If the Arab-Israeli conflict was placed in front of a court in whose favor you think that would be?

Question

Speaking about justice, if this whole Arab-Israeli conflict, from 1948 until today, was placed in front of an international court of "real" low, then carrying out, by means of force if necessary, what ever decision it takes; in whose favor you think that would be?

Answer 1

can u be the judge 4 a minute and tell me... a country occupying another country and killing its citizens.. what do u think!

Answer 2

The carving up of the middle east by the major nations at the end of WWII must be on of the largest mistakes ever made. Without consideration for the population mix lines were drawn on a map and countries were formed. Israel was a country before the Arabs settled into countries. The claims of the Arabs to what is now Israel comes from later conquest of the depleted Israeli nation. Trying to decide who is really right now is like picking the squarest grain of sand in an hourglass. Terrorism is never popular but often those who make up the terrorist group think they are right. The mess in Iraq, India, Pakistan and Israel are part of the same mistake.

Answer 3

Going on just pure legal principles, Israel wins hands down on all counts.

The land Israel originally received was purchased for it by the UN. Surrounding countries where unhappy when they found out the land was going to be given to Israel, but they never put any covenants or restrictions in the deeds to say it couldn't be. Clear title and proper conveyances.

Then there's the land Israel has occupied, by claiming it after various wars, same as countries have been doing for thousands of years. This constitutes encroachment, and acquisition through adverse possession, because Israel has held it for long enough to clear title.

As far as military actions, Israel was never the initial aggressor. Israel has always been fighting under the equivalent of the self-defense doctrine. Generally (I can't think of many exceptions), Israel has also responded with the same type and level of force as their attackers, which is part of the requirement for self-defense.

If Israel's history were judged under common law principles, it would win on all counts. Too bad most of the world doesn't actually care about what's legal.

Answer 4

Usually the winning side of any war is given a pass on anything they did that was wrong. Individuals may be punished but not a government. If the conflict is stopped by the UN both sides would probably face sanctions. Neither side has operated with tact or regard for human life not voluntarily engaged in fighting(civilians). Technically speaking, one side is not protected by the Geneva convention and the other side violates it.

Answer 5

By the time the court reaches a decision both of the nations would most probably have ceased to exist

Answer 6

Sadly, the court would rule in favor of the arabs. Most of the world hates Israel and hates Jews and can not be impartial in their ruling.

Answer 7

Israel would win 100%. they have a right to peacefully exist with out being persecuted for their beliefs. when Lebanon captured the soldiers they should have returned them. because they didn't Israel is defending them

Answer 8

there are many millions of Israeli sympathizers and very few Arab supporters.

If its a popularity contest reather then justice, Arab would lose.

Answer 9

Shukri al-Quwwatli’s war policy during the conflict in Palestine was a disaster both for his presidency and for democracy in Syria. Indeed, the two had become intimately intertwined. In retrospect, it is easy to argue that Syria should never have pushed for war in Palestine. Had Syria not acted as the whip in the Arab League driving the others toward war, the United Nation’s partition plan might well have been carried out; and Israelis would have lived in a much smaller country. After all, who can deny that the Palestinians would have been better off had the Arab League not entered the conflict? King Abdullah was determined to work out a peaceful partition with the Jews, and the British were ready to oversee it.

Most popular accounts of the conflict give two principle reasons for why the Arabs went to war. First, the Arab people considered the partition plan to be highway robbery; it gave over 50 percent of Palestine to the Jews, although they constituted but a third of the population and owned a mere seven percent of the land. No Arab leader, the argument goes, could have accepted such a deal without being lynched.[1] Second, Arab governments believed they were stronger than the Jews and calculated that they could overwhelm the inconsequential Zionist forces and “push them into the sea.” Although the first argument is sound, the second is myth. The Arab leaders all hoped to avoid war, which promised few benefits and many dangers. We now know that early military assessments by the Arab League and individual states of their ability to defeat Zionist forces in the impending conflict were unanimous in warning of the superiority of the Zionist military, which outnumbered the Arab forces at every stage of the war.[2] Certainly, the Syrian leadership was painfully aware of the weakness of the Syrian army and had little or no faith in the ability of the “Arab leaders” to cooperate effectively against the Jews or win the war in Palestine.



This begs the question then of why President Quwwatli and Prime Minister Jamil Mardam were so adamant about opposing partition and pushing for war. Indeed, Syria’s role in shepherding the reluctant Egypt and Saudi Arabia toward war is little appreciated. Of all the Arab states, Syria was the most adamant about the need to go to war. Indeed, it was the first in and the last out of the war and, thus, bears much responsibility for the extent of the nakba or disaster that befell the Palestinians as a result. So why would Syria encourage the Arab world to go to war in Palestine even as it prepared for defeat?



In short, President Shukri al-Quwwatli went to war not for pan-Arab notions of unity or brotherhood, but to prevent that very same spirit from undermining Syria’s independence. He hoped to block King Abdullah from carrying out his Greater Syria unity scheme. During the first years of independence, Quwwatli lived in constant fear that King Abdullah would invade Syria to unify the central Syrian lands which had been divided by the European powers at the end of World War One. The instability and general border rearrangements brought about by the UN’s decision to partition Palestine, Quwwatli understood, presented the Jordanian monarch with his best opportunity to realize his dream of Greater Syria, first by expanding his kingdom over the Arab portions of Palestine and then by striking north at Damascus itself. Throughout the conflict, President Quwwatli’s main concern was to halt Hashemite plans to rule the Levant. First and foremost, he had to stop the Jordanian monarch from acquiring the eastern half of Palestine, only then could he concern himself with the emergence of a Jewish state in the western half.



From the outset of the war, the primary concern of the Arab states was the inter-Arab conflict and the balance of power in the region.[3] In this respect it is useful to view the 1948 war primarily as an inter-Arab struggle or an Arab civil war, and only secondarily as a war against Zionism and the Jews.[4] The widespread public desire for Arab unity threatened weaker governments and rulers, such as Syria’s, by de-legitimizing them and pitting them against other Arab rulers in the desperate scramble for leadership of the nationalist movement that all hoped to master.






Quwwatli, Shukri al- (1892-1967, also spelled Quwatli and Kuwatli), Syrian statesman and first President of independent Syria. He was born in Damascus, schooled in Istanbul, and joined an Arab nationalist secret society during WWI. During the Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927, he raised money in Egypt and emerged as an opponent of the revolt leaders Sultan Pasha al-Atrash and Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar because of their pro-Hashemite politics. He was a founding member of the National Bloc, which emerged after the collapse of the revolt as the main party opposing the French occupation while Atrash and Shahbandar languished in exile. He became the leader of the National Bloc in 1940, following the assassination of Shahbandar, who was making a come back in Syria politics once pardoned by the French in 1937. Several top leaders of the Bloc were implicated in his assassination and fled to Iraq, leaving Quwwatli in charge.

He was elected President in 1943 and worked to liberate Syria from the French, who evacuated Syria in April 1946. In 1949, he was overthrown by a military coup led by Husni al-Zaim, who had Quwwatli imprisoned for a short period before he was allowed to go into exile in Egypt. After a series of military coups, free elections were once again held in Syria, and Quwwatli was elected President again in 1955. In February 1958, he signed the Union Pact with Egypt to establish the United Arab Republic with Gamal Abdel Nasser as president. He died in Beirut, Lebanon on June 30, 1967.


The Initial Desire to Avoid War

The Arab leaders wished they could defeat the Zionists and preserve Palestine for the Arabs; nevertheless, few believed it was possible. From 1946 on, every Syrian newspaper and parliamentary block warned that the country would have to go to war and demanded that the government arm the country and prepare to save Palestine. The President and his ministers closed their ears to the uproar that surrounded them. They were too busy trying to establish a measure of internal order and stability to worry about Palestine. Just keeping their governments in office for more than six months at a stretch taxed every ounce of their political skill and cunning. Moreover, Quwwatli refused to strengthen his army because he feared the disloyalty of its officers and the possibility of a coup. Instead he kept it small and scattered in rural barracks far from Damascus where it could do the least harm; its top officers were kept under constant surveillance. When it entered Palestine on 15 May 1948, the Syrian army had only 10,000 officers and men and was unequipped to fight a war, which is the most telling indication that Quwwatli did not want and was not prepared to fight a war.



President Quwwatli and the leaders of his government decided as early as 1946 that Syria could not save Palestine. `Adil Arslan, an intimate of the President who represented Syria at the UN during 1948 and who sought to become minister of defense during the war, was a keen observer of Syria’s lack of preparation. He records in his diary that Syria's leaders were caught in a dream when it came to Palestine – a dream that he labored in vain to wake them from. In December 1946, Arslan warned the President that Syria needed to begin buying arms and to vigorously oppose President Truman's campaign rhetoric in favor of allowing more Jewish immigrants into Palestine. The American president effectively hijacked British policy in Palestine during his presidential campaign by promising to send 100,000 Jewish European displaced persons to Britain’s mandate as soon as he came to power. This reversed Britain’s policy of restricting Jewish immigration to 15,000 a year and undermined the 1939 White Paper which had promised a unitary state in Palestine. Arslan wrote:



We brought up the situation in Palestine during a meeting with the President of the Republic, and we said that the policy of silence that we were adhering to over the American entrance into the situation is encouraging President Truman in his belief that he can grant Palestine to the Jews. Prime Minister Sa`dallah Bayk defended the policy of silence, and the President of the Republic said: `The Americans and the English refused to sell us arms or to help us to reorganize our army." I said: `Their refusal will continue so long as we don't open negotiations with others, such as the Russians, Czechs, or Irish.' He said, `No, we would only gain the enmity of the British.' They were not convinced and both agreed that the rescue of Palestine at this time was impossible. `Izzat Darwaza agreed with them because he believes that the Egyptians, once they get full independence, will be able to save Palestine. I became very sad about a people who delude themselves with such dreams. When Syria was not independent it cared much more about Palestine. The same will also be true for Egypt.[5]



Arslan’s concerns were well placed. Although Syria had won complete independence, its leaders were still under the thrall of European power. If Syria went to the Soviet Union or other anti-British power for arms, the President argued, Britain would unleash the Hashemites, giving Jordan the green light to take Syria. Rather than admit Syria’s powerlessness to the public or prepare Syrians to accept the partition of Palestine, however, Syrian leaders hid behind pronouncements of Arabism and victory. Most never believed they would be called to account for their rhetoric because they convinced themselves that Britain would never actually give up Palestine, or that Egypt would be able to defend it, some even believed that world opinion or a shared sense of human justice would somehow prevent the worst from happening. A few, like Faris al-Khuri, the Christian President of the Parliament, were bold enough to advance the idea that Syria accept the partition Palestine as the best and only viable solution.[6] But they were quickly silenced.



Syria’s leaders kept their heads buried in the sand until September 1947. Arslan, at the beginning of that month continued to lament the President's inaction on Palestine. He writes:



Poor Palestine: No matter what I say about defending it, my heart remains a turbulent volcano because I cannot convince anyone of importance in my country or in the rest of the Arab countries that it needs anything more than words.... Because we have a small and ill-equipped army, we cannot stand up to the Zionist forces if they should suddenly decide to launch a strike at Damascus. We would be reduced to gathering together the Bedouin tribes to fight against them.[7]

Israel is corrupt and would lose