English Deutsch Français Italiano Español Português 繁體中文 Bahasa Indonesia Tiếng Việt ภาษาไทย
All categories

2006-12-10 16:05:53 · 6 answers · asked by Anonymous in Social Science Anthropology

6 answers

First of all, your question is not an anthropological one, it is an epistemological one; hence, it properly is considered a philosophical question.

First you have to structure the question because "to know" can have sense beyond that of mere propositional knowledge (which I'll shortly get to). Consider the following statements:

1. Janes Knows San Francisco
2. Jane knows how to get to San Francisco from San Jose.
3. Jane knows that San Francisco is North of San Jose.

Statement (1) is an instance of what philosophers call 'avauaintence knowledge'. This is the intuition that knowledge consists in first-hand acquaintance with a person, place, event, and so on. This sort of knowledge is gained by meeting them; or going somewhere; or by witnessing some state of affiars, etc. Statement (2 ) is an instance of what philosophers call 'ability knowledge'. Intuitively, this consists in knowing how to perform certain actions. For example, we gain ability knowledge by learning how to speak a language, or riding a bicycle, or playing a musical instrument. Statement (3) is an instance of what philosophers call "propositional knowledge". It is propositional knowledge that interests epistemologists most--this is what your question is most likely about.

States of affairs in the world are described by true propositions. And the picture passed down to us, primarlily beginiing with Plato, is the following:

S knows that P if and only if (just in case) the following obtain:
1. S believes P
2. S's belief in P is justified
3 P is true

This picture of justified true belief has had serious difficulties recently remaining a plauisible picture due to what is called ""The Gettier Problem" and Casual theories. A causal theory approach concerns how to construe justification. Causal theorists argue that we ougth to construe justification according to causal conditions. Roughly, the idea is that S knows that P if and only if:

1 S believes that P
2 P is true
3. S's belief that P is causally produced and perpetuated by the fact that makes P true.

This is the basis for what is called the Causal Theory of Knowledge.

The other problem I mentioned is The Gettier Problem. In 1963 Gettier published a short but highly influential article in which the standard picture of justified true belief is shown to be lacking. Here is one of his counter-examples to that veiw:
Smith is justified in believing the false proposition that (1) Jones owns a Ford. On the basis of (1), Smith infers, and is therefore justified in believing, that (2) either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. As it happens, Brown is in Barcelona, and so (2) is true. So, although Smith is justified in believing the true proposition (2), Smith does not know that (2) is true.

So, Gettier-style counter-examples are cases in which a person has justified true belief that P but still lacks knowledge that P. So in the above example, while the laws of logic allow Smith to infer justifiedly that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, it remains the case that Smith does not know Brown is in Barcelona just because Jones owns a Ford. Hence, you can now see why the Causal Theory of knowledge was introduced-- it seems that Smith must have some causal conection between his belief that Jones owns a Ford and his belief that Brown is in Barcelona. But seemingly, that Jones owns a Ford confers no causal condition as to why Smith knows that Brown is in Barcelona. The Gettier problem is the problem of finding a modification of, or an addition to, the standard anaysis of justified true belief. It is a highly complex problem in Epistemology. But the Gettier problem is not a refutation of the standard picture, it is an example of the standard picture's incompleteness. Gettier and Causal theorists are not suggesting we throw out the standard anaysis of justified true belief.

2006-12-11 07:35:42 · answer #1 · answered by russell_my_frege 2 · 0 0

Widely accepted and in many text books: In order to count as knowledge, a statement must be justified, true, and believed. Some philosophers object, though, because of the so-called Gettier-case Counterexamples (check "Gettier" in Wikipedia)

2006-12-11 04:19:16 · answer #2 · answered by Jacky D 1 · 1 1

Most anthropologists will understand knowledge in its Foucauldian sense, i.e., knowledge is that which is knowable, and that which is knowable is governed by the categories put in place by those in power. In this sense, the opposite of knowledge is absurdity.

Thus, among the mainstream of anthropology, knowledge and power are inseparable. If you want a more in depth answer, you might post this question to the philosophy forum - there is an entire branch of philosophy, epistemology, devoted to exactly your question.

2006-12-11 07:15:56 · answer #3 · answered by Anonymous · 0 1

I outline atheism as a lack of conception in a deity. Agnosticism is what you defined above, the position someone doesn't believe in any in many situations established gods, yet doesn't deny the life of a deity. And certain, someone can believe in ghosts and be an atheist, yet they could't believe in ghosts and be sensible.

2016-11-30 10:18:07 · answer #4 · answered by haltom 4 · 0 0

If u mean knowledge, then learning to understand concepts is best.

2006-12-10 16:11:56 · answer #5 · answered by papabeartex 4 · 1 3

education

2006-12-11 18:57:04 · answer #6 · answered by Anonymous · 0 1

fedest.com, questions and answers