Hume's view on miracles?

Question

Please simply explain

Answer 1

It's about testimony. Hume thinks it's not reasonable to believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony. Or at least you can't base a religion on the strength of such testimony.

Why? Because, due to the kind of event being reported, any miracle report is very improbable -- so improbable you'd need super-credible testimony to outweigh the probability. That's Part I of the essay. And for a variety of reasons, testimony of miracles is never that credible. That's Part II of the essay. It follows that it's not reasonable to accept testimony of miracles or base your religious convictions on such testimony.

Why are miracle reports intrinsically improbable? Because when you evaluate testimony, there are many factors to take into account. There is the nature of the testimony (how credible are the witnesses?), and the nature of the event being reported (how unusual is the it?). The more unusual the event being reported, the less confidence you should have in the report. Now, miracles are, by definition, violations of the laws of nature. And the laws of nature are established by the strongest kind of evidence. Therefore, miracles are threatened by the strongest kind of evidence, and hence any miracle report is extremely improbable just due to the kind of event being reported.

Why isn't the testimony credible enough to outweigh this extreme improbability? First, nowhere in history do you find really credible miracle reports (e.g., lots of educated witnesses with integrity and a reputation to lose). Second, we humans kind of want to believe in things that are supernatural and 'cool', and in religious matters we tend to 'turn off' our skepticism and common sense. Third, miracle reports tend to show up more among uneducated people. Fourth, there are different miracle reports for different religions, and they can't all be true.

Here's an often-overlooked point. Hume admits that super-credible testimony really could establish a violation of the laws of nature: see his Jan 1, 1600 'eight days of darkness' hypothetical example. It's just that he thinks that you'll never find such solid testimony in real life, and that religion has such a history of lies and forgeries and frauds that, as a rule, it's reasonable to ignore miracle reports coming from religious contexts.

Answer 2

Here is the direct quotation from Hume's "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" pages 114-116:

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation....

The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish....' When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence