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2006-12-10 15:02:08 · 3 answers · asked by Anonymous in Arts & Humanities History

3 answers

In the Battle of Brandywine, General Sir William Howe was the British commander and General George Washington was the American commander. The battle started as a result of Howe's embarrassment. Howe was embarrassed by Washington's successful maneuvering at Trenton and Princeton. Howe wanted to lure Washington into battle and destroy his army. Howe failed to get Washington to fight in New Jersey, so he set out to take Philadelphia, the Patriot capital.

Howe landed near the Brandywine Creek, which became the place of opportunity for Americans to make their first real effort to stop the enemy advance toward Philadelphia. The Americans centered their concentration at Chadd's Ford.

Howe advanced slowly bringing forward supplies from his station near the Brandywine. Howe's troops were still weak from their long confinement aboard ship and few horses were ready for battle. Howe's military intelligence made up for these setbacks. When Howe reached Kennett Square, he split his army of 12,500 in two. 5,000 went with Knyphausen, the other 7,500 went with Cornwallis. Knyphausen was to make a secondary attack against Chadd's Ford.

The two groups of British forces moved out at dawn on September 11, 1777. Washington learned early in the morning that the British were advancing towards Chadd's Ford, and alerted his troops. At 8 o'clock, Maxwell's covering force was in contact, and in two hours they had withdrawn back across the creek. By 10:30 Knyphausen was in position along the creek and his activity was limited to a relatively harmless exchange of cannonballs with Porter's American artillery on the left bank.

When the British didn't make an attempt to cross at Chadd's Ford, Washington and his officers suspected they would cross elsewhere. At 11 o'clock the Americans got reports of Cornwallis' movement. Colonel Moses Hazen sent word from Jones’ Ford to Chadd's that an enemy column was marching to the forks of the Brandywine. Hazen's report was confirmed by Lt. Col. James Ross, who was patrolling Great Valley Road with 70 men. In his message he said about 5,000 men and 16 or 18 guns were moving up the road toward Taylor's and Jeffrie's Fords.

Washington sent a message to Col. Bland, who was with the cavalry screen on the right, to have an officer verify Hazen's report by reconnaisance. Washington then directed Alexander and Stephen to march their divisions to the Birmingham Meeting House. The meeting house was on the road which the British were most likely to move if they really were attempting a turning movement. Washington noticed the opportunity open to him if Howe detached 5,000 men for this maneuver. Washington figured he could counterattack with the divisions of Sullivan, Lincoln, and Green to destroy the enemy forces across Chadd's Ford. The operation had almost started when it was canceled due to a report from Sullivan. Sullivan said he had seen some of the militia who came in from Martin's Tavern on the forks of the Brandywine. They said that they had heard nothing of the enemy above the forks of the Brandywine, so Col. Hazen's information must have been wrong.

Washington was uncertain whether or not the enemy really had been weakened. He not only called off the counterattack but also halted the movement of Alexander and Stephen to Birmingham until the situation was clarified. He permitted Maxwell to cross the creek several times to probe the enemy position, but pulled back the rest of his troops so as to not have further damage from artillery.

Early in the afternoon, a farmer came to Benjamin Ring's house, where Washington was, and insisted that he be able to speak to Washington personally. He told Washington that the British were about to surround him. Washington was skeptical, but confirmation came almost immediately. Col. Bland, who was with the cavalry screen on the right, reported about two enemy brigades in the vicinity of Osborne Hill, about two miles north of Sullivan's flank. A message from Sullivan relayed Bland's information.

Washington was robbed of an opportunity and perhaps trapped by faulty intelligence. Washington ordered Sullivan to march immediately to meet the new threat. Alexander and Stephen were told to rush toward Birmingham. Washington would stay at Chadd's Ford with Greene’s division and the brigades of Wayne and Maxwell since the situation was by no means clear and there could have been only two enemy brigades to his rear.

At about 4:30, cannons were heard to the rear of Washington. The enemy began firing with the Americans returning fire. At the same time the enemy artillery fire quickened at Chadd's Ford to indicate that an attack might be starting there. After forty minutes Washington started for Sullivan's front. Washington was led by Joseph Brown with Green's Division following at a fast pace.

The enemy to Washington's rear had reached Trimble's and Jefferie's Ford by 2 o'clock in the afternoon the next day. By 4 o'clock they had attacked in the vicinity of Birmingham. They had marched 17 miles over 11 hours.

Alexander and Stephen raced to occupy good defensive ground on a hill southwest of Birmingham. As the enemy advanced these two units were almost set up when Sullivan arrived with his division and took overall command. Sullivan, who was unfamiliar with the terrain, soon realized his division was a half-mile in front of Alexander and Stephen as well as only 200 yards from an advancing enemy column. Sullivan ordered the other two divisions to give him room for his division. During this time Stephen's troops gave up good terrain and Sullivan's troops attacked while moving into position. The regiments to Sullivan’s left and other divisions of his right held off the initial enemy attack.

When Washington arrived, about 5:30, Sullivan's left was beginning to break under the British attack. When Weedon's Brigade arrived at 6 o'clock their deployment on the American right succeeded in stopping the enemy on that side. Washington let Sullivan continue to direct action, while he rode up and down the line with Lafayette encouraging the defenders. Sullivan's wing was beaten, and was soon heading back to Chester.

Knyphausen pushed across Chadd's Ford soon after Cornwallis attacked. Knyphausen led the 4th British regiment over next, and the rest of his command followed. The American left fell back first, Armstrong's Militia withdrew from Pyle's Ford. Knyphausen and Cornwallis made contact about dark, soon after 7 p.m. , and Howe established his headquarters at Dilworth.

The British failure to pursue the fleeing Americans and their decision to go into camp is what ended the battle. Washington gathered his troops, marched northward and camped near Germantown. The British marched on after breaking camp and occupied Philadelphia, which the Americans had been forced to leave virtually undefended.

Of some 11,000 men in the ranks General Greene estimated that Washington lost 1,200 to 1,300 men about 400 of which were prisoners. The Americans also lost 11 guns. Of approximately 12,500 in the ranks, Howe lost 577 killed and wounded and six missing.

2006-12-10 15:14:55 · answer #1 · answered by TK 4 · 0 0

see this link

http://www.ushistory.org/brandywine/thestory.htm

2006-12-10 23:15:03 · answer #2 · answered by Sophist 7 · 0 0

http://www.ushistory.org/brandywine/
http://www.thebrandywine.com/attractions/battle.html
http://www.fieldtrip.com/pa/04593342.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brandywine
http://patriots.wordpress.com/tag/pennsylvania/brandywine/
http://www.dailypress.com/travel/dp-trav0414apr12,0,2625744.story?coll=dp-travel-utility
http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Battle_of_Brandywine

2006-12-10 23:57:12 · answer #3 · answered by amhbas 3 · 0 0

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