Productions." A copy wound up at National Public Radio during a "Quest for Sound" project in the 1990s. NPR continues to air them around Lincoln's birthday; both a 6 minute NPR-edited recording and the full 21 minute recording are available for listening.
Gettysburg today
Gettysburg is a thriving town and rural community with a strong tourism sector. Within the town borough, Gettysburg College is an important element, the college regularly hosts cultural opportunities in the town and has many useful facilities. Numerous orchards, especially apples, are present in the surrounding area and so an annual Apple Blossom Festival as well as the National Apple Harvest Festival are held in nearby Biglerville by an area fruitgrowers association. Gettysburg's primary industry is tourism, as nearly two million visitors arrive each year to visit Gettysburg National Military Park and Eisenhower National Historic Site, both maintained and operated by the National Park Service.


[edit] Casino proposal
During 2006 there was debate about the proposed construction of a casino less than two miles outside of Gettysburg near the intersection of U.S. Route 15 and U.S. Route 30 in Straban Township, Pennsylvania, not far from the East Cavalry Field battle site. Legislation enacted in 2005 known as "Act 71" permitted up to 60,000 slot machines to be located in casinos throughout the state in an effort to offset high property taxes. One of two available casino licenses was pursued by Chance Enterprises Inc. and Millennium Management Group for their proposed "Crossroads Gaming Resort & Spa". Many of Gettysburg's residents and tourists believed that a casino near Gettysburg and the resulting increase in traffic would have had a negative impact on Gettysburg's hallowed ground. A group called "No Casino Gettysburg," made up of local citizens as well as students and faculty of Gettysburg College, was formed to lobby against the proposal. On April 3, 2006, the Gettysburg borough council voted by 6–3 to support the proposal.[1]

The Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (PGCB) began hearings on the proposal on April 5, 2006, at Gettysburg College. A second hearing was held on April 7, 2006 in Harrisburg and a third and final hearing occurred on May 17, 2006 at Gettysburg College.[2] On August 23, 2006, the board announced that it intended to reach a final decision on the casino proposal by December 20, 2006.[3] On that date, the PGCB opted not to award Crossroads a casino license, effectively killing the proposal. Crossroads' president soon announced that he will not appeal the decision (Gettysburg Times, December 22, 2006). In February 2007, the activist group, No Casino Gettysburg, disbanded.