The Supreme Court decision for Coffin vs. United States has a very good historical note about the presumption of innocence (provided below). In essence, we know for a fact that it was a feature of Roman law, and it has been suggested that it goes back to Athens and Sparta, perhaps even further to Deuteronomy (which would either predate or be about the same time as Athenian and Spartan law). I would select True, and defend it based on the text below:
From Coffin vs. United States:
"Greenleaf traces this presumption to Deuteronomy, and quotes Mascardius Do Probationibus to show that it was substantially embodied in the laws of Sparta and Athens. On Evidence, pt. 5, 29, note. Whether Greenleaf is correct or not in this view, there can be no question that the Roman law was pervaded with the results of this maxim of criminal administration, as the following extracts show:
'Let all accusers understand that they are not to prefer charges unless they can be proven by proper witnesses or by conclusive documents, or by circumstantial evidence which amounts to indubitable proof and is clearer than day.' Code, L. 4, tit. 20, 1, l. 25.
'The noble (divus) Trajan wrote to Julius Frontonus that no man should be condemned on a criminal charge in his absence, because it was better to let the crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the innocent.' Dig. L. 48, tit. 19, l. 5.
'In all case of doubt the most merciful construction of facts should be preferred.' Dig. L. 50, tit. 17, l. 56.
'In criminal cases the milder construction shall always be preserved.' Dig. L. 50, tit. 17, 1, 155, 2.
'In cases of doubt it is no less just than it is safe to adopt the milder construction.' Dig. L. 50, tit. 17, l. 192, 1.
Ammianus Marcellinus relates an anecdote of the Emperor Julian which illustrates the enforcement of this principle in the Roman law. Numerius, the governor of Narbonensis, was on trial before the emperor, and, contrary to the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public. Numerius contented himself with denying his guilt, and there was not sufficient proof against him. His adversary, Delphidius, 'a passionate man,' seeing that the failure of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and exclaimed, 'Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of the guilty?' to which Julian replied, 'If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?' Rerum Gestarum, lib. 18, c. 1. The rule thus found in the Roman law was, along with many other fundamental and human maxims of that system, preserved for mankind by the canon law. Decretum Gratiani de Presumptionibus, L. 2, T. 23, c. 14, A. D. 1198; Corpus Juris Canonici Hispani et Indici, R. P. Murillo Velarde, Tom. 1, L. 2, n. 140. Exactly when this presumption was, in precise words, stated to be a part of the common law, is involved in doubt. The writer of an able article in the North American Review (January, 1851), tracing the genesis of the principle, says that no express mention of the presumption of innocence can be found in the books of the common law earlier than the date of McNally's Evidence (1802). Whether this statement is correct is a matter of no moment, for there can be no doubt that, if the principle had not found formal expression in the common-law writers at an earlier date, yet the practice which flowed from it has existed in the common law from the earliest time."
2006-12-19 07:03:53
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answer #1
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answered by ³√carthagebrujah 6
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