What specifically is the basis for Hobbes' morality?

Answer 1

all i know about hobbes is really his social contract theory. i hope thats what you mean. he viewed human beings without the state as existing in a very nasty state of nature in which the only right was the right of force. to escape or avoid this scenario they engaged in a social contract. this hypothetical contract provides the moral justification for the existence of the state - to protect against this anarchic state of nature. as long as the state upholds its end of the bargain (making life better than it would be without the state; not a very difficult task if you have hobbes' opinion about the state of nature) its existence is justified. morality, i think he would say, comes from this contract. the moral demand on the populace is to obey the state (since it protects them) and the moral obligation on the state is to guarantee a relatviely better life than pure anarchy would give.

in two words: social contract.

Answer 2

Um. I doubt that I'll get the best answer on this one... But, anyway, it's mostly intuition with Hobbes. Just look at the specifics and his time period - his responses were visceral.

Answer 3

Uhhh, he's only a stuffed tiger.

Answer 4

ONLY A STUFFED TIGER?ONLY A STUFFED TIGER..I CAN'T BELIEVE YOU SAID THAT..THIS IS THAT SMELLY SUZI ISN'T IT? .

Answer 5

Here's one opinion:
"Metaphysics is the study or theory of reality. Such a discipline concerns questions of what exactly is real. Is reality simply one "thing," or is it many? Is the physical world all there is or is there some "spiritual" or "formal" realm of existence that transcends the physical universe? Whatever the answer is for a particular person probably determines his or her entire philosophical outlook. (4) At this point it must be stated that beliefs about the world (whether they be moral, scientific, or historical) do not necessarily reflect on a person's metaphysical world view. One may say something like:



p1: All Pragmatists believe that moral truth does not reflect reality.

p2: Joe believes that moral truth does not reflect reality.

C: Therefore, Joe is a Pragmatist.



The careful observer will note that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, for it can also be the case that although Joe does believe that truth does not reflect reality, he may be a moral relativist. This particular point is important to the discussion of Hobbes since it seems that there is a consensus as to what Hobbes' particular metaphysical position is. However, the same consensus is immediately abolished when it comes to Hobbes' particular moral position. We must not make the mistake the above illustration exemplifies and suppose that Hobbes' metaphysical speculation necessarily presupposes his position on morality. Indeed, the presence of Hobbes' metaphysics simply gives strength and insight into his general moral world view. Referring to our example above we see that Joe is a moral relativist. Although premise 2 does not necessarily entail the conclusion (since we can at least imagine that Joe could be something other than a pragmatist), we have some degree of probability that since Joe accepts the premise that "moral truth does not reflect reality," then he is some sort of moral non-objectivist that may include pragmatism as a world view (should some additional evidence be included). Similarly, if we can ascertain some idea as to what Hobbes believes metaphysically, then we may assert with some force that his particular ethical system will be somewhat consistent with it or even inferred from it.

So what then is Hobbes' metaphysical position? Hobbes presents us with an explanation as to what human nature really is in his profound work, Leviathan. (5) Although most commentators of Leviathan are comfortable with labeling Hobbes as a materialist (6), I will include some quotations from this particular work in support of this position:



Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art

of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an

Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining whereof

is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines

that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificial

life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and

the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was

intended by the Artificer? (7)




From these Metaphysiques, which are mingled with the Scripture to make Schoole

Divinity, wee are told, there be in the world certaine Essences separated from Bodies,

which they call Abstract Essences, and Substantiall Formes: For the Interpreting of

which Jargon, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place.

Also I ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of Discourse, for applying my

selfe to those that are. The World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates the

Lovers of it Worldly men, but the Universe, that is, the whole masse of all things that

are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely,

Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the

like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which

is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is

no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently no where. (8)



In the two passages above, we see that Hobbes' descriptions of human nature reflect those of a machine. He considers life "but a motion of limbs" and attacks the Platonic and Aristotelian notions of "Substantiall Formes" in favor of a universe that is completely and totally "Corporeall." Consequently, in order for Hobbes to maintain his belief in the Bible, he had to redefine the notions of spirits and incorporeality as metaphors for labels of "honour" and "Incomprehensib[ility]." (9) The picture Hobbes has drawn for us in Leviathan is reminiscent of the French physician and agnostic Julien Offray de La Mettrie, (10) behavioral psychologist B.F. Skinner (11), and contemporary mind-body theorist Paul M. Churchland (12). Materialists, especially Hobbes, conceive of a world devoid of anything beyond the physical. Everything is "matter in motion", something ancient materialists Leucippus and Democritus had asserted. Such a world view has led many to picture the world as one big machine including smaller, organic machines such as animals and human beings. Their interrelation is just a matter of physical interaction existing for a short time on an infinitesimal speck of dust called earth, doomed to perish off the face of the earth into nothingness. Concerning this Hobbes states:



And the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. (13)



Therefore, it seems inescapable to describe Hobbes as anything else but some sort of metaphysical materialist that believes solely in a corporeal universe as the underlying basis of all reality.



II. SELECTED AUTHORS ON THE MORAL SYSTEM OF THOMAS HOBBES

So far it has been demonstrated that Hobbes adheres to a mechanistic world system called materialism. Although this particular conclusion is not universally denounced by Hobbesian commentators, the range of applicability of materialism to the Hobbesian moral system remains to be the object of controversy. In this section, we will observe what others have stated on the subject of Hobbes' moral system and what they consider to be the most viable understanding of Hobbes.

Johann P. Sommerville, Associate Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, seems to indicate that commentators on Hobbes believe that he is some sort of psychological egoist. Dr. Ed L. Miller, an eminent philosopher of history and religion, defines psychological egoism by first commenting on mere egoism as a system that "makes the self the central concern, the beginning and the end of all considerations," (14) and, secondly, defining psychological egoism as "a doctrine about human nature, claiming that everyone by nature pursues primarily his or her own interests." (15) With this in mind, Sommerville makes the following statement:



[Hobbes] is often described as a psychological egoist, and he certainly delighted in

expressing cynical opinions about human nature. (16)



It seems that Sommerville never applies the term "psychological egoist" to his own understanding of Hobbes, but he seems to suggest that "self-preservation is the cornerstone of Hobbes' theory." (17) He truly does not deny the label of "psychological egoist" to Thomas Hobbes and is quite sure that this is a proper understanding of the Hobbesian moral system that all of his subsequent political ideas are predicated on.

In Mary Dietz's compilation of various essays about Thomas Hobbes' political theory, Dietz's introduction seems to make the claim that Hobbes' psychological egoism is somehow inconsistent with the interpretations of A. E. Taylor and Howard Warrender:



In response to the increasingly mechanistic and psychological interpretations of the

day, the so-called Taylor-Warrender Thesis claimed a deontological status for Hobbes'

Theory, quite distinct from, and even incompatible with, his egoistic psychology. (18)



Dietz makes it clear that an "egoistic psychology" exists in the Hobbesian moral structure. Her particular comment here suggests that Taylor and Warrender suppose a morally deontological interpretation of Hobbes despite its incompatibility with "egoistic psychology." Like Taylor and Warrender, we will now consider authors who reject psychological egoism as the proper understanding of Hobbesian morality.

In his commentary on Leviathan, F. S. McNeilly suggests that psychological egoism plays no role in Hobbes' Leviathan. He states:



. . . mechanistic materialism plays no important part in the account of the passions in

Leviathan; and . . . this account is not predominantly egoistic, although an unambiguously

egoistic account is given in other works. (19)



It appears that McNeilly reserves a notion of egoism in the writings of Hobbes, but denies that any explicit or implicit egoistic understanding has any proper place in Leviathan. (20) When McNeilly comments on additional works by Hobbes, he clearly avoids the label of "psychological egoism" in his understanding of the Hobbesian moral point of view. (21)



R. E. Ewin, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Western Australia, makes a more explicit declaration that Hobbes is definitely not a psychological egoist:

Hobbes, apart from being read as a psychological egoist, is often read as espousing some

sort of egoistic moral theory, but this is, in fact, a misreading of him. (22)


Possession of the Hobbesian virtues will, indeed, pay off for those people who have them,

but they are, nevertheless, for the most part other-directed motivations and not egoistic

motivations. (23)



Some commentators have been similarly misled, and therefore they misread Hobbes as

a psychological egoist. (24)



Evident from the above passages, it is clear that Ewin makes no ambiguous position in asserting the non-egoistic nature of the Hobbesian moral scheme.



III. A DEFENSE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AS THE HOBBESIAN MORAL VIEW

We may now answer the anticipated question: "What is the Hobbesian moral system despite controversy over the matter?" For our purposes we should probably emend the question to: "What is the Hobbesian moral system as indicated in Leviathan?" On this question I have two particular contentions. First, there is good evidence to suppose that some form of egoism/hedonism is the more probable moral theory in the Hobbesian world view. Secondly, there is good evidence to suggest that "psychological egoism" is the best label for the Hobbesian moral system supported by Leviathan.

(i) There is good evidence to suppose that some form of egoism/hedonism is the more probable moral theory in the Hobbesian world view. Concerning both contentions that will be defended, this more abstract argument will be advanced first. Basically, the proposition being defended here concerns Hobbes' materialism and that it is best explained if hedonism/egoism can be inferred from it. Philosophers of ethics understand that the metaphysical supposition of materialism almost always precludes any objective moral system. If we consider the nature of materialism as a sort of universal mechanism, then morality is either a human invention or a brute fact of reality. If morality is a human invention, then it will possess features that tend to be artificial and arbitrary. For example, moral relativism denies that morality exists as an objective something. Morality is just an artificial creation of rules that reflect our everyday behavior and have no objective dependence outside of human observance. (25) So it is not proper to speak of morality as somehow rooted in human nature, rather it is a theoretical creation instituted for the purposes of governing respective cultures and societies, whatever they may be. In contrast, morality as a given reality in the world (perhaps as necessary "parts" for our mechanistic universe) demands that it be rooted in human nature. Since it makes no sense to speak of morality as existing externally to human (or perhaps divine) beings, and humans (and perhaps a deity) are the only beings who utilize morality, then it follows that the moral "furniture" is rooted in human (and maybe divine) nature regardless of how the particular morality is defined. (26) This narrows the options of a viable moral system in lieu of a metaphysical materialism. We are left with deontology, hedonism/egoism, and utilitarianism. Deontology can be dismissed as it asserts a "categorical imperative" demanding that morality be universally binding and unequivocally the same for everyone. (27) But Hobbes rejects any universality and similitude of morality. Hobbes makes the following remark:



But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for

his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill. (28)



It is clear from this passage that Hobbes rejects the deontological notion of morality as it is applied universally and similarly among human beings.

But what about utilitarianism? (29) It seems clear from Leviathan that Hobbes denies the utilitarian viewpoint when discussing "Good" and "Evill." He states:



That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions . . . whatsoever a man does

against his Conscience, is Sinne; and it dependeth on the presumption of making

himself judge of Good and Evill. (30)



Fundamental tenets of utilitarianism suggest that good be maximized, not in a single individual alone, but in the greatest number of people affected by the decision. Hobbes makes it clear from this passage that a decision of good or evil relies on the individual human conscience. Utilitarianism suggests a more generalized understanding of what is considered maximally good. (31) That is, the notion of "good" is more socially defined as opposed to Hobbes' which is personally defined.

Therefore, since the other viewpoints consistent with materialism are disconfirmed, then we are left with some sort of hedonism or egoism as more probable alternatives. Given Hobbes' materialism and the preclusion of certain ethical theories, then it follows logically and inescapably that Hobbes is some sort of hedonist/egoist. This argument can be reconstructed as follows:



p1: If Hobbes is a materialist, then he is either a deontologist, utilitarian, or a hedonist/egoist.

p2: Hobbes is a materialist.

p3: Hobbes cannot be a deontologist or a utilitarian.

C: Therefore, Hobbes is a hedonist/egoist.


(ii) There is good evidence to suggest that "psychological egoism" is the best label for the Hobbesian moral system supported by Leviathan. It appears to be evident from Leviathan that Hobbes describes the moral state of nature in man as egoistic. As mentioned before, passages from Leviathan appear to vindicate this particular conviction. However, objectors to this label for Hobbes insist that this is not the case. First, recall the passages where Hobbes describes moral decision-making in the context of human passions:



But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for

his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill . . . (32)



That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions . . . whatsoever a man does

against his Conscience, is Sinne; and it dependeth on the presumption of making

himself judge of Good and Evill. (33)



Concerning the understanding of psychological egoism here, R. E. Ewin notes that "this is Hobbes's account of the way in which value terms will operate in our natural condition, and Hobbes is quite clear that this is a bad condition in which to be." (34) That is, although Hobbes admits the presence of psychological egoism in the context of the sinister state of nature, it is not clear that such an egoism is preferable as a meta-ethical belief. (35) However, if psychological egoism is rooted in human nature, and human nature is unalterable, then it follows that psychological egoism is not a chosen moral system by human beings. So, psychological egoism becomes the default moral position. But is Ewin suggesting that humans exercise the initiative to change such a system if it is wrong? Well, to ask the question is to pose a moral standard and, consequently, to beg the question. After all, it cannot be true that Hobbes' moral decision-making, being rooted in human passions, is anything but the standard by which one can say that psychological egoism is wrong. If I judge moral actions by my appetites and aversions and if Ewin is correct about his speculation, then it must be the case that human beings will eventually desire to adopt a different moral system. But regardless of whatever moral system is instituted, psychological egoism remains to be the foundation of it and makes the "new" ethic one that is adopted out of desire. Therefore, Ewin's concern poses no threat to the existence of psychological egoism as the best label for the Hobbesian moral system.

University of California Professor Gregory Kavka, someone who would rank himself as one who denied the "psychological egoism" label as the best label for Hobbes' moral system, contends that anyone who supports such a label for Hobbes' moral system fails to consider the reading of "something good to the agent" as "something regarded as good by the agent, something he would call 'good.'" (36) Essentially, Kavka is suggesting that one may be a non-egoist and still assert a personal reflection as to what he or she may consider good, whether it be in the deontological or teleological sense. But this particular explanation is considerably weak, for Hobbes is not suggesting that "good" be the type of label fitting for one's moral theory. Instead, Hobbes gives a cause or a source of moral decision-making. It is not that human beings express what is "good" based on their previously adopted moral system, it is that human beings base their moral system off of what is considered desirable. The good-desire correlation tends to have a symbiotic relationship. Besides, how does Kavka expect us to understand a non-egoistic rendering of a statement that validates moral judgment on the basis of a private conscience? The moral system utilized by human beings is self-contained in the human conscience and observes only those inclinations as dictated by that agent's passions.

Therefore, it seems that based on the Leviathan passages, the term "psychological egoism" is the best label of the Hobessian moral system. Likewise, Ewin and Kavka have unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade me from an egoistic understanding of Hobbes.



CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued that "psychological egoism" is the best interpretation of the Hobbesian moral view. This conclusion was derived by first establishing the metaphysical world view of Hobbes. Based on this world view (particularly materialism), the contention that some form of hedonism/egoism follows was defended. My second reason for concluding "psychological egoism" as the best label for the Hobbesian moral view was based on the contention that Leviathan best supports it. The objections to the contrary are disregarded as arguments of little strength."


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