have you ever read or heard of this book??

Question

A wittgensteinian dissolution of epistemological solipsism objectified subjectivity.

what did you think about it? what did you hear about it? i am having a real problem with solipsism and i am hoping that this book will help to disprove it. i know you can never truly refute it because you can only experience yourself. but i think that throught your subjective reality you can prove that somethign exists independently from it

Answer 1

Although I haven’t read this work, understanding it begins with understanding the writer, Ludwig Wittgenstein . Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and regarded by some as the most important since Immanuel Kant. His early work was influenced by that of Arthur Schopenhauer and, especially, by his teacher Bertrand Russell and by Gottlob Frege, who became something of a friend.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only philosophy book that Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. It claimed to solve all the major problems of philosophy and was held in especially high esteem by the anti-metaphysical logical positivists. It would likely be a better read than the one offered and I believe more respected An additional paper can be found at the source link:

Answer 2

First, no I haven't read or heard of a book like that. Not to attempt to "cram religon down your throat"(I hate that),the Bible will dispute the theory of Solipsism. Pick any of the 66 books in it.

Answer 3

I have neither read nor heard of this book.

Answer 4

It diffenitly sounds scientific. Did you look it up? I can't help you there.

Answer 5

No.

Answer 6

consider this
Wittgensteinians

Close students of his ideas have tended to work chiefly on particular concepts that lie at the core of traditional philosophical problems. As an example of such an investigation, a monograph entitled Intention (1957), by G.E.M. Anscombe, an editor of Wittgenstein's posthumous works, may be cited as an extended study of what it is for a person to intend to do something and of what the relationship is between his intention and the actions that he performs. This work has occupied a central place in a growing literature about human actions, which in turn has influenced views about the nature of psychology, of the social sciences, and of ethics. And, as an extension of this British influence into the United States, one of Wittgenstein's students, Norman Malcolm of Cornell University, has investigated such concepts as knowledge, certainty, memory, and dreaming. As these topics suggest, Wittgensteinians have tended to concentrate on Wittgenstein's ideas about the nature of mental concepts and to work in the area of philosophical psychology. Typically, they begin with classical philosophical theories and attack them by arguing that they employ some key concept, such as that of knowledge, in a manner incongruous with the way in which the concept would actually be employed in various situations. Their works thus abound with descriptions of hypothetical, though usually homely, situations and with questions of the form, “What would a person say if . . .?” or “Would one call this a case of X ?” In doing so, they are following out Wittgenstein's advice that, instead of trying to capture the essence of a concept by an abstract analysis, the philosopher should look at how it is employed in a variety of situations.


Oxford philosophers

After World War II, Oxford University was the centre of extraordinary philosophical activity; and, although Wittgenstein's general outlook on philosophy—his turning away, for example, from the notion of formal methods in philosophical analysis—was an important ingredient, many of the Oxford philosophers could not be called Wittgensteinians in the strict sense. The method employed by many of these philosophers has often been characterized—especially by critics—as an “appeal to ordinary language,” and they were thus identified as belonging to the school of “ordinary language” philosophy. Exactly what this form of argument is supposed to be and what exemplifies it in the writings of these philosophers has been by no means clear. Gilbert Ryle, Moore's successor as editor of a leading journal, Mind—and especially in his The Concept of Mind—was among the most prominent of those analysts who were regarded as using ordinary language as a philosophical tool. Ryle, like Wittgenstein, pointed out the mistake of regarding the mind as what he called “a ghost in a machine”—to defeat the radical dualism of mind and body that has characterized much of philosophical thinking—by investigating how people employ a variety of concepts, such as memory, perception, and imagination, that designate “mental” properties. He tried to show that, when philosophers carry out such investigations, they find that, roughly speaking, it is the way people act and behave that leads to attributing these properties to them, and that there is no involvement of anything internally private. He also attempted to show how philosophers have come to dualistic conclusions—usually from having a wrong model in terms of which to interpret human activities. A dualistic model may be constructed, for example, by wrongly supposing that an intelligently behaving person must be continually utilizing knowledge of facts—knowledge that something is the case. Ryle contended, on the contrary, that much intelligent behaviour is a matter of knowing how to do something and that, once this fact is acknowledged, there is no temptation to explain the behaviourby looking for a private internal knowledge of facts. Though Ryle's objectives were similar to those of Wittgenstein, his results have often seemed more behavioristic than Wittgenstein's.

It is true that Ryle did ask, in pursuit of his method, some fairly detailed questions about when a person would say, for example, that someone had been imagining something; but it is by no means clear that he was appealing to ordinary language in the sense that his was an investigation into how, say, speakers of English use certain expressions. In any case, the charge, often voiced by critics, that this style of philosophizing trivializes and perverts philosophy from its traditional function would probably also have to be levelled against Aristotle, who frequently appealed to “what wewould say.”

A powerful philosophical figure among postwar Oxford philosophers was John Austin, who was White's professor of moral philosophy until his death, in 1960. Austin felt that many philosophical theories derive their plausibility from overlooking distinctions—often very fine—between different uses of expressions, and he also thought that philosophers too frequently think that any one of a number of expressions will do just as well for their purposes. (Thus, ignoring the difference between an illusion and a delusion, for example, gives credence to the view that what one immediately perceives are not physical objects, but sense data.) Austin's work was, in many respects, much closer to the ideal of philosophy as comprising the analysis of concepts than was that of Ryle or Wittgenstein. He was also much more concerned with the nature of language itself and with general theories of how it functions. This novel approach, as exemplified in How to Do Things with Words (1962), set a trend that has been followed out in a growing literature in the philosophy of language. Austin took the total speech act as the starting point of analysis, which allowed him to make distinctions based not only upon words and their place in a language but also upon such points as the speaker's intentions in making the utterance and its expected effect on the audience. There was also in Austin's approach something of the program of Russell and the early Wittgenstein for laying bare the fundamental structure of language.

Trends in the United States

Although the Oxford philosophers and the posthumous publication of Wittgenstein's writings have produced a revolution in Anglo-American philosophy, the branch of Analytic philosophy that emphasized formal analyses by means of modern logic has byno means been dormant. Since the appearance of Principia Mathematica, striking new findings have emerged in logic, many of which, though requiring for their understandinga high level of mathematical sophistication, are nevertheless important for philosophy.

Among those philosophers for whom symbolic logic occupies a central position, W.V.O. Quine, Pierce professor of philosophy at Harvard University, has been especially important. Symbolic logic represented for him, as it did for many earlier Analytic philosophers, the framework for the language of science. There were two important themes in his work, however, that represent significant departures from, say, the positions of the logical atomists and the Logical Positivists. In the first place, Quine rejected the distinction between those statements in which their truth or falsity dependsupon the meaning of the terms involved and those in which their truth or falsity is a matter of empirical and observable fact—a distinction that had played an essential role in Logical Positivism and was thought by most Empiricists to be the basis for a divisionbetween the deductive and the empirical sciences. Quine, in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and subsequent writings, argued that the sort of distinction intended by philosophers is impossible to draw. In the course of his argument, a similar doubt was cast upon concepts traditional not only to philosophy but also to linguistics—in particular, the concept of synonymy or sameness of meaning. Quine's attack has been a threat not only to some long-held doctrines of the Analytic tradition but also to its conception of the nature of philosophy, which has generally depended upon contrasting it with the empirical sciences.

The second important departure of Quine's philosophy has been his attempt to show that science can be successfully conducted without what he calls “intentional entities.” In contrast to “extensional,” used above as an essential feature of standard symbolic logic, intentional entities include many of the common items that Analytic philosophers often assume that they can talk about without difficulty, such as the meanings of expressions, propositions, or the property of certain statements (such as those of mathematics) of being necessarily true. Quine's program—as exemplified by Word and Object (1960)—is intended in part to show that science can say everything that it needs to say without using concepts that cannot be expressed in the extensional language of standard logic. Quine's work, though by no means widely accepted, has made Analytic philosophers at least wary of uncritically accepting certain of their standard distinctions.

Since the mid-20th century, there has been an interaction between the science of linguistics and Analytic philosophy. This did not occur before because Analytic philosophers had almost always considered their study of language to be a priori and unconcerned with empirical facts about particular languages. However, a book by Noam Chomsky, a U.S. generative grammarian, entitled Syntactic Structures (1957), has produced a theory of grammar that not only has profoundly affected the course of linguistics but also bears striking resemblances to philosophical analysis. At first, some Analytic philosophers saw in Chomsky's theory a technique that could be appliedto philosophy. It was subsequently considered, however, that, whereas the possibility of looking at grammar in Chomsky's way had contributed valuable concepts for philosophers, the possibility that it would become a methodology for Analytic philosophy had receded. The interchange between linguists and philosophers, however, has continued.


Analytic philosophy today

It is not possible to forecast in any detail the future trends of Analytic philosophy in Anglo-American and Scandinavian countries. It seems relatively certain, however, that the two conceptions of the subject that stem from Moore and Russell will both continue.

Analytic philosophers, mainly influenced by Oxford philosophy, and those for whom symbolic logic is a touchstone analyze many of the same problems and benefit from each other's work. Analysis in the more rigorous sense that Russell's theory of definite descriptions represents is more frequently an aim, despite the doubts of Wittgenstein and many of the Oxford philosophers. The general idea that the only ultimate explanations of the world are the scientific ones and the usual corollary that philosophy is in the service of science—which was a central idea for Russell, for the Logical Positivists, and (in recent times) for Quine—has apparently lost nothing of its vigour. The opposing tendencies, noted above, among Empiricists in general, and present also in Analytic philosophy, toward behaviourism or Materialism, on the one hand, and toward an Idealism of a phenomenalistic sort (such as that of the Irish bishop George Berkeley), on the other, are not present in the same form—mainly because of the sustained criticisms of Wittgenstein, of his followers, and of the Oxford philosophers. The battleground has shifted to a more subtle level. A substantial number of Analytic philosophers who are styled Materialists or physicalists have proposed a novel technique for reducing mental events and states to physical states. They avoid the well-exposed difficulties of older attempts in which it was held that, when one apparently talks about a separate realm of the mind—speaking of such things as thoughts, emotions, and sensations—the proper analysis of its meaning would be in terms of physical properties and events (usually observable behaviour). The novel idea,on the contrary, is that there is, in fact, an identity between so-called mental events and certain physical events, particularly those occurring in the brain, an identity that it is eventually the task of science to specify—in a way modelled after that in which science discovered that lightning is identical with an electrical discharge. The opposition against this new brand of scientific Materialism does not set up against it a view of the mind as a separate realm coexisting with the physical nor as an essentially private collection of nonphysical events and objects. Rather, the issue has been joined on the question whether the language (or perhaps the concepts) of the psychological and the physical are such as to allow for a scientifically discovered identity between items of theone and items of the other. That there still remains a division among Analytic philosophers concerning the problem of the mental and the physical (though in much altered form) shows both the continuity of the movement and the changes that have occurred.
SOLIPSISM
in philosophy, formerly, moral egoism (as used in the writings of Immanuel Kant), but now, in an epistemological sense, the extreme form of subjective idealism that denies that the human mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself. The British idealist F.H. Bradley, in Appearance and Reality (1897), characterized the solipsistic view as follows:
“I cannot transcend experience, and experience is my experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond myself exists; for what is experience is its (the self 's) states.”
Presented as a solution of the problem of explaining human knowledge of the external world, it is generally regarded as a reductio ad absurdum. The only scholar who seems tohave been a coherent radical solipsist is Claude Brunet, a 17th-century French physician.