could someone explain to me the concept of "time" perhaps an example?

Answer 1

Time
Discussions of the nature of time, and of various issues related to time, have always featured prominently in philosophy, but they have been especially important since the beginning of the 20th Century. This article contains a brief overview of some of the main topics in the philosophy of time -- Fatalism; the Topology of Time; Reductionism and Platonism with Respect to Time; McTaggart's Arguments; The A Theory of Time and The B Theory of Time; Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory; Time Travel; and The 3D/4D Controversy --
1. Fatalism
A good deal of work in the philosophy of time has been produced by people worried about Fatalism, which can be understood as the thesis that whatever will happen in the future is already unavoidable (where to say that an event is unavoidable is to say that no human is able to prevent it from occurring). Here is a typical argument for Fatalism.
(1)There exist now propositions about everything that might happen in the future.[1]

(2)Every proposition is either true or else false.
(3)If (1) and (2), then there exists now a set of true propositions that, taken together, correctly predict everything that will happen in the future.
(4)If there exists now a set of true propositions that, taken together, correctly predict everything that will happen in the future, then whatever will happen in the future is already unavoidable.
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(5)Whatever will happen in the future is already unavoidable.
The main objections to arguments like this have been to premises (2) and (4). The rationale for premise (2) is that it appears to be a fundamental principle of semantics, sometimes referred to as The Principle of Bivalence (or just Bivalence for short). The rationale for premise (4) is the claim that no one is able to make a true prediction turn out false.
A proper discussion of Fatalism would include a lengthy consideration of premise (4), and that would take us beyond the scope of this article. For our purposes it is important to note that many writers have been motivated by this kind of argument to deny Bivalence. According to this line, there are many propositions -- namely, propositions about matters that are both future and contingent -- that are neither true nor false right now. Take, for example, the proposition that you will have lunch tomorrow. On this view, that proposition either has no truth value right now, or else has the value indeterminate. When the relevant time comes, and you either have lunch or don't, then, on the view in question, the proposition that you have lunch on the relevant day will come to be either true or false (as the case may be), and from then on that proposition will forever be either true or false (again, depending on whether you had lunch at the relevant time).[2]
The view that Bivalence is false, and that, in particular, there are sometimes propositions about the future that are neither true nor false, is sometimes referred to as the “Open Future” response to arguments for Fatalism. One important presupposition of the Open Future response is that it makes sense to talk about a proposition's having a truth value at a time, and that, moreover, it is possible for a proposition to have different truth values at different times. Thus, the Open Future response to arguments for Fatalism entails the following semantical thesis.
The Tensed View of Semantics:
i.Propositions have truth values at times rather than just having truth values simpliciter.
ii.The fundamental semantical locution is ‘p is v at t’ (where the expression in place of ‘p’ refers to a proposition, the expression in place of ‘v’ refers to a truth value, and the expression in place of ‘t’ refers to a time).
iii.It is possible for a proposition to have different truth values at different times.
The Tensed View of Semantics can be contrasted with the following semantical view.
The Tenseless View of Semantics:
i.Propositions have truth values simpliciter rather than having truth values at times.
ii.The fundamental semantical locution is ‘p is v’ (where the expression in place of ‘p’ refers to a proposition and the expression in place of ‘v’ refers to a truth value.
iii.It is not possible for a proposition to have different truth values at different times.
Other views that have (at least sometimes) been associated with the Open Future response to Fatalism include Taking Tense Seriously and The Growing Universe Theory, which will be discussed below.
Suggestions for Further Reading: Aristotle, De Interpretatione, Ch. 9; Lewis, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel;” Markosian, “The Open Past;” McCall, A Model of the Universe; Taylor, Metaphysics, Ch. 6; van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, Ch. 2.
2. The Topology of Time
One of the leading theories in contemporary cosmology is The Big Bang Theory, according to which the universe exploded into existence at a certain time in the past (some 15 to 25 billion years ago). If The Big Bang Theory is true, then the universe had a beginning. Does that mean that time also had a beginning? Or could it be that there was an infinite expanse of “empty” time before the universe ever popped into existence? Could it in fact be that, whether there was a beginning to the universe or not, time itself could not possibly have had a beginning?
Various philosophers have argued that time could not have had a beginning, while others have argued that time must have had (or at least contingently did have) a beginning. There is a corresponding controversy over the question of whether time will have an end. These controversies concern one aspect of the topology, or structure, of time.
Other issues concerning the topology of time include (i) whether time is branching or non-branching, (ii) whether time is open or closed, (iii) whether there can be two or more disconnected time streams, (iv) whether time has an intrinsic direction, and (v) whether time is dense or continuous or neither.
Suggestions for Further Reading: On the beginning and end of time: Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII; Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, esp. pp. 75ff.; Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, Ch. V; Swinburne, “The Beginning of the Universe;” Swinburne, Space and Time. On the linearity of time: Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, Ch. III; Swinburne, Space and Time. On the direction of time: Price, “A Neglected Route to Realism About Quantum Mechanics;” Price, Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time; Savitt, Time's Arrows Today; Sklar, Space, Time, and Spacetime. On all of these topics: Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time.
3. Reductionism and Platonism with Respect to Time
What if one day things everywhere ground to a halt? What if birds froze in mid-flight, people froze in mid-sentence, and planets and subatomic particles alike froze in mid-orbit? What if all change, throughout the entire universe, completely ceased for a period of, say, one year? Is such a thing possible?
If the answer to this last question is Yes -- if it is possible for there to be a period of time during which nothing changes, anywhere (except, perhaps, for the pure passage of time itself, if there is such a thing) -- then it is possible that a worldwide “freeze” will occur between the time you finish reading this sentence and the time you start the next sentence. In fact, if it's possible for there to be a period of time without change, then it may well be that a billion years have passed since you finished reading the last sentence. (Or maybe it just feels that way.)
The question of whether there could be time without change has been debated by philosophers since the days of Plato and Aristotle, and has traditionally been thought to be closely tied to the question of whether time exists independently of the events that occur in time. For, the thinking goes, if there could be a period of time without change, then it follows that time could exist without any events to fill it; but if, on the other hand, there could not be a period of time without change, then it must be that time exists only if there are some events to fill it.
Aristotle and others (including, especially, Leibniz) have argued that time does not exist independently of the events that occur in time. This view is typically called either “Reductionism with Respect to Time” or “Relationism with Respect to Time,” since according to this view, all talk that appears to be about time and temporal relations can somehow be reduced to talk about events and relations among them.
The opposing view, normally referred to either as “Platonism with Respect to Time” or as “Absolutism with Respect to Time,” has been defended by Plato, Newton, and others. On this view, time is like an empty container into which events may be placed; but it is a container that exists independently of whether or not anything is placed in it.
Reductionism and Platonism with Respect to Time have spatial analogues, and the views about time have traditionally been taken to stand or fall with their spatial counterparts. Indeed, although there is some controversy over the degree to which time is similar to the dimensions of space, the Reductionism vs. Platonism dispute is almost universally thought to be one area in which the two dimensions are perfectly analogous.
Suggestions for Further Reading: Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence; Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time; Shoemaker, “Time Without Change.”
4. McTaggart's Argument
In a famous paper published in 1908, J.M.E. McTaggart argued that there is in fact no such thing as time, and that the appearance of a temporal order to the world is a mere appearance. Other philosophers before and since (including, especially, F.H. Bradley) have argued for the same conclusion. We will focus here only on McTaggart's argument against the reality of time, which has been by far the most influential.
McTaggart begins his argument by distinguishing two ways in which positions in time can be ordered. First, he says, positions in time can be ordered according to their possession of properties like being two days future, being one day future, being present, being one day past, etc. (These properties are often referred to now as “A properties.”) McTaggart calls the series of times ordered by these properties “the A series.” But he says that positions in time can also be ordered by two-place relations like two days earlier than, one day earlier than, simultaneous with, etc. (These relations are now often called “B relations.”) McTaggart calls the series of times ordered by these relations “the B series.” And McTaggart argues that the B series alone does not constitute a proper time series. I.e., McTaggart says that the A series is essential to time. His reason for this is that change (he says) is essential to time, and the B series without the A series does not involve genuine change (since B series positions are forever “fixed,” whereas A series positions are constantly changing).
McTaggart also argues that the A series is inherently contradictory. For (he says) the different A properties are incompatible with one another. (No time can be both future and past, for example.) Nevertheless, he insists, each time in the A series must possess all of the different A properties. (Since a time that is future will be present and past, and so on.)
One response to this argument that McTaggart anticipates involves claiming that it's not true of any time, t, that t is both future and past. Rather, the objection goes, we must say that t was future at some moment of past time and will be past at some moment of future time. But this objection fails, according to McTaggart, because the additional times that are invoked in order to explain t's possession of the incompatible A properties must themselves possess all of the same A properties (as must any further times invoked on account of these additional times, and so on ad infinitum). Thus, according to McTaggart, we never resolve the original contradiction inherent in the A series, but, instead, merely generate an infinite regress of more and more contradictions.
Since, according to McTaggart, the supposition that there is an A series leads to contradiction, and since (he says) there can be no time without an A series, McTaggart concludes that time itself, including both the A series and the B series, is unreal.
Philosophers like McTaggart who claim that time is unreal are aware of the seemingly paradoxical nature of their claim. They generally take the line that all appearances suggesting that there is a temporal order to things are illusory.
Suggestions for Further Reading: Bradley, Appearance and Reality; McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time;” Mellor, Real Time II; Prior, Papers on Time and Tense; Prior, Past, Present, and Future.
5. The A Theory and The B Theory
Needless to say, despite arguments such as McTaggart's, many philosophers have remained convinced of the reality of time (for it certainly seems like there is a temporal order to the world). But a number of philosophers have been convinced by at least one part of McTaggart's argument, namely, the part about the contradiction inherent in the A series. That is, some philosophers have been persuaded by McTaggart that the A series is not real, even though they have not gone so far as to deny the reality of time itself. These philosophers accept the view (sometimes called “The B Theory”) that the B series is all there is to time. According to The B Theory, there are no genuine, unanalyzable A properties, and all talk that appears to be about A properties is really reducible to talk about B relations. For example, when we say that the year 1900 has the property of being past, all we really mean is that 1900 is earlier than the time at which we are speaking. On this view, there is no sense in which it is true to say that time really passes, and any appearance to the contrary is merely a result of the way we humans happen to perceive the world.
The opponents of The B Theory accept the view (often referred to as “The A Theory”) that there are genuine properties such as being two days past, being present, etc.; that facts about these A properties are not in any way reducible to facts about B relations; and that times and events are constantly changing with respect to their A properties (first becoming less and less future, then becoming present, and subsequently becoming more and more past). According to The A Theory, the passage of time is a very real and inexorable feature of the world, and not merely some mind-dependent phenomenon.
(It is worth noting that some discussions of these issues employ terminology that is different from the A series/B series terminology used here. For example, some discussions frame the issue in terms of a question about the reality of tense (roughly, the irreducible possession by times, events, and things of genuine A properties), with A Theorists characterized as those who affirm the reality of tense and B Theorists characterized as those who deny the reality of tense.)
The A Theorist is normally happy to concede McTaggart's claim that there can be no time without an A series, but the typical A Theorist will want to reject the part of McTaggart's argument that says that the A series is inherently contradictory. For the typical A Theorist will deny McTaggart's claim that each time in the A series must possess all of the different A properties. That is, she will deny that it is true of any time, t, that t is past, present, and future. Instead, she will insist, the closest thing to this that can be true of a time, t, is (for example) that t was future, is present, and will be past, where the verbal tenses of the verb ‘to be’ in this claim are not to be analyzed away (just as the apparent references to the putative A properties pastness, presentness, and futurity are not to be analyzed away in favor of reference to B relations).
Thus the standard A Theorist's response to McTaggart's argument involves the notion that we must “take tense seriously,” in the sense that there is a fundamental distinction between (for example) saying that x is F and saying that x was F. The thesis can be put this way.
Taking Tense Seriously: The verbal tenses of ordinary language (expressions like ‘it is the case that’, ‘it was the case that’, and ‘it will be the case that’) must be taken as primitive and unanalyzable.[3]
In virtue of her commitment to Taking Tense Seriously, the A Theorist will say that no time ever possesses all of the different A properties. Thus, according to the A Theorist, there is no contradiction in the A series -- i.e., no contradiction in saying of a time, t, that t was future, is present, and will be past -- and, hence, no contradiction to be passed along to the different times at which t was future, is present, and will be past.
In effect, then, the typical A Theorist makes exactly the move in response to McTaggart's argument that McTaggart anticipated, and explicitly rejected. Not surprisingly, then, many supporters of McTaggart's argument feel that the A Theorist's response fails.
Although some B Theorists deny that time really passes as a result of considering McTaggart's argument, many B Theorists have different reasons for saying that time doesn't really pass. Two other arguments against The A Theory (besides McTaggart's argument, that is) have been especially influential. The first of these is an argument from the special theory of relativity in physics. According to that theory (the argument goes), there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity. But if there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity, then there cannot be objective facts of the form “t is present” or “t is 12 seconds past”. Thus, according to this line of argument, there cannot be objective facts about A properties, and so the passage of time cannot be an objective feature of the world.
It looks as if the A Theorist must choose between two possible responses to the argument from relativity: (1) deny the theory of relativity, or (2) deny that the theory of relativity actually entails that there can be no such thing as absolute simultaneity. Option (1) has had its proponents (including Arthur Prior), but in general has not proven to be widely popular. This may be on account of the enormous respect philosophers typically have for leading theories in the empirical sciences. Option (2) seems like a promising approach for A Theorists, but A Theorists who opt for this line are faced with the task of giving some account of just what the theory of relativity does entail with respect to absolute simultaneity. (Perhaps it can be plausibly argued that while relativity entails that it is physically impossible to observe whether two events are absolutely simultaneous, the theory nevertheless has no bearing on whether there is such a phenomenon as absolute simultaneity.)
The second of the two other influential arguments against The A Theory concerns the rate of the alleged passage of time. According to this argument, if it is true to say that time really passes, then it makes sense to ask how fast time passes. But (the argument goes) if it makes sense to ask how fast time passes, then it is possible for there to be a coherent answer to that question. Yet, according to the argument, there is no rate that can be coherently assigned to the passage of time. (“One hour per hour,” for example, is said not to be a coherent answer to the question “How fast does time pass?”) Thus, the argument concludes, it cannot be true to say that time really passes.
This argument raises important questions concerning the correct way to talk about rates, but it has been argued that the A Theorist can answer those questions in a way that allows her to avoid any untoward consequences.

Answer 2

The precise definition of what time is eludes us. There have been many attempts to set a definition but there are always exceptions to the rule. We all know what time is intuitively, but actually setting a definition for such an etherial concept is difficult. We could say that it is the direction we observe things as they tend towards increasing entropy. This works sometimes but not all the time. The fact that time is relative to each observer also makes it harder to make a defintion for. We can set a standard of measuing the passage of time using the predictable atomic decay of some element, but that only works because we are all on earth and moving at about the same speed through the universe so we all observe the decay at the same rate.

Answer 3

I am totally impressed by the research of "Blue Sky".

However, Aristotle is correct. Time cannot exist without events - which is to say change.
After all, how do we measure time? By observing change. Your watch changes in a fairly regular manner. The sun rises & sets in a regular manner. The two coordinate fairly well. The currently accepted most accurate method of counting time today -maintained by the National Institute of Standards - uses the regularly repeating behavior of an atomic particle (its accuracy is now 0.000,001 second). Our whole sense of time has to do with observing change.
Did time exist before the "Big Bang"? Not unless there some events occurred. And we don't know what, if anything.

Plato may have speculated about a period of time where no change took plate, but Plato loved to throw out puzzling ideas & questions just to see if anyone would see through them.

Answer 4

Time means different things to different people.
It's difficult to define in terms of words.
Time is the duration of an incident.
A space-time pulse initiated the universe.
The two dimensional pulse needed each other to sustain their existence.
Time directs the evolution of the universe.

Time is a finite entity,one day it will stop and never occur again.
One aspect of time is personnel and subjective.
When you are having a good time it flies,if you are being tortured,it lasts forever.
The only objective time is the one that orchestrates the evolution of the universe.
There is an aspect of zero time,each entity is isolated from the other by time.
When you look at a person in the room with you,you are seeing that person as they existed in past.
It's only billionths of a second so you see no difference.
If they are far away the isolation widens.
Nature injects a holographic effect that allows you to inter act as if the isolation didn't exist.
Tough question!

Answer 5

Plato argued that time is constant - it’s life that’s the illusion. Galileo shrugged over the philosophy of time and figured out how to plot it on a graph so he could get on with the important physics. Albert Einstein said that time is just another dimension, a fourth one to go along with the up-down, side-side, forward-back we move through every day. Our understanding of time, Einstein said, is based on its relationship to our environment. Weirdly, the faster you travel, the slower time moves. The most radical interpretation of his theory: Past, present, and future are merely figments of our imagination, constructs built by our brains so that everything doesn’t seem to happen at once.

Einstein’s conception of unified spacetime works better on graph paper than in the real world. Time isn’t like those other dimensions - for one thing, we move only one way within it. “What’s needed is not to make the notion of time and general relativity work or to go back to the notion of absolute time, but to invent something radically new,” says Lee Smolin, a physicist at the Perimeter Institute in Waterloo, Ontario.

Others, including famed astrophysicist Stephen Hawking, note that time is defined by entropy. That is, the universe, in its current expanding direction, is becoming more and more disordered- entropy is increasing and always has been since the inception of the universe, as is time. Thus, time can represented as a measure of entropy in the universe.

Somebody is going to get it right eventually. It’ll just take time.

Answer 6

Time is man made so we can cause things to happen at the same time. Like meetings and so on. When people started wondering about time, they said things like "meet you here when sun comes up." Now we can say "I'll be on the 5.49 to Milton Keynes" and still not be sure exactly when that will be!

Answer 7

Time is a line of events and pysics.

We're travelling into time by every yoctosecond (trillionth of a trillionth of a second) and we can't do anything about it..

It's like a huge movie, each frame can be a millisecond, sometimes you know what's going to happen, sometimes you don't..
We can always remember the past in order to guess what'll happen in the future.

It's a huge quantum of pysics and mathematics basically..
Dys.

Answer 8

Time is what keeps everything from happening all at once.

For an example, look at a clock. 9 o'clock and 10 o'clock do not happen together.

Answer 9

Think of time as mans invention to keep track of the Earth's natural cycles.
(Its also a convenience if you want to meet someone after the sun has set)

Answer 10

I could explain time to you, but it would take too long!

Answer 11

come back in a couple of minutes ...