Is a "fact" a known truth?

Answer 1

§ 38

To some extent this source from which Empiricism draws is common to it with metaphysic. It is in our materialised conceptions, i.e. in facts which emanate, in the first instance, from experience, that metaphysic also finds the guarantee for the correctness of its definitions (including both its initial assumptions and its more detailed body of doctrine). But, on the other hand, it must be noted that the single sensation is not the same thing as experience, and that the Empirical School elevates the facts included under sensation, feeling, and perception into the form of general ideas propositions, or laws. This, however, it does with the reservation that these general principles (such as force) are to have no further import or validity of their own beyond that taken from the sense impression, and that no connection shall be deemed legitimate except what can be shown to exist in phenomena. And on the subjective side Empirical cognition has its stable footing in the fact that in a sensation consciousness is directly present and certain of itself.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_ivpi.htm#SL38

§ 78

We must then reject the opposition between an independent immediacy in the contents or facts of consciousness and an equally independent mediation, supposed incompatible with the former. The incompatibility is a mere assumption, an arbitrary assertion. All other assumptions and postulates must in like manner be left behind at the entrance to philosophy, whether they are derived from the intellect or the imagination. For philosophy is the science in which every such proposition must first be scrutinised and its meaning and oppositions be ascertained.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_v.htm#SL78

Beyond this point then we need not go: immediate knowledge is to be accepted as a fact. Under these circumstances examination is directed to the field of experience, to a psychological phenomenon. If that be so, we need only note, as the commonest of experiences, that truths which we well know to be results of complicated and highly mediated trains of thought present themselves immediately and without effort to the mind of any man who is familiar with the subject. The mathematician, like everyone who has mastered a particular science, meets any problem with ready-made solutions which presuppose most complicated analyses: and every educated man has a number of general views and maxims which he can muster without trouble, but which can only have sprung from frequent reflection and long experience. The facility we attain in any sort of knowledge, art, or technical expertness, consists in having the particular knowledge or kind of action present to our mind in any case that occurs, even, we may say, immediate in our very limbs, in an outgoing activity. In all these instances, immediacy of knowledge is so far from excluding mediation, that the two things are linked together — immediate knowledge being actually the product and result of mediated knowledge.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_v.htm#SL66

§ 75

It was impossible for us to criticise this, the third attitude which thought has been made to take towards objective truth, in any other mode than what is naturally indicated and admitted in the doctrine itself. The theory asserts that immediate knowledge is a fact. It has been shown to be untrue in fact to say that there is an immediate knowledge, a knowledge without mediation either by means of something else or in itself. It has also been explained to be false in fact to say that thought advances through finite and conditioned categories only, which are always mediated by a something else, and to forget that in the very act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes. And to show that, in point of fact, there is a knowledge which advances neither by unmixed immediacy nor by unmixed mediation, we can point to the example of Logic and the whole of philosophy.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_v.htm#SL75

Answer 2

Several of the modern Western philosophers refer to brute facts and such. Generally, its understood to mean something that is almost an identity or tautology. "Two is a number" is a factual statement, but it doesn't really do much for anyone. In this sense, it is a sort of known truth, I suppose.

But all truth is "known" - you can't speak of an unknown truth too successfully in epistemology. I suspect you mean "Is Fact A Verified Truth?" In which case you delve into the Positivist sort of verification process.

Answer 3

Fact; IE: Science; just IS,even when disputed. TRUTH is a belief, often, also disputed. There is no such thing in my reality as a KNOWN Truth, only fact.

Answer 4

Depends, when you say "as a matter of fact" is it really? A real fact is I found mud on the floor. That was true and I cleaned it up. Also depends on who knows what facts and who doesn't. Confusing, isn't it.

Answer 5

~~~Yes , I would think so, but you need to back up your fact with correct and persice information to make your fact the actual truth.

Answer 6

Is a "myth" a known lie?

Answer 7

That's a functional definition.

Answer 8

Yep.

Answer 9

no, but maybe, you never know. try google-ing it