What book compares rationalism and empiricism?

Answer 1

Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism: An introduction
by Aune, B Random House New York 1970

Answer 2

Kant's Critique of organic reason is puzzling yet functional. Hume's An Enquiry on the problem of Human information will be more effective certain on your needs than his Treaty on Human Nature. I trust the first poster with regards to Descartes. study his Discourse on approach and his Meditations on First Philosophy. in case you try this, you'll fly nicely.

Answer 3

Or you could compare them for yourself.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl778.htm

"Hegel’s Science of Logic

Kant's Critique of Rational Psychology
§ 1685
These conceptions, which must be called barbarous, place the defect in the fact that in thinking of the 'I', the 'I' as subject cannot be omitted; but the same defect then also appears the other way round, namely in this way, that 'I' occurs only as subject of self-consciousness, or I can use myself only as subject of a judgement, and the intuition is lacking by which the 'I' might be given as an object; but the notion of a thing that can exist only as subject does not so far involve any objective reality at all. If external intuition, determined in space and time, is required for objectivity, and it is this that is missing here, then it is quite clear that by objectivity is meant merely sensuous reality; and to have risen above that is a condition of thinking and of truth. But of course, if 'I' is taken not in its Notion but as a mere, simple, general idea, in the way we pronounce 'I' in everyday consciousness, then it is the abstract determination and not the self-relation that has itself for object. In that case, it is only one of the extremes, a one-sided subject without its objectivity, or else it would be merely an object without subjectivity, were it not for the inconvenience alluded to, that the thinking subject cannot be eliminated from the 'I' as object. But in fact the same inconvenience occurs with the former determination, with the 'I' as subject; the 'I' thinks something, itself or something else. This inseparability of the two forms in which it opposes itself to itself belongs to the innermost nature of its Notion and of the Notion itself; it is precisely what Kant wants to stave off in order to retain the mere general idea, which does not inwardly differentiate itself and therefore, of course, lacks the Notion. Now a Notionless conception of this kind may indeed oppose itself to the abstract reflective determinations or categories of the previous metaphysics: for in one-sidedness it stands on a level with them, though these are indeed on a higher level of thought; but on the other hand it appears all the more meagre and empty when compared with the profounder ideas of ancient philosophy on the conception of the soul or of thinking, as for example the genuinely speculative ideas of Aristotle. If the Kantian philosophy investigated the reflective categories in question, it was even more bound to investigate the firmly held abstraction of the empty 'I', the presumed idea of the thing-in-itself, which, precisely on account of its abstraction, proves on the contrary to be something completely untrue. The experience of the inconvenience complained of is itself the empirical fact in which the untruth of that abstraction expresses itself."


http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/li_terms.htm