The British and French governments followed a policy of appeasement in order to avoid a new European war. This was partially due to doubts about the willingness of their populations to fight another war so soon after the huge death tolls of the first World War. This policy culminated in the Munich Agreement in 1938, in which the seemingly inevitable outbreak of the war was averted when the United Kingdom and France agreed to Germany's annexation and immediate occupation of the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain declared that the agreement represented "peace in our time". In March 1939, Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia, effectively killing appeasement. Less than a year after the Munich agreement, the United Kingdom and France declared war on Germany.
The failure of the Munich Agreement showed that deals made with Hitler at the negotiating table could not be trusted and that his aspirations for power and dominance in Europe went beyond anything that the United Kingdom and France would tolerate. Poland and France pledged on May 19, 1939, to provide each other with military assistance in the event either was attacked. The British had already offered support to Poland in March. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Pact included a secret protocol that would divide Central Europe into German and Soviet areas of interest, including a provision to partition Poland. Each country agreed to allow the other a free hand in its area of influence, including military occupation. The deal provided for sales of oil and food from the Soviets to Germany, thus reducing the danger of a UK blockade such as the one that had nearly starved Germany in World War I. Hitler was then ready to go to war with Poland and, if necessary, with the United Kingdom and France. He claimed there were German grievances relating to the issues of the Free City of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, but he planned to conquer all Polish territory and incorporate it into the German Reich. The signing of a new alliance between the United Kingdom and Poland on August 25 did not significantly alter his plans.
2006-12-12 03:29:35
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answer #1
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answered by Anonymous
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Primarily due to a military axiom, that roughly goes "losers learn, winners forget". The Germans analyzed the causes of their almost-victory and rightly saw that the allies' armored vehicles, combined with airpower helped overcome the German's tactical superiority. Also, they refined that superiority, infiltration tactics, by increasing the number of automatic weapons in infantry units. This gibed with the Treaty of Versailles which prevented the Germans from having "sustained fire weapons". Tanks and aircraft were also forbidden, but deals with Sweden and the USSR ensured that the officer corps could be kept up to speed with the latest developments in armored and aerial warfare. The Germans had opportunities to try out their new weapons and tactics in Spain. Finally the effect of Hitler cannot be ignored. He was looking for a cheap, fast way to overawe the western allies, and develop his military strength. The idea of mobile warfare "Blitzkrieg" (though it was never called that by the German military. To this day as a matter of fact) answered those needs. Whereas the Allies, occupied with disarmament and colonial policing, did not invest the economic or intellectual power (especially in Britain, where professional officers were actually discouraged) to reassess their tactical philosophy. In the case of Britain, it can be said that they never did really catch on to mobile/mounted warfare until after WW2.
2006-12-12 10:26:27
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answer #2
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answered by jim 7
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Take some time to go to the library and pick up "The Arms of Krupp" by William Manchester. They were the steel giants and the armorer to the Kaiser and Hitler. You'll see how they left everyone else in Europe in the dust.
2006-12-12 04:00:02
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answer #3
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answered by Quasimodo 7
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