I need to critically evaluate David Humes argument that we don't know that the sun will rise tomorrow?

Question

I don't know where to start. I've read the essays but I think I am missing the point. Does this link with his theory of cause and effect?

Answer 1

I presume you're reading the Enquiry, section 4.

Here is a simple version:

A: I think the sun will rise tomorrow.
B: Why do you think that?
A: Because it's risen on every previous day.
B: But that only counts if you assume that the future will be like the past.
A: What's wrong with that assumption? It seems reasonable enough.
B: Can you give an argument for that assumption?
A: Well, doesn't the future _have to be_ like the past? Isn't it just a matter of necessity?
B: No. There's no rule that says the future has to be like the past. Nature might change its course. That's a consistent possibility and you haven't ruled it out.
A: But I have strong evidence for thinking nature won't change its course. After all, nature has never changed its course before. It's always been very consistent.
B: But that evidence counts only if you assume that the future will be like the past. And that's exactly what I'm questioning.
A: So let me get this straight. I can't prove for sure that the future will be like the past --
B: -- because nature might change its course, and you can't rule that out.
A: And I can't simply draw on experience to say that nature won't change its course --
B: -- because if you draw on experience, you're assuming that the future will be like the past. And that's what you're supposed to show. So it's circular.
A: So I can't flat-out prove my assumption and I can't draw on experience to give evidence that supports it. So what can I do?
B: Apparently nothing. There's no argument available. Your assumption is forever unsupported.

OK, now here's the more accurate version:

First, Hume thinks our reasoning about cause and effect is a matter of 'learning from experience'. We have a current case in front of us, and we draw on experience of previous cases similar to the current case. For example, when I make judgments about the sun rising tomorrow, I draw on experience of previous days where the sun rose. Or when I make judgments about what will happen when one billiard ball knocks into another, I draw on experience of previous cases of things knocking into each other. In general, when I reason from cause to effect or from effect to cause, when I try to figure out what caused x or what will result from x, I'm drawing on experience of similar previous cases.

Now, Hume's interested in the psychological process by which we move from previous cases to the current case. And what Hume wants to show is that it's not _reasoning_ that's driving this process. There's no argument, no intellectual line of thought, no "operation of the understanding" capable of explaining this move from past to future, from the previous cases to the current case. Reason can't do the job. That's what he wants to show.

Here's how he shows it. He says there are two kinds of reasoning, demonstrative reasoning and matter-of-fact reasoning, and that neither one will work.

What's demonstrative reasoning? It's the kind of reasoning we do in mathematical proofs. You go from one idea to the next, seeing the connections between them. Everything is supposed to follow with necessity. So 2+2=4 isn't just true; it _has_ to be true. Denying it entails a contradiction. You can't even conceive of it being any other way.

Why won't this kind of reasoning work? Because, as Hume says, even if all the previous cases have been a certain way, it doesn't follow that the current case will also be that way. There's no rule saying the future has to be like the past. Nature might change course, and there's no contradiction there, it's perfectly conceivable. So there's no way for demonstrative reasoning to account for this move from past to future.

What's matter-of-fact reasoning? It's the kind of reasoning this section is all about. It's reasoning from cause to effect or effect to cause by drawing on experience.

Why won't this kind of reasoning work? Circularity. Matter-of-fact reasoning can't be what's driving this move from past to future; after all, you can't even do matter-of-fact reasoning without making that move. Again: this kind of reasoning _relies on_ a move from past from future, and therefore it can't be what _accounts for_ or _explains_ that move.

So Hume says neither of the two kinds of reasoning could account for this move from past to future. Those are the only two kinds. So it must not be reasoning that's at work here. It must be something else, some other psychological mechanism or process. (In section 5, we learn that _habit_ is what's behind it)

Answer 2

You are referring to David Hume's Principle of Induction. In short, it is that: "similar events occur similarly under similar circumstances."

For example, one may say, "sun will rise tomorrow." The question here is that: how do you really know that? If you say that you know, then the sun must rise tomorrow without a fail. I will use another example, suppose that it is back in year 2001. On Sep 10th, people thought that WTC would be standing on Sep 12. As you know it came down on 11th. That means on 10th, they did not know. So if you say you know about something that will happen in future, that something really has to happen.

Back to David Hume's principle of induction; quite often scientists would refer to this mechanism or that mechanism involving the solar system. "because this is this and that is that, the sun will rise tomorrow." Usually, scientists would appeal to the causal law (the theory of cause and effect) and say, sun will rise tomorrow.

The concern here is not so much of what the cause and effect relation is. The real issue is that how do you really know that the causal law will not cease to exist tomorrow. Simply because a given thing has happened so many times in the past is not a guarantee of it is going to happen tomorrow; all it guarantees is that it happened before.

So if you want to make projection scientifically into future, it requires to PRESUPPOSE that the causal effects would hold tomorrow. Another way to look at it is that the principle of induction is an axiom; which by definition cannot be proven or demonstrated in any other way. By the same token, you cannot even disprove it too.

Answer 3

What Hume replaced into talking approximately frequently replaced into regulations of Nature, approximately which he proposed that they might desire to not be referred to as "regulations" because of the fact if the sunlight did not upward push day after today, this is blow the completed factor to products. the only reason he reported that replaced into so as that he might desire to disprove the existence of miracles. For him, to confirm that something to be classed as a miracle between the criterion is that it would desire to ruin a regulation of nature. If there at the instant are not any regulations of nature even though if, this might't take place and finally, he succeeds in disproving miracles. in actuality, the reason you do not completely understand Hume is via the fact he refused to be open minded touching directly to the existence of miracles and so dogmatically rejected perception in them. To sum up he reported that "miracles do not take place because of the fact they are able to't"; a type of irrational standpoint that rational people like your self are sure to question if not get a splash perplexed approximately. wish this helps! :)

Answer 4

It's just as valid to say we don't know that it won't. It is the philosophic uncertainty principle. The future is not knowable with absolute certainty. (except for the death and taxes part).