Was Harry S. Truman and the United States justified in bringing the world to the brink of war over the control

Question

of Berlin Germany?

Answer 1

Hindsight is always 20/20. Personally, given the context of the times:

"On June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union blocked access to the three Western-held sectors of Berlin, which lay deep within the Soviet-controlled zone of Germany, by cutting off all rail and road routes going through Soviet-controlled territory in Germany. The Western powers had never negotiated a pact with the Soviets guaranteeing these rights. Amid the fallout of the London Conference, the Soviets now rejected arguments that occupation rights in Berlin and the use of the routes during the previous three years had given the West legal claim to unimpeded use of the highways and railroads. As a further means of applying pressure, the Western sectors of Berlin were isolated from the city power grid, depriving the inhabitants of domestic and industrial electricity supplies.
The commander of the American occupation zone in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, proposed sending a large armoured column driving peacefully, as a moral right, down the Autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin, but prepared to defend itself if it were stopped or attacked. President Harry S. Truman, however, following the consensus in Washington, believed this entailed an unacceptable risk of war. Truman stated, "It is too risky to engage in this due to the consequence of war". Clay was told to take advice from General Curtis LeMay, commander of United States Air Forces in Europe, to see if an airlift was possible. By chance, General Albert Wedemeyer, the U.S. Army Chief of Plans and Operations, was in Europe on an inspection tour when the crisis occurred. He had been commander of the U.S. China Theater in 1944–1945 and had an intimate knowledge of the World War II Allied airlift from India over the Hump of the Himalayas. He was in favour of the airlift option and knew the best person to run the operation: Lt. General William H. Tunner was charged with organizing and commanding the Berlin airlift because of his experience in commanding and organising the airlift over the Hump.


U.S. Air Force pilot Gail Halvorsen who pioneered the idea of dropping candy bars and bubble gum with little handmade miniature parachutes, which later became known as Operation Little Vittles


Berlin Airlift Monument in Berlin-Tempelhof, displaying the names of the 39 British and 31 U.S.-American pilots who lost their lives during the operation. Similar monuments can be found at the military airfield Wietzenbruch near Celle and at Rhein-Main Air Base.


Berlin Airlift Monument in Berlin-Tempelhof with inscription "They lost their lives for the freedom of Berlin in service for the Berlin Airlift 1948/49"
On June 25 Clay gave the order to launch a massive airlift using both civil and military aircraft (ultimately lasting 462 days) that flew supplies into the Western-held sectors of Berlin over the blockade during 1948–1949. The first plane flew on the following day, and the first British aeroplane flew on the 28th. This aerial supplying of West Berlin became known as the Berlin Airlift. Military confrontation loomed while Truman embarked on a highly visible move which would publicly humiliate the Soviets.
The U.S. action was given the name Operation Vittles. An existing British supply plan known as Knicker evolved into 'Carter Paterson', and then became Operation Plainfare in early July 1948.
Hundreds of aircraft, nicknamed Rosinenbomber ("raisin bombers") by the local population, were used to fly in a wide variety of cargo, ranging from large containers to small packets of candy with tiny individual parachutes intended for the children of Berlin (an idea of a pilot named Gail Halvorsen that soon gained considerable US civilian support). Sick children were evacuated on return flights. The aircraft were supplied and flown by the United States, United Kingdom and France, but pilots and crew also came from Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand in order to assist the supply of Berlin. Ultimately 278,228 flights were made and 2,326,406 tons of food and supplies, including more than 1.5 million tons of coal, were delivered to Berlin.[citation needed]
On April 4, 1949, the Western powers signed the North Atlantic Treaty founding NATO, declaring that an attack on any one would be considered an attack against them all.
At the height of the operation, on April 16, 1949, an allied aircraft landed in Berlin every minute, with 1,398 flights in 24 hours carrying 12,940 tons (13,160 t) of goods, coal and machinery, beating the record of 8,246 (8,385 t) set only days earlier.
The USSR lifted its blockade at 00:01, on May 12, 1949. However, the airlift did not end until September 30, as the Western nations wanted to build up sufficient amounts of supplies in West Berlin in case the Soviets blockaded it again.
The major Berlin airfields involved were Tempelhof in the American Sector, Gatow on the Havel river in the British, and Tegel (built by army engineers in 49 days with the help of Berlin volunteers) in the French. Operational control of the three allied airlift corridors was given to Berlin Air Route Traffic Control Center (BARTCC), located at Tempelhof. Tensions in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) – a four-power organization manned by personnel from France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union – reached an understandable high during the Airlift, though the success of the campaign was in large part due to the coordination carried out within the BASC."

I'd say Truman and the West (not just the USA - the British and French participated as well) WERE justified, especially since the (then) USSR was the "aggressor" in the incident.


"Although Clay had predicted to Bradley on April 10 that the currency reform would develop the "real crisis", the Soviets had taken the action Clay doubted they would risk: that of stopping all food supplies to Berlin because it would "alienate the Germans almost completely."(1) As so often, the Soviets were not worried about alienating any group if they could gain their immediate objective.

Regarding the reasons for remaining in Berlin, Clay summed them up in a cable to Washington on June 13, 1948: "There is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis. . . We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent."(2)

The British government was in agreement with Clay's views on remaining in Berlin, but the French, while agreeing to accept Western monetary reform in their sector of Berlin, foresaw grave problems and notified Clay: "The French Government is obliged to dissociate itself from all responsibility with regard to these consequences."(3) In spite of this written rebuke, the French government went along with all major decisions made by the US and British governments during the Berlin crisis of 1948-49."

It was a "stare-down" contest, a test of wills much like the Cuban missle crisis. and if the West had blinked first, that would only have encouraged Stalin to try to "push the envelope" again, in some other place.

By the way, I'm so old that I can vividly recall "the context of the times", and in that context, if the West hadn't stood up to Stalin, it would have been seen by everyone as a MAJOR psychological defeat.

Answer 2

Yes for the principle of containing the Soviet expansion all over the world. After the rape of Berlin by ordered Soviet mongol soldiers, the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with any agreed upon treaty. The U.S. responded with the non-violent Berlin Airlift. The thick and stupid Soviet Union only respected strength and resolve which the plucky Harry Truman demonstrated.

Answer 3

What a strange question! Where did you get such a notion? The only person who even gets close to your description was Kennedy, when he went toe-to-toe with Kruschev over Cuba. NOBODY has taken us closer to nuclear annihilation!