In laymans terms what is this question...?

Question

"Critically consider arguments for and against the theory that mental states are inner representations that explain behaviour. What kind of mental representations might be involved, if any?"

Answer 1

In philosophy of mind there are two very broad views about the nature of mental states. One view says that mental states represent the external world, and the other view says that mental states are essentially Being encountering itself. I know this just as confusing as the original question, but give me a moment and I will explain.

You might think of this difference as the difference between a REPRESENTATION and a PRESENTATION. Some philosophers emphasize this difference by writing 'representation' as 're-presentation' (the hyphen serves to emphasize the 're'). The point is that a re-presentation is essentially different than what it re-presents. A road map, for example, re-presents a region on the surface of the earth. A map is a sheet of paper with ink on it, whereas the surface of the earth is obviously something substantially different. There is supposedly some sort of correspondence between the distribution of ink on the map and the distribution of roads and other features on the surface of the earth, which is what allows us to say that the maps represents the surface of the earth.

Now the notion that mental states are INNER representations of the world suggests that each person has her own "map" of the world in her head. Notice that, on this view, what is "in our heads" is fundamentally different than what the world is in itself. So if you and I look at a tree, our brain cells fire in certain ways and we each have our own experience of the tree. How do I know that your experience of the tree is the same as mine? We both say it is green, but we could agree on this language even if our experiences of green are very different. In other words, it doesn't really matter what we actually experience because for the purpose of communication (and other sorts of useful behavior) all that really matters is that whatever we each experience corresponds to the world in a functionally useful way. But the point is that I never really experience THE WORLD as such, but rather, I only experience my mental re-presentation of the world. This leads to the classic philosophical "problem of other minds" (how do I know that my experiences are like yours) and "the problem of the external world" (how do I know that there really even is an external world? Maybe its all just a dream or delusion.) If you've seen the movie "The Matrix" (or "Total Recall" or "The 13th Floor", etc.) then you can get an idea of how this sort of skepticism might arise.

So in plain English, if mental states are inner representations, then our practical abilities to interact with the world (behave in ways that makes sense) depends on the correspondence between our mental representations and the world itself, just like the usefulness of a road map depends on the correspondence between the lines of ink and the locations of actual roads.

Now just for fun, you may want to compare this to a radically different theory on the nature of mental states. Some philosophers, (phenomenologists, for example) don't talk about our mental states as "representing" the world. Rather, they say that there is fundamentally one Being (just simply Existence itself) so each of us is essentially Being as it presents Itself to Itself. Notice there is no RE-presentation; there is only PRESENTATION. Being PRESENTS itself to itself. (Or, the world PRESENTS itself to beings.) Mental processes are the processes by which the world presents itself to beings. On this view, there is no such thing as an isolated individual, and there are no such things as "inner representations." Rather, there is simply the world, and the world is a network of meaningful relationships. What seem to be "individuals" are really just "subprocesses" (so to speak) in which the world finds itself experiencing itself from assorted unique perspectives. Basically, we can know the world because we essentially "are" the world. There is no radical ontological distinction between subject and object.

Non-representationalist views of reality are confusing to most westerners because we are so used to thinking in terms of mental representations and correspondence views on the nature of truth. But for what its worth, my own views are non-representationalist / phenomenological in nature, so if you take a look at my profile and read some of my other answers, you might start to get a better picture of how the phenomenological approach works.

Answer 2

I would say it's the other way around. Inner mental states explain external behavior.

For example, someone who is depressed may commit suicide.

Someone who has been dwelling on a personal problem might lash out for a trivial reason the action not matching the provocation to the casual observer.

Someone with obsessive\compulsive behavior might feel compelled to continually check that their children are sleeping throughout the night, the thought leading to the action.

Answer 3

The very brief theory of Karma is just that...
The "residue " of past experiences, perceptions, do condition the future behaviour, and it is further compounded by the consequences, making the inner representations, mental representations more complex, till the residue 'collection' process terminates/recedes, plus, mutation of the past residues, whichever way....

Answer 4

Present the two sides of the argument concerning whether mental states (i.e. mood) are representative of the behaviour the individual carries out. i.e. if they are behaving violently does this reflect an angry mood? You will need to explain what this theory fully entails and what alternative theories might be by presenting them in contrast. Hope this helps.

Answer 5

Sounds like.... Give good for and against the theory that a person's mental state is a personality or multiple personalities of that one person.
Ie; if it's at all possible that we have many different characters with seperate reasoning inside our one mind!
Also discuss if these are indeed characters or seperate parts of the brain that syphon rationality seperately and eliminate reasons, methods and cause etc;...

That is what I percieve this question to be about.

Answer 6

Mental

Answer 7

Very generally speaking our mental state does define, and often promote our behaviors.

What we think and feel is manifest in our actions.

It might take someone very cognizant to act insane, or disturbed, or other mentally challenging disorders, but someone with a psychosis might be hard pressed to FOOL others in any opposite representation.

Answer 8

the question is "what kind of mental states are involved in explaining behaviour, if it is involved at all?" It is worded quite oddly in the provided text i would say.

Answer 9

To what extent does our mood dictate our actions? How far do people allow the way they happen to be feeling at a particular time reflect on their behaviour and in what ways?

Answer 10

A metaphor and a concept are heavily proper. Apples and Oranges are the two end result. Why --- by way of fact they're like one yet another -- how by way of fact they're the fit to be eaten seed bearing areas of vegetation. If I say "He grow to be a lion in the courtroom" which means he had characteristics that have been similar to those of a lion -- braveness, boldness, stealth, means. it is likewise real to assert that metaphors are basically conceptual. If there have been a concept for beings that are stealthy/formidable/skillful then that criminal professional and a lion might the two be subsumed in the belief, superb. no longer something particularly is something. we are in a position to convey mutually issues mutually below innovations (like apples and oranges). Or we are in a position to convey mutually then mutually in metaphors (like trial legal professionals and lions) yet apples are no longer oranges -- and extra to the element -- this apple isn't that orange, and lions are no longer legal professionals, and extra to the element, this lion isn't that criminal professional. In the two situations we are saying that one element is like yet another in some way. Metaphors and prefer innovations in some way; and vice-versa. They convey mutually issues mutually which rather are diverse, separate, unique, no longer the comparable element -- particularly some issues. desire this facilitates you.