Battle of Marathon
The Battle of Marathon (490 BC) was the culmination of King Darius I of Persia's first major attempt to conquer the remainder of the Greeks and add them to the Persian Empire, thereby securing the weakest portion of his Western border.
Background
Hippias, tyrant of Athens, had been expelled in 510 BC by his people, with the assistance of Cleomenes I, King of Sparta. He fled to the court of Darius to seek assistance.
With the failure of the Ionian Revolt (499 BC - 494 BC), Darius was intent on subjugating the Greeks and punishing them for their part in the revolt. In 492 BC Darius dispatched an army under his son-in-law, Mardonius. This army reduced Thrace and compelled Alexander I of Macedon to submit again to Persia. However, in attempting to advance into Greece much of the fleet was wrecked in a storm and Mardonius was forced to retreat to Asia.
Darius learned through Hippias that the Alcmaeonidae, a powerful Athenian family, were opposed to Miltiades and ready to help reinstate Hippias. They were also ready to bow to Persian demands in exchange for being excused for their role in the Ionian Revolt. Darius wished to take advantage of this situation to take Athens, which would isolate Sparta and hand him the remainder of the Greeks. In order for the Athenians to revolt, two things would need to happen: the populace would need encouragement to revolt, and the Athenian army would have to leave Athens.
In order to accomplish the first, Darius planned to take Eretria, which would offer little resistance, and whose fall would terrify the Athenians. To accomplish the second, Darius's army, now led by Artaphernes, son of a satrap of Sardis, and Datis, a Median admiral (Mardonius had been injured in the prior attack), was dispatched in early September 490 BC to land at the Bay of Marathon and threaten an overland attack towards Athens. This army probably numbered at most 25,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, since it was transported entirely by sea.
The Persian transports, escorted by the fleet, sailed from Samos to Naxos and reached Carystus on the south coast of Euboea. From there they sailed up the Euboean channel to Eretria, where their aims became clear to the Greeks.
The Eretrians sent an urgent message to Athens for help. The Athenians agreed, but realized they needed more help. They sent a courier to the Spartans and probably a messenger to the Plataeans. The courier arrived in Sparta on September 9, and the Spartans agreed to help, but pointed out that they could not go to war until the Carneian festival ended on the full moon of September 19-20.
Artaphernes took part of the Persian army and laid siege to Eretria. The remainder of the army crossed with Datis and landed in the Bay of Marathon. The Athenian army, numbering 9,000-10,000, under Callimachus the polemarch and accompanied by his ten tribal generals marched north from Athens. When Callimachus heard that the Persians had landed in the Bay of Marathon, he wheeled right and reached the valley of Avlona and encamped his army at the shrine of Heracles. One thousand Plataeans joined him there.
Since it was obvious from the Persians' disposition that they did not intend to march to Athens, the Athenians waited for the Spartans. For eight days the armies peacefully confronted each other.
Battle
On the ninth day it became known to the Athenians that Eretria had fallen by treachery. This meant that Artaphernes was now free to move, and might attack Athens. On September 21, the Athenian army went out to face the Persians. This was probably a combined decision by the generals, although Herodotus reports that they were rotating days of command and that Miltiades was in charge at this point, since he had a large part in persuading the others to do so. According to Herodotus, five Strategoi voted for the move and five voted against it, with Callimachus, the Polemarch, casting the deciding vote in favor of attack.
Since the bulk of Persian infantry were archers, the Greek plan was to advance in formation until they reached the limit of the archer's effectiveness, the "beaten zone," or roughly 200 yards, then advance in double time to close ranks quickly and bring their heavy infantry into play. This meant that they would almost certainly end up fighting in disordered ranks, but this was preferable to giving the Persian archers more time. The Greek center was reduced to possibly four ranks, from the normal eight, in order to extend the line and prevent the Persian line from overlapping the Greeks. The wings maintained their eight ranks.
The Greek heavy infantryman, or hoplite, was much more heavily armored than the Persian troops and the pike the Greeks carried gave them greater range than the short spears and swords of the Persian foot soldier. The Persian advantage came from the bow that most of them carried (the advantage was partially cancelled by the superiority of Greek armor and numbers).
As the Greeks advanced, their wings drew ahead of the center, which was under heavy fire from the archers. As they closed some Persians broke through the resulting gaps and drove the center back in rout. The Greek retreat in the center, besides pulling the Persians in, also brought the Greek wings inwards, shortening the Greek line. The inadvertent result was a double envelopment, and the battle ended when the whole Persian army, crowded into confusion, broke back in panic towards their ships and were pursued by the Greeks.
Herodotus records that 6,400 Persians died for the loss of approximately 192 Athenians.
Aftermath
As soon as Datis had put to sea, the Athenians marched to Athens. They arrived in time to prevent Artaphernes from securing a landing. Seeing his opportunity lost, Artaphernes set about and returned to Asia. The Spartans arrived afterwards, toured the battlefield at Marathon, and agreed that the Athenians had won a great victory.
The Greek upset of the Persians, who had not been defeated on land for many decades, caused great problems for the Persians. Seeing that the Persians were not invincible, many peoples subject to their rule rose up following the defeat of their overlords at Marathon and order was not restored for several years.
The common enemy of Persia helped provide some solidarity to the disunited Greek city-states. The victory helped solidify the view that Greeks were "civilized" and Asians were merely "Barbarians."
Conclusion
Marathon was in no sense a decisive victory over the Persians. However, it was the first time the Greeks had bested the Persians on land, and "their victory endowed the Greeks with a faith in their destiny which was to endure for three centuries, during which western culture was born." (J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World.) In this Fuller echoes John Stuart Mill's famous opinion that the Battle of Marathon was more important an event for British history than the Battle of Hastings.
According to the Greek historian Herodotus, who was born in the year of the battle, an Athenian soldier named Pheidippides ran from Athens to Sparta to ask for assistance. This event was later turned into the popular legend that Pheidippides ran from Marathon to Athens. The International Olympic Committee estimates the distance from the Marathon battlefield to Athens as 34.5 km (21.4 miles). There is no historical evidence for this popular version of the legend, which first appears in Plutarch's On the Glory of Athens in the 1st century AD. The story became the basis for the modern marathon athletics event. The race is run over a distance of 42.195 km (26.2 miles).
External links
Discovery article about Marathon date controversy and Pheidippides' death
General article
2006-06-28 09:27:03
·
answer #1
·
answered by englands.glory 4
·
0⤊
1⤋
Firstly from the Persian perspective the campaign was more or less a success many of Greek Island gave "Earth and Water"hdt. as sign of submission previously as had Athens. It is True the Ionian revolt had razed Sardis which the Persian slowly responded too and through great management skills corrected the problem that caused the revolt.
The purpose of the campaign appears first to punish the cities that revolted and hopefully bring them into line, secondly to secure a submission. The initial strike by Persia with the razing of Eretria shows that their intention is not to conquer the region by force. Indeed the force was not large enough too acomplish this aim. It is a curious move by Sparta, I would like to propose why the Spartans did not move. It had been noted that the Karneia and religious observance, but one must realise that Kleomenes had previously pushed for the return of Hippias hdt. but the idea was reversed by the league allies and his co-king (demaratus?) whom he later exiled. It seems that while Sparta was religiously fanatic, they were more interested in how events would unfold though carries as much weight as Korinth "Because the Heroes and Gods disallow it" Thukydides and their excuse not to sign the peace of Nikias.The Kleomenes faction (herodotus gives a scathing report of him but he was a man of great following in Sparta) didnt seem to care about Athens. Their appearance later seems to be for show and to study the Medes (In hdt. Medes and Persians are the same). The loss by Persia was anything but a failure, they had razed Eretria (no attempt to occupy Euboea), they had control of the Greek Islands and they successfully quashed the Ionian revolt and more importantly fixed the prolem that caused it. They failed to raze Athens (they will do that later) but overall secured peace. Persia was huge, the impact on Persia came as a surprise but not a devastating one. As for problems in Persia, with the exception of Egypt and Bactria, the Empire was still very stable. What had been a great victory for Athens is a minor setback for Persia, I would like to note that the direct aftermath the Pelopennesian league was still the unifying force in Greece and had been for some time prior to Marathon, and when Xerses did invade it was this league that lead Greece, with a couple of add ons eg Athens. I agree with the above analyse of battle but diverge on the facts slightly also the aftermath.
Lastly on Herodotus. Hdt. gives a scathing account of Kleomenes its true, he is also a pro-athenian writer. hdt. job is to boost Athens and Greece while trying to 'destroy' anti- athenians (eg Kleomenes, Persia) when a objective approach is taken the facts spell a different picture. Im afraid it seems I disagree with both Mills and Fuller analysis (personally Im not Pro- Mill anyway) that do not encompass political reality at the time. Though Fuller is right the battle is a inspiration and more so later on, the victory for the moment is solely Athenian.
2006-06-28 17:04:02
·
answer #3
·
answered by tissapharnes 3
·
0⤊
0⤋