I live with my landlord by renting out a room. I am doing research on this type of tenacy and od not know?

Question

where to start. I just need the name of this type of tenancy. BTW our rental agreement is verbal.

Answer 1

Well, the type of tenancy isn't determined by WHAT you rent. It's termed by the nature of the agreement itself. Here are a few types (the most common):

Term of Years: This is an estate that lasts for some fixed period of time for a period computable by a formula that results in fixing calendar dates for beginning and ending, once the term is created or becomes possessory. Note, this can be for almost any period, so long as your state's Statutes allow, e.g., 2 days, a month, 2 years, 10 years, etc.

Periodic Tenancy: This is a lease for a period of some fixed duration that continues for succeeding periods until either the landlord or tenant gives notice of termination. A month-to-month lease fits in this category. Note: In this category if notice is not given then the period is AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED for another period.

Answer 2

Try the site below, make sure to change the location/state in which you reside. Hope this helps.

Answer 3

LANDLORD AND TENANT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Various types: There are four estates that involve a landlord-tenant relationship: (1) the tenancy for years; (2) the periodic tenancy; (3) the tenancy at will; and (4) the tenancy at sufference. [192]

B. Statute of Frauds: Under the original English Statute of Frauds, any lease for more than three years must be in writing. (Otherwise, it merely creates an "estate at will.") In the U.S., most statutes now require a writing for all leases for more than one year. [193]

1. Option to renew: In calculating whether a lease is for more than one year (so that it probably has to be in writing), most courts add together the fixed term and any period for which the tenant has the option to renew. [193]

C. The estate for years: Most leases are estates for years. An estate for years is any estate which is for a fixed period of time. (So even a six-month lease is an "estate for years.") [194]

FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3>1. Certain term: For a lease to be an estate for years, the beginning date and end date must be fixed.

2. Automatic termination: Because an estate for years contains its own termination date, no additional notice of termination need be given by either party - on the last day, the tenancy simply ends, and the tenant must leave the premises.

D. Periodic tenancy: The periodic tenancy is one which continues from one period to the next automatically, unless either party terminates it at the end of a period by notice. Thus a year-to-year tenancy, or a month-to-month one, would be periodic. [195 - 196]

1. Creation by implication: Normally a periodic tenancy is created by implication. Thus a lease with no stated duration (e.g., T agrees to pay L "$200 per month," but with no end period) creates a periodic tenancy. Also, if a tenant holds over, and the landlord accepts rent, probably a periodic tenancy is created. [195]

2. Termination: A periodic tenancy will automatically be renewed for a further period unless one party gives a valid notice of termination. [195 - 196]

a. Common law: At common law, six months' notice was needed to terminate a year-to-year tenancy, and a full period's notice was necessary when the period was less than a year (e.g., 30 days notice for a month-to-month tenancy). Also, at common law, the notice had to set the end of a period as the termination date.

b. Modern: Most states today require only 30 days notice for any tenancy, even year-to-year. Notice today must still generally be effective as of the end of a period, but if the notice is not sufficiently in advance of one period, it is automatically applicable to the following period. (Example: L and T have a month-to-tenancy; if one gives the other notice of termination on January 4, this will be effective as of February 28.)

E. At-will tenancy: A tenancy at will is a tenancy which has no stated duration and which may be terminated at any time by either party. [196 - 197]

1. Implication: Usually a tenancy at will, like a periodic tenancy, is created by implication. For instance, if T takes possession with L's permission, with no term stated and no period for paying rent defined (so that the lease is not even a periodic one), it will probably be at will. Also, a few courts hold that if one party has the option to terminate at will, the other party has a similar option so that the tenancy is at will.

F. Tenancy at sufferance: There is only one situation in which the "tenancy at sufferance" exists: where a tenant holds over at the end of a valid lease. Here, the landlord has a right of election, between: (1) evicting the tenant; and (2) holding him to another term as tenant. (If L elects to hold T to another term, most courts hold that a periodic tenancy is then created, and the length of the period is determined by the way rent was computed under the lease which terminated.) [198 - 200]

II. TENANT'S RIGHT OF POSSESSION AND ENJOYMENT

A. Tenant's right of possession: Courts ar split about whether L impliedly warrants to T that he will deliver actual possession at the start of the lease term. The question usually arises when a prior tenant holds over.

1. "American" view: The so-called "American" view is that the landlord has a duty to deliver only legal possession, not actual possession. Despite the name, at most a slight majority of American courts follow this rule. [200]

2. "English" rule: Other courts follow the so-called "English" rule, by which L does have a duty to deliver actual possession. In courts following this rule, T has the right to terminate the lease and recover damages for the breach if the prior tenant holds over and L does not oust him. Alternatively, T may continue the lease and get damages for the period until the prior tenant is removed. [200 - 201]

B. Quiet enjoyment: T has the right of "quiet enjoyment" of the leased premises. This right can be violated in two main ways: (1) by claims of "paramount title"; and (2) by acts of L, or persons claiming under him, which interfere with T's possession or use of the premises. [201]

1. Claims of paramount title: L, by making the lease, impliedly warrants that he has legal power to give possession to T for the term of the lease. If someone else successfully asserts a claim to the property which is superior to T's claim under the lease (a claim of "paramount title"'), L has breached this warranty. Thus suppose that X shows that L does not have title to the premises at all (because X has title), or that X shows that L has previously leased the premises to X, or that X shows that X holds a mortgage on the premises, and is entitled to foreclose because L has not made mortgage payments - in all of these instances, X's claim of paramount title constitutes a breach by L of his implied warranty. [201]

a. Before T takes possession: If T discovers the paramount title before he takes possession, he may terminate the lease.

b. After T takes possession: Once T takes possession, he may not terminate the lease (or refuse to pay rent) merely on the grounds that a third person holds a paramount title. (It is sometimes said that T is "estopped to deny L's title" to the leased property.) On the other hand, if the third person then asserts his paramount title in such a way that T is evicted, T may terminate the lease and recover damages.

2. Interference by landlord or third person: If L himself, or someone claiming under L, interferes with T's use of the premises, this will be a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. [202]

a. Conduct by other tenants: If the conduct of other tenants makes the premises uninhabitable for T, the traditional view is that L is not responsible (unless the other tenants use their portion for immoral or lewd purposes, or conduct their acts in the common areas). But the modern trend is to impute the acts of other tenants to L where these acts are in violation of the other leases, and L could have prevented the conduct by eviction or otherwise. (Example: Suppose that other tenants make a great deal of noise in violation of their leases, so that L could evict them, but does not. The modern trend, but not the traditional rule, is that T may terminate the lease.)

b. Constructive eviction: If T's claim is merely that his use or enjoyment of the property has been substantially impaired (e.g., excessive noise, terrible odors) the eviction is "constructive". When T is constructively evicted, even if this is L's fault, T is not entitled to terminate or stop paying rent unless he abandons the premises. (Example: Other tenants make so much noise that T's use is severely impaired. If T remains in the premises, he may not reduce the rent payments to L; he must leave and terminate the lease, or else pay the full lease amount.) [203]

C. Condemnation: If the government uses its right of eminent domain to condemn all or part of the leased premises, T may have a remedy. [204]

1. Total taking: If the entire premises are taken, the lease terminates, and T does not have to pay the rent.

2. Partial: But if only a portion of the premises is taken (even a major part), at common law the lease is not terminated. Also, T must continue paying the full rent (though he gets an appropriate portion of any condemnation award which L collects from the government). However, the modern trend is to let T terminate if the condemnation "significantly interferes" with his use, and to give him a reduction in rent even for a small interference.

D. Illegality: If T intends to use the property for illegal purposes, and L knows this fact, the court will probably treat the lease as unenforceable, especially if the illegality would be a serious one (e.g., crack distribution). [205 - 206]

1. Variance or permit: If the use intended by T requires a variance or permit, and T is unable to get the variance or permit after the lease is signed, most courts hold that the lease remains valid.

III. CONDITION OF THE PREMISES

A. Common-law view: At common law, T takes the premises as is. L is not deemed to have made any implied warranty that the premises are fit or habitable. Nor does L have any duty to repair defects arising during the course of the lease (unless the parties explicitly provide that he does). [208]

1. Independence of covenants: Also, the common law applies the doctrine of "independence of covenants" in leases. Thus even if L does expressly promise to repair (or warrants that the premises are habitable), if he breaches this promise T must still pay rent. T may sue for damages, but he is stuck in the uninhabitable living conditions. [209]

2. Constructive eviction: However, even at common law, T can raise the defense of "constructive eviction" - he can terminate the lease if he can show that the premises are virtually uninhabitable. But he can only assert constructive eviction if he first leaves the premises, something which a poor tenant in uninhabitable residential space can rarely afford to do. [209]

B. Modern implied warranty of habitability: But today, the vast majority of states (either by statute or case law) impose some kind of implied warranty of habitability. That is, if L leases residential premises toT, he impliedly warrants that the premises are in at least good enough condition to be lived in. If L breaches this warranty, T may (among other remedies) withhold rent, and use the withheld rent to make the repairs himself. [210]

1. Waiver of known pre-existing defects: Some (but by no means all) courts hold that if T knows of the defect before he moves in, he will be held to have waived the defect, so that the implied warranty of habitability does not apply to that defect. (If the defect is one which T neither discovered nor reasonably could have discovered before moving in, then all courts agree that an otherwise-applicable implied warranty of habitability protects T against the defect.) [211 - 212]

2. Standards for determining "habitability": All courts agree that the existence of a building code violation is at least evidence of uninhabitability. However, most courts require that to prove uninhabitability, T must show that the conditions not only violate the building code, but are also a substantial threat to T's health or safety. (Conversely, most courts hold that if conditions are a substantial threat to T's health or safety, the warranty is breached even if there is no building code violation.) [213]

a. Relevance of nature of building: Some (but not all) courts hold that the age of the building and the amount of rent charged may be considered in determining whether there has been a breach. Thus a given condition might be a breach of the warranty as to a new luxury high-rise, but not as to an old low-rent structure.

3. Kinds of leases:

a. Residential: Most statutes imposing an implied warranty of habitability apply to all residential leases (though some apply merely to units in multiple dwellings, so that a single-family house would not be covered). [213]

b. Commercial leases: Most statutes and cases do not impose an implied warranty of habitability as to commercial leases. [214]

4. Waiver in lease: Generally, a clause in the lease expressly stating that there is no implied warranty is usually not effective. (But some statutes, such as the URLTA, will enforce a deal in which T promises, in a separate writing, and for adequate consideration such as a lower rent, to make repairs himself.) [215]

5. Remedies: If T shows a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, he may have a number of remedies:

a. Terminate lease: T may usually vacate the premises and terminate the lease (after he puts L on notice and L still refuses to make the repairs). [216]

b. Withhold rent: T may also withhold rent until the defects have been cured. (But most statutes, and some cases, require T to deposit the rent in some sort of escrow account.) [216]

c. Use rent for repairs: Many cases and statutes allow T to make the repairs and then to deduct the reasonable costs of those repairs from the rent. T must usually give L advanc notice of his intent to make the repairs and to deduct (so that L can make the repairs himself to avoid the loss of rent). [217]

6. Retaliatory eviction barred: By the doctrine of "retaliatory eviction," L usually may not terminate a periodic lease, or deny T's request for a new lease at the conclusion of a tenancy for years, on account of T's assertion of the right to habitable premises. The doctrine is most likely to be applied where L tries to terminate the tenancy in retaliation for T's complaints made to a housing authority about code violations. Also, some courts apply the doctrine where the non-renewal or termination is in retaliation for T's withholding of rent or his joining in a tenants' organization. [219 - 221]

C. Destruction of premises: If the premises are suddenly destroyed or damaged (by fire, flood, lightning or other natural elements), at common law T must keep paying rent, and may not terminate the lease. [221]

1. Modern view: But most states have now passed statutes changing this common-law rule - if the premises are destroyed or damaged so that they are no longer habitable, T may now usually terminate the lease and stop paying rent. Also, some courts have reached this result by case law. (But T usually cannot recover damages, so termination of the lease is his only remedy.)

IV. TORT LIABILITY OF LANDLORD AND TENANT

A. Tenant's tort liability: T, during the time he is in possession of the premises, is treated like an owner, for purposes of his tort liability to others who come onto the property. (Example: Since L would have a duty to warn a social guest, or licensee, of known dangers, T has a similar duty to warn of dangers that he is aware of.) [223]

B. Landlord's liability:

1. Common law: At common law, L is generally not liable for physical injury to T, or to persons who are on the leased property with T's consent. That is, L has no general duty to use reasonable care to make or keep the premises safe. [223] However, there are a number of exceptions (including some developed by courts recently), including the following:

a. Concealment: L is liable if he conceals, or fails to disclose, a dangerous defect existing at the start of the lease of which he is aware. [224]

i. L should know but does not: Most courts also hold that if L does not have actual knowledge but should know about the danger, based on facts that he does know, he will be liable for failing to warn.

ii. No duty of inspection: But L has no duty of inspection, i.e., no obligation to inspect the property to find out whether there are hidden defects.

b. Liability to persons other than T: Nearly all courts hold that if L would be liable to T, he is also liable to persons on the premises with T's consent. (But if L has told T about the defect, L will not be liable to T's guests even if T did not pass on the warning.) [224]

c. Areas under L's control: L has a duty to use reasonable care to keep the common areas safe (e.g., lobbies, elevator, corridor, etc.). [224]

i. Security against criminals: Most courts now require L to use reasonable care to prevent unauthorized access to the building. (Example: L, the owner of an apartment building, fails to repair the building's outer lock after being told that it is broken. X enters, and mugs T. Most courts would hold L liable for not using reasonable care to secure the building.)

d. Repairs negligently performed: If L attempts to make a repair, he will be liable if the repair is done negligently, and L has made the condition more dangerous or lulled T into a false feeling of security. (But if L's negligent repair does not make the condition worse or lull T, the courts are split as to whether L is liable if T is injured.) [225]

e. L contracts to repair: If a clause in the lease requires L to make repairs or otherwise keep the premises safe, L will be liable in tort if he fails to use reasonable care and T is injured. Also, L is probably liable to third persons on the premises with T's consent in this situation. [226]

f. L's legal duties: If building codes or other laws impose a duty on L to keep the premises safe, L will generally be liable in tort if he fails in this duty. Probably L will also be liable if he breaches an implied warranty of habitability, and the uninhabitable condition causes injury to T or T's guest. [226 - 228]

g. Admission of public: If L has reason to believe that T will hold the premises open to the public, and L has reason to know that a dangerous condition exists, L will be liable for resulting physical harm to the public. (L usually has an affirmative duty to inspect in this situation.) [228 - 229]

2. General "reasonable care" theory: Some recent cases have simply rejected the common law view that L has no general duty to use reasonable care. Under these cases, P does not have to fit within one of the above exceptions, and merely has to show that: (1) L failed to use reasonable care and (2) the lack of reasonable care proximately caused P's injury. [228 - 229]

3. Exculpatory clauses: At least in the case of a residential lease, most courts today refuse to enforce an "exculpatory clause" in a lease, that is, a clause purporting to relieve L of tort liability for his negligence. About half the states accomplish this by statute, and some others by case law. [229]

V. TENANT'S DUTIES

A. Duty to pay rent: T of course has a duty to pay rent.

1. Breach of L's duties: Most courts today hold that if L materially breaches his implied or express obligations (e.g., the implied warranty of habitability), T is temporarily relieved from continuing to pay rent. [230 - 231]

B. Duty to repair: At common law, T had an implied duty to make minor repairs. [230]

1. Modern rule: However, most courts today do not impose this duty on T (and indeed, most impose it on L under the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability, at least for residential leases).

C. Fixtures: A fixture is an item of personal property which is attached to the land (e.g., lighting, built-in bookcases, etc.). [231]

1. Right to affix: T is usually allowed to attach fixtures if this would not unfairly damage the value of L's reversion.

2. Right to remove: Similarly, most courts today say that T may remove a fixture installed by him if this removal will not damage L's interests (so that T must normally restore the premises to the way they were before the fixture was attached).

D. Duty to behave reasonably: T has the implied duty to behave reasonably in his use of the premises. (Examples: T must not unreasonably disturb other tenants, and must obey reasonable regulations posted by the landlord.) [233]

VI. LANDLORD'S REMEDIES

A. Security deposits:

1. Interest: In many states, L is required by statute to pay interest on the security deposit. [233]

2. Right to keep: Once the lease terminates, L must return the deposit to T, after subtracting any damages. If T abandons the lease before the end of the lease term and L re-lets, L must immediately return the deposit (after subtracting damages).

3. Commingle: L may normally commingle the security deposit with his own funds.

4. Purchaser's obligation: Courts are split as to whether one who purchases L's interest in the property must account to T for the end of the deposit at the end of the lease term. [234]

B. Acceleration clause: Most leases contain an acceleration of rent clause, by which if T fails to pay rent promptly or otherwise breaches the lease, L may require that all of the rent for the rest of the lease term is payable at once. [234]

1. Generally valid: Most courts enforce such acceleration clauses. (But if L decides to sue for enforcement of the acceleration clause, he may not also demand possession of the premises.)

C. Eviction:

1. Express forfeiture clause: Most leases explicitly give L the right to terminate the lease if T fails to pay rent or violates any other lease provision. Such clauses will be enforced, but only if T's breach is material. (Example: If T is merely a couple days late with the rent on one or two occasions, the court will probably not allow L to terminate the lease.) [235]

2. Summary proceedings: In most states, if L is entitled to terminate the lease and regain possession (or if T holds over at the end of the lease term and L wants to get him out), L may do so by "summary proceedings," which provide for a speedy trial of L's right to immediate possession. Summary proceedings usually work by limiting the defenses whch T may assert. (Example: Some summary proceeding statutes prevent T from asserting the breach of the implied warranty of habitability as a defense in L's action to regain possession for non-payment of rent.) [236 - 237]

D. Damages for holdover: If T holds over after the lease terminates, L is entitled to damages as well as eviction. [237]

E. Abandonment: If T abandons the premises (and defaults on the rent) before the scheduled end of the lease term, L has three basic choices: (1) to accept a surrender of the premises, thus terminating the lease; (2) to re-let on T's behalf; and (3) to leave the premises vacant and sue for rent as it comes due. [238 - 241]

1. Accept surrender: L may treat T's abandonment as a surrender, and accept it. This has the effect of terminating the lease, so that no further rent becomes due from T. (If T takes possession and/or leases to someone else, and does not notify T that he is acting on T's behalf, then this will probably be held to be an acceptance of surrender, causing T's rent obligation to end.) [238]

2. Re-letting on T's account: L may re-let on T's behalf, if he notifies T that he is doing so. This has two advantages to L: (1) T remains liable for all rents coming due, if no new tenant is found; and (2) if a new tenant is found who pays a lesser rent, T is still liable for the difference between this and the original rent due under the L-T lease. (Courts are split on whether L must give the surplus to T if L re-lets for a higher amount.) [239 - 241]

3. Leave vacant: Courts are split on whether L has the right to leave the premises vacant, and hold L to the lease. Usually, the question is phrased, "Does L have the duty to mitigate?"

a. Traditional view: The traditional view is that L has no duty to mitigate, i.e., no duty to try to find a new tenant. [240]

b. Duty to mitigate: But an increasing minority of courts now hold that L does have a duty to mitigate, by attempting to find a suitable replacement tenant. In these courts, if L does not make such an effort, T is off the hook. [240]

VII. TRANSFER AND SALE BY LESSOR; ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING BY LESSEE

A. Generally allowed: Unless the parties to a lease agree otherwise, either may transfer his interest. Thus L may sell his reversion in the property, and T may either assign or sublease his right to occupy. [241]

1. Distinguish assignment from sublease: Be sure to distinguish sublease from assignment. An assignment is the transfer by T of his entire interest in the leased premises. Thus he must transfer the entire remaining length of the term of his lease. A sublease is the transfer by T of less than his entire interest. (Example: T's lease has one year to go. T transfers the first 11.5 months of this interest to T1. In most states, this is a sublease, not an assignment.) [242]

a. Significance: The main significance of this distinction is that if T assigns to T1, T1 is personally liable to pay rent to L, even if he makes no express promise to L or Tthat he will do so. If T merely subleases to T1, T1 is not personally liable to L for the rent (absent an explicit promise). [243]

B. Running of benefit and burden: Determine whether a particular promise runs with the land, either as to benefit or burden. If the benefit runs, then an assignee of the promisee can sue to enforce; if the burden runs, an assignee of the promisor will be liable. If neither the burden nor benefit runs, then the promisor's assignee is not liable, and promisee's assignee cannot sue. [244]

Example 1 (benefit runs): In the L-T lease, T promises to make repairs. This promise "touches and concerns the land" both as to benefit and burden, so benefit and burden run. Thus if T assigns to T1, T1 is personally liable for making the repairs. Conversely, if L assigns to L1, L1 can sue T (and T1 if T has assigned to T1) to enforce this promise.

Example 2 (burdens runs, but benefit does not): In the L-T lease, T promises not to compete with L's use of certain other property. If T assigns to T1, T1 is liable not to compete. But if L assigns to L1, in most states L1 cannot enforce the promise against either T or T1.

1. "Touch and concern" test: The burden runs if the promise "touches and concerns" the promisor's assignee's interest in the land. Similarly, the benefit runs if the promise "touches and concerns" the promisee's assignee's interest in the property. [244]

2. Normally both or neither: Normally, either the benefit and burden will both run, or neither will run. (The non-competition situation described in Example 2 above is one of the few examples where this is not true.) [244 - 245]

C. Rights after T assigns: Here are the rights of the parties after T assigns to T1 his rights under the L-T lease:

1. T's liability to L: After the assignment, T remains liable to L (whether T's promise to L does or does not "touch and concern" the land). (Example: T remains liable for the rent after assignment to T1. This is true even if L consents to the assignment, and even if L accepts some rent payments from T1.) [246]

2. T's rights against T1: After the assignment, T1 becomes primarily liable, and T is only secondarily liable. Therefore, if L sues T when T1 does not make the rent payments, T can then sue T1 for the amount that T has had to pay (even if T1 never expressly assumed the lease duties at the time of the assignment). [246]

3. L's rights against T1: Assuming that T1 does not make any specific promises of performance when he takes the assignment, T1 is liable only for those promises made by T whose burden runs with the land. [247]

Example 1: T1 is liable to L for rent, since the burden of T's original rent promise ran with the land. Thus T1 must make the rent payments even if he did not expressly promise either T or L that he would make these payments.

Example 2: In the original L-T lease, T promises to keep the premises insured. Assume that the burden of this promise does not run with the land (the majority rule). If T assigns to T1 and T1 does not make any promise of insurance, T1 is ot liable for failing to insure the property (though L can terminate the lease for breach if T1 does not do so).

a. Assignment by assignee: But T1 remains liable (even on promises whose burdens run with the land) only for the period when he is in actual possession. If he re-assigns, he is not liable for breaches by the subsequent assignee. [248] (Example: T assigns to T1. T1 remains in possession for six months, then assigns to T2. T1 is liable for the rent that accrued during the six months he was in possession, but not for any rents accruing after he left possession and T2 took possession.)

b. Assumption: However, if T1 assumes the lease (i.e., expressly promises T that T1 will obey all terms of the L-T lease), then T1 is liable both to T and L for all T's obligations, including those accruing after T1 re-assigns to T2. [248]

D. Assignment by L: Now, assume that L assigns his rights to L1. Here, the same rule applies: L1 has the burden of covenants whose burden runs with the land, and has the benefit of covenants whose benefit runs with the land. [249 - 251]

1. Repair obligation: Thus if L promised T that he would keep the premises in repair, L1 is liable for making the repairs after the sale. (Also, the implied warranty of habitability, if it applies at all, probably binds L1 just as it bound L.)

E. Agreement by the parties about transfer: All of the above assumes that the lease itself contains no provisions restricting transfer. Most leases, however, contain a promise by T that he will not assign or sublease his interest without L's consent. [251 - 252]

1. Generally enforced: Most states enforce such a clause, even if L is completely unreasonable in refusing to consent to the transfer.

a. Strict construction and waiver: However, courts construe such anti-transfer clauses strictly, and are quick to hold that L waived the benefit of the clause. (Example: If L knowingly accepts rents from T1 he will probably be held to have waived his right to refuse to consent to the transfer.)

b. Consent to second transfer: Also, if L consents (or waives his objection to) a particular transfer, he is usually held to have also waived his right to a subsequent transfer, under the rule of Dumpor's Case. (Example: L consents to T's assignment to T1. In most states, L is also held to consent to T1's further assignment to T2.) [251]

2. Modern trend: An increasing minority of states hold (often by statute) that even if the lease says that L has an unconditional right to refuse to consent to a transfer by T, the consent may not be unreasonably withheld. (In such a state, L should get a lease provision giving him the right to make his own deal directly with T1 - this way, if T1 is willing to pay more than the original lease amount, L, not T, gets the benefit.) [252]