why was richmond abandoned in the american civil war when petersburg fell?

Question

In the early months of the war Robert E Lee built numerous start shaped forts around the confederate capitol, so why was Richmond abandoned when Grant broke through at Petersburg with the rest of Richmond's defenses still intact?

Answer 1

The defense of Petersburg and Richmond were interlinked. If one fell, the other would be untennable.

The Army of the Potomac had its winter quarters in front of the Army of Northern Virginia in 1864-65. The left of the former held a tight grasp upon the Weldon road, while the Army of the James, on the north side of that river, and forming the right of the besiegers of Petersburg and Richmond, had its pickets within a few miles of the latter city. Sheridan, at the same time, was at Kernstown, near Winchester, full master of the Shenandoah Valley from Harper's Ferry to Staunton. Grant's chief business during the winter was to hold Robert E. Lee tightly while Sherman, Thomas, and Canby were making their important conquests, in accordance with the comprehensive plan of the lieutenant-general. The leaders in the Confederate government at Richmond contemplated the abandonment of Virginia and the concentration of the troops of Lee and Johnston south of the Roanoke. The politicians of Virginia would not allow such a movement, nor would Lee have led the Army of Northern Virginia out of that State; so, President Davis and his advisers had to abandon their project. Besides, Grant held Lee so firmly that he had no free choice- in the matter.

It was near the close of March, 1865, before Grant was ready for a general movement against Lee. Early in December Warren had seized the Weldon road farther south than had yet been done. He destroyed it (Dec. 7) all the way to the Meherin River, meeting with little opposition. A few weeks later there was some sharp skirmishing between Confederate gunboats and National batteries near Dutch Gap Canal. A little later a movement was made on the extreme left of the Nationals to seize the Southside Railway and to develop the strength of Lee's right. The entire army in front of Petersburg received marching orders, and, on Feb. 6, the flanking movement began. After a sharp fight near Hatcher's Run, the Nationals permanently extended their left to that stream. Grant now determined to cut off all communication with Richmond north of that city. The opportunity offered towards the middle of February. Lee had drawn the greater portion of his forces from the Shenandoah Valley, and Sheridan, under instructions, made a grand cavalry raid against the northern communications with the Confederate capital, and especially for the seizure of Lynchburg. It was a most destructive march, and very bewildering to the Confederates.

This raid, the junction of the National armies in North Carolina, and the operations at Mobile and in Central Alabama satisfied Lee that he could no longer maintain his position, unless, by some means, his army might be vastly increased and new and ample resources for its supply obtained. He had recommended the emancipation of the slaves and making soldiers of them, but the slave interest was too powerful in the civil councils of the Confederacy to obtain a law to that effect. Viewing the situation calmly, he saw no hope for the preservation of his army from starvation or capture, nor for the existence of the Confederacy, except in breaking through Grant's lines and forming a junction with Johnston in North Carolina. He knew such a movement would be perilous, but he resolved to attempt it; and he prepared for a retreat from the Appomattox to the Roanoke. Grant saw symptoms of such a movement, and, on March 24, 1865, issued an order for a general forward movement on the 29th. On the 25th Lee's army attempted to break the National line at the strong point of Fort Steadman, in front of the 9th Corps. They also assailed Fort Haskell, on the left of Fort Steadman, but were repulsed. These were sharp but fruitless struggles by the Confederates to break the line. The grand movement of the whole National army on the 29th was begun by the left, for the purpose of turning Lee's right, with an overwhelming force. At the same time Sheridan was approaching the Southside Railway to destroy it. Lee's right entrenched lines extended beyond Hatcher's Run, and against these and the men who held them the turning column marched. General Ord, with three divisions of the Army of the James, had been drawn from the north side of that river and transferred to the left of the National lines before Petersburg. The remainder of Ord's command was left in charge of General Weitzel, to hold the extended lines of the Nationals, fully 35 miles in length.

Sheridan reached Dinwiddie Courthouse towards the evening of March 29. Early that morning the corps of Warren (5th) and Humphreys (2nd) moved on parallel roads against the flank of the Confederates, and, when within 2 miles of their works, encountered a line of battle. A sharp fight occurred, and the Confederates were repulsed, with a loss of many killed and wounded and 100 made prisoners. Warren lost 370 men. Lee now fully comprehended the perils that menaced him. The only line of communication with the rest of the Confederacy might be cut at any hour. He also perceived the necessity of strengthening his right to avert the impending shock of battle; likewise of maintaining his extended line of works covering Petersburg and Richmond. Not aware of the withdrawal of troops from the north side of the James, he left James Longstreet's corps, 8,000 strong, to defend Richmond. Robert E. Lee had massed a great body of his troops—some 15,000-at a point in front of the corps of Warren and Humphreys, the former on the extreme right of the Confederates. There Lee attempted (March 30) to break through the National lines, and for a moment his success seemed assured. A part of the line was pushed back, but Griffin's division stood firm and stemmed the fierce torrent, while Ayres and Crawford reformed the broken column.

Warren soon assumed the offensive, made a countercharge, and, by the aid of a part of Hancock's corps, drove back the Confederates. Lee then struck another blow at a supposed weak point on the extreme left of the Nationals, held by Sheridan. A severe battle ensued. Both parties lost heavily.On the evening of the same day all the National guns in front of Petersburg opened on the Confederate lines from Appomattox to Hatcher's Run.


EVACUATION OF PETERSBURG.

Wright, Parke, and Ord, holding the entrenchments at Petersburg, were ordered to follow up the bombardment with an assault. The bombardment was kept up until 4 A.M. (April 2), and the assault began at daybreak. Parke carried the outer line of the Confederate works in his front, but was checked at an inner line. Wright drove everything before him to the Boydton plank road, where he turned to the left towards Hatcher's Run, and, pressing along the rear of the Confederate entrenchments, captured several thousand men and many guns. Ord's division broke the Confederate division on Hatcher's Run, when the combined forces swung round to the right and pushed towards Petersburg from the southwest. On the same day the Southside Railway was first struck at three points by the Nationals, who had driven the Confederates from their entrenchments and captured many. This achievement effectually cut off one of Lee's most important communications. Gibbon's division of Ord's command captured two strong redoubts south of Petersburg. In this assault Gibbon lost about 500 men. The Confederates were now confined to an inner line of works close around Petersburg. James Longstreet went to the help of Lee, and the latter ordered a charge to be made to recover some of the lost entrenchments. It failed; and so ended the really last blow struck for the defense of Richmond by Lee's army. General A. P. Hill, one of Lee's best officers, was shot dead while reconnoitering. Lee now perceived that he could no longer hold Petersburg or the capital with safety to his army. At 10.30 on Sunday morning (April 2) he telegraphed to the government at Richmond: "My lines are broken in three places; Richmond must be evacuated this evening." Then Lee's troops withdrew from Petersburg, and the struggle there ended.

Answer 2

Mainly because by that late in the war Lee's army had been so reduced in numbers that he could not afford to split off part of it to man the defenses of Richmond while keeping the rest of his army mobile. If he had fallen back into Richmond with his entire army, they would have been surrounded by Grant's much larger army and besieged, with little hope of holding out for very long anyway due to a lack of virtually everything that keeps an army going. Defending Richmond would have been a futile gesture in either case by that point in the war, because Grant had enough troops to both besiege Richmond and maintain an army of maneuver. By keeping his army in the field and able to maneuver while living off the land, Lee hoped to yet snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, or at least achieve a negotiated peace.

That, too, was a forlorn hope, but Lee just couldn't bear the thought of giving up. Eventually, however, as the pitiful remnant of the once grand Army of Northern Virginia became surrounded, even in the field, by overwhelming Union forces, Lee recognized the futility of continued resistance and bowed to the inevitable.

Answer 3

Maybe, prior to the 2nd revolutionary war congress had set up a series of tariffs on imports. The result being that as southern agricultural exports were traded overseas the southern states wound up paying somewhere around 90% of Federal taxes which were being spent on railroad and canal projects in the north. You have to realize at the time there were more millionaires in Natchez Mississippi than in New York City. It was similar to Obama's plan to "Tax the Rich". When the government takes upon itself the responsibility to pick winners and losers you're laying ground work for civil strife.

Answer 4

Lee's plan in conjuction with Jefferson Davis was to move the war south. Rally support in North Carolina and Georgia. This would have been possible with the shipping of Sherman's army North to help close the noose, there were limitted Union forces in the deep South. Lee's army of Northern Virginia was alway famous for it's ability to move rapidly and escape from the Union.

Answer 5

Basically Lee was out maneuvered and his army needed a break. The South was collapsing at this time so he needed a place to rally, gather supplies, and think of a way to keep fighting.

Answer 6

Perhaps he was worried about being out flanked, or their food source couldn't sustain a seige.

Answer 7

it was untenable, the union was rolling them up, also Lee felt the town irrelevant to continuing the fight.

Answer 8

Anytime you're outflanked, you need to retreat or be caught in the trap with no escape....