"While temporarily commanding the Union forces on the first day at Gettysburg, General Winfield Scott reorganized the shaken federal defenses and protected Culp's Hill. On the second day he commanded the wing of the Union army which repulsed the Confederate drive to capture Little Round Top."
"At Gettysburg, during the Confederate assault on Little Round Top, the 20th Maine, commanded by Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, ran out of ammunition, so they fixed bayonets and attacked, turning the Confederate assault."
" Gouverneur K. Warren saw the long line of the enemy approaching (Little Round Top), and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into their hands. Once in their possession they would flank our whole line and post guns there to drive our troops there from the ridge; so that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle-field, and must be held at all hazards."
NO, I think Colonel J. Chamberlain "put his soldiers at risk" for a very good reason, and under the circumstances the decisions he made were timely, and effective.
2007-03-22 14:35:22
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answer #3
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answered by WMD 7
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... the height was "the key of the whole position"… It might have been used to advantage by a few artillery pieces, ... but its real significance was in its being the potential anchor of the Union left. So long as Little Round Top was in Union hands, the left of Cemetery Ridge was likely to be secure. But should the Confederates take it, they would have access to the Union rear and be able to pry the Federal army from its position. Once the Confederates held the hill, artillery or not, the Cemetery Ridge line would have to be abandoned. It was as simple as that.
– Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (1987)
It was a desperate moment. The troops of the 20th Maine had been ordered to defend the left flank of the Federal line at Gettysburg "at all costs" and given the strategic value of the site, Chamberlain cannot be faulted with taking the initiative and turning the tide -- if they had been outflanked by the Confederates, the entire Union position would be in jeopardy. His regiment's losses were considerable and they were running out of amunition -- their line would not have withstood another Confederate charge. By ordering a bayonet charge, he caught the 15th Alabama men off-guard.
The men of the 20th Maine, in contrast to the Alabamians, were not veteran troops, having had little battlefield experience. These men were also tired; they had marched 107 miles in the past five days, including 26 miles the previous day, to get to the battlefield. Their colonel had been a professor of religion and romance languages at Bowdoin College. However, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain sought to offset Oates'advantage with strength of position, better handling of his men, and iron determination. Chamberlain reported that every man who could carry a rifle, including "every pioneer and musician," was placed in the line. Two soldiers from the 2nd Maine Regiment being guarded by the 20th Maine Regiment while awaiting court-martial were also given rifles and willingly joined the battle line.
"The 20th Maine took 400 prisoners and stopped the Confederate threat to the Union flank. The crucial role these Maine militiamen played in the Union victory at Gettysburg exemplifies the military qualities of leadership, initiative, unit cohesion and gallantry. "
*****
The regiment had fired 15,000 rounds, and the 60 rounds allotted per man were almost exhausted. Three hundred and fifty-eight riflemen had gone into the battle and only 228 remained effective. The enemy appeared to be massing for another charge, one that would certainly overwhelm the left wing of the 20th Maine. Private Gerrish remembered: "Our line is pressed back so far that our dead are within the lines of enemy. Our ammunition is nearly all gone, and we are using the cartridges from the boxes of our wounded comrades. A critical moment has arrived, and we can remain as we are no longer; we must advance or retreat."
For Chamberlain there was only one thing left--a counterattack. He gave the order, "Fix bayonets!" Gerrish describes it this way: "Every man understood in a moment that the movement was our only salvation, but there is a limit to human endurance... and the little line seemed to quail under the fearful fire that was being poured upon it. In that moment of supreme need...Lieutenant Holman S. Melcher with a cheer and a flash of his sword, full ten paces to the front he sprang--ten paces--more than half the distance between hostile lines. 'Come on! Come on! Come on, boys!' he shouts. The color sergeant and the brave color guard follow, and with one wild yell of anguish wrung from it's tortured heart, the regiment charged."
In a brilliantly executed maneuver, Chamberlain's men charged forward and across the hill from the left wing of their line while those on the right swung with them in an extended "right wheel forward" movement. Chamberlain described the charge as having the effect of "a reaper cutting down the disconcerted foe." Stunned, the Confederate troops in the front ranks dropped their rifles and surrendered. The rest broke and retreated toward a stone wall in their rear.
"Suddenly," said Chamberlain, "to our mutual surprise, two scores of rifle barrels gleam over the rocks, and a murderous volley was poured in upon them at close quarters." Captain Morrill's lost Company B and Staughton's wandering sharpshooters rose up out of their hiding place, and with a shout they too charged into the Confederate flank, making such a commotion that the Rebels thought they were a whole regiment. Oates described the situation: "My position rapidly became untenable. The Federal infantry were reported to be coming down on my right and certainly were closing in on my rear." He ordered his staff officers to "return to your companies; we will sell out as dearly as possible."
What was left of the 15th and 47th Alabama Regiments fled to Round Top. Oates collapsed while climbing the hill and might have been captured had not two of his men carried him to safety. He described the retreat simply and honestly, saying, "We ran like a herd of cattle."
Chamberlain reported capturing 400 prisoners. In addition, 150 dead or wounded Rebels were found in his front. These numbers seem exaggerated; at least Oates thought so. He admitted that in a roll call after the battle only 223 enlisted men and half the officers (19) of his regiment responded. The 20th Maine had only 200 of 386 officers and men still effective. The Confederate assault on the south slope of Little Round Top had been repulsed.
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With many of his own men dead, wounded, or low on ammunition, and expecting another Confederate attack, Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain gave the order to fix bayonets and charge. The surprised Southerners raced back to their former positions with many scooped up as prisoners along the way. Some reports suggest that the stalwart Confederate soldiers, exhausted, without water, and having marched 20 plus miles just to reach the battlefield, had already begun to pull back when the onrushing blue tide charged forward. Either way, the slaughter on this part of the field ended with the far left of the Union line secure. Possession of the rest of the fields further west however still hung in the balance.
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Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was in command of the 20th Maine Infantry, V Corps, on 2 July 1863. On Little Round Top his troops were ordered by Strong Vincent to anchor of the extreme left of the Union line. (See map) Facing the 20th Maine were Col. William C. Oates' 15th and 47th Alabama. At about 6:30 pm, after once refusing his line to prevent the 15th Alabama from flanking him, and finding his troops short of ammunition, he ordered the regiment to "fix bayonets." In Chamberlain's own words:
At that crises, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line, from man to man, and rose into a shout, with which they sprang forward on the enemy, now not 30 yards away. The effect was surprising; many of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at my head with one hand, while he handed me his sword with the other. Holding fast by our right, and swinging forward our left, we made an extended "right wheel," before which the enemy's second line broke and fell back, fighting from tree to tree, many being captured, until we had swept the valley and cleared the front of nearly our entire brigade.
*****
Our regiment numbered 358 men, but as Company B, numbering 50 men, had been sent out to " protect our dank," we had 308 men in line to resist the furious assault of these two strong regiments, outnumbering us more than 3 to 1. The confliet was fierce, but necessarily brief, as it was a question of only a short time when every man must fall before the superior fire of our enemy.
When 130 of our brave officers and men had been shot down where they stood, and only 178 remained,-hardly more than a strong skirmish line,-and each man had fired the 60 rounds of cartridges he carried into the fight, and the survivors were using from the cartridge-boxes of their fallen comrades, the time had come when it must be deeided whether we should fall back and give up this key to the whole field of Gettysburg, or charge and try and throw off this foe. Colonel Chamberlain gave the order to "fix bayonets," and almost before he could say "charge !" the regiment leaped down the hill and closed in with the foe, who we found behind every rock and tree. Surprised and overwhelmed, most of them threw down their arms and surrendered.
2007-03-22 14:55:22
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answer #8
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answered by Dandirom 2
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