why did japan bomb pearl harbour?

Answer 1

Why Pearl Harbor Was Attacked

According to President Franklin Roosevelt December 7th, 1941 was “a date which will live in infamy.” This was the date that the Japanese made their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This was the definitive beginning of the United States’ involvement in World War II. Why did the Japanese attack? Who was at fault for negotiations gone sour? Who’s to blame? Could the attack have been avoided? Could the Pacific War been avoided? All of these questions have been examined throughout the time that has passed since that day in 1941. There have been many different interpretations of the answers for these questions. Some historians, such as George Morgenstern, would argue that the Japanese attack was a result of U.S. sanctions against Japan. Others, such as Harry Wray, argue that there would have been no sanctions had the Japanese discontinued their expansionist activities and their fight with China. There are others, such as Gary Dean Best and Jonathan Utley, who say that even though there were sanctions and there were expansionist activities that it still could have been avoided if President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, or any of a number of other men had acted differently. There are those, such as John Emmerson and Hosoya Chihiro, who blame one country over another, one country’s nationalist or military groups over the other, or that one country was serving as the example for the other. The reasons and causes of the attack and eventual Pacific War have been explained and interpreted in many different, sometimes contradicting, ways.

George Morgenstern is one of the historians who says that the attacks were more of a result of the U.S. sanctions against Japan and that those sanctions, in the years right before the war, that led to the increasing tensions between the two nations. He points out a series of events, mostly actions by the United States in response to Japanese attacks on China, Indo-China, and other area colonies and nations, which led to the war. Morgenstern argues that there was the perception in the minds of some of the Japanese that the U.S. only wished to preserve “White empires”, not wishing that Japan try to create an empire of its own. The U.S. enacted one of a number of embargos, the oil and steel embargo as a result of both Japan’s expansion to then unprotected nearby islands and Japan’s war with China. The Japanese were told that in order for the embargo to be stopped the Japanese must get out of Indo-China, China, their pact with Germany and Italy, and “accept equality and no more in the trade of the Far East.”[1]This would basically force Japan to give up what it had gained along with its goals of becoming a great nation. Some of the events that, he notes, probably led to the Japanese decision to attack the U.S. were when President Roosevelt gave money to China for currency stabilization, embargoed the exports of scrap iron and steel to all nations except Britain and “nations of the Western Hemisphere” (which the Japanese deemed an “unfriendly act” and that “further trade restrictions would make relations between the two countries unpredictable”), a second loan to China, material aid to China and Britain, the American military being sent to China, and the freezing of Japanese assets and ending of trade relations with the U.S. and Great Britain after Japan’s occupation of Indo-China.[2] Morgenstern argues that these actions on the part of the U.S. would have led the Japanese to war because of the economic strangulation of the embargoes.

While Morgenstern states they seemingly had to fight, he also mentions the fact that not all the Japanese were united in the war against China. He states that a conflict between the war party and the peace part existed, but rather than aid the peace party, the United States chose to ignore this fact and impose their sanctions instead.[3] Morgenstern also argues that had the United States chosen to support the peace party in Japan, that it was possible to have made an ally out of Japan rather than an enemy and war could have been prevented; howver, our actions played right into the hands of the war party.[4] Morgenstern also mentions peace proposals made by the Japanese which the United States refused to consider unless the Japanese would first release any territory they were occupying in the south west Pacific and get out of Indo-China.[5]

Morgenstern argues that all of these actions by the U.S., the sanctions, assistance to China, ignoring the peace party, refusal to negotiate the peace proposals, and the inflexibility of those in charge in the U.S. may have led the Japanese to really have no other options than to attack and they may have chosen that particular time to attack because of their tripartite pact with Germany and Italy. They may have believed they would get support in the event of the U.S. retaliation. To sum up Morgenstern’s arguments, he argues the U.S. in many ways left the Japanese with no choice other than war by refusing to negotiate with them with regards to sanctions or military events.[6]

Unlike Morgenstern, Harry Wray argues that the problems between the U.S. and Japan cannot simply be traced back thru that decade or the decade before. Wray states that the problems between the U.S. and Japan that resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War go back to the turn of the century when there was “power politics, aggressive nationalism, and western colonialism.”[7] Wray argues that the Japanese were simply trying to emulate the actions of their western counterparts by acquiring territories in Asia. In addition to this Wray argues that with their new expansionist efforts they also gained new paranoia with every new territorial acquisition just as other nations did.[8] Wray also states the Japanese realization both that the western nations didn’t approve of their attempted expansion and that International Law was not as important as power, and that power was justification for whatever actions, after they were forced to give back certain territory.[9] Wray also argues that the Japanese militarist and nationalist groups were able to use these two things, the paranoia and the western nations forcing them to give back territory, to fuel their theory of encirclement, believing that Japan was encircled and persecuted by the western powers and that it must beat this by expansion.[10] Also to define the conflict between the U.S. and Japan Wray says that

Japan was determined “to achieve autonomy” and to solve the China question in her own way. The United States was just as determined to contain Japan, to uphold its historic Open Door policy in China, and to check the Japanese by economic actions in concert with its allies. War was imminent.[11]

His argument is that with both nations inflexibility in their plans for the other, there was no way to avoid war or the attack, and that this is why the attack happened.

John Emmerson argues that each of the two nations misjudged each other. The Americans underestimated Japan’s strength and determination and Japan underestimated the United States’ ability to strike back after the attack on Pearl Harbor.[12] He also points out that we wanted Japan to conform to our ideals, however, Japan wouldn’t and in the end forced us to fight.

However Chihiro also argues that there were miscalculations, however he notes the miscalculations when trying to deter the Japanese from war. Chihiro points out the United States’ lack of understanding of the Japanese psychology as one of the main reason why our actions lead to war. He argues that the United States, when trying to deter Japanese expansionism by imposing an embargo on them, didn’t realize the results of this embargo would be more extreme.[13] Chihiro stresses the importance of the United States misunderstanding of the Japanese mindset as the larger issue in why the Japanese attacked.

Rather than blame miscalculations or certain events, Jonathan Utley wants to place blame on Secretary of State Hull. While he points out that Hull did try to resolve the “Japan problem”, his policy for it, though it worked for the first two years of the Sino-Japanese war, it stopped working with the changing conditions. Throughout these changes Hull refused to adapt his plan to fit the changes. Utley argues that “his failure should be attributed not to idealism or weakness but to his determination that Japanese-American differences be resolved rather than papered over.”[14] Utley identifies the inflexibility of Hull in his stance to resolve the issue as leading to weaker relations and eventually to the Japanese attack.

However, unlike Utley’s placing the blame on Hull, Gary Dean Best wants to place more blame on President Roosevelt, rather than allowing for the blame of his subordinates, his cabinet members, whom Roosevelt himself chose. Best argues that Roosevelt surrounded himself with people that he believed to be not of “equal or greater stature” than himself and so surrounded himself with those who would not ordinarily have been considered and lacked experience.[15] The members or the cabinet quickly learned that they should agree with the president and his diplomatic ideals, which in some cases may have been mistakes.[16] Best argues the point of Roosevelt’s involvement in the conflict and the importance of it, rather than focus on his cabinet and Secretary of State Hull.

All of these historians have different perspectives; some are radically different than the other. However, it seems that all of them tend to place more of the blame on the United States and the actions of those in power in the country rather than placing the blame on Japan. It seems while they say that ultimately Japan made the decision to attack, most of them point to the actions of the United States as forcing them to make that decision, of backing them into that corner. However, each historian has their own perspective, ranging from the blaming of one country, miscalculations or one person who they think is largely responsible for the war.

Answer 2

To win the war America was a threat to Japan even though the countries was going though a peace talk at the time Japan was scared and hit first given a supprise to pearl harbour but the allies won the war anyway

Answer 3

The goal of this attack was to sufficiently cripple the US Fleet so that Japan could then attack and capture the Phillipines and Indo-China and so secure access to the raw materials needed to maintain its position as a global military and economic power. This would enable Japan to further extend the empire to include Australia, New Zealand, and India (the ultimate boundaries planned for the so-called "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere"). The prevailing belief within the Japanese military and political establishment was that eventually, with the then expected German defeat of Great Britain and Soviet Russia, the United States' non-involvement in the European war, and Japan's control of the Pacific, that the world power structure would stabilize into three major spheres of influence:
1.) The Empire of Japan controlling East, Southeast, and South Asia and the entire Pacific Ocean.

2.) The combined powers of Germany and Italy controlling Great Britain, all of Europe, Western and central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

3.) The United States, controlling North and South America.

Answer 4

To take control of the South East Asia. By crippling the US fleet Japan can capture the Philippines and Indo-China so Japan can secure access to the raw materials needed to maintain it's position as a global and military power in the world. Japan has very little natural resources and of course it's better to take what you don't have from countries that have the material then send envoys to try and talk things over about developing a trade pact between other countries.www.ccdemo.info/PearlHarbor/PearlHarborDayRemembered.html

Answer 5

Why did Japan bomb Pearl Harbor? Their are some motives, however the main considerable reason is to cripple and stop the US from getting into the conflict it became fake effect on the US reaction. Why Japan does not have it own components? It does, yet Japan is a team of islands with limited land to apply for farming and different organic components. How did the Lend lease Act convey US into WW2? It made the US deliver supplies and mandatory supplies to those international locations interior the conflict, interior the top this made Germany desperate to objective US provider provider ships and ships donning US passengers yet not on US Ships which made them desperate to connect the combat and end their neutrality.

Answer 6

japan had a clear ambition of conquering the whole of pacific, and the americans were the only one who could stop them.

Answer 7

it was a surprise strategic attack to destroy the US fleet in the Pacific and to take early advantage in the war.

Answer 8

Because their fleet was in the neighbourhood, and the pilots were board...

Answer 9

The Nazi's told them that America was preparing to attack them - it may have been a lie, who knows...

Answer 10

To try and destroy the American Ships

Answer 11

because they are Japan.