Are all noun phrases eliminable?

Question

Quine shows how we may predicate "being-Socrates" of Socrates, then evaluate the description: there exists an object such that it is-Socrates. If all proper names, which implicitly commit us to the existence of the denotata, are reducible in our language to a description (however irreducible the description may be) are we then committed to an ontology without objects?

I suppose all noun phrases refer to objects-- to things and not properties. 'Redness' is nothing more than "the set of all red objects" which doesn't commit us to the existence of the irreducible property over and above the particular. If a theory stipulates "there exists an x" as a requirement, we are committed to that thing in the ontology. Quine showed how we are not committed to non-existent objects, though we may still meaningfully talk about them when we say "Pegasus does not exist". He reduces names, that imply existence, to definite descriptions, which can then be analyzed out by quantified variables under predication.

Noun phrases include definite descriptions of the kind: "the tallest alcoholic in the bar"; indefinite descriptions: "a man walking a poodle"; proper names: Napoleon Bonaparte; and also the deviant class of properties: redness, "the most salient pitch", etc.

Descriptions eliminate the need to include the objects we talk about, either truthfully or falsely, in our ontology. If we affirm the description "The tallest alcoholic in the bar is tired" then we are committed to an object satisfying the variable. Since all nouns -- even proper names, the last bastion of reference -- can be described by means of description, it seems that we are no longer comitted to objects at all.

I can replace "object" in the metalanguage with a description. Wherever there is hypostasis, predication will subsume.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_theory_of_descriptions

Answer 1

I don't see why proper names being "reducible" to descriptions commits us to an ontology without objects. Both the proper name and the description refer to an object (their denotatum). It seems like an ontology can't be "without objects" by definition. Unless you are referring to the linguistic expression of the ontology, which obviously doesn't contain the objects themselves but rather their associated referents (e.g. proper names and descriptions).

Noun phrases can refer to properties: (1) general: "redness", which is a noun and therefore a noun phrase; (2) specific "that ball's redness" (another noun phrase).

I would say that it is incorrect to say that "'redness' is nothing more than the set of all red objects". It seems a little better to say something like "the set of all red objects implicitly constitute a definition of redness," but that's still not quite right because an object that's not currently red may become red and it might appear different from any previously existing red object.

Answer 2

I don't think so, are nouns sometimes objects? I think they are so they must exist in turn then, since our language permits such. In your example, you described a proper-noun, i see no difference

EDIT: Well, I guess all noun phrases to an extent are eliminable, because there is no coherent truth to the existence of some such objects, like the Unicorn. But the Correspondence truth could be that there are such objects as the Unicorn that do exist, and since ideas have become a part of the definition of a noun, in turn, any idea formulated must exist because someone had thought of it, and ideas exist in the mind.

I think I just contradicted myself, I will finally answer no, all noun phrases are eliminable, in fact, none are.

Answer 3

A noun is a noun word ... with null modifiers. so that you're splitting hairs. the way I see it, "Brighton college" is a noun. "the common yet over-rated Brighton college" is a noun word. No offence to Brighton or Brighton college ... this is in basic terms an get mutually! ... depending on your later addition ... "Brighton college" IS a attractiveness, in basic terms as "David Cockersell" (my call!) is a attractiveness. Names are a subset of nouns, and nouns are a subset of noun words. So "Brighton college" is a attractiveness, a noun and a noun word with null modifiers.

Answer 4

description does not reduce. it amplifies the noun. and no we don't ned objects to do it. a thought is not an object and the word nothing is also not an object, but we can describe it. if i type the word nothing, then it becomes object but if i think nothing it does not.

Answer 5

The answer to this question is that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. It is not in the naming that the rose is given its characteristics.

And try to speak English, ok ArtistFormerlyKnownAs? You don't impress the people who understand what you say, and you don't educate the people who don't understand what you say.

Answer 6

I want what your smoking!

Maybe, if you wanted some one to reply your question you need to make it look like it could be answered !

When did Socrates have anything to do with sentence structure?