what is Quine's argument about the difference between analytical and synthetic language?

Answer 1

Actually, Willard Van Orman Quine rejected a distinction between analytical and synthetic language. As a strict logician, Quine evaluated our division of the two strenuously. What he came to argue is that we have no clear definition of an analytical proposition: we simply rely on synonymy. However, Quine even doubted the distinction in synonymy. Quine agreed with the definitions of both analytic and synonymous, however, he found them to be incoherent.

His main criticism is that analyticity is dependent on itself to derive meaning. Essentially, our definition of analyticity is circular. If this is true, and there is no logical foundation to analyticity, then how can we support it and make distinctions around it? He felt the same way in regards to synonymy, which seemed, to him, as analyticities only savior.

However, Quine never proposed an explanation for the intuitive distinction himself.

Answer 2

IMO, Quine understands that people have asserted that there are two sorts of proposition, or statements that claim to have truth value. For Quine there are

1) Analytic propositions - propositions grounded in meanings, independent of matters of fact.

2) Synthetic propositions - propositions grounded in fact.

What Quine seems to argue is that the notion of an analytic proposition requires a notion of synonymy, and that these notions are parasitic on one another. In essence, when someone asks you to explain what an analytic proposition *means* you have to resort to synthetic propositions. A language learner only comes to understand analytic propositions after they have a set of synthetic propositions in mind. Consequently, Quine invokes a kind of Occam's Razor by asking what then is the point of a distinction between the two since each seems to require or presuppose the other in order to stand. Thus, there is no non-circular (and so no tenable) way to ground the notion of analytic propositions.

Having said that, one can explore Quine's understanding of the two sorts of propositions and whether Quine's understanding is unique. Are analytic propositions as Quine characterizes them; i.e., would, say, Kant agree?

That's an exercise I leave to the reader.

:)

HTH

Charles

Answer 3

Well I don't know who "Quine" is, I've never heard of any such philosopher, but I do know the difference. (See Immanuel Kant, German philosopher.)

Analytic language is that which refers to things that can be known a priori, or without experience. More accurately, they're things that do not rely on experience for verification. For example, the statement "All bachelors are single" is true analytically, because a bachelor is single by definition. (All mathematical truths go in this category.)

Synthetic language is the opposite- that which requires some form of experience or induction to establish its truth, like "Dogs communicate by barking". While barking is an attribute of dogs in a way, there can't really be considered anything in the definition of what a dog is that requires that they bark. This is a very simple example. More complex ones often rely more and more on empirical (sense) data. In short, synthetic statements are any that aren't true by definition.